Corte di giustizia UE n. 91/2014

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) 27 February 2014 ( * ) (Appeal – Dumping – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 384/96 – Second subparagraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(7)(c) – Imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in China – Market economy treatment – Time-limit for adoption of the related decision exceeded – Effect) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑601/12 P, APPEAL under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 20 December 2012, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Ltd, established in Zhouhan (China), represented by F. Graafsma and J. Cornelis, advocaten, applicant, the other parties to the proceedings being: [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], represented by J.-P. Hix and S. Boelaert, acting as Agents, assisted by G. Berrisch, Rechtsanwalt, defendant at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA], represented by M. França and T. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], acting as Agents, with an address for service in [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] AISBL (EIFI), established in Brussels (Belgium), represented by J. Bourgeois, avocat, interveners at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), composed of J.L. da [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (Rapporteur), President of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], G. Arestis and A. Arabadjiev, Judges, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: Y. Bot, Registrar: A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], having regard to the written procedure, having decided, after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], to proceed to judgment without an Opinion, gives the following [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1 By its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Ltd seeks the setting aside of the judgment of 10 October 2012 in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑150/09 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (‘the judgment under appeal’) by which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed its action for annulment of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 91/2009 of 26 January 2009 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of China (OJ 2009 L 29, p. 1; ‘the contested regulation’) in so far as that regulation imposes a definitive anti-dumping duty on that company. Legal context 2 At the material time, the application of anti-dumping measures by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was governed by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (OJ 1996 L 56, p. 1), as last amended by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 2117/2005 of 21 December 2005 (OJ 2005 L 340, p. 17) (‘the basic regulation’). 3 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(7)(a) of the basic regulation laid down a special rule on the method to be used for determining the ‘normal value’ for imports from non‑market economy countries. 4 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(7)(b) of the basic regulation provided that the general rules laid down in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(1) to (6) were to apply to certain countries, including the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of China, if it was shown on the basis of claims by one or more producers subject to an investigation that market economy conditions prevailed for that producer or those producers. 5 The criteria and procedures for determining whether that was the case were set out in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(7)(c) of the basic regulation, under which: ‘A claim under subparagraph (b) must be made in writing and contain sufficient evidence that the producer operates under market economy conditions, that is if: –      decisions of firms regarding prices, costs and inputs, including for instance raw materials, cost of technology and labour, output, sales and investment, are made in response to market signals reflecting supply and demand, and without significant State interference in this regard, and costs of major inputs substantially reflect market values, … A determination whether the producer meets the abovementioned criteria shall be made within three months of the initiation of the investigation, after specific consultation of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and after the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] industry has been given an opportunity to comment. This determination shall remain in force throughout the investigation.’ Background to the dispute and the contested regulation 6 The appellant – [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Ltd – is a company governed by Chinese law which produces and exports iron and steel fasteners to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 7 On 9 November 2007, following a complaint lodged on 26 September 2007 by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] AISBL (EIFI), the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] published a Notice of initiation of an anti‑dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of China (OJ 2007 C 267, p. 31). 8 On 3 December 2007, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submitted a claim for market economy treatment (‘MET’). 9 Between early December 2007 and August 2008, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] sent [OSCURATO:PERSONA] various requests for information and for additional clarification – to which that company submitted replies – in connection with its MET claim. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] also undertook a verification visit at [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’ premises and carried out inspections at the premises of producers in an analogue country – namely, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(7)(a) of the basic regulation. 10 On 30 April 2008, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] sent [OSCURATO:PERSONA] an information document on the MET, setting out the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had concluded that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not meet the criteria allowing it to receive MET. 11 In the final information document sent on 3 November 2008, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] told [OSCURATO:PERSONA] that it intended to propose to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] that a definitive anti‑dumping duty be imposed on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in China. 12 On 26 January 2009, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] adopted the contested regulation. 13 With regard to [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’ MET claim, recital 63 and recitals 66 to 68 of that regulation are worded as follows: ‘(63)      [[OSCURATO:PERSONA] was] denied MET on the grounds that the costs of the major input, steel wire rod, did not substantially reflect market values, as required by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(7)(c) of the basic regulation. It was found that the prices of steel wire rod, or in some cases, drawn steel wire, charged on the Chinese market were significantly lower than those charged on other markets, such as [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Japan … … (66)       … Based on data obtained and verified during the investigation as well as from independent market sources, such as the [ [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ], it is undisputable that prices of steel wire rod on the Chinese domestic market are significantly below prices on other markets. Given that [China] does not benefit from any natural comparative advantage with regard to iron ore, which it imports at international market prices, it is considered that there is no justification for the abnormally low prices of steel wire rod, which do not substantially reflect market values. This conclusion applies equally to the sector as a whole as well as individually to all of the investigated sampled companies. Therefore criterion 1 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(7)(c) is not considered to be met. (67)       … It should also be borne in mind that it is up to the exporting producers to demonstrate that they operate under market economy conditions and that the costs of their major inputs substantially reflect market values. This has not been demonstrated in this case. (68)      Some exporting producers have also argued that even if there was a price difference between raw material prices on the Chinese domestic market and other international markets, this difference could be explained by quality differences. It is clear however, that even if some quality differences existed, they could not explain the huge price gap found for steel of similar grades used by the Chinese exporting producers and the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Indian producers. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the difference between Chinese prices of steel wire rod and prices on other markets, as apparent from published sources, and referring to the same type of wire rod is very significant; according to data published by the [ [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ], Chinese domestic prices of steel wire rod were in the range of 300-350 [euros]/tonne in the [investigation period] whereas prices in [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Japan ranged between 400-500 [euros]/tonne for the same quality. Data obtained and verified during the investigation at the sampled exporting producers and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] producers is in line with the above published data. Therefore it is maintained that, even if there were any quality differences, these could not explain the huge price difference between raw material prices found on the Chinese domestic market and those charged on other international markets.’ 14 On the other hand, recitals 80 to 83 of the contested regulation show that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considered that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] met the conditions for individual treatment, listed in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 9(5) of the basic regulation. 15 Recitals 91 and 92 of the contested regulation state that, pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(7)(a) of the basic regulation, normal value for that company was established on the basis of verified information received from a producer established in [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 16 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1(1) and (2) of the contested regulation imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty of 78.3% on imports by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of certain iron or steel fasteners, other than of stainless steel. Procedure before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the judgment under appeal 17 In support of its action for annulment of the contested regulation, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] raised three pleas in law before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], all of which concerned the rejection of its MET claim by the EU institutions. 18 By the first plea, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submitted that the contested regulation had rejected its MET claim after the three-month period laid down in the second subparagraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(7)(c) of the basic regulation had expired – circumstances which, in its view, should have entailed the annulment of the contested regulation. 19 The second and third pleas alleged, respectively: (i) manifest error of assessment on the part of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the application of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(7)(c) of the basic regulation and (ii) misinterpretation by those institutions of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(7)(b) and (c) of that regulation. 20 By the judgment under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] rejected all the pleas in law raised by [OSCURATO:PERSONA], dismissed the action, and ordered that company to pay the costs. Forms of order sought on appeal 21 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should: –        set aside the judgment under appeal; –        annul the contested regulation in so far as it concerns [OSCURATO:PERSONA]; and –        order the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to pay the costs incurred both at first instance and on appeal. 22 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and EIFI contend that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should dismiss the appeal and order [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to pay the costs. In the alternative, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that the application for annulment of the contested regulation should be dismissed. The appeal 23 As a preliminary point, it should be emphasised that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] limits its appeal, in so far as it contests only the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] final decision and the grounds for that decision which relate to the first plea raised at first instance, alleging that the MET decision was out of time. 24 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relies on three grounds of appeal: (i) the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] rendered the three‑month time-limit laid down in the second subparagraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(7)(c) of the basic regulation meaningless by introducing a new criterion of interpretation, namely, the ‘only plausible hypothesis’ criterion; (ii) the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] applied an incorrect test with regard to the consequences of a procedural irregularity, leading it to impose an unreasonable burden of proof on [OSCURATO:PERSONA]; and (iii) in arriving at its findings, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] distorted the evidence and the facts before it. First ground of appeal: infringement of the second subparagraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(7)(c) of the basic regulation, in that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] introduced a new criterion of interpretation Arguments of the parties 25 According to [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had based its approach on the view that, as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was aware from the beginning of the investigation that the prices charged by Chinese suppliers for the major ‘input’ (component) of the product in question were significantly below the market price, the effect that the MET decision would have on the dumping margin was known even before [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had submitted its replies to sections E and F of the anti‑dumping questionnaire. Given the information available to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] at that time, the application of a lower dumping margin to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was, according to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], ‘the only plausible hypothesis’ if that company were to be granted MET. In the light of that finding, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held that the practical effect of the three‑month time-limit had not been undermined in the circumstances of the case. 26 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] observes first in that regard that lower production costs do not necessarily result in a lower normal value, since it is possible in such circumstances that sales prices on the domestic market may be very high. Secondly, it submits that having a lower dumping margin applied to it is an equally plausible hypothesis for any company claiming MET. Accordingly, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in law in its interpretation of the second subparagraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(7)(c) of the basic regulation since that court is not at liberty to interpret the provisions of a regulation in such a way as to render them redundant or useless. 27 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] asserts that such an interpretation is contrary to two judgments in which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice highlighted the importance of that three-month time-limit, namely, the judgments in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑249/10 P [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (HK) and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [2012] ECR and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑247/10 P [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [2012] ECR. 28 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and EIFI dispute those arguments. Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 29 In paragraphs 51 to 54 of the judgment under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held that, although the MET decision was indeed adopted after the expiry of the three‑month period laid down in the second subparagraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(7)(c) of the basic regulation, it could not be inferred either from the content of the relevant provisions or from the purpose and structure of the basic regulation that non-compliance with that procedural rule would automatically entail the annulment of the contested regulation. 30 In that regard, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] first of all pointed out, in paragraph 55 of the judgment under appeal, that the three-month time-limit had been imposed in order to ensure that the question whether the producer meets the criteria set out in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(7)(c) of the basic regulation is not decided on the basis of its effect on the calculation of the dumping margin. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] then found, in paragraph 61 of the judgment under appeal, that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had been aware from the beginning of the investigation that the Chinese prices for steel wire rod – the major ‘input’ of the product in question, representing approximately 50% of production costs – were significantly below prices on other international markets. Lastly, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concluded, in paragraphs 62 to 65 of the judgment under appeal, that, in the particular circumstances of the case, the practical effect of the three-month time-limit could not be undermined by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] having exceeded that time-limit, given that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was aware from the beginning of the investigation – and thus before the expiry of the three-month period – of information enabling it to conclude that the normal value and, consequently, the dumping margin for [OSCURATO:PERSONA] would in all likelihood be lower if that company were to be granted MET. 31 Without it being necessary to give a ruling on the purposive interpretation given by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in paragraph 55 of the judgment under appeal of the three-month time-limit laid down in the second subparagraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(7)(c) of the basic regulation, it must be found that the line of argument put forward by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] as its first ground of appeal cannot succeed. 32 It can be seen from the above considerations that it was on the basis of an appraisal of the facts before it that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] decided that, in the circumstances, the interests of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had not been damaged as a consequence of the three-month time-limit having achieved its intended practical effect. This means that, by the first ground of appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is in part effectively challenging the findings of fact made by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and set out in paragraphs 61 to 64 of the judgment under appeal, regarding the question whether the purpose of that time-limit had been undermined in the particular circumstances of the case. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], it is settled law that, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 256 TFEU and the first paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], an appeal lies on a point of law only, to the exclusion of any appraisal of the facts. Accordingly, that appraisal does not, save where the facts are distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice (see [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑416/04 P Sunrider v OHIM [2006] ECR I‑4237, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited). 33 To that extent, the first ground of appeal must be rejected as inadmissible. 34 As to the remainder, it should be noted that the argument from [OSCURATO:PERSONA] that the approach taken by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] would render the three-month time-limit redundant or useless is ineffective ab initio : the determinant line of reasoning adopted by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in that regard – as set out in paragraph 68, inter alia, of the judgment under appeal – is based on the finding that [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’ arguments had failed to prove that, if the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had not exceeded the three-month time‑limit, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] might have adopted a different regulation more favourable to that company’s interests than the contested regulation. 35 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (HK) and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , cited by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in support of its position, are irrelevant in the present case. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] gave no indication in those judgments as to the consequences of failure to comply with the three-month time-limit laid down in the second subparagraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(7)(c) of the basic regulation. 36 Accordingly, the first ground of appeal must be rejected as being in part inadmissible and in part unfounded. Second ground of appeal: application of an incorrect test with regard to the legal consequences of non-compliance with a procedural time-limit Arguments of the parties 37 According to [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] applied an incorrect test in the judgment under appeal when examining the legal consequences of the failure to comply with the three-month procedural time-limit, leading it to impose an unreasonable burden of proof on [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. In that regard, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] maintains that the appropriate test does not consist in requiring proof that, but for that procedural irregularity, a different MET decision – and, accordingly, a more favourable dumping margin – would have been adopted, but in requiring a demonstration that such a possibility cannot be totally ruled out. If, therefore, in the judgment under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had applied the correct test – as set out by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in, inter alia, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑141/08 P [OSCURATO:PERSONA] & Hardware v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [2009] ECR I‑9147 – it would have found that the fact that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had exceeded that procedural time-limit justified annulment of the contested regulation. 38 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contend that those submissions are legally irrelevant and based on a distortion of the findings made by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 39 It should be noted from the outset that the second ground of appeal is based on an incorrect reading of the judgment under appeal. 40 The finding made by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in paragraphs 68 and 70 of the judgment under appeal was not that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had to prove that, but for the procedural irregularity at issue, a different MET decision – and, accordingly, a more favourable dumping margin – would have been adopted; rather, that finding was, in essence, that it was for [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to establish, in accordance with the line of authority on that point (see [OSCURATO:PERSONA] & Hardware v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , paragraph 94 and the case-law cited), that, if the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had complied with the three-month time-limit in question, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ‘might have’ adopted a different regulation more favourable to [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’ interests than the contested regulation. 41 In those circumstances, the second ground of appeal clearly lacks any basis in fact and must therefore be declared unfounded, without there being any need to give a ruling as whether the time-limit laid down in the second subparagraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(7)(c) of the basic regulation constitutes a procedural guarantee intended to protect [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’ rights of defence. 42 In any event, the arguments submitted by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in connection with that ground of appeal are ineffective ab initio since that company has not adduced any reasons to show that, if the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had complied with the three-month time-limit in question, the MET decision or the contested regulation might have been more favourable to [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’ interests, and especially since it has not disputed before this [OSCURATO:PERSONA] the findings made in the judgment under appeal concerning the substance of the MET decision. 43 Accordingly, the second ground of appeal must be declared unfounded in that regard also. Third ground of appeal: distortion of the evidence and the facts Arguments of the parties 44 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submits that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] distorted the evidence when it found, in paragraph 61 of the judgment under appeal, that it was apparent from the documents before it that, from the beginning of the investigation, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had general information at its disposal indicating that the prices charged by Chinese suppliers for steel wire rod were significantly below prices on other markets. According to [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the single newspaper article on which that finding was based was not enough to enable the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to reach a conclusion of that kind. 45 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], by finding in paragraph 61 of the judgment under appeal that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had not disputed the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s argument that the prices charged by Chinese suppliers for steel wire rod were significantly below prices on other markets, even though that company had indeed disputed that argument, as was clear from the evidence which it had produced in the context of its MET claim, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] distorted the evidence which [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had provided in the course of the proceedings. 46 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that the arguments put forward by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in connection with its third ground of appeal are inadmissible, incorrect, or irrelevant. Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 47 As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has exclusive jurisdiction to assess the evidence. Save where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted, that appraisal does not therefore constitute a point of law which is subject as such to review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], a distortion must be obvious from the documents before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence (see, inter alia, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑551/03 P [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [2006] ECR I‑3173, paragraph 54; [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑535/06 P [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [2009] ECR I‑7051, paragraph 33; and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑552/10 P [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [2012] ECR, paragraph 27). 48 In the present case, it must first of all be stated that the arguments raised in support of the third ground of appeal are based on a false premiss since the newspaper article in question was not the only source of general information available to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] prior to the expiry of the three-month period indicating that Chinese prices of steel wire rod were significantly below prices on other international markets. It can be seen from paragraphs 81 and 82, in particular, of the judgment under appeal that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] based the finding of fact set out in paragraph 61 of that judgment on various items of evidence, including the fact that the institutions also had access, for that purpose, to – inter alia – the published data taken from the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] publication, which confirmed that conclusion. 49 Next, it should be noted that [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’ criticisms of that newspaper article’s evidential value are inadmissible at the appeal stage. Those criticisms are intended to challenge the appraisal of the facts carried out by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on the basis of the evidence placed before it, which is not subject to review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice on appeal. 50 Lastly, as regards the complaint that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was wrong to find, in paragraph 61 of the judgment under appeal, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had not disputed the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s argument that it was clear from the evidence that the company had supplied in its MET claim form that the prices it was paying for Chinese steel wire rod were significantly below prices on other international markets, it is sufficient to note that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] made that finding merely for the sake of completeness: the decisive finding in that regard was based on the fact that the MET claim form submitted by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] showed that the average price paid in China by that company for steel wire rod was lower than the price on other international markets. 51 As it is, complaints directed against the grounds of a judgment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] included merely for the sake of completeness must be rejected outright since such grounds cannot provide any basis for setting that judgment aside (see [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑13/12 P CHEMK and KF v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [2013] ECR, paragraph 82 and the case-law cited). Consequently, that complaint must be declared ineffective ab initio . 52 Thus, contrary to the assertions made by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in relation to its third ground of appeal, it is impossible to discern in the reasoning of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] any distortion of the facts or the evidence. 53 Since none of the three grounds of appeal can be upheld, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 54 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, applicable to appeal proceedings pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has been unsuccessful and the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has applied for costs, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must be ordered to pay the costs incurred by that institution in the present appeal. 55 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 140(1) of the Rules of Procedure, also applicable to appeal proceedings under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) thereof, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is to bear its own costs. Pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 140(3) of those Rules, it is appropriate to order EIFI to bear its own costs. On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby: 1. Dismisses the appeal; 2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Ltd to pay the costs incurred by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the present proceedings; 3. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] AISBL (EIFI) each to bear its own costs. [Signatures] * Language of the case: English.