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Corte di giustizia UEsentenza

Corte di giustizia UE n. 1017/2014

ECLI:EU:C:2014:1751
Testo integrale del provvedimento

Testo integrale del provvedimento

62013CO0285_EN

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] part

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑285/13 P,

APPEAL under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 20 May 2013, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] SA, established in Barcelona (Spain), represented by N. [OSCURATO:PERSONA]Pacheco, abogado, appellant, the other parties to the proceedings being: Office for Harmonisation in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Designs) ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), represented by A. Folliard-Monguiral, acting as Agent, defendant at first instance, Café do [OSCURATO:SOCIETA], established in Melito di Napoli (Italy), represented by M. Mostardini and F. Mellucci, avvocati, intervener at first instance,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]),

composed of J.L. da [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], G. Arestis (Rapporteur) and A. Arabadjiev, Judges, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: P. Mengozzi, Registrar: A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], having decided, after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], to give a decision by reasoned order, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, makes the following

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

1. By its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] SA (‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA]’) seeks to have set aside the judgment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑277/12 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] — Café do [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] ( Caffè KIMBO ) EU:T:2013:146 (‘the judgment under appeal’), by which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed its action seeking annulment of the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Designs) ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) of 15 May 2012 ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] R 1017/2011-4) relating to opposition proceedings between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Café do [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] (‘the contested decision’).

Legal context

2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark (OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1) was repealed and replaced by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1).

The latter regulation entered into force on 13 April 2009.

3. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94 provided: ‘1.

Upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for shall not be registered: … (b) if because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected; the likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.

2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, “earlier trade marks” means: … (c) trade marks which, on the date of application for registration of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark, or, where appropriate, of the priority claimed in respect of the application for registration of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark, are well known in a [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in the sense in which the words “well known” are used in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 6 bis of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [for the Protection of [OSCURATO:PERSONA], signed in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 20 March 1883, last revised in Stockholm on 14 July 1967 and amended on 28 September 1979 ( [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , Vol. 828, No 11851, p. 305)]. …

4. Upon opposition by the proprietor of a non-registered trade mark or of another sign used in the course of trade of more than mere local significance, the trade mark applied for shall not be registered where and to the extent that, pursuant to the law of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] governing that sign: (a) rights to that sign were acquired prior to the date of application for registration of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark, or the date of the priority claimed for the application for registration of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark; (b) that sign confers on its proprietor the right to prohibit the use of a subsequent trade mark.

5. Furthermore, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark within the meaning of paragraph 2, the trade mark applied for shall not be registered where it is identical with or similar to the earlier trade mark and is to be registered for goods or services which are not similar to those for which the earlier trade mark is registered, where in the case of an earlier [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark the trade mark has a reputation in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and, in the case of an earlier national trade mark, the trade mark has a reputation in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concerned and where the use without due cause of the trade mark applied for would take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier trade mark.’

4. Rule 19 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 2868/95 of 13 December 1995 implementing [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94 (OJ 1995 L 303, p. 1), as amended by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 1041/2005 of 29 June 2005 (OJ 2005 L 172, p. 4) (‘the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’), provides: ‘1. [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] shall give the opposing party the opportunity to present the facts, evidence and arguments in support of his opposition or to complete any facts, evidence or arguments that have already been submitted pursuant to Rule 15(3), within a time-limit specified by it and which shall be at least 2 months starting on the date on which the opposition proceedings shall be deemed to commence in accordance with Rule 18(1).

2. Within the period referred to in paragraph 1, the opposing party shall also file proof of the existence, validity and scope of protection of his earlier mark or earlier right, as well as evidence proving his entitlement to file the opposition.

In particular, the opposing party shall provide the following evidence: (a) if the opposition is based on a trade mark which is not a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark, evidence of its filing or registration, by submitting: … (ii) if the trade mark is registered, a copy of the relevant registration certificate and, as the case may be, of the latest renewal certificate, showing that the term of protection of the trade mark extends beyond the time-limit referred to in paragraph 1 and any extension thereof, or equivalent documents emanating from the administration by which the trade mark was registered; …’ Background to the dispute

5. The background to the dispute was set out as follows by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in paragraphs 1 to 11 of the judgment under appeal: ‘1.

On 30 October 2003, the intervener [at first instance], Café do [OSCURATO:SOCIETA], filed an application for registration of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark at [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [No 40/94].

2. The trade mark for which registration was sought is the figurative sign reproduced below: >image>1

3. The goods in respect of which registration was sought fall, inter alia, within Class 30 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 15 June 1957 concerning the international classification of goods and services for the purposes of the registration of marks, as revised and amended [“the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]”], and correspond to the following description: “Coffee, tea, cocoa, sugar, rice, tapioca, sago, coffee substitutes; flour and preparations made from cereals, bread, pastry and confectionery, ices; honey, treacles; yeast, baking-powder; salt, mustard; vinegar sauces (condiments); relish; ice”.

4. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark application was published in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 45/2004 of 8 November 2004.

5. On 3 February 2005, [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] filed a notice of opposition pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 42 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94 (now [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 207/2009) against registration of the mark applied for in respect of the goods referred to in paragraph 3 above.

6. The opposition was based on the Spanish word mark [OSCURATO:PERSONA], registered under number 291655, applied for on 8 March 1955 and authorised on 4 October 1955, in respect of the goods “cereals, milling industry, baking, pastry and starch” in Class 30, reputation being claimed in Spain in respect of all of those goods, and on the earlier mark [OSCURATO:PERSONA], well known in Spain in respect of those same goods.

7. The grounds relied on in support of the opposition were those referred to in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1)(a) and (b) and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(5) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94 (now [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1)(a) and (b) and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(5) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 207/2009).

8. On 14 March 2011, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] upheld the opposition in respect of part of the goods at issue, namely “flour and preparations made from cereals, bread, pastry and confectionery, ices; yeast, baking-powder” in Class 30, on the basis of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1)(b) and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(2)(c) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 207/2009.

9. On 12 May 2011, the intervener [at first instance] filed an appeal with [OSCURATO:PERSONA], under Articles 58 to 64 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 207/2009, against the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] decision.

10. By [the contested decision], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] upheld that appeal in part and annulled the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] decision in so far as it rejected the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark application in respect of “flour, confectionery, ices, yeast and baking-powder” in Class

30. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal dismissed the appeal as to the remainder and thus confirmed the rejection of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark application as regards “preparations made from cereals, bread, pastry”.

11. In the contested decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal stated as follows: – first, the earlier Spanish trade mark No 291655 “[OSCURATO:PERSONA]” must be disregarded since [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] has not proved the renewal of that registration within the time-limit set by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to substantiate its opposition (contested decision, point 10); – second, the opposition must be examined on the basis of the earlier unregistered mark “[OSCURATO:PERSONA]”, which is well known in Spain, and that, therefore, the only ground of opposition to be examined is [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1)(b) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 207/2009, read in conjunction with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(2)(c) of that regulation (point 11); – third, the well-known character of the unregistered trade mark “[OSCURATO:PERSONA]” has been substantiated in Spain, before the date of filing of the contested [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark application, only in respect of “packaged sliced bread” (points 13 to 23 in reference to the items of evidence summarised on pages 4 and 5 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] decision); – fourth, the “preparations made from cereals, bread” and “pastry” in the trade mark application are identical or similar to the “packaged sliced bread” in respect of which the well-known character of the earlier mark “[OSCURATO:PERSONA]” is established (points 27 and 28); – fifth, the “flour” and “yeast and baking-powder” in the trade mark application are dissimilar to [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]]’s “packaged sliced bread” since, although the former are important ingredients of bread, they have a different nature, purpose and method of use (point 29); – sixth, the “confectionery” and “ices” in the trade mark application differ in nature, purpose and method of use from [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]]’s “packaged sliced bread” (points 30 and 31); – seventh, the signs are similar overall (points 36 to 40); – eighth, there is a likelihood of confusion in respect of the goods in the trade mark application which are found similar to those for which the well-known character of the earlier mark was established, which has the effect that the opposition must be upheld in respect of “preparations made from cereals, bread, pastry” (point 45); – ninth, there is no likelihood of confusion in respect of goods which are dissimilar, that is, “flour, confectionery, ices, yeast and baking‑powder” (point 46).’ The procedure before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the judgment under appeal

6. By application lodged at the Registry of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 25 June 2012, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] brought an action seeking, principally, the alteration of the contested decision or, in the alternative, its annulment.

7. In support of its action, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relied on two pleas in law, alleging, first, breach of Articles 64, 75 and 76 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 207/2009 and, second, breach of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1)(b) of that regulation.

8. By the judgment under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] rejected both those pleas in law and dismissed the action in its entirety. Forms of order sought by the parties before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice

9. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should: – principally, set aside the judgment under appeal and order the annulment of the registration of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] figurative trade mark Caffè KIMBO for all goods in Class 30 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]; – in the alternative, set aside the judgment under appeal and order the annulment of the registration of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] figurative trade mark Caffè KIMBO for the following goods in Class 30 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: ‘flour, confectionery, ices, yeast and baking-powder’; and – order [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Café do [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] to pay the costs.

10. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Café do [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] contend that the appeal should be dismissed and that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should be ordered to pay the costs. The appeal

11. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of its Rules of Procedure, where an appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may at any time, acting on a report from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], decide by reasoned order to dismiss that appeal in whole or in part.

That provision must be applied in the context of the present case.

12. At the outset, it should be noted that, in support of its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relies on two grounds alleging, first, breach of Rule 19 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and, second, breach of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1), (2), (4) and (5) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 207/2009.

13. Given, however, that, in the present case, the application for registration of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] figurative trade mark Caffè KIMBO was filed on 30 October 2003 by Café do [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] and that that date is decisive for purposes of identifying the applicable substantive law, the present dispute remains governed by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94 (see, to that effect, orders in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑14/12 P Shah v Three-N-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] EU:C:2013:349, paragraph 2, and in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑346/12 P DMK v [OSCURATO:PERSONA]:C:2013:397, paragraph 2).

The first ground of appeal, alleging breach of Rule 19 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the parties

14. By its first ground of appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] breached Rule 19 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

In particular, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] criticises the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for having examined the opposition to registration of the mark applied for solely on the basis of the earlier unregistered mark [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which is well known in Spain, and for not having taken into consideration the earlier Spanish mark [OSCURATO:PERSONA], registered under No 291655, even though [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had proved the existence and validity of that latter mark, in accordance with that rule.

15. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Café do [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] take the view that this first ground of appeal must be rejected as being manifestly inadmissible. Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]

16. It follows from the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] settled case-law that to allow a party to put forward for the first time before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, in an appeal, a plea in law which it has not raised before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] would be to allow it to bring before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the appellate jurisdiction of which is limited, a dispute of wider ambit than that which came before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

In an appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] jurisdiction is, as a result, confined to reviewing the findings of law on the pleas argued before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (see, to that effect, inter alia, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑408/08 P Lancôme v [OSCURATO:PERSONA]:C:2010:92, paragraph 53, and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑92/10 P Media-Saturn-Holding v [OSCURATO:PERSONA]:C:2011:15, paragraph 39).

17. It is clear, in the present case, that the alleged breach of Rule 19 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] put forward by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in support of its first ground of appeal and, in particular, the claim based on the assertion that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had proved the existence and validity of the earlier Spanish mark [OSCURATO:PERSONA] registered under No 291655, in accordance with that rule, were never raised before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

It must be stressed, in this regard, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] based its action before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] solely on the earlier unregistered mark [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which is well known in Spain.

18. Consequently, the first ground put forward by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in support of its appeal must be rejected as being manifestly inadmissible.

The second ground of appeal, alleging breach of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1), (2), (4) and (5) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the parties

19. By the first part of its second ground of appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] breached [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1)(b) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94, read in conjunction with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(2)(c) thereof.

It contests, in essence, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] assessment concerning the comparison of the goods at issue and claims that those goods are identical or very similar, since all of them belong to the food industry sector. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims, moreover, that the signs at issue are highly similar in visual and phonetic respects.

It deduces from this that a more appropriate comparison of the goods concerned could have led to the conclusion that there was a high likelihood of confusion.

20. The second part of [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s second ground of appeal alleges breach of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(4) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94.

21. By the third part of its second ground of appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] breached [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(5) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] argues that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], essentially, failed to take into account, when assessing the likelihood of confusion, the reputation of the earlier mark [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in Spain, even though that reputation had been accepted in its judgment in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑357/11 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) EU:T:2012:696. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that registration of the mark applied for by Café do [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] will allow the latter to take unfair advantage of the distinctive character or reputation of the earlier mark [OSCURATO:PERSONA] or will be detrimental to that mark.

22. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Café do [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] consider that this second ground of appeal must be rejected as being manifestly inadmissible.

In the alternative, Café do [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] argues that this ground of appeal must be rejected, in any event, as being unfounded in so far as it could be interpreted as calling into question the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] findings concerning the application of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94.

Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]

23. With regard to the first part of the second ground of appeal, it must be borne in mind that, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 256(1) TFEU and the first paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], an appeal is limited to points of law. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has exclusive jurisdiction to find and appraise the relevant facts and to assess the evidence.

The appraisal of those facts and the assessment of that evidence thus do not, save where the facts or evidence are distorted, constitute points of law which are subject, as such, to review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice on appeal (see, inter alia, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑104/00 P DKV v [OSCURATO:PERSONA]:C:2002:506, paragraph 22, and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑254/09 P [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA]:C:2010:488, paragraph 49).

24. In this regard, it must be pointed out that the assessment of the comparison of the conflicting goods is factual in nature and is not, save where the facts or the evidence submitted in that context by the parties have been distorted, subject to review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice.

25. It is clear, in the present case, that, by the first part of the second ground put forward in support of its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is inviting the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], with regard to the comparison of the goods at issue, without, moreover, either showing or even alleging that that assessment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is based on a distortion of the facts or the evidence.

The first part of this second ground of appeal must therefore be rejected as being manifestly inadmissible.

26. As regards the second part of the second ground presented in support of the present appeal, alleging breach, by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(4) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94, suffice it to point out that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not put forward that argument before either the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] or the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

Consequently, in accordance with the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] settled case-law, cited at paragraph 16 of the present order, the second part of the ground of appeal must be rejected as being manifestly inadmissible.

27. As regards the third part of the second ground of appeal put forward by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in support of its appeal, it is also sufficient to point out that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] never argued, before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], that the earlier mark [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had a reputation in Spain.

It must be stressed, in this regard, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(5) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94 applies to earlier trade marks, within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(2) thereof, only in so far as they have been the subject of registration.

28. In the present case, however, as is clear from paragraph 17 of the present order, only the earlier unregistered mark [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which is well known in Spain, was taken into consideration by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], since [OSCURATO:PERSONA], moreover, specifically based its action before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on that mark alone.

Consequently, in accordance with the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] settled case-law, cited at paragraph 16 of the present order and referred to again at paragraph 26, the third part of the second ground of appeal must be rejected as being manifestly inadmissible.

29. The second ground of appeal must therefore be rejected in its entirety as being manifestly unfounded.

30. It follows from all of the foregoing that the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety as being manifestly inadmissible. Costs

31. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, which is applicable to appeal proceedings by virtue of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

Since [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Café do [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] have applied for costs to be awarded against [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and as the latter has been unsuccessful, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must be ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] part On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby orders:

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] SA shall pay the costs.

Anonimizzato ex art. 52 D.Lgs. 196/2003
62013CO0285_EN [OSCURATO:PERSONA] part [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑285/13 P, APPEAL under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 20 May 2013, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] SA, established in Barcelona (Spain), represented by N. [OSCURATO:PERSONA]Pacheco, abogado, appellant, the other parties to the proceedings being: Office for Harmonisation in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Designs) ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), represented by A. Folliard-Monguiral, acting as Agent, defendant at first instance, Café do [OSCURATO:SOCIETA], established in Melito di Napoli (Italy), represented by M. Mostardini and F. Mellucci, avvocati, intervener at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), composed of J.L. da [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], G. Arestis (Rapporteur) and A. Arabadjiev, Judges, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: P. Mengozzi, Registrar: A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], having decided, after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], to give a decision by reasoned order, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, makes the following [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1. By its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] SA (‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA]’) seeks to have set aside the judgment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑277/12 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA]  — Café do [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] ( Caffè KIMBO ) EU:T:2013:146 (‘the judgment under appeal’), by which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed its action seeking annulment of the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Designs) ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) of 15 May 2012 ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] R 1017/2011-4) relating to opposition proceedings between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Café do [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] (‘the contested decision’). Legal context 2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark (OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1) was repealed and replaced by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1). The latter regulation entered into force on 13 April 2009. 3. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94 provided: ‘1. Upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for shall not be registered: … (b) if because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected; the likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark. 2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, “earlier trade marks” means: … (c) trade marks which, on the date of application for registration of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark, or, where appropriate, of the priority claimed in respect of the application for registration of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark, are well known in a [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in the sense in which the words “well known” are used in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 6 bis of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [for the Protection of [OSCURATO:PERSONA], signed in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 20 March 1883, last revised in Stockholm on 14 July 1967 and amended on 28 September 1979 ( [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , Vol. 828, No 11851, p. 305)]. … 4. Upon opposition by the proprietor of a non-registered trade mark or of another sign used in the course of trade of more than mere local significance, the trade mark applied for shall not be registered where and to the extent that, pursuant to the law of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] governing that sign: (a) rights to that sign were acquired prior to the date of application for registration of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark, or the date of the priority claimed for the application for registration of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark; (b) that sign confers on its proprietor the right to prohibit the use of a subsequent trade mark. 5. Furthermore, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark within the meaning of paragraph 2, the trade mark applied for shall not be registered where it is identical with or similar to the earlier trade mark and is to be registered for goods or services which are not similar to those for which the earlier trade mark is registered, where in the case of an earlier [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark the trade mark has a reputation in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and, in the case of an earlier national trade mark, the trade mark has a reputation in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concerned and where the use without due cause of the trade mark applied for would take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier trade mark.’ 4. Rule 19 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 2868/95 of 13 December 1995 implementing [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94 (OJ 1995 L 303, p. 1), as amended by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 1041/2005 of 29 June 2005 (OJ 2005 L 172, p. 4) (‘the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’), provides: ‘1. [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] shall give the opposing party the opportunity to present the facts, evidence and arguments in support of his opposition or to complete any facts, evidence or arguments that have already been submitted pursuant to Rule 15(3), within a time-limit specified by it and which shall be at least 2 months starting on the date on which the opposition proceedings shall be deemed to commence in accordance with Rule 18(1). 2. Within the period referred to in paragraph 1, the opposing party shall also file proof of the existence, validity and scope of protection of his earlier mark or earlier right, as well as evidence proving his entitlement to file the opposition. In particular, the opposing party shall provide the following evidence: (a) if the opposition is based on a trade mark which is not a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark, evidence of its filing or registration, by submitting: … (ii) if the trade mark is registered, a copy of the relevant registration certificate and, as the case may be, of the latest renewal certificate, showing that the term of protection of the trade mark extends beyond the time-limit referred to in paragraph 1 and any extension thereof, or equivalent documents emanating from the administration by which the trade mark was registered; …’ Background to the dispute 5. The background to the dispute was set out as follows by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in paragraphs 1 to 11 of the judgment under appeal: ‘1. On 30 October 2003, the intervener [at first instance], Café do [OSCURATO:SOCIETA], filed an application for registration of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark at [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [No 40/94]. 2. The trade mark for which registration was sought is the figurative sign reproduced below: >image>1 3. The goods in respect of which registration was sought fall, inter alia, within Class 30 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 15 June 1957 concerning the international classification of goods and services for the purposes of the registration of marks, as revised and amended [“the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]”], and correspond to the following description: “Coffee, tea, cocoa, sugar, rice, tapioca, sago, coffee substitutes; flour and preparations made from cereals, bread, pastry and confectionery, ices; honey, treacles; yeast, baking-powder; salt, mustard; vinegar sauces (condiments); relish; ice”. 4. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark application was published in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 45/2004 of 8 November 2004. 5. On 3 February 2005, [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] filed a notice of opposition pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 42 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94 (now [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 207/2009) against registration of the mark applied for in respect of the goods referred to in paragraph 3 above. 6. The opposition was based on the Spanish word mark [OSCURATO:PERSONA], registered under number 291655, applied for on 8 March 1955 and authorised on 4 October 1955, in respect of the goods “cereals, milling industry, baking, pastry and starch” in Class 30, reputation being claimed in Spain in respect of all of those goods, and on the earlier mark [OSCURATO:PERSONA], well known in Spain in respect of those same goods. 7. The grounds relied on in support of the opposition were those referred to in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1)(a) and (b) and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(5) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94 (now [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1)(a) and (b) and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(5) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 207/2009). 8. On 14 March 2011, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] upheld the opposition in respect of part of the goods at issue, namely “flour and preparations made from cereals, bread, pastry and confectionery, ices; yeast, baking-powder” in Class 30, on the basis of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1)(b) and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(2)(c) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 207/2009. 9. On 12 May 2011, the intervener [at first instance] filed an appeal with [OSCURATO:PERSONA], under Articles 58 to 64 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 207/2009, against the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] decision. 10. By [the contested decision], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] upheld that appeal in part and annulled the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] decision in so far as it rejected the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark application in respect of “flour, confectionery, ices, yeast and baking-powder” in Class 30. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal dismissed the appeal as to the remainder and thus confirmed the rejection of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark application as regards “preparations made from cereals, bread, pastry”. 11. In the contested decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal stated as follows: – first, the earlier Spanish trade mark No 291655 “[OSCURATO:PERSONA]” must be disregarded since [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] has not proved the renewal of that registration within the time-limit set by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to substantiate its opposition (contested decision, point 10); – second, the opposition must be examined on the basis of the earlier unregistered mark “[OSCURATO:PERSONA]”, which is well known in Spain, and that, therefore, the only ground of opposition to be examined is [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1)(b) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 207/2009, read in conjunction with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(2)(c) of that regulation (point 11); – third, the well-known character of the unregistered trade mark “[OSCURATO:PERSONA]” has been substantiated in Spain, before the date of filing of the contested [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark application, only in respect of “packaged sliced bread” (points 13 to 23 in reference to the items of evidence summarised on pages 4 and 5 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] decision); – fourth, the “preparations made from cereals, bread” and “pastry” in the trade mark application are identical or similar to the “packaged sliced bread” in respect of which the well-known character of the earlier mark “[OSCURATO:PERSONA]” is established (points 27 and 28); – fifth, the “flour” and “yeast and baking-powder” in the trade mark application are dissimilar to [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]]’s “packaged sliced bread” since, although the former are important ingredients of bread, they have a different nature, purpose and method of use (point 29); – sixth, the “confectionery” and “ices” in the trade mark application differ in nature, purpose and method of use from [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]]’s “packaged sliced bread” (points 30 and 31); – seventh, the signs are similar overall (points 36 to 40); – eighth, there is a likelihood of confusion in respect of the goods in the trade mark application which are found similar to those for which the well-known character of the earlier mark was established, which has the effect that the opposition must be upheld in respect of “preparations made from cereals, bread, pastry” (point 45); – ninth, there is no likelihood of confusion in respect of goods which are dissimilar, that is, “flour, confectionery, ices, yeast and baking‑powder” (point 46).’ The procedure before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the judgment under appeal 6. By application lodged at the Registry of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 25 June 2012, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] brought an action seeking, principally, the alteration of the contested decision or, in the alternative, its annulment. 7. In support of its action, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relied on two pleas in law, alleging, first, breach of Articles 64, 75 and 76 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 207/2009 and, second, breach of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1)(b) of that regulation. 8. By the judgment under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] rejected both those pleas in law and dismissed the action in its entirety. Forms of order sought by the parties before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice 9. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should: – principally, set aside the judgment under appeal and order the annulment of the registration of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] figurative trade mark Caffè KIMBO for all goods in Class 30 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]; – in the alternative, set aside the judgment under appeal and order the annulment of the registration of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] figurative trade mark Caffè KIMBO for the following goods in Class 30 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: ‘flour, confectionery, ices, yeast and baking-powder’; and – order [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Café do [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] to pay the costs. 10. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Café do [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] contend that the appeal should be dismissed and that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should be ordered to pay the costs. The appeal 11. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of its Rules of Procedure, where an appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may at any time, acting on a report from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], decide by reasoned order to dismiss that appeal in whole or in part. That provision must be applied in the context of the present case. 12. At the outset, it should be noted that, in support of its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relies on two grounds alleging, first, breach of Rule 19 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and, second, breach of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1), (2), (4) and (5) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 207/2009. 13. Given, however, that, in the present case, the application for registration of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] figurative trade mark Caffè KIMBO was filed on 30 October 2003 by Café do [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] and that that date is decisive for purposes of identifying the applicable substantive law, the present dispute remains governed by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94 (see, to that effect, orders in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑14/12 P Shah v Three-N-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] EU:C:2013:349, paragraph 2, and in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑346/12 P DMK v [OSCURATO:PERSONA]:C:2013:397, paragraph 2). The first ground of appeal, alleging breach of Rule 19 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the parties 14. By its first ground of appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] breached Rule 19 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. In particular, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] criticises the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for having examined the opposition to registration of the mark applied for solely on the basis of the earlier unregistered mark [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which is well known in Spain, and for not having taken into consideration the earlier Spanish mark [OSCURATO:PERSONA], registered under No 291655, even though [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had proved the existence and validity of that latter mark, in accordance with that rule. 15. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Café do [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] take the view that this first ground of appeal must be rejected as being manifestly inadmissible. Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 16. It follows from the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] settled case-law that to allow a party to put forward for the first time before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, in an appeal, a plea in law which it has not raised before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] would be to allow it to bring before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the appellate jurisdiction of which is limited, a dispute of wider ambit than that which came before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. In an appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] jurisdiction is, as a result, confined to reviewing the findings of law on the pleas argued before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (see, to that effect, inter alia, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑408/08 P Lancôme v [OSCURATO:PERSONA]:C:2010:92, paragraph 53, and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑92/10 P Media-Saturn-Holding v [OSCURATO:PERSONA]:C:2011:15, paragraph 39). 17. It is clear, in the present case, that the alleged breach of Rule 19 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] put forward by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in support of its first ground of appeal and, in particular, the claim based on the assertion that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had proved the existence and validity of the earlier Spanish mark [OSCURATO:PERSONA] registered under No 291655, in accordance with that rule, were never raised before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. It must be stressed, in this regard, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] based its action before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] solely on the earlier unregistered mark [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which is well known in Spain. 18. Consequently, the first ground put forward by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in support of its appeal must be rejected as being manifestly inadmissible. The second ground of appeal, alleging breach of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1), (2), (4) and (5) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the parties 19. By the first part of its second ground of appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] breached [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1)(b) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94, read in conjunction with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(2)(c) thereof. It contests, in essence, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] assessment concerning the comparison of the goods at issue and claims that those goods are identical or very similar, since all of them belong to the food industry sector. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims, moreover, that the signs at issue are highly similar in visual and phonetic respects. It deduces from this that a more appropriate comparison of the goods concerned could have led to the conclusion that there was a high likelihood of confusion. 20. The second part of [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s second ground of appeal alleges breach of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(4) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94. 21. By the third part of its second ground of appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] breached [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(5) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] argues that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], essentially, failed to take into account, when assessing the likelihood of confusion, the reputation of the earlier mark [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in Spain, even though that reputation had been accepted in its judgment in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑357/11 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) EU:T:2012:696. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that registration of the mark applied for by Café do [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] will allow the latter to take unfair advantage of the distinctive character or reputation of the earlier mark [OSCURATO:PERSONA] or will be detrimental to that mark. 22. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Café do [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] consider that this second ground of appeal must be rejected as being manifestly inadmissible. In the alternative, Café do [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] argues that this ground of appeal must be rejected, in any event, as being unfounded in so far as it could be interpreted as calling into question the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] findings concerning the application of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94. Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 23. With regard to the first part of the second ground of appeal, it must be borne in mind that, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 256(1) TFEU and the first paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], an appeal is limited to points of law. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has exclusive jurisdiction to find and appraise the relevant facts and to assess the evidence. The appraisal of those facts and the assessment of that evidence thus do not, save where the facts or evidence are distorted, constitute points of law which are subject, as such, to review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice on appeal (see, inter alia, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑104/00 P DKV v [OSCURATO:PERSONA]:C:2002:506, paragraph 22, and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑254/09 P [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA]:C:2010:488, paragraph 49). 24. In this regard, it must be pointed out that the assessment of the comparison of the conflicting goods is factual in nature and is not, save where the facts or the evidence submitted in that context by the parties have been distorted, subject to review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice. 25. It is clear, in the present case, that, by the first part of the second ground put forward in support of its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is inviting the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], with regard to the comparison of the goods at issue, without, moreover, either showing or even alleging that that assessment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is based on a distortion of the facts or the evidence. The first part of this second ground of appeal must therefore be rejected as being manifestly inadmissible. 26. As regards the second part of the second ground presented in support of the present appeal, alleging breach, by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(4) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94, suffice it to point out that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not put forward that argument before either the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] or the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Consequently, in accordance with the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] settled case-law, cited at paragraph 16 of the present order, the second part of the ground of appeal must be rejected as being manifestly inadmissible. 27. As regards the third part of the second ground of appeal put forward by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in support of its appeal, it is also sufficient to point out that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] never argued, before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], that the earlier mark [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had a reputation in Spain. It must be stressed, in this regard, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(5) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94 applies to earlier trade marks, within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(2) thereof, only in so far as they have been the subject of registration. 28. In the present case, however, as is clear from paragraph 17 of the present order, only the earlier unregistered mark [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which is well known in Spain, was taken into consideration by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], since [OSCURATO:PERSONA], moreover, specifically based its action before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on that mark alone. Consequently, in accordance with the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] settled case-law, cited at paragraph 16 of the present order and referred to again at paragraph 26, the third part of the second ground of appeal must be rejected as being manifestly inadmissible. 29. The second ground of appeal must therefore be rejected in its entirety as being manifestly unfounded. 30. It follows from all of the foregoing that the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety as being manifestly inadmissible. Costs 31. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, which is applicable to appeal proceedings by virtue of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Café do [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] have applied for costs to be awarded against [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and as the latter has been unsuccessful, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must be ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] part On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby orders: 1. The appeal is dismissed. 2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] SA shall pay the costs.
Sentenza Corte di giustizia UE n. 1017/2014 — Fons Iuris — Fons Iuris