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Corte di giustizia UEsentenza

Corte di giustizia UE n. 340/2019

ECLI:EU:C:2019:686
Testo integrale del provvedimento

Testo integrale del provvedimento

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA])

5 September 2019 ( * ) (Appeal — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice — EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Absolute grounds for refusal — Decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal to stay the proceedings and remit the case to the examiner for an examination of the absolute grounds for refusal — Appeal manifestly unfounded)

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑162/19 P,

APPEAL under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 22 February 2019,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA],

established in Deeside ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), represented by S. Malynicz QC, S. Baran, Barrister, J. Hertzog, J. Warner and C. Hill, Solicitors, appellant, the other party to the proceedings being:

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO),

defendant at first instance,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]),

composed of C. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], A. Rosas (Rapporteur) and L. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA],

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]: M. [OSCURATO:PERSONA],

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]: A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA],

having regard to the decision taken, after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], to give a decision by reasoned order in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], makes the following

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

1 By its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] seeks to have set aside the order of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 14 December 2018,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

v EUIPO — Íslandsstofa ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) (T‑267/18, not published, ‘the order under appeal’, EU:T:2018:1014), by which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed as manifestly inadmissible the action seeking annulment of the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO) of 7 February 2018 ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] R 340/2017-5), relating to opposition proceedings between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Íslandsstofa (‘the contested decision’). 2 In support of its appeal, the appellant relies on three grounds of appeal alleging, respectively, infringement of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 71 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1), of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 72 of that regulation, and of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 126 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

The appeal 3 Pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], where the appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], decide by reasoned order to dismiss that appeal in whole or in part. 4 It is appropriate to apply that provision in the present case. 5 On 7 June 2019, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] took the following position: ‘1.

In support of its appeal, brought against the order under appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relies on three grounds.

2. By its third ground, which it is appropriate to examine first, the appellant complains that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in its interpretation of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 126 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

According to the appellant, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in law by declaring the action inadmissible since, by the contested decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of EUIPO has definitely and unequivocally established its position on the existence of the absolute grounds for refusal.

3. That ground of appeal is manifestly unfounded.

According to settled case-law, noted in paragraph 15 of the order under appeal, any measure the legal effects of which are binding on, and capable of affecting the interests of the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position is an act which may be the subject of an action for a declaration that it is void.

In the case of acts adopted by a procedure involving several stages, in particular where they are the culmination of an internal procedure, in principle an act is open to review only if it is a measure definitely laying down the position of the competent institution on the conclusion of that procedure, and not a provisional measure intended to pave the way for the final decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 November 1981, IBM v Commission , 60/81, EU:C:1981:264, paragraphs 9 and 10).

The contested decision limits itself, first, to explaining the reasons why it is necessary to remit the case to the examiner and, second, to identifying the absolute grounds for refusal before being examined.

Contrary to the appellant’s claim, the specific examination of those grounds is explicitly left to the examiner, as is clear from the operative part of the contested decision and as noted by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in paragraph 16 of the order under appeal.

4. Therefore, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was entitled to hold that the action should be dismissed as being manifestly inadmissible.

5. Thus, it is not necessary to examine the first and second grounds of the appeal. Those grounds relating to errors allegedly committed by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal in applying Articles 71 and 72 of Regulation 2017/1001 cannot succeed either.

6. In any event, those grounds are manifestly inadmissible.

It follows from [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 168(1)(d) and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 169(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice that an appeal must identify precisely the contested points in the grounds of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and indicate precisely the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal, failing which the appeal or ground of appeal concerned is inadmissible (see, to that effect, order of 19 March 2019, Sevenfriday v

EUIPO

, C‑734/18 P, not published, EU:C:2019:223, paragraph 5 (Position of [OSCURATO:PERSONA]Bordona, point 6 and the case-law cited)).

Accordingly, an appeal which merely repeats or reproduces verbatim the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not satisfy the requirements to state reasons under those provisions.

However, the points of law examined at first instance may be argued again in the course of an appeal, provided that the appellant challenges the interpretation or application of EU law by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 December 2015, Italy v Commission , C‑280/14 P, EU:C:2015:792, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).

7. I note at the outset that, in its appeal, the appellant merely reproduces certain arguments which it has put forward previously in its action before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in order to establish the errors allegedly committed by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal.

The appellant does not indicate the contested points of the order under appeal.

Furthermore, it could not be otherwise, because those arguments raise substantive issues which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was not required to examine on account of the manifest inadmissibility of the action.

8. Having regard to the foregoing, I propose that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismiss the appeal as being manifestly unfounded.’ 6 For the same reasons as those given by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the appeal must be dismissed as being manifestly unfounded.

Costs 7 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 137 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, applicable to the procedure on appeal pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) thereof, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings.

In the present case, since this order was adopted before the appeal was served on the defendant at first instance and therefore before the latter could have incurred costs, it must be held that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is to bear its own costs.

On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby orders:

1. The appeal is dismissed as being manifestly unfounded.

2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] shall bear its own costs.

Luxembourg, 5 September 2019.

A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA]

C. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] * Language of the case: English.

Anonimizzato ex art. 52 D.Lgs. 196/2003
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) 5 September 2019 ( * ) (Appeal — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice — EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Absolute grounds for refusal — Decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal to stay the proceedings and remit the case to the examiner for an examination of the absolute grounds for refusal — Appeal manifestly unfounded) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑162/19 P, APPEAL under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 22 February 2019, [OSCURATO:PERSONA], established in Deeside ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), represented by S. Malynicz QC, S. Baran, Barrister, J. Hertzog, J. Warner and C. Hill, Solicitors, appellant, the other party to the proceedings being: [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO), defendant at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), composed of C. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], A. Rosas (Rapporteur) and L. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: M. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], having regard to the decision taken, after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], to give a decision by reasoned order in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], makes the following [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1 By its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] seeks to have set aside the order of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 14 December 2018, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v EUIPO — Íslandsstofa ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) (T‑267/18, not published, ‘the order under appeal’, EU:T:2018:1014), by which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed as manifestly inadmissible the action seeking annulment of the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO) of 7 February 2018 ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] R 340/2017-5), relating to opposition proceedings between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Íslandsstofa (‘the contested decision’). 2 In support of its appeal, the appellant relies on three grounds of appeal alleging, respectively, infringement of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 71 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1), of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 72 of that regulation, and of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 126 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. The appeal 3 Pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], where the appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], decide by reasoned order to dismiss that appeal in whole or in part. 4 It is appropriate to apply that provision in the present case. 5 On 7 June 2019, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] took the following position: ‘1.      In support of its appeal, brought against the order under appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relies on three grounds. 2.      By its third ground, which it is appropriate to examine first, the appellant complains that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in its interpretation of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 126 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. According to the appellant, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in law by declaring the action inadmissible since, by the contested decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of EUIPO has definitely and unequivocally established its position on the existence of the absolute grounds for refusal. 3.      That ground of appeal is manifestly unfounded. According to settled case-law, noted in paragraph 15 of the order under appeal, any measure the legal effects of which are binding on, and capable of affecting the interests of the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position is an act which may be the subject of an action for a declaration that it is void. In the case of acts adopted by a procedure involving several stages, in particular where they are the culmination of an internal procedure, in principle an act is open to review only if it is a measure definitely laying down the position of the competent institution on the conclusion of that procedure, and not a provisional measure intended to pave the way for the final decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 November 1981, IBM v Commission , 60/81, EU:C:1981:264, paragraphs 9 and 10). The contested decision limits itself, first, to explaining the reasons why it is necessary to remit the case to the examiner and, second, to identifying the absolute grounds for refusal before being examined. Contrary to the appellant’s claim, the specific examination of those grounds is explicitly left to the examiner, as is clear from the operative part of the contested decision and as noted by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in paragraph 16 of the order under appeal. 4.      Therefore, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was entitled to hold that the action should be dismissed as being manifestly inadmissible. 5.      Thus, it is not necessary to examine the first and second grounds of the appeal. Those grounds relating to errors allegedly committed by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal in applying Articles 71 and 72 of Regulation 2017/1001 cannot succeed either. 6.      In any event, those grounds are manifestly inadmissible. It follows from [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 168(1)(d) and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 169(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice that an appeal must identify precisely the contested points in the grounds of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and indicate precisely the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal, failing which the appeal or ground of appeal concerned is inadmissible (see, to that effect, order of 19 March 2019, Sevenfriday v EUIPO , C‑734/18 P, not published, EU:C:2019:223, paragraph 5 (Position of [OSCURATO:PERSONA]Bordona, point 6 and the case-law cited)). Accordingly, an appeal which merely repeats or reproduces verbatim the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not satisfy the requirements to state reasons under those provisions. However, the points of law examined at first instance may be argued again in the course of an appeal, provided that the appellant challenges the interpretation or application of EU law by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 December 2015, Italy v Commission , C‑280/14 P, EU:C:2015:792, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited). 7.      I note at the outset that, in its appeal, the appellant merely reproduces certain arguments which it has put forward previously in its action before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in order to establish the errors allegedly committed by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal. The appellant does not indicate the contested points of the order under appeal. Furthermore, it could not be otherwise, because those arguments raise substantive issues which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was not required to examine on account of the manifest inadmissibility of the action. 8.      Having regard to the foregoing, I propose that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismiss the appeal as being manifestly unfounded.’ 6 For the same reasons as those given by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the appeal must be dismissed as being manifestly unfounded. Costs 7 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 137 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, applicable to the procedure on appeal pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) thereof, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings. In the present case, since this order was adopted before the appeal was served on the defendant at first instance and therefore before the latter could have incurred costs, it must be held that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is to bear its own costs. On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby orders: 1. The appeal is dismissed as being manifestly unfounded. 2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] shall bear its own costs. Luxembourg, 5 September 2019. A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] * Language of the case: English.
Sentenza Corte di giustizia UE n. 340/2019 — Fons Iuris — Fons Iuris