Corte di giustizia UE n. 528/2017

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) 19 July 2017 ( * ) (Appeal — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice –– [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EU) No 528/2012 — Making available on the market and use of biocidal products — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 95 — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) — Publication of a list of active substances — Inclusion of a company as a supplier of an active substance) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑666/16 P, APPEAL under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 21 December 2016, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] GmbH, established in Berlin (Germany), [OSCURATO:PERSONA] GmbH, established in Monheim (Germany), represented by M. Grunchard and K. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], avocats, and by P. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA], appellants, the other party to the proceedings being: [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), represented by M. Heikkilä and C. Buchanan, acting as Agents, and by P. Oliver, Barrister, defendant at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), composed of E. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], A. Arabadjiev and C.G. Fernlund ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: E. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], having decided, after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], to give a decision by reasoned order, pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, makes the following [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1 By their appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] GmbH (‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA]’) and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] GmbH (‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA]’) request that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice set aside the order of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 12 October 2016, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (T‑543/15, not published, ‘the order under appeal’, EU:T:2016:612), whereby the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed as inadmissible their action for annulment of the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) of 17 June 2015 concerning the inclusion of Oxea GmbH, established in Germany, as supplier of an active substance on the list referred to in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 95(1) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EU) No 528/2012 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the Council of 22 May 2012 concerning the making available on the market and use of biocidal products (OJ 2012 L 167, p. 1), (‘the decision at issue’). Background to the dispute 2 It is apparent from paragraphs 1 to 19 of the order under appeal that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] are members of the working group called ‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA]’. That working group was created in order to share the costs related to the submission of a review dossier concerning propyl alcohol in accordance with the EU legislation on biocidal products. After those companies notified that substance to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the latter designated the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Germany as [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for the purposes of examining that substance as an active substance. In their capacity as notifying companies, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submitted a dossier to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 3 On 29 January 2008, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] informed [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] that their dossier was complete. 4 On 21 August 2008 and 5 November 2008, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] asked for an in vivo study, ‘the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] study’, to be produced. 5 It is apparent from paragraph 9 of the order under appeal that, as at the date of that order, the dossier on propyl alcohol submitted by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was still being assessed. 6 Oxea is a member of a working group called ‘ASD [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2013, that working group contacted [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] with a view to possibly sharing data in accordance with Articles 62 and 63 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 528/2012. That request did not concern the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] test, but an inhalation toxicity study. ASD [OSCURATO:PERSONA] acquired a letter of access to the inhalation toxicity study. 7 On 24 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2014, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] published the list of the active substances provided for in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 95(1) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 528/2012 (‘the active substances list’). [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA], as well as the other members of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], were included on that list as suppliers of propyl alcohol as of February 2014. 8 On 25 January 2015, Oxea asked [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to be included on the active substances list as a supplier of propyl alcohol. 9 By the decision at issue, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] granted that request. 10 On 26 June 2015, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] updated the active substances list. 11 On 28 July 2015, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] asked [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to state whether it was of the view that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] study was not necessary for the inclusion of Oxea on the active substances list as a supplier of propyl alcohol, which [OSCURATO:PERSONA] confirmed by letter of 18 August 2015. 12 On 28 August 2015, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] lodged a notice of appeal against the decision at issue before the Board of Appeal of [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 13 By decision of 25 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2015, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of that board dismissed the appeal as manifestly inadmissible. The procedure before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the order under appeal 14 By application lodged at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 18 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2015, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] brought an action for annulment of the decision at issue. 15 By the order under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed the action as inadmissible and ordered [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to bear their own costs, and to pay those incurred by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] except for those relating to the applications for leave to intervene. 16 In order to rule on the plea of inadmissibility before it, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] examined whether the applicants could be considered directly concerned by the decision at issue, within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU. 17 In paragraph 33 of the order under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] referred to the settled case-law according to which for a person to be directly concerned by an EU measure, the measure must, first, directly affect his legal situation and, secondly, leave no discretion to the addressees of that measure who are entrusted with the task of implementing it, such implementation being purely automatic and resulting from EU rules without the application of other intermediate rules. 18 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] examined whether the decision at issue produces effects with regard to the applicants’ legal situation. On the grounds set out in paragraphs 38 to 75 of the order under appeal, it decided, in paragraph 76 of that order, to reject the applicants’ arguments seeking to demonstrate direct concern within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU. 19 After finding, in paragraphs 78 to 81 of the order under appeal, that the decision at issue did not amount to a regulatory act which does not entail implementing measures within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed the action in its entirety as inadmissible. Forms of order sought and procedure before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice 20 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claim that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice should: –        set aside the order under appeal; –        rule on admissibility and refer the case back to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to rule on the merits of the case; –        in the alternative, refer the case back to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to rule on the admissibility of the appellants’ application for annulment of the decision at issue and, as appropriate, thereafter to rule on the merits of the case; –        order [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to pay the costs. 21 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice should dismiss the appeal and order [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to pay the costs. 22 By document registered at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 4 April 2017, on the basis of the second paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Oxea applied for leave to intervene in support of the form of order sought by [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. The appeal 23 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of its rules of procedure, where an appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice may at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] and after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], decide by reasoned order to dismiss the appeal in whole or in part, without opening the oral procedure. 24 That provision must be applied in the present case. 25 In support of their appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] put forward three grounds of appeal. The first ground of appeal , alleging an infringement of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 130(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 26 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] complain that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] infringed [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 130(1) of its rules of procedure in rejecting, in paragraphs 49 to 68 of the order under appeal, their arguments relating to an infringement of their rights stemming from [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 63 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 528/2012. They submit that, pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 130(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the defendant must refrain from ‘going to the substance of the case’ when he raises a plea of inadmissibility. He should, therefore, restrict himself to arguments relating to direct or individual concern and to the concept of a ‘regulatory act’ without discussing the actual merits of the application or a potential defence. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] infringed that rule, however, in putting forward in its plea of inadmissibility arguments relating to the substance of the case. 27 In order to adjudicate on that plea, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ruled on those arguments on the substance of the case, since it held, in paragraph 59 of the order under appeal, that Oxea’s dossier was complete and it complained, in paragraph 60 of that order, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed to produce evidence to show the contrary. 28 However, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice points out that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 130(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] provides that ‘a defendant applying to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for a decision on inadmissibility or lack of competence without going to the substance of the case shall submit the application by a separate document within the time limit referred to in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 81’. It is apparent from those clear and unambiguous words that, in advancing a plea of inadmissibility in the form specified in that provision, a defendant requests the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to rule on inadmissibility ‘without going to the substance of the case’, that is, without the written part of the procedure following its normal course by the submission of a defence. 29 The plea of inadmissibility provided for in both [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 151 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 130 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] makes it possible, for reasons of economy of procedure, to confine the debate and examination, at an early stage in the proceedings, to the question whether the action at issue is admissible. Thus, it is possible, as a result of that plea, to avoid a situation in which the parties’ pleadings and the court’s examination go into the substance of the case, even though the action is inadmissible (judgment of 17 December 2009, Review M v EMEA , C‑197/09 RX‑II, EU:C:2009:804, paragraph 48). 30 On the other hand, where the action is declared admissible because the plea of inadmissibility is rejected or where a decision on that plea is reserved for the final judgment, there must be an exchange of arguments on the substance of the application at a subsequent stage. The provisions referred to above expressly provide that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is to prescribe new time limits for further steps in the proceedings if an application for a ruling on a plea of inadmissibility is dismissed or the decision on that application is reserved (judgment of 17 December 2009, Review M v EMEA , C‑197/09 RX-II, EU:C:2009:804, paragraph 49). 31 In addition, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] points out that, in the absence of any provision of the Rules of Procedure expressly providing to the contrary, the defendant is free to choose its arguments and cannot, therefore, when lodging a plea of inadmissibility in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 130(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], be prohibited from addressing the substance of the case. 32 Admittedly, it would be incompatible with the rationale of the rules on the plea of inadmissibility to require the defendant raising such a plea to put forward, as a matter of prudence, its arguments on the substance of the case (judgment of 17 December 2009, Review M v EMEA , C‑197/09 RX-II, EU:C:2009:804, paragraph 50). 33 However, it may, in certain situations, be useful, even necessary, for that defendant to address the substance of the case in its plea of inadmissibility. That is true, in particular, if there is a close connection between the pleas of inadmissibility and the substance of the action, or a close relationship between the question of admissibility of the various claims and the substance of the action (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 October 1977, Giry v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , 126/75, 34/76 and 92/76, EU:C:1977:169, paragraph 3, and of 15 March 1984, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , 64/82, EU:C:1984:106, paragraph 12). 34 It is, therefore, apparent from the foregoing that the first ground of appeal is based on a manifestly erroneous interpretation of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 130(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Consequently, the present ground of appeal must be rejected as manifestly unfounded. The second ground of appeal, alleging an infringement of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 130(7) of the Rules of the Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 35 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submit that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ought to have reserved its decision on the plea of inadmissibility until it ruled on the substance of the case, as it was allowed to do under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 130(7) of its rules of procedure. The issue of whether Oxea’s dossier was complete constitutes the basis of the present case. Resolving that issue required full elaboration of arguments (written and oral) thereon. 36 However, it must be borne in mind that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 130(7) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] provides that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ‘shall decide on the application as soon as possible or, where special circumstances so justify, reserve its decision until it rules on the substance of the case’. It is apparent from the clear and unambiguous words of that provision that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is under no duty to hold a hearing and that it has exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether to rule immediately on the objection of inadmissibility or to reserve its decision for the final judgment if special circumstances so require. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has, in that regard, a wide discretion (see, by analogy, orders of 7 December 2004, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑521/03 P, not published, EU:C:2004:778, paragraph 25; of 21 November 2005, SNF v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑482/04 P, not published, EU:C:2005:706, paragraph 30; and of 30 March 2006, EFfCI v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Council , C‑113/05 P, not published, EU:C:2006:222, paragraph 26). 37 It follows that in deciding in the present case to give its decision on the single plea of inadmissibility raised by [OSCURATO:PERSONA], without reserving that decision until it ruled on the substance of the case, on the ground that it had sufficient information from the documents before it, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] correctly applied [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 130(7) of its rules of procedure. 38 The second ground of appeal must, therefore, be rejected as manifestly unfounded. The third ground of appeal, alleging no access to justice and a failure to comply with the obligation to state reasons 39 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submit that the refusal of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to allow an oral hearing and/or other steps of written procedure denied them all effective judicial protection, because they have no legal remedy at the national level against the decision at issue. Secondly, they submit that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed to state reasons for its refusal to reserve its decision on the plea of inadmissibility until it ruled on the substance of the case. 40 As regards that second point, it suffices to note that it is apparent from the grounds stated in paragraphs 27 to 82 of the order under appeal, that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] set out to the requisite legal standard the reasons for which it had sufficient information from the documents before it and decided to give its decision without taking further steps in the proceedings. Consequently, the argument that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons is manifestly unfounded. 41 As regards the arguments relating to an infringement of the principle of effective judicial protection, it should be borne in mind that, in the system for reviewing the legality of EU acts, the fourth paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU provides for two situations in which natural or legal persons are accorded standing to institute proceedings against an act which is not addressed to them. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], such proceedings may be instituted if the act is of direct and individual concern to those persons. Secondly, they may bring proceedings against a regulatory act not entailing implementing measures if that act is of direct concern to them (judgment of 21 December 2016, Council v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑104/16 P, EU:C:2016:973, paragraph 130). 42 It must also be borne in mind that the condition that a natural or legal person must be directly concerned by the decision being challenged, as provided for in the fourth paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU, requires two cumulative criteria to be met, namely, first, the contested measure must directly affect the legal situation of the individual and, secondly, it must leave no discretion to its addressees, who are entrusted with the task of implementing it, such implementation being purely automatic and resulting from EU rules without the application of other intermediate rules (see, to that effect, order of 6 March 2014, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Agriculture and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑248/12 P, not published, EU:C:2014:137, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited). 43 Admittedly, the conditions of admissibility laid down in the fourth paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU are interpreted by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice in the light of the principle of effective judicial protection. However, that interpretation cannot have the effect of setting aside those conditions, which are expressly laid down in the FEU Treaty, without going beyond the jurisdiction conferred by that treaty on the EU Courts (judgment of 25 July 2002, Unión de [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Council , C‑50/00 P, EU:C:2002:462, paragraph 44; order of 30 March 2006, EFfCI v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Council , C‑113/05 P, not published, EU:C:2006:222, paragraph 56; and judgment of 28 April 2015, T & L Sugars and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑456/13 P, EU:C:2015:284, paragraph 44). 44 Consequently, in rejecting in paragraph 76 of the order under appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s line of argument seeking to demonstrate direct concern within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not fail to have regard to the principle of effective judicial protection, but correctly applied the conditions provided for in that provision of the Treaty. 45 The third ground of appeal is, therefore, manifestly unfounded. 46 It follows from all the foregoing considerations that the appeal brought by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must be dismissed as being manifestly unfounded. Application to intervene 47 Pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 129(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, intervention is to be ancillary to the main proceedings. It is to become devoid of purpose if the case is removed from the register of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in particular where the application is declared inadmissible. 48 Consequently, there is no longer any need to rule on the application to intervene of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Oxea. Costs 49 In accordance with the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], where the appeal is unfounded, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is to make a decision as to costs. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 138(1) of those rules of procedure, applicable to the procedure on appeal by virtue of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 50 Since [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has applied for costs to be awarded against [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and the latter have been unsuccessful, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must be ordered to pay the costs. 51 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 142 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which applies to the procedure on appeal pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) of those rules, where a case does not proceed to judgment the costs are to be in the discretion of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 52 In the present case, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Oxea are each to bear their own costs relating to the application for leave to intervene. On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby orders: 1. The appeal is dismissed. 2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] GmbH and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] GmbH shall pay the costs. 3. [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] GmbH, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] GmbH, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Oxea GmbH shall each bear their own costs relating to the application for leave to intervene. Luxembourg, 19 July 2017. A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] E. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] * Language of the case: English.