Corte di giustizia UE/2018

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) 7 June 2018 ( * ) (Appeal — Dumping — Imports of certain polyethylene terephthalate originating in India, Thailand and Taiwan — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2013/226/EU — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to terminate the expiry review proceeding without imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty — Non-contractual liability — Causal link — Obligation to state reasons) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑363/17 P, APPEAL under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 13 June 2017, [OSCURATO:SOCIETA], established in Milan (Italy), M&[OSCURATO:SOCIETA], established in Patrica (Italy), Novapet SA, established in Saragossa (Spain), represented by L. Ruessmann, avocat, and J. Beck, Solicitor, appellants, the other parties to the proceedings being: Committee of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (PET) Manufacturers in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (CPME), established in Brussels ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), [OSCURATO:PERSONA] SA, established in Madrid (Spain), [OSCURATO:PERSONA] sp. z o.o., established in Włocławek ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), [OSCURATO:PERSONA] UK Ltd, established in Cleveland ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), [OSCURATO:SOCIETA], established in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (Italy), UAB [OSCURATO:PERSONA], established in Klaipėda (Lithuania), UAB [OSCURATO:PERSONA], established in Rimkai (Lithuania), UAB [OSCURATO:PERSONA] pet, established in Klaipėda, applicants at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], represented by H. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], acting as Agent, and by B. O’Connor, Solicitor, and S. Gubel, avocat, defendant at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EFBW), established in Brussels, Caiba SA, established in Paterna (Spain), Coca-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] (CCEB), established in Anderlecht ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), Danone, established in Paris (France), [OSCURATO:PERSONA] & Technology, established in Issy-les-Moulineaux (France), [OSCURATO:PERSONA], established in London ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), [OSCURATO:PERSONA] BV, established in Rotterdam (Netherlands), interveners at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), composed of C. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], K. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and C. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (Rapporteur), [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: P. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], having regard to the written procedure, having decided, after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], to proceed to judgment without an Opinion, gives the following [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1 By their appeal, [OSCURATO:SOCIETA], M&[OSCURATO:SOCIETA] and Novapet SA ask the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to set aside the judgment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 5 April 2017, CPME and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (T‑422/13, ‘the judgment under appeal’, EU:T:2017:251), in so far as, by that judgment, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed their claims for compensation for the damage which they allegedly suffered on account of the illegality of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2013/226/EU of 21 May 2013 rejecting the proposal for a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] implementing regulation imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain polyethylene terephthalate originating in India, Taiwan and Thailand following an expiry review pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 11(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 1225/2009 and terminating the expiry review proceeding concerning imports of certain polyethylene terephthalate originating in Indonesia and Malaysia, in so far as the proposal would impose a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain polyethylene terephthalate originating in India, Taiwan and Thailand (OJ 2013 L 136, p. 12, ‘the decision at issue’). Legal context 2 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 11(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (OJ 2009 L 343, p. 51, and corrigendum OJ 2010 L 7, p. 22, ‘the basic regulation’), provides: ‘A definitive anti-dumping measure shall expire five years from its imposition or five years from the date of the conclusion of the most recent review which has covered both dumping and injury, unless it is determined in a review that the expiry would be likely to lead to a continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. Such an expiry review shall be initiated on the initiative of the [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] [OSCURATO:PERSONA], or upon request made by or on behalf of [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] producers, and the measure shall remain in force pending the outcome of such review. An expiry review shall be initiated where the request contains sufficient evidence that the expiry of the measures would be likely to result in a continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. Such likelihood may, for example, be indicated by evidence of continued dumping and injury or evidence that the removal of injury is partly or solely due to the existence of measures or evidence that the circumstances of the exporters, or market conditions, are such that they would indicate the likelihood of further injurious dumping. In carrying out investigations under this paragraph, the exporters, importers, the representatives of the exporting country and the [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] producers shall be provided with the opportunity to amplify, rebut or comment on the matters set out in the review request, and conclusions shall be reached with due account taken of all relevant and duly documented evidence presented in relation to the question as to whether the expiry of measures would be likely, or unlikely, to lead to the continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. A notice of impending expiry shall be published in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] at an appropriate time in the final year of the period of application of the measures as defined in this paragraph. Thereafter, the [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] producers shall, no later than three months before the end of the five-year period, be entitled to lodge a review request in accordance with the second subparagraph. A notice announcing the actual expiry of measures pursuant to this paragraph shall also be published.’ 3 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 21(1) of the basic regulation provides: ‘A determination as to whether the [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] interest calls for intervention shall be based on an appreciation of all the various interests taken as a whole, including the interests of the domestic industry and users and consumers, and a determination pursuant to this [OSCURATO:PERSONA] shall only be made where all parties have been given the opportunity to make their views known pursuant to paragraph 2. In such an examination, the need to eliminate the trade distorting effects of injurious dumping and to restore effective competition shall be given special consideration. Measures, as determined on the basis of the dumping and injury found, may not be applied where the authorities, on the basis of all the information submitted, can clearly conclude that it is not in the [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] interest to apply such measures.’ Background to the dispute 4 [OSCURATO:SOCIETA], M&[OSCURATO:SOCIETA] and Novapet are [OSCURATO:PERSONA] producers of polyethylene terephthalate (‘PET’). 5 Since 2000, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had been imposing anti-dumping duties on imports of certain PET from, inter alia, India, Taiwan and Thailand. 6 On 25 November 2011, following the publication in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the Notice of the impending expiry of certain anti-dumping measures (OJ 2011 C 122, p. 10), which included the duties mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] received a request from the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] PET producer industry for the initiation of an expiry review in respect of those duties on the basis of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 11(2) of the basic regulation. After announcing, on 24 February 2012, the initiation of such a review and carrying out an investigation, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submitted to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], on 23 April 2013, a proposal for an anti-dumping regulation extending the anti-dumping duties in question for a further period of five years, on the ground that, in the event of their expiry, there would be a likelihood of a continuation of dumping and recurrence of injury to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] industry and that extending those duties was not against the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] interest. 7 By the decision at issue, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] rejected the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s proposal ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1) and terminated the review proceeding concerning imports of PET ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2). [OSCURATO:PERSONA] stated that it had not been made out that a recurrence of injury would be likely if the anti-dumping measures were allowed to lapse (recital 5), and such a recurrence was even unlikely (recital 17). [OSCURATO:PERSONA] added that it was clearly not in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] interest to extend those measures, as the resulting costs to importers, users and consumers were disproportionate to the benefits for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] industry (recital 23). The procedure before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the judgment under appeal 8 By application lodged at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 14 August 2013, the applicants at first instance — an association of EU producers of PET and 11 EU producers of PET, which included [OSCURATO:SOCIETA], M&[OSCURATO:SOCIETA] and Novapet — brought an application before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU, seeking annulment in part of the decision at issue and, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 268 TFEU, an order that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] compensate the PET producers for the damage allegedly suffered on account of the unlawful adoption of that decision. 9 Further to the hearing on 28 June 2016, the applicants at first instance, having been authorised to that effect by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], lodged a submission for the purposes of updating their claim for damages. 10 In support of their application for annulment of the decision at issue, the applicants at first instance relied on three pleas in law. 11 In the context of the second plea in law, they submitted that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s conclusions in recitals 17 and 23 of the decision at issue according to which, on the one hand, the expiry of the measures was unlikely to lead to the recurrence of material injury and, on the other, the extension of the anti-dumping duties at issue was clearly not in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] interest, constituted manifest errors of assessment and infringed [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 11(2) and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 21(1) of the basic regulation, respectively. 12 As regards their claim for damages, the applicants at first instance argued that, following the decision at issue, they had been forced to maintain their EU sales prices at loss-making levels, in order to compete with dumped imports from India, Taiwan and Thailand. That loss was due, according to them, to the difference between their earnings before interest, taxes and amortisation (‘EBITA’) during the period between April 2012 and March 2013 and the EBITA estimated for the period from June 2013 to May 2014. 13 However, as part of the updating of their claim for damages, the applicants at first instance stated that only [OSCURATO:SOCIETA], M&[OSCURATO:SOCIETA] and Novapet maintained their claims for compensation for the losses incurred, and only for the period from June 2013 to February 2014. They explained that the entry into force of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2014/109/EU of 4 February 2014 repealing [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2000/745/EC accepting undertakings offered in connection with the anti-dumping and anti-subsidy proceedings concerning imports of certain polyethylene terephthalate (PET) originating, inter alia, in India (OJ 2014 L 59, p. 35), had led to a considerable drop in imports of PET from India to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] as from 1 March 2014. 14 By the judgment under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] allowed the second plea in law and annulled the decision at issue in part, without examining the first and third pleas in law of the application for annulment. 15 By contrast, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed the claim for damages, on the ground, set out in paragraph 187 of the judgment under appeal, that ‘the information provided by the applicants [at first instance] in the context of the update [of their claim for damages] d[id] not make it possible to establish to the requisite legal standard that there is a causal link between the … adoption of the [decision at issue] and the alleged losses’. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] explained, in paragraph 188 of the judgment under appeal, that ‘the applicants [at first instance had not made] a distinction, in the reduction of their EBITA, between the part which [had been] caused by the increase in imports at low prices following the … adoption of the [decision at issue] and that resulting from other factors likely to cause or lead to a decrease in that single economic indicator’. Consequently, in paragraph 189 of the judgment under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concluded that the applicants at first instance, which included [OSCURATO:SOCIETA], M&[OSCURATO:SOCIETA] and Novapet ‘ha[d] not established the existence of a direct and sufficient causal link capable of engaging the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] liability’. Forms of order sought by the parties before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice 16 By their appeal, [OSCURATO:SOCIETA], M&[OSCURATO:SOCIETA] and Novapet claim that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should: –        declare the appeal admissible and well founded; –        set aside the judgment under appeal in so far as it dismisses the claims for compensation for damage; –        rule on the substance of the claims for compensation for damage and award the appellants the damages claimed, or refer the case back to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for a decision on the substance of those claims; –        order the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to pay the appellants’ costs. 17 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should: –        dismiss the appeal in its entirety as inadmissible; –        in the alternative, dismiss the appeal as unfounded; –        order the appellants to pay the costs of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in these proceedings. The appeal 18 In support of their appeal, the appellants raise a single ground of appeal, alleging that, in finding that there was no direct and sufficient causal link between the unlawful adoption of the decision at issue and the damage incurred capable of engaging the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] liability, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] distorted the evidence submitted by them. Admissibility 19 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that the appeal is inadmissible, arguing that, by their single ground of appeal, the appellants in fact contest the assessment of the facts carried out by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], whereas such an assessment is not subject to review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice and no distortion of the facts or evidence has been proven. 20 It must be noted that, under the second subparagraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 256(1) TFEU and the first paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], an appeal is to be limited to points of law. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], consequently, has exclusive jurisdiction to find and assess the relevant facts and the evidence submitted to it. The assessment of those facts and that evidence thus do not, except when the facts or evidence are distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject as such to review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice in an appeal. Such a distortion must be obvious from the documents on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence (judgments of 18 March 2010, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Makarov v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑419/08 P, EU:C:2010:147, paragraphs 31 and 32, and of 26 October 2017, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑457/16 P and C‑459/16 P to C‑461/16 P, not published, EU:C:2017:819, paragraph 25). 21 In the present case, by their single ground of appeal, the appellants complain that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed, without any justification, to examine the adjustments and explanations provided in their updated damages claim, in particular those relating to the limitation in time of that claim, the choice of the EBITA indicator, the imports from Malaysia and Indonesia, raw material price fluctuations, extraordinary income and costs, and overall market developments. They state that while the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] acknowledged, in paragraphs 165 and 176 to 178 of the judgment under appeal, that they had accounted for the potential impact of several factors when they assessed the causal link between the unlawful adoption of the decision at issue and their alleged damage, it did not adjudicate on the relevance of those factors when determining the causal link. 22 Consequently, contrary to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s contentions, the appellants cannot be considered to be seeking from the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, by their single ground of appeal, a new assessment of the facts and evidence. Indeed, first, they dispute that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], relying solely on the factors referred to in paragraph 188 of the judgment under appeal and failing to take into account the information which they had produced in the context of the updating of the claim for damages, could have validly concluded that they had not established a causal link between the decision at issue and the damage alleged. Such a question is a question of law which may be subject to review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice in an appeal (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2009, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑440/07 P, EU:C:2009:459, paragraphs 192 and 193). 23 Secondly, the appellants complain that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed to state the reasons for which the factors mentioned in paragraph 21 above were insufficient or irrelevant in order to establish such a causal link. 24 The question of whether the grounds of a judgment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] are inadequate is also a question of law which is amenable, as such, to judicial review on appeal (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 September 2008, FIAMM and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑120/06 P and C‑121/06 P, EU:C:2008:476, paragraph 90, and of 26 May 2016, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑224/15 P, EU:C:2016:358, paragraph 26). 25 It follows that since the single ground of appeal is admissible, the plea of inadmissibility raised by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must be rejected. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the parties 26 By their single ground of appeal, the appellants submit that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] conclusions in paragraphs 187 to 189 of the judgment under appeal constitute an incorrect presentation and distortion of the evidence provided in their updated damages claim. They complain that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] accepted, without requiring any evidence in that regard, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s allegations, according to which factors other than those concerned by the evidence submitted by the appellants could have had an impact on their performance. 27 In their updated damages claim, of all the known factors other than the decision at issue, the appellants examined those which could have had an impact on their EBITA. Indeed, as is apparent from paragraphs 165 and 176 to 178 of the judgment under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] itself acknowledged that, in that updating, they had accounted for the potential impact of several other factors when establishing the causal link between the adoption of the decision at issue and their alleged damage. 28 However, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] incorrectly found, in paragraph 188 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellants had not made a distinction, with regard to the origin of their loss, between the part caused by the increase in imports at low prices from India, Taiwan and Thailand, following the unlawful adoption of the decision at issue, and that resulting from other factors. In so doing, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed to take into account the adjustments made and explanations given in the updated damages claim. In that context, the appellants submit that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not explain the reasons for which the information they had provided was not capable, in its view, of establishing to the requisite legal standard that there was a causal link. 29 By way of example, the appellants submit that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed, in paragraph 187 et seq. of the judgment under appeal, to take into consideration the fact that they had, in their updated damages claim, limited that claim solely to the period from June 2013 to February 2014, acknowledging that after that period certain factors occurred that were likely to break the causal link for subsequent periods. 30 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] also failed, first, to take into account the fact that the appellants, in relying on EBITA, had excluded other potential sources of losses, such as capital expenditures or factory closure costs. Secondly, it failed to analyse the fact that the appellants claimed only 77% of their EBITA losses as damages because they attributed 23% of their EBITA losses to imports from Malaysia and Indonesia, although the EU market share of those countries was only 1.7%. Similarly, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not examine whether such a very conservative approach was reasonably likely to cover potential similar impacts, such as the change in competition between EU companies. 31 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] also failed to examine the appellants’ explanations as to why raw material price fluctuations had had no impact on the damage sustained, and the exclusion, by one of the appellants, of some extraordinary costs from its damages calculation. 32 Lastly, in paragraph 188 of the judgment under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed to examine the impact of the market share increase by over 47% of the imports from India, Taiwan and Thailand between the periods compared for the purposes of calculating damages. 33 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] disputes the appellants’ arguments. Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 34 By their single ground of appeal, the appellants dispute paragraphs 187 and 188 of the judgment under appeal, in that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held there that ‘the information provided by [them] in the context of the update [of their claim for damages] d[id] not make it possible to establish to the requisite legal standard that there is a causal link between the … adoption of the [decision at issue] and the alleged losses’ (paragraph 187) and that ‘[they had not made] a distinction, in the reduction of their EBITA, between the part which would be caused by the increase in imports at low prices following the … adoption of the [decision at issue] and that resulting from other factors likely to cause or lead to a decrease in that single economic indicator’ (paragraph 188). Consequently, they dispute the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] conclusion, in paragraph 189 of the judgment under appeal, that ‘[they had] not established the existence of a direct and sufficient causal link capable of engaging the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] liability’. 35 First, the appellants submit, in essence, that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in law in failing to assess the information provided in the context of the updating of their damages claim, whereas that information was relevant for determining whether there was a causal link between the unlawful adoption of the decision at issue and their alleged damage. 36 In that connection, it must be borne in mind that, according to the settled case-law of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in order for the non-contractual liability of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to be capable of being engaged, the damage must flow sufficiently directly from the unlawful conduct of the institutions (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 March 2010, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Makarov v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑419/08 P, EU:C:2010:147, paragraph 53, and of 30 May 2017, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑45/15 P, EU:C:2017:402, paragraph 61). 37 It is for the party seeking to establish the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] non-contractual liability to adduce conclusive proof as to the existence and extent of the damage it alleges and as to the existence of a sufficiently direct causal nexus between the conduct of the EU institutions objected to and the damage alleged (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 May 2017, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑45/15 P, EU:C:2017:402, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited). 38 In the present case, it must be noted that in order to reach the conclusion, in paragraph 189 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellants had not established the existence of such a causal link between the decision at issue and the damage alleged, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] found, in paragraph 188 of that judgment, that ‘[t]he EBITA [could] have been influenced by factors other than the [decision at issue], in particular, changes in sales practices, competition between EU producers and competition between their products and imports from countries other than India, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia’, noting, in that regard, that ‘during the period from June 2013 to February 2014, imports from India, Taiwan and Thailand [had] represented only 5.6% of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] consumption and those from Malaysia and Indonesia 1.72%’. 39 However, the appellants do not dispute the relevance of the factors thereby relied on by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for determining whether or not there was a sufficiently direct causal link between the unlawful adoption of the decision at issue and the reduction in their EBITA. 40 By contrast, while accepting implicitly that the factors relied on by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in paragraph 188 of the judgment under appeal were capable of influencing their EBITA, the appellants submit that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ought to have examined whether the fact that they claimed only 77% of their EBITA losses as damages, in attributing 23% of those losses to imports from Malaysia and Indonesia, although the EU market share of those countries was only 1.7%, could also cover potential impacts of the change in competition between EU companies. 41 In that regard, it must be pointed out, first, that as has been noted in paragraph 37 above, it was for the appellants to adduce conclusive proof as to the existence of a sufficiently direct causal nexus between the adoption of the decision at issue and the damage alleged. It was not, therefore, for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to attempt to deduce the existence of such a link, by referring to calculations which, at least expressly, did not take into account all the relevant factors. Secondly, the appellants do not state that the possible effect on the decrease of their EBITA of changes in sales practices and of the imports from countries other than India, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia had been accounted for in the evidence they submitted to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 42 In those circumstances, it is irrelevant that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may have failed to take into account in its analysis certain adjustments and explanations provided by the appellants in their updated damages claim, the purpose of which was to make a distinction, in the reduction of their EBITA, between the part caused by the increase in imports from India, Taiwan and Thailand following the adoption of the decision at issue and that resulting from other factors, since the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held that, notwithstanding that information submitted by the appellants, other factors could have influenced their EBITA. 43 It follows that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not err as to the characterisation of the facts when it held, in paragraph 189 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellants had not established the existence of a direct and sufficient causal link capable of engaging the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] liability. 44 Secondly, as regards the appellants’ submission that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] infringed its obligation to state reasons, it should be borne in mind that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is not required to provide reasons for each of its choices where it relies on one item of evidence as opposed to another in support of its decision (judgments of 16 February 2012, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] NTRP , C‑191/09 P and C‑200/09 P, EU:C:2012:78, paragraph 161, and of 7 April 2016, ArcelorMittal [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑186/14 P and C‑193/14 P, EU:C:2016:209, paragraph 40). 45 However, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] obligation to state reasons is intended to enable the persons concerned to know the reasons which led it to adopt the judgment in question and provide the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review (judgment of 14 March 2013, Viega v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑276/11 P, not published, EU:C:2013:163, paragraph 44). 46 In that regard, it is clear from established case-law that the obligation to state reasons does not require the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to provide an account which follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments put forward by the parties to the case and that the reasoning may be implicit on condition that it enables the persons concerned to know why the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has not upheld their arguments and provides the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review (judgments of 16 July 2009, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑440/07 P, EU:C:2009:459, paragraph 135, and of 16 February 2012, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] NTRP , C‑191/09 P and C‑200/09 P, EU:C:2012:78, paragraph 105). 47 In the present case, the appellants submit that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not set out the reasons for which the evidence provided in the context of their updated damages claim was insufficient to establish a causal link between the unlawful adoption of the decision at issue and the damage alleged. 48 However, since, in paragraph 188 of the judgment under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] listed factors which, notwithstanding the unlawful adoption of the decision at issue, were likely to cause or lead to a reduction in the appellants’ EBITA, and stated that the appellants had not made a distinction, in that reduction, between the part entailed by the unlawful adoption of that decision and that attributable to those factors, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] implicitly but necessarily considered that the evidence put forward by the appellants did not enable a direct and sufficient causal link to be established between that decision and the damage allegedly sustained. 49 Thus, the explanations in paragraph 188 of the judgment under appeal were such as to enable the appellants to know the reasons for which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not uphold their arguments relating to the existence of such a causal link and to provide the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review. 50 The appellants are not, therefore, justified in maintaining that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] infringed its obligation to state reasons. 51 Accordingly, the appellants’ single ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded. 52 Consequently, the appeal must be dismissed. Costs 53 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], where the appeal is unfounded, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is to make a decision as to the costs. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 138(1) of those rules, applicable to the procedure on appeal by virtue of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 54 Since the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has applied for costs to be awarded against the appellants and they have been unsuccessful, the appellants must be ordered to pay the costs. On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby: 1. Dismisses the appeal; 2. [OSCURATO:SOCIETA], M&[OSCURATO:SOCIETA] and Novapet SA to pay the costs. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in open court in Luxembourg on 7 June 2018. A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] * Language of the case: English.