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Corte di giustizia UEsentenza

Corte di giustizia UE n. 2017/2024

ECLI:EU:T:2024:14
Testo integrale del provvedimento

Testo integrale del provvedimento

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA])

16 January 2024 ( * ) (Action for annulment – Institutional law – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – Request for the lifting of parliamentary immunity by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – Decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to announce this request to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and refer it to the Committee of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – Acts not open to challenge – Inadmissibility)

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑46/23,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA],

residing in Ixelles (Belgium), represented by S. Pappas, lawyer, applicant, v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA],

represented by N. Lorenz and A.-M. Dumbrăvan, acting as Agents, and

[OSCURATO:PERSONA],

represented by L. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], C. Charalambous, and E. Farhat, acting as Agents, defendants,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]),

composed of K. Kowalik-Bańczyk, [OSCURATO:PERSONA], G. Hesse and B. Ricziová (Rapporteur), [OSCURATO:PERSONA],

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]: V. [OSCURATO:PERSONA],

having regard to the written part of the procedure, including: – the plea of inadmissibility put forward by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] by separate document lodged at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 20 April 2023, – the plea of inadmissibility put forward by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] by separate document lodged at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 21 April 2023, – the applicant’s observations on the plea of inadmissibility lodged at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 5 June 2023, makes the following

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

1 By her action pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU, the applicant, [OSCURATO:PERSONA], seeks the annulment, first, of the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 15 December 2022 to lift her parliamentary immunity and, second, of the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to announce that request to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and refer it to the Committee of [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

Background to the dispute 2 By letter of 15 December 2022, sent to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] requested, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 29(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (‘the EPPO’) (OJ 2017 L 283, p. 1), the lifting of the privileges and immunities of two Members of [OSCURATO:PERSONA], including the applicant, and of six accredited parliamentary assistants.

It was stated therein that those persons were the subject of an investigation by the EPPO concerning the management of parliamentary allowances. 3 By letter of 9 January 2023 sent to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] stated that, as regards the Members of [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in addition to Articles 11, 17 and 19 to 22 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7 on the privileges and immunities of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (OJ 2016 C 202, p. 266) (‘the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on privileges and immunities’), her request of 15 December 2022 must also be understood as referring to Articles 8 and 9 of that protocol. 4 On 10 January 2023, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA][OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] sent a letter to the applicant to inform her that the EPPO had submitted a request to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to lift her parliamentary immunity and that, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 9(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], that request would be announced in plenary session and referred to the Committee of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (‘the letter of 10 January 2023’).

The applicant was also informed that she could consult the file in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s premises in Brussels (Belgium) and Strasbourg (France). 5 By letter dated 11 January 2023, the Head of the Members’ administration Unit in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] sent the letter of 10 January 2023 to the applicant’s lawyer and invited him to consult the EPPO’s file. 6 At the plenary session of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 18 January 2023, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] announced that she had received the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] request.

That request was referred to the Committee of [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

Forms of order sought 7 The applicant claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should: – annul the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 15 December 2022 and the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], disclosed by the letter of 10 January 2023, to send that request to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and refer it to the Committee of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (‘the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’); – order the EPPO and the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to pay the costs. 8 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends, in essence, that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should: – dismiss the action as inadmissible; – order the applicant to pay the costs. 9 The EPPO contends that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should: – dismiss the action as inadmissible; – order the applicant to pay the costs.

Law 10 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 130(1) and (7) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], on the application of the defendant, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may decide on inadmissibility or lack of competence without going to the substance of the case.

In the present case, as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the EPPO have each requested a ruling on inadmissibility, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], considering that it has sufficient information from the documents in the case file, hereby decides to give a ruling regarding those requests without taking further steps in the proceedings.

The request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 11 The EPPO raises a plea of inadmissibility of the action on the ground that the request of its [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 15 December 2022 is not an act open to challenge under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU.

Principally, it submits, in essence, that that request does not produce binding legal effects as regards the applicant.

The request is a preliminary step which initiates the procedure for the lifting of the applicant’s immunity before the competent institution.

It follows that, first, the said request is not an act that is open to challenge under the first paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU.

Secondly, the applicant is not directly concerned by the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

Thirdly, the applicant does not have any interest in the present case in seeking the annulment of that request, since that annulment cannot, in itself, procure a benefit for her.

In the alternative, if the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considers that that request produces legal effects as regards the applicant, the EPPO submits that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not have jurisdiction to review that request. 12 The applicant disputes the EPPO’s arguments. 13 The applicant alleges, inter alia, that the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 15 December 2022 is amenable to review given that the introduction of that request is mandatory where the conditions set out in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 29(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2017/1939 are met.

In addition, such a request obliges the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to act, the latter having responsibility for its implementation, in principal with no discretion, and the subsequent act of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] will automatically have serious consequences for the applicant’s legal situation.

Accordingly, the applicant is ultimately directly and seriously affected by the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] by being the subject of a procedure in which she is the ‘defendant, defending her immunity, which for a politician and regulator constitutes a severe moral and reputational damage even if at the end the waiver is not granted’.

She also submits that that request produces, taking account of its content, legal effects in her regard. 14 In addition, the applicant states that, having regard to its own effects, the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should be detached from the subsequent steps which could lead to the lifting of her immunity.

Moreover, that request contains a definitive position of the EPPO. 15 In accordance with the second sentence of the first paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is to review the legality of acts of bodies, offices or agencies of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. 16 In those circumstances, according to settled case-law, where, as in the present case, the applicant is a natural or legal person, only measures the legal effects of which are binding on, and capable of affecting the interests of, the applicant by bringing about a distinct change to his or her legal position may be the subject of an action for annulment under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU (judgments of 11 November 1981, IBM v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

, 60/81, EU:C:1981:264, paragraph 9, and of 26 January 2010,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

, C‑362/08 P, EU:C:2010:40, paragraph 51). 17 Thus, it is in principle those measures which definitively determine the position of an institution upon the conclusion of an administrative procedure, and which are intended to have legal effects capable of affecting the interests of the applicant, that constitute acts open to challenge, and not intermediate measures whose purpose is to prepare for the final decision, which do not have those effects (judgment of 6 May 2021, ABLV Bank and Others v ECB , C‑551/19 P and C‑552/19 P, EU:C:2021:369, paragraph 39). 18 It would be otherwise only if acts or decisions adopted in the course of the preparatory proceedings were themselves the culmination of a special procedure distinct from the main procedure and themselves produce independent legal effects and must therefore be capable of forming the subject matter of an action for annulment in order to ensure sufficient legal protection (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 November 1981, IBM v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

, 60/81, EU:C:1981:264, paragraph 11, and of 13 October 2011, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Germany v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA],

C‑463/10 P and C‑475/10 P, EU:C:2011:656, paragraphs 53 and 54). 19 In order to determine whether the contested act produces binding legal effects, it is necessary to examine the substance of that act and to assess its effects on the basis of objective criteria, such as the content of that act, taking into account, where appropriate, the context in which it was adopted and the powers of the institution which adopted the act (see judgment of 20 February 2018, Belgium v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

, C‑16/16 P, EU:C:2018:79, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited; judgment of 9 July 2020,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

, C‑575/18 P, EU:C:2020:530, paragraph 47). 20 In the present case, the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 15 December 2022 was submitted to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on the basis of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 29(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2017/1939, according to which, where the investigations of the EPPO involve persons protected by privileges or immunities under EU law, in particular the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on privileges and immunities, and such privilege or immunity presents an obstacle to a specific investigation being conducted, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is to make a reasoned written request for its lifting in accordance with the procedures laid down by EU law. 21 As regards the content of the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], it merely asks the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to lift the applicant’s immunity and refers, in an annex, to the type of irregularities that are the subject matter of the investigation.

That request does not contain any definitive position by the EPPO as regards the investigation opened in relation to the applicant. 22 As regards the context of the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the EPPO’s powers, it follows from the wording of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 29(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2017/1939 and of the general scheme of the regulation that the request to lift immunity is a preliminary and necessary measure, made available to the EPPO by the EU legislature, in order to ensure the effectiveness of the investigations where the immunity from which a person benefits is an obstacle to an investigation relating to him or her. 23 Furthermore, it must be recalled that the third paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 9 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on privileges and immunities confers on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] the exclusive right to waive the immunity provided for in that article, that is to say, the right to deprive a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the protection he or she enjoys under that provision.

Such a decision constitutes an act open to challenge for the purposes of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU (judgment of 15 October 2008, Mote v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

, T‑345/05, EU:T:2008:440, paragraph 31).

The exercise of that right means that a request for waiver of immunity has been made to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] by a competent authority.

That authority has thus already found that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concerned enjoyed the immunity provided for in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 9 of that protocol in a given procedure and requested the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to waive that immunity in order to continue those proceedings.

It is thus for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to decide whether or not to waive that immunity (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 January 2013, Gollnisch v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

, T‑346/11 and T‑347/11, EU:T:2013:23, paragraph 59, and of 5 July 2023 , Puigdemont i Casamajó and Comín i Oliveres v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

, T‑115/20, under appeal, EU:T:2023:372, paragraph 62). 24 It follows that the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not entail, in itself, the lifting of the applicant’s immunity and is not capable of having any impact whatsoever on her rights or obligations.

That request has the sole legal effect of seising the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which is the sole authority competent to make the decision and, where appropriate, to lift the applicant’s immunity.

So long as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has not taken such a decision, the applicant continues to benefit from the protection of the privileges and immunities granted by EU law. 25 Having regard to those considerations, it must be held that the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 15 December 2022, first, is not capable of producing binding legal effects that may affect the applicant’s interests by bringing about a distinct change to her legal situation and, secondly, that it is a preliminary measure which does not constitute the culmination of a special procedure distinct from that opened before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the possible illegalities of which could, if necessary, be relied on in support of an action directed against the final act, namely the possible decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relating to the lifting of the applicant’s immunity, of which the said request constitutes a preparatory step (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 November 1981, IBM v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

, 60/81, EU:C:1981:264, paragraph 12, and of 19 June 2015, Italy v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA],

T‑358/11, EU:T:2015:394, paragraph 26). 26 The arguments put forward by the applicant are not such as to call that conclusion into question. 27 In the first place, the applicant submits that the interpretation of the concept of a legal act, which appears in paragraphs 35 to 37 of the judgment of 10 May 2017, Efler and Others v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

(T‑754/14, EU:T:2017:323), should be applied, by analogy, in the present case.

It should be observed that, in paragraphs 34 to 36 of that judgment, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held that the concept of a legal act, for the purposes of a citizens’ initiative pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EU) No 211/2011 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 16 February 2011 on the citizens’ initiative (OJ 2011 L 65, p. 1), is not limited only to definitive [OSCURATO:PERSONA] legal acts which produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties, but also includes acts such as a decision authorising the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to open negotiations with a view to concluding an international agreement, which are preparatory and produce legal effects between the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and its [OSCURATO:PERSONA] as well as between the institutions of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

In that regard, it must be held that that interpretation cannot be transposed to the present case given that the concept of an act that is open to challenge in the context of an action for annulment brought by a natural or legal person on the basis of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU is narrower and is limited to acts that produce binding legal effects on the applicant only, to the exclusion, in principle, of intermediate measures (see the case-law cited in paragraphs 16 to 18 above).

In those circumstances, and as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] rightly submits, in essence, the wide interpretation of the concept of a legal act in the light of the objective of the Treaties of promoting the participation of citizens in the exercise of public power by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] cannot validly be relied on by the applicant in order to widen or relax the admissibility criteria for actions for annulment brought under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU. 28 In the second place, as regards the applicant’s argument that the procedure opened by the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] would cause severe moral damage and harm her reputation, it must be observed that the alleged damage and harm does not concern the applicant’s legal situation, but her material and moral situation. 29 In the third place, as regards the applicant’s argument alleging that the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should be detached from the subsequent steps that could lead to the lifting of her immunity, it suffices to observe that it is clear from paragraphs 20 to 25 above that that request, first, does not constitute the culmination of a special procedure distinct from that opened before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and, second, does not produce any independent legal effects as regards the applicant. 30 In the fourth place, the applicant refers to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 47 of the Charter of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (‘the Charter’) enshrining the right to an effective remedy and submits that national remedies do not have effects equivalent to those before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], to the extent that Greek ordinary and criminal courts do not have jurisdiction to annul an act of a public authority.

Furthermore, not all national courts participate in the enhanced cooperation established by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2017/1939, and those which do participate do not offer the same legal protection. 31 In that regard it suffices to recall that, although the requirement as to binding legal effects must be interpreted in the light of the right to effective judicial protection as guaranteed in the first paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 47 of the Charter, that right is not intended to change the system of judicial review laid down by the Treaties, and particularly the rules relating to the admissibility of direct actions brought before the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (see judgment of 3 October 2013, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraph 97 and the case-law cited).

Thus, the interpretation of the concept of ‘actionable measure’ in the light of that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 47 cannot have the effect of setting aside that condition without going beyond the jurisdiction conferred by the Treaty on the EU Courts (judgment of 25 October 2017, Slovakia v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

, C‑593/15 P and C‑594/15 P, EU:C:2017:800, paragraph 66; see also, by analogy, judgment of 12 September 2006, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

, C‑131/03 P, EU:C:2006:541, paragraph 81). 32 It follows from all of the foregoing that the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is not capable of being challenged by the applicant by means of an action for annulment under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU.

The plea of inadmissibility raised by the EPPO must therefore be upheld, without it being necessary to examine its other arguments.

The decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 33 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] raises a plea of inadmissibility of the action inter alia on the ground, in essence, that the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not produce binding legal effects vis-à-vis third parties and does not constitute a final decision, but the start of an internal procedure, such that it does not constitute an ‘actionable measure’ within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU. 34 The applicant disputes the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s arguments. 35 The applicant observes, first of all, that the lifting of the immunity of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is subject to a complex parliamentary procedure that comprises the proposal of the responsible committee and the final decision of the plenary, ‘while the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]] opening this procedure remains distinct’. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is under duty to satisfy himself or herself of the fundamental legitimacy of the request for the lifting of immunity by checking that it originates from a competent authority and, in so doing, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] takes an independent decision that is ‘separate from the following complex procedure’. 36 In addition, the applicant states that the opening of the parliamentary procedure has a particular impact on her situation ‘as it is timely interlinked with a criminal case of major importance (Qatargate)’.

The mere announcement of the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 15 December 2022 at the plenary session of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] seriously affected the applicant politically and interfered with the proceedings before the Belgian judicial authorities. 37 In addition, the applicant alleges that the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is open to challenge, since, if the EPPO could dispute the rejection by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of its request for immunity to be lifted, the applicant must also have the right to challenge the opposite decision agreeing to commence the procedure for the lifting of immunity. 38 In the present case, in accordance with the case-law recalled in paragraphs 16 to 18 above, it must be ascertained whether, having regard to the criteria set out there, the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] produces binding legal effects that may affect the applicant’s interests, including, inter alia, the conditions under which she performs her mandate as a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of [OSCURATO:PERSONA], by bringing about a distinct change to her legal situation, or whether that decision is a preparatory measure. 39 To that end, it should be recalled, first, as regards the content of the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], that that decision covers the announcement, at the plenary session of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], of the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 15 December 2022 for the applicant’s parliamentary immunity to be lifted and the referral to the Committee of [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

That decision therefore does not contain any final or even provisional position as to the legal situation of the applicant, including as to the merits of that request. 40 Secondly, as regards the context of the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the latter’s powers, it should be observed that the announcement in plenary session of a request for the lifting of immunity of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and its referral to the Committee of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is part of a procedure that is comprised of many stages, at the end of which, in accordance with the third paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 9 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on privileges and immunities, the final decision is taken by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] itself (see paragraph 23 above). 41 It follows that, as is the case for the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not produce binding legal effects that may affect the applicant’s interests by bringing about a distinct change to her legal situation.

In that regard, it must be observed that, until the final decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is taken, the applicant continues to benefit from the protection of the privileges and immunities granted by EU law.

Furthermore, it must be held that the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] constitutes a preparatory act. 42 Effective judicial protection as regards that decision is ensured for the applicant by means, inter alia, of an action pursuant [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU that will be available to her before the EU judicature against the final decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], through which she will be able to rely, as the case may be, on possible illegalities that may vitiate the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 43 The arguments put forward by the applicant are not such as to call those findings into question. 44 In the first place, the applicant submits that the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must be open to challenge since it remains separate from the parliamentary procedure that includes the final decision of the plenary assembly, because the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has a duty to check the fundamental legitimacy of the request for immunity to be lifted.

That argument is not capable of succeeding.

As follows from the analysis in paragraphs 38 to 42 above, the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], first, does not constitute the culmination of a special procedure distinct from that opened before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and, secondly, does not produce any independent legal effects as regards the applicant. 45 In the second place, as regards the applicant’s claim that the mere announcement in plenary session of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] would seriously affect the applicant politically and would have an ‘impact’ on the ongoing proceedings before the Belgian judicial authorities in the ‘Qatargate’ case, it must be held that the applicant produces no evidence capable of establishing that the alleged effects of the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and in particular those on the pending proceedings before the Belgian judicial authorities, affect not only her material and moral situation, but also her legal situation. 46 In the third place, as regards the applicant’s argument that the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is open to challenge, since, if the EPPO could dispute the rejection by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of its request for immunity to be lifted, the applicant must also have the right to challenge the opposite decision agreeing to commence the procedure for the lifting of immunity, it suffices to recall, as follows from paragraph 41 above, that the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not produce binding legal effects that may affect the applicant’s interests. 47 It follows from all of the foregoing that the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is not capable of being challenged by the applicant by means of an action for annulment under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU.

The plea of inadmissibility raised by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must therefore be upheld, without it being necessary to examine the other arguments raised by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] or by the applicant. 48 Consequently, the action must be rejected as being inadmissible in its entirety.

Costs 49 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 50 Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, she must be ordered to bear her own costs and to pay those incurred by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the EPPO, in accordance with the forms of order sought by them.

On those grounds,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA])

hereby orders: 1. The action is dismissed. 2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is ordered to bear her own costs and those incurred by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Luxembourg, 16 January 2024.

V. [OSCURATO:PERSONA]

K. Kowalik-Bańczyk

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

* Language of the case: English.

Anonimizzato ex art. 52 D.Lgs. 196/2003
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) 16 January 2024 ( * ) (Action for annulment – Institutional law – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – Request for the lifting of parliamentary immunity by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – Decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to announce this request to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and refer it to the Committee of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – Acts not open to challenge – Inadmissibility) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑46/23, [OSCURATO:PERSONA], residing in Ixelles (Belgium), represented by S. Pappas, lawyer, applicant, v [OSCURATO:PERSONA], represented by N. Lorenz and A.-M. Dumbrăvan, acting as Agents, and [OSCURATO:PERSONA], represented by L. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], C. Charalambous, and E. Farhat, acting as Agents, defendants, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), composed of K. Kowalik-Bańczyk, [OSCURATO:PERSONA], G. Hesse and B. Ricziová (Rapporteur), [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: V. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], having regard to the written part of the procedure, including: –        the plea of inadmissibility put forward by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] by separate document lodged at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 20 April 2023, –        the plea of inadmissibility put forward by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] by separate document lodged at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 21 April 2023, –        the applicant’s observations on the plea of inadmissibility lodged at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 5 June 2023, makes the following [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1 By her action pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU, the applicant, [OSCURATO:PERSONA], seeks the annulment, first, of the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 15 December 2022 to lift her parliamentary immunity and, second, of the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to announce that request to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and refer it to the Committee of [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Background to the dispute 2 By letter of 15 December 2022, sent to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] requested, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 29(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (‘the EPPO’) (OJ 2017 L 283, p. 1), the lifting of the privileges and immunities of two Members of [OSCURATO:PERSONA], including the applicant, and of six accredited parliamentary assistants. It was stated therein that those persons were the subject of an investigation by the EPPO concerning the management of parliamentary allowances. 3 By letter of 9 January 2023 sent to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] stated that, as regards the Members of [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in addition to Articles 11, 17 and 19 to 22 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7 on the privileges and immunities of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (OJ 2016 C 202, p. 266) (‘the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on privileges and immunities’), her request of 15 December 2022 must also be understood as referring to Articles 8 and 9 of that protocol. 4 On 10 January 2023, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA][OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] sent a letter to the applicant to inform her that the EPPO had submitted a request to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to lift her parliamentary immunity and that, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 9(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], that request would be announced in plenary session and referred to the Committee of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (‘the letter of 10 January 2023’). The applicant was also informed that she could consult the file in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s premises in Brussels (Belgium) and Strasbourg (France). 5 By letter dated 11 January 2023, the Head of the Members’ administration Unit in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] sent the letter of 10 January 2023 to the applicant’s lawyer and invited him to consult the EPPO’s file. 6 At the plenary session of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 18 January 2023, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] announced that she had received the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] request. That request was referred to the Committee of [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Forms of order sought 7 The applicant claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should: –        annul the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 15 December 2022 and the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], disclosed by the letter of 10 January 2023, to send that request to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and refer it to the Committee of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (‘the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’); –        order the EPPO and the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to pay the costs. 8 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends, in essence, that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should: –        dismiss the action as inadmissible; –        order the applicant to pay the costs. 9 The EPPO contends that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should: –        dismiss the action as inadmissible; –        order the applicant to pay the costs. Law 10 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 130(1) and (7) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], on the application of the defendant, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may decide on inadmissibility or lack of competence without going to the substance of the case. In the present case, as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the EPPO have each requested a ruling on inadmissibility, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], considering that it has sufficient information from the documents in the case file, hereby decides to give a ruling regarding those requests without taking further steps in the proceedings. The request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 11 The EPPO raises a plea of inadmissibility of the action on the ground that the request of its [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 15 December 2022 is not an act open to challenge under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU. Principally, it submits, in essence, that that request does not produce binding legal effects as regards the applicant. The request is a preliminary step which initiates the procedure for the lifting of the applicant’s immunity before the competent institution. It follows that, first, the said request is not an act that is open to challenge under the first paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU. Secondly, the applicant is not directly concerned by the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Thirdly, the applicant does not have any interest in the present case in seeking the annulment of that request, since that annulment cannot, in itself, procure a benefit for her. In the alternative, if the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considers that that request produces legal effects as regards the applicant, the EPPO submits that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not have jurisdiction to review that request. 12 The applicant disputes the EPPO’s arguments. 13 The applicant alleges, inter alia, that the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 15 December 2022 is amenable to review given that the introduction of that request is mandatory where the conditions set out in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 29(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2017/1939 are met. In addition, such a request obliges the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to act, the latter having responsibility for its implementation, in principal with no discretion, and the subsequent act of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] will automatically have serious consequences for the applicant’s legal situation. Accordingly, the applicant is ultimately directly and seriously affected by the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] by being the subject of a procedure in which she is the ‘defendant, defending her immunity, which for a politician and regulator constitutes a severe moral and reputational damage even if at the end the waiver is not granted’. She also submits that that request produces, taking account of its content, legal effects in her regard. 14 In addition, the applicant states that, having regard to its own effects, the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should be detached from the subsequent steps which could lead to the lifting of her immunity. Moreover, that request contains a definitive position of the EPPO. 15 In accordance with the second sentence of the first paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is to review the legality of acts of bodies, offices or agencies of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. 16 In those circumstances, according to settled case-law, where, as in the present case, the applicant is a natural or legal person, only measures the legal effects of which are binding on, and capable of affecting the interests of, the applicant by bringing about a distinct change to his or her legal position may be the subject of an action for annulment under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU (judgments of 11 November 1981, IBM v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , 60/81, EU:C:1981:264, paragraph 9, and of 26 January 2010, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑362/08 P, EU:C:2010:40, paragraph 51). 17 Thus, it is in principle those measures which definitively determine the position of an institution upon the conclusion of an administrative procedure, and which are intended to have legal effects capable of affecting the interests of the applicant, that constitute acts open to challenge, and not intermediate measures whose purpose is to prepare for the final decision, which do not have those effects (judgment of 6 May 2021, ABLV Bank and Others v ECB , C‑551/19 P and C‑552/19 P, EU:C:2021:369, paragraph 39). 18 It would be otherwise only if acts or decisions adopted in the course of the preparatory proceedings were themselves the culmination of a special procedure distinct from the main procedure and themselves produce independent legal effects and must therefore be capable of forming the subject matter of an action for annulment in order to ensure sufficient legal protection (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 November 1981, IBM v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , 60/81, EU:C:1981:264, paragraph 11, and of 13 October 2011, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Germany v [OSCURATO:PERSONA], C‑463/10 P and C‑475/10 P, EU:C:2011:656, paragraphs 53 and 54). 19 In order to determine whether the contested act produces binding legal effects, it is necessary to examine the substance of that act and to assess its effects on the basis of objective criteria, such as the content of that act, taking into account, where appropriate, the context in which it was adopted and the powers of the institution which adopted the act (see judgment of 20 February 2018, Belgium v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑16/16 P, EU:C:2018:79, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited; judgment of 9 July 2020, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑575/18 P, EU:C:2020:530, paragraph 47). 20 In the present case, the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 15 December 2022 was submitted to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on the basis of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 29(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2017/1939, according to which, where the investigations of the EPPO involve persons protected by privileges or immunities under EU law, in particular the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on privileges and immunities, and such privilege or immunity presents an obstacle to a specific investigation being conducted, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is to make a reasoned written request for its lifting in accordance with the procedures laid down by EU law. 21 As regards the content of the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], it merely asks the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to lift the applicant’s immunity and refers, in an annex, to the type of irregularities that are the subject matter of the investigation. That request does not contain any definitive position by the EPPO as regards the investigation opened in relation to the applicant. 22 As regards the context of the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the EPPO’s powers, it follows from the wording of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 29(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2017/1939 and of the general scheme of the regulation that the request to lift immunity is a preliminary and necessary measure, made available to the EPPO by the EU legislature, in order to ensure the effectiveness of the investigations where the immunity from which a person benefits is an obstacle to an investigation relating to him or her. 23 Furthermore, it must be recalled that the third paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 9 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on privileges and immunities confers on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] the exclusive right to waive the immunity provided for in that article, that is to say, the right to deprive a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the protection he or she enjoys under that provision. Such a decision constitutes an act open to challenge for the purposes of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU (judgment of 15 October 2008, Mote v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑345/05, EU:T:2008:440, paragraph 31). The exercise of that right means that a request for waiver of immunity has been made to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] by a competent authority. That authority has thus already found that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concerned enjoyed the immunity provided for in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 9 of that protocol in a given procedure and requested the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to waive that immunity in order to continue those proceedings. It is thus for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to decide whether or not to waive that immunity (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 January 2013, Gollnisch v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑346/11 and T‑347/11, EU:T:2013:23, paragraph 59, and of 5 July 2023 , Puigdemont i Casamajó and Comín i Oliveres v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑115/20, under appeal, EU:T:2023:372, paragraph 62). 24 It follows that the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not entail, in itself, the lifting of the applicant’s immunity and is not capable of having any impact whatsoever on her rights or obligations. That request has the sole legal effect of seising the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which is the sole authority competent to make the decision and, where appropriate, to lift the applicant’s immunity. So long as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has not taken such a decision, the applicant continues to benefit from the protection of the privileges and immunities granted by EU law. 25 Having regard to those considerations, it must be held that the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 15 December 2022, first, is not capable of producing binding legal effects that may affect the applicant’s interests by bringing about a distinct change to her legal situation and, secondly, that it is a preliminary measure which does not constitute the culmination of a special procedure distinct from that opened before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the possible illegalities of which could, if necessary, be relied on in support of an action directed against the final act, namely the possible decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relating to the lifting of the applicant’s immunity, of which the said request constitutes a preparatory step (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 November 1981, IBM v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , 60/81, EU:C:1981:264, paragraph 12, and of 19 June 2015, Italy v [OSCURATO:PERSONA], T‑358/11, EU:T:2015:394, paragraph 26). 26 The arguments put forward by the applicant are not such as to call that conclusion into question. 27 In the first place, the applicant submits that the interpretation of the concept of a legal act, which appears in paragraphs 35 to 37 of the judgment of 10 May 2017, Efler and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (T‑754/14, EU:T:2017:323), should be applied, by analogy, in the present case. It should be observed that, in paragraphs 34 to 36 of that judgment, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held that the concept of a legal act, for the purposes of a citizens’ initiative pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EU) No 211/2011 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 16 February 2011 on the citizens’ initiative (OJ 2011 L 65, p. 1), is not limited only to definitive [OSCURATO:PERSONA] legal acts which produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties, but also includes acts such as a decision authorising the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to open negotiations with a view to concluding an international agreement, which are preparatory and produce legal effects between the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and its [OSCURATO:PERSONA] as well as between the institutions of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. In that regard, it must be held that that interpretation cannot be transposed to the present case given that the concept of an act that is open to challenge in the context of an action for annulment brought by a natural or legal person on the basis of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU is narrower and is limited to acts that produce binding legal effects on the applicant only, to the exclusion, in principle, of intermediate measures (see the case-law cited in paragraphs 16 to 18 above). In those circumstances, and as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] rightly submits, in essence, the wide interpretation of the concept of a legal act in the light of the objective of the Treaties of promoting the participation of citizens in the exercise of public power by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] cannot validly be relied on by the applicant in order to widen or relax the admissibility criteria for actions for annulment brought under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU. 28 In the second place, as regards the applicant’s argument that the procedure opened by the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] would cause severe moral damage and harm her reputation, it must be observed that the alleged damage and harm does not concern the applicant’s legal situation, but her material and moral situation. 29 In the third place, as regards the applicant’s argument alleging that the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should be detached from the subsequent steps that could lead to the lifting of her immunity, it suffices to observe that it is clear from paragraphs 20 to 25 above that that request, first, does not constitute the culmination of a special procedure distinct from that opened before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and, second, does not produce any independent legal effects as regards the applicant. 30 In the fourth place, the applicant refers to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 47 of the Charter of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (‘the Charter’) enshrining the right to an effective remedy and submits that national remedies do not have effects equivalent to those before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], to the extent that Greek ordinary and criminal courts do not have jurisdiction to annul an act of a public authority. Furthermore, not all national courts participate in the enhanced cooperation established by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2017/1939, and those which do participate do not offer the same legal protection. 31 In that regard it suffices to recall that, although the requirement as to binding legal effects must be interpreted in the light of the right to effective judicial protection as guaranteed in the first paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 47 of the Charter, that right is not intended to change the system of judicial review laid down by the Treaties, and particularly the rules relating to the admissibility of direct actions brought before the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (see judgment of 3 October 2013, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraph 97 and the case-law cited). Thus, the interpretation of the concept of ‘actionable measure’ in the light of that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 47 cannot have the effect of setting aside that condition without going beyond the jurisdiction conferred by the Treaty on the EU Courts (judgment of 25 October 2017, Slovakia v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑593/15 P and C‑594/15 P, EU:C:2017:800, paragraph 66; see also, by analogy, judgment of 12 September 2006, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑131/03 P, EU:C:2006:541, paragraph 81). 32 It follows from all of the foregoing that the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is not capable of being challenged by the applicant by means of an action for annulment under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU. The plea of inadmissibility raised by the EPPO must therefore be upheld, without it being necessary to examine its other arguments. The decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 33 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] raises a plea of inadmissibility of the action inter alia on the ground, in essence, that the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not produce binding legal effects vis-à-vis third parties and does not constitute a final decision, but the start of an internal procedure, such that it does not constitute an ‘actionable measure’ within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU. 34 The applicant disputes the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s arguments. 35 The applicant observes, first of all, that the lifting of the immunity of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is subject to a complex parliamentary procedure that comprises the proposal of the responsible committee and the final decision of the plenary, ‘while the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]] opening this procedure remains distinct’. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is under duty to satisfy himself or herself of the fundamental legitimacy of the request for the lifting of immunity by checking that it originates from a competent authority and, in so doing, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] takes an independent decision that is ‘separate from the following complex procedure’. 36 In addition, the applicant states that the opening of the parliamentary procedure has a particular impact on her situation ‘as it is timely interlinked with a criminal case of major importance (Qatargate)’. The mere announcement of the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 15 December 2022 at the plenary session of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] seriously affected the applicant politically and interfered with the proceedings before the Belgian judicial authorities. 37 In addition, the applicant alleges that the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is open to challenge, since, if the EPPO could dispute the rejection by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of its request for immunity to be lifted, the applicant must also have the right to challenge the opposite decision agreeing to commence the procedure for the lifting of immunity. 38 In the present case, in accordance with the case-law recalled in paragraphs 16 to 18 above, it must be ascertained whether, having regard to the criteria set out there, the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] produces binding legal effects that may affect the applicant’s interests, including, inter alia, the conditions under which she performs her mandate as a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of [OSCURATO:PERSONA], by bringing about a distinct change to her legal situation, or whether that decision is a preparatory measure. 39 To that end, it should be recalled, first, as regards the content of the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], that that decision covers the announcement, at the plenary session of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], of the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 15 December 2022 for the applicant’s parliamentary immunity to be lifted and the referral to the Committee of [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. That decision therefore does not contain any final or even provisional position as to the legal situation of the applicant, including as to the merits of that request. 40 Secondly, as regards the context of the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the latter’s powers, it should be observed that the announcement in plenary session of a request for the lifting of immunity of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and its referral to the Committee of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is part of a procedure that is comprised of many stages, at the end of which, in accordance with the third paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 9 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on privileges and immunities, the final decision is taken by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] itself (see paragraph 23 above). 41 It follows that, as is the case for the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not produce binding legal effects that may affect the applicant’s interests by bringing about a distinct change to her legal situation. In that regard, it must be observed that, until the final decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is taken, the applicant continues to benefit from the protection of the privileges and immunities granted by EU law. Furthermore, it must be held that the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] constitutes a preparatory act. 42 Effective judicial protection as regards that decision is ensured for the applicant by means, inter alia, of an action pursuant [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU that will be available to her before the EU judicature against the final decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], through which she will be able to rely, as the case may be, on possible illegalities that may vitiate the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 43 The arguments put forward by the applicant are not such as to call those findings into question. 44 In the first place, the applicant submits that the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must be open to challenge since it remains separate from the parliamentary procedure that includes the final decision of the plenary assembly, because the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has a duty to check the fundamental legitimacy of the request for immunity to be lifted. That argument is not capable of succeeding. As follows from the analysis in paragraphs 38 to 42 above, the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], first, does not constitute the culmination of a special procedure distinct from that opened before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and, secondly, does not produce any independent legal effects as regards the applicant. 45 In the second place, as regards the applicant’s claim that the mere announcement in plenary session of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the request of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] would seriously affect the applicant politically and would have an ‘impact’ on the ongoing proceedings before the Belgian judicial authorities in the ‘Qatargate’ case, it must be held that the applicant produces no evidence capable of establishing that the alleged effects of the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and in particular those on the pending proceedings before the Belgian judicial authorities, affect not only her material and moral situation, but also her legal situation. 46 In the third place, as regards the applicant’s argument that the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is open to challenge, since, if the EPPO could dispute the rejection by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of its request for immunity to be lifted, the applicant must also have the right to challenge the opposite decision agreeing to commence the procedure for the lifting of immunity, it suffices to recall, as follows from paragraph 41 above, that the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not produce binding legal effects that may affect the applicant’s interests. 47 It follows from all of the foregoing that the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is not capable of being challenged by the applicant by means of an action for annulment under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU. The plea of inadmissibility raised by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must therefore be upheld, without it being necessary to examine the other arguments raised by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] or by the applicant. 48 Consequently, the action must be rejected as being inadmissible in its entirety. Costs 49 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 50 Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, she must be ordered to bear her own costs and to pay those incurred by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the EPPO, in accordance with the forms of order sought by them. On those grounds, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby orders: 1. The action is dismissed. 2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is ordered to bear her own costs and those incurred by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Luxembourg, 16 January 2024. V. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] K. Kowalik-Bańczyk [OSCURATO:PERSONA] * Language of the case: English.
Sentenza Corte di giustizia UE n. 2017/2024 — Fons Iuris — Fons Iuris