Corte di giustizia UE n. 207/2016

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) 21 July 2016( * ) (Appeal — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] word mark — Word mark [OSCURATO:PERSONA] — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] word mark [OSCURATO:PERSONA] — Relative ground for refusal — Reputation — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 207/2009 — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(5) — Partial rejection of the opposition) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑87/16 P, APPEAL under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 11 February 2016, [OSCURATO:PERSONA], residing in Osaka (Japan), represented by A. Wenninger-Lenz, M. Ring and W. von der Osten-Sacken, Rechtsanwälte, appellant, the other parties to the proceedings being: [OSCURATO:PERSONA], established in Paris (France), applicant at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO), defendant at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), composed of F. Biltgen, President of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (Rapporteur) and M. Berger, Judges, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: E. Sharpston, Registrar: A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], having decided, after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], to give a decision by reasoned order, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], gives the following [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1 By his appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] asks the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to set aside the judgment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 2 December 2015 in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v OHIM — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) (T‑528/13, not published, ‘the judgment under appeal’, EU:T:2015:921), by which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] partially annulled the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO) of 3 July 2013 ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] R 1363/2012-2), relating to opposition proceedings between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 2 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] also asks the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to give final judgment in the matter. 3 In support of his appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] raises a single ground of appeal, alleging infringement of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(5) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1). The appeal 4 Pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of its [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure, where the appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], decide by reasoned order to dismiss that appeal in whole or in part. 5 On 10 June 2016, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] took the following position: ‘1     This is an appeal against the judgment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 2 December 2015 in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v OHIM — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) , T‑528/13, EU:T:2015:921 (‘the judgment under appeal’). [OSCURATO:PERSONA] there upheld [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s action for annulment of a decision of 3 July 2013 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (‘EUIPO’) concerning [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s opposition to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] application for registration of the word sign [OSCURATO:PERSONA] as a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark with respect to goods and services in Classes 29, 30, 31, 35, 41 and 43 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [concerning the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks], as revised and amended, in so far as that decision rejected the opposition in respect of the registration sought for goods in Classes 29 to 31. That opposition was based on the earlier [OSCURATO:PERSONA] word mark [OSCURATO:PERSONA], registered for certain goods in, inter alia, Classes 3, 18 and 25 (‘the earlier mark’). In support of its opposition, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relied on the relative ground in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(5) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1) (‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA] 207/2009’). On 24 May 2012, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] rejected the opposition. Whilst the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal partly upheld [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s appeal against that decision, it found that goods in Classes 29 to 31 covered by the application for registration are common mass-consumed foodstuffs that are bought in any corner shop and thus have only a peripheral relation with the goods covered by the earlier mark. Consequently, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal found that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had failed to justify why the registration applied for would, as regards those goods, take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character or the reputation of the earlier mark. 2.     [OSCURATO:PERSONA] appealed to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which annulled that decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal in so far as it had granted [OSCURATO:PERSONA] application for registration in respect of the goods in Classes 29 to 31. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] emphasised in particular that some of the goods in those classes might be among the goods sold as luxury goods under the earlier mark and that there was thus a certain closeness between those goods. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] inferred from that closeness and the high degree of similarity between the signs at issue that, contrary to what the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal found, there was a risk that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] might take advantage of the link which exists between the mark applied for and the earlier mark in order to associate his sign with the renown of that earlier mark and take unfair advantage of that mark’s reputation, benefitting from the image of luxury and exclusivity which that mark conveys. Furthermore, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held in essence that, given the link between the marks at issue, registration of the mark applied for in respect of goods in Classes 29 to 31, which are associated more with everyday consumer goods, or even with a bad diet, could damage the image of exclusivity, luxury and high quality associated with the earlier mark and therefore be detrimental to the distinctive character and the reputation of that mark. 3.     I refer the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to the judgment under appeal for further details. 4.     In his appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (‘the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’) asks the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to annul the judgment under appeal, to give a final ruling on the dispute and to order EUIPO and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to pay the costs. 5.     [OSCURATO:PERSONA] advances a single ground of appeal. He submits in essence that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in its application of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(5) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 207/2009 when it concluded, despite the lack of evidence, that the use of the trade mark applied for in connection with goods in Classes 29 to 31 covered by the application for registration would take unfair advantage of, and be detrimental to, the distinctive character and the reputation of the earlier mark for cosmetics, perfumery and clothes. Contrary to the conclusion reached in the judgment under appeal, all the goods covered by the application for registration are daily consumption goods which are very different in nature from the luxury goods covered by the earlier mark. They also serve different purposes and are directed at different categories of consumers. The differences between the goods covered by the registration applied for and those covered by the earlier mark are therefore such that there is no risk that the relevant section of the public will establish a link between the signs in conflict. 6.     In my opinion, the single ground of appeal in reality asks the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to revisit the factual findings and assessment of evidence made by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] regarding the nature of the goods concerned by the signs in conflict, how the relevant sections of the public perceive those goods and the link which the public may make between those signs (see, by analogy, orders of 14 May 2013 in You-Q v OHIM , C‑294/12 P, EU:C:2013:300, paragraph 61 and 62, and of 17 September 2015 in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v OHIM , C‑548/14 P, EU:C:2015:624, paragraphs 67 and 68). 7.     However, it follows from [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 256(1) TFEU and the first paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] that an appeal to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] lies on a point of law only. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] thus has exclusive jurisdiction to find and appraise the relevant facts and to assess the evidence. The appraisal of those facts and the assessment of that evidence do not, save where facts or evidence are distorted, constitute a point of law subject, as such, to review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice on appeal. 8.     [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has not demonstrated or even alleged that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] distorted the facts or evidence. 9.     I therefore conclude that the single ground of appeal is manifestly inadmissible and recommend that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should dismiss the appeal under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure. 10.   [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 137 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure, which applies to appeals by virtue of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) thereof, the order terminating a case should also rule on the costs. The present appeal has not been notified to the defendant and the latter has not therefore incurred costs in connection with the appeal. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should bear his own costs.’ 6 For the same reasons as those given by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], it is necessary to dismiss the appeal as manifestly inadmissible. Costs 7 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 137 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure, applicable to the procedure on appeal pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) of those rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings. In the present case, since the present order was adopted before the appeal was served on the other parties and therefore before they could have incurred costs, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must be ordered to bear his own costs. On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby orders: 1. The appeal is dismissed. 2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is ordered to bear his own costs. [Signatures] * Language of the case: English.