Corte di giustizia UE/2026

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] 14 July 2026 ( * ) ( Appeal – Action for annulment – Application to intervene – Admissibility of the request – Time limit for lodging – Method for calculating the time limit – Publication in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – Extension of the time limit on account of distance – Out of time – Effective judicial protection – Principle of equal treatment ) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑111/26 P(I), APPEAL under the second paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 57 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 19 February 2026, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – Bundesverband der IT-Anwender eV, established in Berlin (Germany), represented by J. Aatz, F. Hack, L. Hauser and T. Knapowski, Rechtsanwälte, appellant, the other parties to the proceedings being: [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in Europe (CISPE), established in Brussels (Belgium), applicant at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA], represented by P. Berghe, M. Domecq and I. Naglis, acting as Agents, defendant at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]-[OSCURATO:PERSONA], after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], M. Szpunar, makes the following [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1 By its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – Bundesverband der IT-Anwender eV (‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA]’) seeks to have set aside the order of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 3 February 2026, CISPE v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (T‑503/25, ‘the order under appeal’, EU:T:2026:105), by which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s application to intervene in support of the form of order sought by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in Europe (CISPE), the applicant at first instance in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑503/25. The background to the dispute, the proceedings before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the order under appeal 2 By application lodged at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 23 July 2025, CISPE brought, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU, an action for annulment of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C(2023) 4654 final of 12 July 2023 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the internal market and the EEA agreement ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] M.10806 – Broadcom/VMware). 3 The notice provided for in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 79 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], indicating the date of lodging of that application, the names of the main parties, the form of order sought in that application and the pleas in law and the main arguments, was published in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 15 September 2025. 4 By document lodged at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 7 November 2025, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] sought leave to intervene in support of the form of order sought by CISPE. 5 By the order under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed that application to intervene. 6 In paragraph 4 of that order, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] found that the application to intervene was out of time, since the period of six weeks referred to in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 143(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], as extended on account of distance by a single period of 10 days under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60 thereof and calculated, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58 of those rules, from the publication, on 15 September 2025, of the notice referred to in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 79 of the Rules of Procedure, expired on 6 November 2025. 7 In paragraph 5 of that order, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had not pleaded the existence of unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure , such as would permit the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to derogate from that time limit pursuant to the second paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 45 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], applicable to the procedure before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] by virtue of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 53 thereof. Forms of order sought by the parties 8 By its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice should: –        set aside the order under appeal; –        refer the case back to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for a decision on the application for leave to intervene; and –        order the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to pay the costs. 9 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice should: –        dismiss the appeal; and –        order [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to pay the costs. The appeal 10 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] raises three grounds in support of its appeal. The first ground of appeal alleges an error of law in the application of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. The second ground of appeal alleges an infringement of the right to effective judicial protection. The third ground of appeal alleges an error of law and breach of the principle of equality before the law resulting from the fact that the additional time limit of 14 days provided for in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 59 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for initiating proceedings against a measure adopted by an institution published in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was not applied to its application for leave to intervene. The first ground of appeal Arguments 11 By its first ground of appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submits, in essence, that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in law in the application of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(a) of the Rules of Procedure of that court, which includes an express rule for the general calculation of time limits and clearly excludes from the calculation the day of the event triggering the time limit. 12 In the present case, as regards a publication in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submits that the time limit should have started to run not from the day after, but two days after, that publication. It infers from this that the time limit expired on Tuesday 7 November 2025 and that its application to intervene was not therefore out of time. 13 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends, in essence, that that argument is unfounded. Assessment 14 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(a) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], where a time limit expressed in days, weeks, months or years is to be calculated from the moment at which an event occurs or an action takes place, the day during which that event occurs or that action takes place is not to be counted as falling within the time limit. 15 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(b) of those rules states that a time limit expressed in weeks, months or years is to end with the expiry of whichever day in the last week, month or year is the same day of the week, or falls on the same date, as the day during which the event or action from which the time limit is to be calculated occurred or took place. 16 According to settled case-law, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(a) and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(b) of those rules of procedure set out, in a consistent manner, the rules defining, respectively, the date on which a procedural time limit starts to run and the date on which such a time limit ends (order of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 17 May 2022, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v EUIPO , C‑103/22 P(I), EU:C:2022:399, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited). 17 It follows from point (a) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1) that the day during which the event occurs, from which that time limit is calculated, is not counted in the time limit, with the result that the latter starts to run from the day after that event, at 00:00 and not the day after that. It also follows from point (b) of that provision that, where it is expressed in weeks, that time limit expires at the end of the same day of the week as that during which the event occurs from which the time limit is calculated. 18 The interpretation advanced by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] would therefore result in deferring by a day both the starting point and the end of the time limit, without there being any basis for such postponement in the wording of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(a) and (b) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 19 In the present case, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 143(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the application for leave to intervene had to be submitted within six weeks of the publication in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the notice provided for in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 79 of those rules. 20 Since that notice was published on Monday 15 September 2025, the six-week time limit, extended on account of distance by 10 days as provided for in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60 of those rules, started to run from Tuesday 16 September 2025 at 00:00 and expired on Thursday 6 November 2025 at midnight. 21 In that regard, it must be held that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has not shown how the calculation performed by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] infringes the rules for the calculation of time limits set out in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(a) and (b) of the Rules of Procedure of that court. 22 Since the application for leave to intervene was submitted on 7 November 2025 and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not rely on the existence of unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure within the meaning of the second paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 45 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not err in law in dismissing that application on the grounds that it was out of time. 23 Consequently, the first ground of appeal must be rejected as manifestly unfounded. The second ground of appeal Arguments 24 By the second ground of appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submits, in essence, that the interpretation of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(a) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] adopted in the order under appeal infringes its right to effective judicial protection, as guaranteed by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 47 of the Charter of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (‘the Charter’). 25 It claims that the provisions governing access to justice and the exercise of the rights derived from EU law must be applied in such a way that the exercise of those rights is not rendered practically impossible or excessively difficult. 26 In support of that argument, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relies on the case-law arising from the judgment of 26 September 2013, PPG and SNF v ECHA (C‑625/11 P, EU:C:2013:594, paragraph 33), according to which, in so far as the wording of a provision of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may give rise to doubt, it is necessary, in the absence of any imperative reasons to the contrary, to favour an interpretation which does not result in the interested parties being time-barred and therefore depriving them of their right to resort to legal proceedings. 27 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends, in essence, that that argument is unfounded. Assessment 28 At the outset, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the principle of effective judicial protection is a general principle of EU law, enshrined in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 47 of the Charter, and that principle does not preclude the setting of a time limit for the institution of legal proceedings (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 June 2019, RF v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑660/17 P, EU:C:2019:509, paragraphs 55 and 56 and the case-law cited). 29 In that regard, the right to effective judicial protection is in no way undermined by the strict application of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] rules on procedural time limits, which, according to settled case-law, serves the requirements of legal certainty and the need to avoid any discrimination or arbitrary treatment in the administration of justice (judgment of 19 June 2019, RF v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑660/17 P, EU:C:2019:509, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited). 30 In the present case, in the first place, it must be stated that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had the full six-week period provided for in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 143(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], extended by 10 days as referred to in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60 of those rules, to submit its application for leave to intervene and that it has not demonstrated how the method for calculating that time limit could have rendered the exercise of its procedural rights practically impossible or excessively difficult. 31 In the second place, as is apparent from paragraphs 14 to 18 of the present order, the wording of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(a) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not present the ambiguity alleged by [OSCURATO:PERSONA], with the result that it cannot validly rely on the case-law cited in paragraph 26 of the present order. 32 Consequently, the second ground of appeal must be rejected as manifestly unfounded. The third ground of appeal Arguments 33 By the third ground of appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submits, in essence, that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in law by not applying, to its application to intervene, the additional time limit of 14 days provided for in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 59 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for initiating proceedings against a measure of an institution published in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] . 34 By failing to extend the benefit of that additional time limit to the application to intervene, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] also infringed the principle of equality before the law, enshrined in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 20 of the Charter. According to [OSCURATO:PERSONA], applicants initiating proceedings against those measures, referred to in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 59 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and applicants for leave to intervene, are in a comparable procedural situation, since their respective time limits start to run following a publication in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] . 35 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends, in essence, that that argument is unfounded. Assessment 36 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 59 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], where the time limit allowed for initiating proceedings against a measure adopted by an institution runs from the publication of that measure in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , that time limit is to be calculated, for the purposes of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(a) of those rules, from the end of the fourteenth day after such publication. 37 It is clear from the wording of that provision that it refers exclusively to initiating proceedings directed against a measure adopted by an institution and not to applications for leave to intervene governed by Articles 142 to 145 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not therefore err in law by not applying [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 59 to [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s application to intervene. 38 Further, as is apparent from settled case-law, equality before the law, enshrined in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 20 of the Charter, is a general principle of EU law which requires that comparable situations should not be treated differently and that different situations should not be treated in the same way, unless such different treatment is objectively justified. The requirement that situations must be comparable, for the purpose of determining whether there is a breach of the principle of equal treatment, must be assessed in the light of all the elements that characterise them (judgment of 8 March 2022, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]Fürstenfeld (Direct effect) , C‑205/20, EU:C:2022:168, paragraphs 54 and 55 and the case-law cited). 39 In the present case, pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 142(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the intervention is to be limited to supporting, in whole or in part, the form of order sought by one of the main parties and is not to confer the same procedural rights as those conferred on the main parties. Therefore, the applicants initiating proceedings under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 59 of those rules of procedure and the applicants for leave to intervene are clearly not in a comparable situation as regards the rules governing the time limits applicable to them respectively. The argument alleging discrimination between those two categories of persons, summarised in paragraph 34 of the present order, is therefore irrelevant. 40 Consequently, the third ground of appeal must be rejected as being manifestly unfounded and the appeal must therefore be dismissed in its entirety as being manifestly unfounded. Costs 41 In accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, where the appeal is unfounded, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is to make a decision as to costs. 42 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 138(1) of those rules, which applies to the appeal procedure by virtue of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) of those rules, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 43 Since the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has applied for [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to be ordered to pay the costs and the latter has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs. On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] hereby orders: 1. The appeal is dismissed as being manifestly unfounded. 2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – Bundesverband der IT-Anwender eV shall pay the costs. Luxembourg, 14 July 2026. A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] T. von [OSCURATO:PERSONA][OSCURATO:PERSONA] * Language of the case: English.