Corte di giustizia UE/2026

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 25 September 2026 ( * ) ( [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for interim measures – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] cases – Officials – Disciplinary proceedings – Decision to suspend the applicant from her functions with reduction of her remuneration to the minimum subsistence allowance and withdrawal of her access to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] premises and to her professional IT account – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for suspension of operation and interim measures – Lack of urgency ) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑436/26 R, HI, represented by A. Champetier, C. Laurent and S. Rodrigues, lawyers, applicant, v [OSCURATO:PERSONA], represented by S. Seyr and M. Marescaux, acting as Agents, defendant, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] makes the following [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1 By her application brought pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 278 and 279 TFEU, the applicant, HI, seeks, on the one hand, suspension of the operation of the decision of 30 June 2026 by which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] decided, first, to suspend her for an indeterminate period of time; secondly, to pay her the minimum subsistence allowance provided for in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 6 of Annex VIII to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Officials of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (‘the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’) and to withhold the remainder of her remuneration; and, thirdly, to block her entry badge permitting access to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s premises and also her access to her professional IT account (‘the contested decision’) and, on the other hand, to have the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ordered to restore her full remuneration as well as all related benefits, and also access to the abovementioned premises and her professional IT account pending the final judgment in the main proceedings. Background to the dispute 2 The applicant has been an official of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] since 2018. Between 2018 and 2022, she held the post of Head of Learning and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the House of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the Directorate-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] for Communication. 3 On 1 March 2022, she was dismissed from her management functions and reassigned to the post of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the House of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the Directorate-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] for Communication. 4 By letter of 10 July 2025, the applicant was informed that an administrative investigation had been opened into her conduct in 2022, 2023 and 2025 pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 86 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1 and 2 of Annex IX to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2 of the general implementing provisions of 18 May 2004 concerning disciplinary proceedings and administrative investigations. 5 On 17 December 2025, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] decided to extend the scope of the administrative investigation to include additional allegations. 6 By letter of 12 February 2026, the applicant was informed that the appointing authority (‘AA’) considered all of the allegations about her to be sufficiently serious in nature as to constitute serious misconduct. It was also stated in that letter that, on those grounds, the AA was intending to suspend her pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 23 of Annex IX to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and to withhold part of her remuneration pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 24 of that annex. By that same letter and in an email addressed to the applicant the same day, the AA also summoned her to a hearing pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 23(2) of Annex IX to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. The applicant declined that summons on the ground that she would be on annual leave on the dates proposed. 7 On 23 March 2026, the AA summoned the applicant to a hearing for the second time. The applicant declined that summons, stating that she was on medical leave until 30 April 2026. 8 The applicant’s legal representatives then informed the AA that she would be on medical leave until 31 May 2026. 9 By email of 13 May 2026, addressed to the applicant’s legal representatives, the AA stated that, following consultation with the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]'s competent services, there was no medical obstacle preventing the applicant from exercising her rights of defence, either personally or through representation. The AA accordingly summoned the applicant, for the third time, to attend a hearing on 3 June 2026, either in person at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s premises or remotely. In the alternative, the applicant was offered the option of submitting written observations by that date. 10 By email of 1 June 2026, the applicant's legal representatives informed the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] that the applicant’s certified medical leave had been extended until 10 July 2026. They enclosed a medical certificate from her treating physician stating that she was medically unfit to participate in an administrative procedure, whether at a hearing or in writing, and whether in person or through a legal representative. 11 On 30 June 2026, the AA adopted the contested decision. 12 On 15 July 2026, the applicant lodged a complaint with the AA challenging the contested decision, pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 90(2) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Procedure and forms of order sought 13 By application lodged at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 15 July 2026, the applicant brought an action for annulment of the contested decision. 14 By separate document lodged at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on the same day, the applicant lodged the present application for interim measures in which she claims that the judge hearing the application for interim measures should: –        suspend operation of the contested decision; –        order the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to restore her full remuneration as well as all related benefits, and also access to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s premises and her professional IT account pending the final judgment in the main proceedings; –        reserve the costs. 15 By order of 17 July 2026, HI v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (T‑436/26 R, not published; ‘the order of 17 July 2026’), adopted pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 157(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the Vice-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ordered the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: (i) to suspend the operation of the contested decision in so far as it ordered that the applicant’s remuneration would be withheld for a period of six months; and (ii) to ensure that the applicant could access the electronic systems and applications that were necessary for her to exercise effectively her social security rights and to undertake any other administrative formalities that may be required. 16 In its observations on the application for interim measures, lodged at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 27 August 2026, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that the judge hearing the application for interim measures should: –        dismiss the application for interim measures; –        cancel the order of 17 July 2026; –        order the applicant to pay the costs of the interim proceedings. 17 By separate document lodged at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 3 September 2026, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] requests the judge hearing the application for interim measures to vary the order of 17 July 2026. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for suspension of operation and interim measures 18 It is apparent from a combined reading of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 278 and 279 TFEU and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 256(1) TFEU that the judge hearing an application for interim measures may, if he considers that the circumstances so require, order that the operation of a measure challenged before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] be suspended or prescribe any necessary interim measures. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 278 TFEU establishes the principle that actions do not have suspensory effect, since acts adopted by the institutions of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] are presumed to be lawful. It is therefore only exceptionally that the judge hearing an application for interim measures may order the suspension of operation of an act challenged before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] or prescribe any interim measures (see order of 11 November 2025, LB v Commission , T‑514/25 R, not published, EU:T:2025:1023, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited). 19 The first sentence of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 156(4) of the Rules of Procedure provides that applications for interim measures must state ‘the subject matter of the proceedings, the circumstances giving rise to urgency and the pleas of fact and law establishing a prima facie case for the interim measure applied for’. 20 Thus, the court hearing an application for interim relief may order suspension of operation of an act, or other interim measures, if it is established that such an order is justified, prima facie, in fact and in law and that it is urgent in so far as, in order to avoid serious and irreparable harm to the interests of the party making the application, it must be made and produce its effects before a decision is reached in the main action. Those conditions are cumulative, so that applications for interim measures must be dismissed if any one of them is not satisfied. The court hearing an application for interim relief must also, where appropriate, weigh up the interests involved (see order of the Vice-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 24 May 2022, Puigdemont i Casamajó and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Spain , C‑629/21 P(R), EU:C:2022:413, paragraph 175 and the case-law cited). 21 In the context of that overall examination, the court hearing the application for interim relief enjoys a broad discretion and is free to determine, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, the manner and order in which those various conditions are to be examined, there being no rule of EU law imposing a pre-established scheme of analysis within which the need to order interim measures must be assessed (see order of the Vice-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 2 February 2024, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Commission , C‑609/23 P(R), not published, EU:C:2024:114, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). 22 Having regard to the documents in the case file, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considers that he has all the information required to rule on the present application for interim measures, without there being any need first to hear oral argument from the parties. The condition of urgency 23 In order to determine whether the interim measures sought are urgent, it should be noted that the purpose of the procedure for interim relief is to guarantee the full effectiveness of the future final decision, in order to prevent a lacuna in the legal protection afforded by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. To attain that objective, urgency must be assessed in the light of the need of an interlocutory order to avoid serious and irreparable damage to the party requesting the interim measure. That party must demonstrate that it cannot await the outcome of the main proceedings without suffering serious and irreparable damage (see order of 14 January 2016, AGC [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v Commission , C‑517/15 P-R, EU:C:2016:21, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited). 24 Those are the criteria in the light of which it must be examined whether the applicant has succeeded in establishing urgency. 25 In the present case, in order to demonstrate the serious and irreparable damage, the applicant claims, first, that she is the principal source of income in her family and that, due to the contested decision, she is no longer able to meet her household’s regular monthly expenses, which largely exceed the minimum subsistence allowance. She states that she is unable to repay the bank loans she took out to cover her children’s school fees and that, as a result, she is at risk of being listed as a defaulting debtor. She states that that situation will have lasting effects not only for her, but also for her family. 26 Secondly, the applicant states that, if she is unable to pay her children’s school fees, they will suffer a forced interruption to their schooling at their school, the loss of their learning environment, a disruption in their social and psychological stability and the obligation to change schools during the course of their learning cycle. She adds that such consequences cannot ever be undone by the subsequent payment of a salary. 27 Thirdly, the applicant states that she is still on medical leave and that, for that reason, she necessarily incurs medical expenses on an ongoing basis. She adds that, by blocking access to her professional IT account and the intranet, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has deprived her of ordinary electronic means by which officials submit requests for reimbursement under the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (JSIS). She states that she is in a situation in which she requires continuous medical care whilst being deprived of effective access to the IT tools allowing her to exercise the rights provided for in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 72 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. She states that the contested decision provides no indication whatsoever as to when or under which conditions access to her professional IT account and the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s electronic administrative systems will be restored. 28 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] disputes the applicant’s arguments. 29 In the first place, it should be noted that the first type of harm alleged by the applicant, namely the risk of no longer being able to financially provide for her family, is pecuniary in nature. 30 In accordance with settled case-law, damage of a pecuniary nature cannot, otherwise than in exceptional circumstances, be regarded as irreparable since, as a general rule, pecuniary compensation is capable of restoring the aggrieved person to the situation that obtained before he or she suffered the damage. Any such damage could be recouped by the applicant’s bringing an action for compensation on the basis of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 268 TFEU and 340 TFEU (see order of 23 April 2015, Commission v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] & Benefits , C‑35/15 P(R), EU:C:2015:275, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited). 31 However, where the harm referred to is of a pecuniary nature, the interim measures sought are justified where, in the absence of those measures, the applicant would be in a position that would imperil its financial viability before final judgment is given in the main action (see order of 23 March 2017, Kanyama v Council , T‑145/17 R, not published, EU:T:2017:212, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited). 32 To that end, the judge hearing the application for interim measures must have specific and precise information, supported by detailed, certified documentary evidence, which shows the situation in which the party seeking the interim measures finds itself and enables the probable consequences, should the measures sought not be granted, to be assessed. It follows that that party, in particular when it relies on the occurrence of financial damage, must produce, with supporting documentation, an accurate overall picture of its financial situation (see order of 29 February 2016, ICA Laboratories and Others v Commission , T‑732/15 R, not published, EU:T:2016:129, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited). 33 Moreover, under the second sentence of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 156(4) of the Rules of Procedure, an application for interim measures is to ‘contain all the evidence and offers of evidence available to justify the grant of interim measures’. 34 Thus, an application for interim measures must by itself enable the defendant to prepare its observations and the judge hearing the application to rule on it, as necessary, without any other supporting information, since the essential elements of fact and law on which the application is based must be found in the actual text of that application (see order of the Vice-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 6 September 2016, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Commission , C‑378/16 P-R, not published, EU:C:2016:668, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited). 35 In the present case, the applicant claims that her monthly remuneration went from EUR 9 676.10 to the minimum subsistence allowance provided for in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 24 of Annex IX to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], representing an immediate reduction of over EUR 6500 per month. She adds that her remuneration-related benefits: household allowance, children’s allowance, expatriation allowance and the reimbursement of annual travel expenses paid to her each year in July, have been taken away from her. She concludes therefrom that she is no longer able to provide for her household, although she is the principal source of income for her family. 36 In that regard, as correctly observed by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], it should be noted, first, that the minimum subsistence allowance provided for in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 24(1) of Annex IX to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], amounts to EUR 3 754.39. To that amount must be added the family allowances in so far as, contrary to what the applicant claims, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 24(1) of Annex IX to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] provides that the amount paid to the official is not under any circumstances to be less than the minimum subsistence figure, with the addition of any family allowances payable. It is thus apparent from the evidence in the file that the amount of EUR 1 093.17 was paid to the applicant by way of those allowances for the month of July. In those circumstances, due to the contested decision, the monthly amount paid to the applicant amounts to around EUR 4 847.56. Therefore, the calculations put forward by her do not accurately reflect the financial situation resulting for her from the contested decision. For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that, following the order of 17 July 2026, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] paid the applicant the annual travel allowance in the amount of EUR 10 837.40. 37 Secondly, although the applicant claims that her spouse is engaged in self-employment which, to date, has not generated regular income, she does not adduce any evidence on this point in support of her application for interim relief, producing merely instead a forecast table, which is not sufficient evidence. 38 Thirdly, the applicant states that she has taken out two consumer loans to pay her children’s school fees and that the contested decision prevents her from being able to make the monthly payments on those loans. However, in her application for interim relief, she does not establish that those children are being educated in a school charging high fees. Nor does she provide any proof of the amount of those fees; the table produced has no probative value in that regard. Moreover, as observed by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the only evidence the applicant has produced in support of her application for interim relief of the first consumer loan she claims to have taken out is an unsigned contract, with no proof of monthly payments having been made. As regards the second consumer loan, however, although the contract the applicant has produced is also unsigned, she has provided proof of monthly payments being made. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], it is clear that, as correctly observed by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the last monthly payment on the second loan was due on 6 September 2026, with the result that that loan only partly comes within the period covered by the contested decision, the operation of which was, moreover, suspended by the order of 17 July 2026 until the adoption of the present order. 39 It follows from all of those considerations that the applicant has failed to establish that she is in a situation liable to jeopardise her financial viability. 40 In the second place, the applicant claims that, irrespective of the financial harm, the contested decision has caused her children to suffer harm in their own right in the form of disruption to their social and psychological stability resulting inter alia from the need to change schools in the course of their learning cycle. However, it has been stated above that the applicant has failed to establish that her children were being educated in an institution the fees of which she was no longer able to cover following the contested decision. A fortiori, nor has the applicant succeeded in establishing that her children are having to change schools. Accordingly, at the present juncture, the harm the applicant alleges has been caused to her children, even if there was a direct link between such harm and the contested decision, has not been proven and cannot justify the granting of interim measures. 41 In the third place, the applicant alleges harm arising from the difficulties associated with accessing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s IT environment to submit requests for reimbursement of her medical expenses. On that point, it is apparent from an email, sent on 16 July 2026 by the Director-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] for Personnel of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to the applicant’s legal representatives, that they were informed of the possibility for the applicant to create an external account in order to contact the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (JSIS) during her suspension. It was further stated in that email that she could also submit her requests for reimbursement in paper format. Those aspects were reiterated to the applicant’s legal representatives in an email of 20 January 2026. In those circumstances, the applicant is not entitled to claim that the contested decision deprives her of effective access to the IT tools enabling her to exercise her rights under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 72 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 42 It follows from all of the foregoing that the applicant has not succeeded in demonstrating the serious and irreparable nature of the harm alleged. 43 It follows that the application for interim measures must be dismissed, as the applicant has failed to establish that the condition relating to urgency is satisfied, without it being necessary to rule on the question of whether an order is prima facie justified and without weighing up the interests involved. The forms of order sought by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in relation to the order of 17 July 2026 44 The present order closes the proceedings for interim relief. Accordingly, the order of 17 July 2026, adopted pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 157(2) of the Rules of Procedure, must be cancelled. Consequently, there is no need to rule on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s application to vary that order. Costs 45 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 158(5) of the Rules of Procedure, in the order closing the proceedings for interim relief, costs are to be reserved until the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on the substance of the case. However, if it appears justified in the light of the circumstances of the case, a decision as to the costs relating to the proceedings for interim relief is to be given in the order, pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 134 to 138 thereof. 46 In the present case, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] states that, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 24(2) of Annex IX to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the situation of a suspended official must be definitively settled within six months, failing which the official concerned is to be entitled to again receive full remuneration. It concludes therefrom that delaying the effects of the contested decision by granting the interim measures sought by the applicant would effectively amount to negating that decision and would have an irreversible effect. Moreover, given that the order of 17 July 2026 suspended the operation of the contested decision pending the adoption of the present order, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considers that the circumstances of the present case require that a decision as to the costs relating to the present proceedings should be given in the present order. 47 However, since the question of the awarding of costs is very different from the question of the conditions for granting the interim measures sought, the circumstances relied on by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] do not justify derogating from the rule that costs are to be reserved until the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on the substance of the case. 48 Therefore, pursuant to the last sentence of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 158(5) of the Rules of Procedure, costs are to be reserved until the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on the substance of the case. On those grounds, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] hereby orders: 1. The application for interim relief is dismissed. 2. The order of 17 July 2026, HI v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (T ‑ 436/26 R), is cancelled. 3. The costs are reserved. Luxembourg, 25 September 2026. V. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] S. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] * Language of the case: English.