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Corte di giustizia UEsentenza

Corte di giustizia UE n. 1613/2016

ECLI:EU:C:2016:786
Testo integrale del provvedimento

Testo integrale del provvedimento

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA])

19 October 2016 ( * ) (Appeal — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure — Signed original of the application — Lodgement out of time — Handwritten signature — Defect capable of being rectified — Appeal manifestly unfounded)

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑313/16 P,

APPEAL under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 27 May 2016, Médis — Companhia portuguesa de Seguros de Saúde SA, established in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (Portugal), represented by M. Martinho do Rosário, advogada, applicant, the other party to the proceedings being:

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO)

, defendant at first instance,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]),

composed of M. Vilaras, President of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], M. Safjan and D. Šváby (Rapporteur), [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: M. Wathelet, Registrar: A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], having decided, after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], to give a decision by reasoned order, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], makes the following

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

1 By its appeal, Médis — Companhia portuguesa de Seguros de Saúde SA (‘Médis’) seeks the setting aside of the order of 15 March 2016, Médis v OHIM — Medis (Médis) (T‑774/15, not published, EU:T:2016:175) (‘the order under appeal’), by which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed as manifestly inadmissible the action brought against the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO) of 23 September 2015 ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] R 1613/2014-1), relating to opposition proceedings between Medis ehf. and Médis.

Médis also claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should be ordered to pay the costs. 2 In support of its appeal, the appellant puts forward a single ground of appeal alleging infringement, first, of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 51(4), [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 78(6) and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 177(7) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and, second, of paragraphs 105 and 111 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for the Implementation of those [OSCURATO:PERSONA], as well as point (f) of Annex 2 thereto.

That ground of appeal is divided, in essence, into two parts.

By the first part of that ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] infringed the provisions referred to above by failing to inform it, prior to the adoption of the order under appeal, that its lawyer’s signature, as it appeared in the application initiating proceedings at first instance, was irregular.

By the second part of that ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] infringed those provisions by not fixing a reasonable time limit for it to put its application in order.

The appeal 3 Pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of its [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure, where the appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], decide by reasoned order to dismiss that appeal in whole or in part. 4 On 20 September 2016, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] took the following position: ‘I propose that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should dismiss the appeal in the present case as manifestly unfounded and order [Médis] to pay the costs, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 137 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure [of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]], for the following reasons: (1) By the order under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed the appellant’s action as manifestly inadmissible, as the paper version of the application initiating proceedings which was received at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] within the 10-day time limit laid down by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 73(3) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not include its lawyer’s handwritten signature, but only that lawyer’s scanned signature and, consequently, did not satisfy the requirements of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 73(1) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. (2) In support of its appeal, the appellant puts forward a single ground of appeal, divided into two parts. (3) By the first part of its single ground of appeal, the appellant argues that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] infringed paragraphs 105 and 111 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for the Implementation of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and point (f) of Annex 2 thereto, as well as Articles 177(7), 78(6) and 51(4) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], by failing to notify it of the irregularity of its lawyer’s signature before adopting a decision of inadmissibility. (4) By the second part of its single ground of appeal, the appellant accuses the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of having infringed those provisions by not fixing a reasonable time limit for the appellant to put its application in order. (5) The two parts of the single ground of appeal, which should be considered together, must be rejected as manifestly unfounded. (6) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has already ruled, in paragraph 22 of the order of 6 October 2015, Marpefa v

OHIM

(C‑181/15 P, not published, EU:C:2015:678), that the obligation, imposed by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 73(1) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], “that the original version of any procedural document must bear a handwritten signature, that is, a signature added by hand by the author of the procedural document concerned, is intended, in the interests of legal certainty, to guarantee the authenticity of that procedural document and to exclude the risk that it is not in fact the work of the person authorised for that purpose”. (7) In addition, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held, in paragraph 42 of the judgment of 22 September 2011, Bell & Ross v

OHIM

(C‑426/10 P, EU:C:2011:612), and in paragraphs 22 and 23 of the order of 21 September 2012, Noscira v

OHIM

(C‑69/12 P, not published, EU:C:2012:589), that a failure to submit the signed original of the application is not one of the defects capable of being rectified under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 177(7) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

Thus, an application which is not signed by a lawyer is affected by a defect which is such as to entail the inadmissibility of the action upon the expiry of the procedural time limits, and cannot be put in order. (8) It must be pointed out that neither [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 78(6) nor [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 51(4) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concern the putting in order of an application not signed by a lawyer. (9) Pursuant to the principle of the hierarchy of norms, neither paragraphs 105 and 111 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for the Implementation of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] nor point (f) of Annex 2 thereto can add further possibilities of regularisation which have not been provided for by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (see, by analogy, order of 21 September 2012, Noscira v

OHIM

, C‑69/12 P, not published, EU:C:2012:589, paragraph 24). (10) Consequently, neither Articles 177(7), 78(6) and 51(4) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] nor paragraphs 105 and 111 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for the Implementation of those [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and point (f) of Annex 2 thereto impose an obligation for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to notify an applicant of the absence of its lawyer’s handwritten signature from the application and to fix a reasonable time limit for that applicant to put its application in order.’ 5 For the same reasons as those given by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the appeal must be dismissed as manifestly unfounded.

Costs 6 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 137 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], applicable to appeal proceedings by virtue of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) of those [OSCURATO:PERSONA], a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings.

In the present case, since the present order was adopted before the appeal was served on the respondent and therefore before the latter could have incurred costs, Médis must be ordered to bear its own costs.

On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby orders:

1. The appeal is dismissed;

2. Médis — Companhia portuguesa de Seguros de Saúde SA is to bear its own costs. [Signatures] * Language of the case: English.

Anonimizzato ex art. 52 D.Lgs. 196/2003
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) 19 October 2016 ( * ) (Appeal — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure — Signed original of the application — Lodgement out of time — Handwritten signature — Defect capable of being rectified — Appeal manifestly unfounded) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑313/16 P, APPEAL under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 27 May 2016, Médis — Companhia portuguesa de Seguros de Saúde SA, established in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (Portugal), represented by M. Martinho do Rosário, advogada, applicant, the other party to the proceedings being: [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO) , defendant at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), composed of M. Vilaras, President of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], M. Safjan and D. Šváby (Rapporteur), [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: M. Wathelet, Registrar: A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], having decided, after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], to give a decision by reasoned order, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], makes the following [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1 By its appeal, Médis — Companhia portuguesa de Seguros de Saúde SA (‘Médis’) seeks the setting aside of the order of 15 March 2016, Médis v OHIM — Medis (Médis) (T‑774/15, not published, EU:T:2016:175) (‘the order under appeal’), by which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed as manifestly inadmissible the action brought against the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO) of 23 September 2015 ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] R 1613/2014-1), relating to opposition proceedings between Medis ehf. and Médis. Médis also claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should be ordered to pay the costs. 2 In support of its appeal, the appellant puts forward a single ground of appeal alleging infringement, first, of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 51(4), [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 78(6) and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 177(7) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and, second, of paragraphs 105 and 111 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for the Implementation of those [OSCURATO:PERSONA], as well as point (f) of Annex 2 thereto. That ground of appeal is divided, in essence, into two parts. By the first part of that ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] infringed the provisions referred to above by failing to inform it, prior to the adoption of the order under appeal, that its lawyer’s signature, as it appeared in the application initiating proceedings at first instance, was irregular. By the second part of that ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] infringed those provisions by not fixing a reasonable time limit for it to put its application in order. The appeal 3 Pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of its [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure, where the appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], decide by reasoned order to dismiss that appeal in whole or in part. 4 On 20 September 2016, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] took the following position: ‘I propose that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should dismiss the appeal in the present case as manifestly unfounded and order [Médis] to pay the costs, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 137 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure [of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]], for the following reasons: (1)      By the order under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed the appellant’s action as manifestly inadmissible, as the paper version of the application initiating proceedings which was received at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] within the 10-day time limit laid down by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 73(3) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not include its lawyer’s handwritten signature, but only that lawyer’s scanned signature and, consequently, did not satisfy the requirements of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 73(1) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. (2)      In support of its appeal, the appellant puts forward a single ground of appeal, divided into two parts. (3)      By the first part of its single ground of appeal, the appellant argues that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] infringed paragraphs 105 and 111 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for the Implementation of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and point (f) of Annex 2 thereto, as well as Articles 177(7), 78(6) and 51(4) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], by failing to notify it of the irregularity of its lawyer’s signature before adopting a decision of inadmissibility. (4)      By the second part of its single ground of appeal, the appellant accuses the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of having infringed those provisions by not fixing a reasonable time limit for the appellant to put its application in order. (5)      The two parts of the single ground of appeal, which should be considered together, must be rejected as manifestly unfounded. (6)      [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has already ruled, in paragraph 22 of the order of 6 October 2015, Marpefa v OHIM (C‑181/15 P, not published, EU:C:2015:678), that the obligation, imposed by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 73(1) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], “that the original version of any procedural document must bear a handwritten signature, that is, a signature added by hand by the author of the procedural document concerned, is intended, in the interests of legal certainty, to guarantee the authenticity of that procedural document and to exclude the risk that it is not in fact the work of the person authorised for that purpose”. (7)      In addition, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held, in paragraph 42 of the judgment of 22 September 2011, Bell & Ross v OHIM (C‑426/10 P, EU:C:2011:612), and in paragraphs 22 and 23 of the order of 21 September 2012, Noscira v OHIM (C‑69/12 P, not published, EU:C:2012:589), that a failure to submit the signed original of the application is not one of the defects capable of being rectified under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 177(7) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Thus, an application which is not signed by a lawyer is affected by a defect which is such as to entail the inadmissibility of the action upon the expiry of the procedural time limits, and cannot be put in order. (8)      It must be pointed out that neither [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 78(6) nor [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 51(4) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concern the putting in order of an application not signed by a lawyer. (9)      Pursuant to the principle of the hierarchy of norms, neither paragraphs 105 and 111 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for the Implementation of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] nor point (f) of Annex 2 thereto can add further possibilities of regularisation which have not been provided for by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (see, by analogy, order of 21 September 2012, Noscira v OHIM , C‑69/12 P, not published, EU:C:2012:589, paragraph 24). (10)      Consequently, neither Articles 177(7), 78(6) and 51(4) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] nor paragraphs 105 and 111 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for the Implementation of those [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and point (f) of Annex 2 thereto impose an obligation for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to notify an applicant of the absence of its lawyer’s handwritten signature from the application and to fix a reasonable time limit for that applicant to put its application in order.’ 5 For the same reasons as those given by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the appeal must be dismissed as manifestly unfounded. Costs 6 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 137 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], applicable to appeal proceedings by virtue of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) of those [OSCURATO:PERSONA], a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings. In the present case, since the present order was adopted before the appeal was served on the respondent and therefore before the latter could have incurred costs, Médis must be ordered to bear its own costs. On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby orders: 1. The appeal is dismissed; 2. Médis — Companhia portuguesa de Seguros de Saúde SA is to bear its own costs. [Signatures] * Language of the case: English.
Sentenza Corte di giustizia UE n. 1613/2016 — Fons Iuris — Fons Iuris