Corte di giustizia UE n. 2022/2026

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 20 July 2026 ( * ) ( Interim relief – Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 – Foreign subsidies – Request for information – Application for suspension of operation of a measure – Lack of urgency ) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑335/26 R, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] & [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Ltd, established in Beijing (China), represented by S. Corrijn, N. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], I. Lunneryd, B. Meyring and T. Reyntjens, lawyers, applicant, v [OSCURATO:PERSONA], represented by M. Abenhaïm, M. Farley and C. Faroghi, acting as Agents, defendant, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] makes the following [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1 By its application under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU, the applicant, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] & [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Ltd, seeks the suspension of operation of the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 20 March 2026 concerning a request for information adopted on the basis of Article 13(2) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the Council ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] FS.100143 – [OSCURATO:PERSONA]) (‘the contested decision’). Background to the dispute and forms of order sought by the parties 2 The applicant is a company incorporated under the laws of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of China. Together with its subsidiaries, it forms the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which is active, inter alia, in the manufacture and marketing of wind turbines. That group comprised 822 and then 792 entities, according to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] annual accounts for 2023 and 2024. 3 Following the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (OJ 2022 L 330, p. 1), the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was approached by several stakeholders in the EU wind power sector. Those stakeholders were concerned about the potential existence of foreign subsidies distorting the internal market for the provision of wind turbines and related services. 4 Having considered that that information indicated the possibility that foreign subsidies distorting the internal market existed, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] decided, in accordance with Article 10(1) of Regulation 2022/2560, to obtain the information necessary to assess, on a preliminary basis, whether the financial contributions under examination constituted foreign subsidies and whether they distorted the internal market in the wind power sector (‘the preliminary review’). 5 To that end, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in accordance with Article 13(2) of Regulation 2022/2560, sent a number of requests for information to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], including request for information No 1 of 9 April 2024 and request for information No 33 of 22 May 2025. In response, the applicant sought numerous extensions to the deadlines for providing the information requested and repeatedly requested that the scope of the questions contained in those requests for information be limited. 6 Thus, in request for information No 1 of 9 April 2024, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] asked the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to furnish a list of the financial contributions provided by a third country, within the meaning of Article 3 of Regulation 2022/2560 (‘financial contributions’), that had been granted to it between July 2018 and April 2024. In its response of 14 June 2024, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] requested that the scope of that request for information be limited to ‘EU nexus entities’ and that certain financial contributions be excluded. 7 Once again, in request for information No 33 of 22 May 2025, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] asked the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to provide a list of the financial contributions granted between July 2018 and May 2025, specifying that that request did not concern certain types of purchases of goods or services or certain amounts. In its response of 25 July 2025, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] requested that the scope of that request for information be limited to certain entities, on that occasion agreeing to extend the scope beyond ‘EU nexus entities’. 8 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] granted a number of deadline extensions. It also states that it endeavoured, where possible, to accommodate the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] requests to review the scope of certain questions. This resulted in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] providing information only in respect of 98 of its entities during the preliminary review. 9 On 3 February 2026, on the basis of the preliminary review, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] decided to adopt a decision to initiate an in-depth investigation under Article 10(3) of Regulation 2022/2560 (‘the decision to initiate the in-depth investigation’). That decision, in sections 4 and 5 thereof, summarises certain issues of fact and law and includes the preliminary assessment of the existence of foreign subsidies and of actual or potential distortions in the internal market, taking into account the information provided by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 10 In that context, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] states that it has, on a preliminary basis, identified three categories of foreign subsidies relating to subsidies proper (‘grants’), tax measures and loans. 11 In paragraph 42 of the decision to initiate the in-depth investigation, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] specifies, however, that, since it agreed, for the purposes of the preliminary review, that the scope of the reporting of the financial contributions granted to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] could be temporarily limited, as requested by [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the preliminary assessment carried out in that decision was based on the content of the information provided by that undertaking, which concerned only 98 entities in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] then states that, ‘in the in-depth investigation, [that institution] may require [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to disclose other [foreign financial contributions], including those granted to other entities in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].’ 12 On 20 March 2026, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] adopted the contested decision in accordance with Article 13(1) and (2) of Regulation 2022/2560 with a view to obtaining from the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – represented by the applicant – the information necessary to enable the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to carry out the duties assigned to it by Regulation 2022/2560. 13 By application lodged at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 29 May 2026, the applicant has brought an action for annulment of the contested decision. 14 By a separate document lodged at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on the same date, the applicant has made the present application for interim measures, in which it claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should: –        order the suspension of operation of the contested decision; –        in the alternative, order the suspension of operation of the contested decision in so far as it requires the applicant to provide information pursuant to questions No 10.2 to 10.6, 11.1, 11.3, 11.6, 12, 13 and 15 to 20 of that request for information, which goes beyond the scope of the decision to initiate the in-depth investigation; –        order the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to pay the costs. 15 In its observations regarding the application for interim measures, which were lodged at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 17 June 2026, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should: –        dismiss the application for interim measures; –        reserve the costs. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considerations 16 It is apparent from reading Articles 278 and 279 TFEU together with Article 256(1) TFEU that the judge hearing an application for interim measures may, if he or she considers that the circumstances so require, order that the operation of a measure challenged before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] be suspended or prescribe any necessary interim measures, pursuant to Article 156 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Nevertheless, Article 278 TFEU establishes the principle that actions do not have suspensory effect, since acts adopted by the institutions of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] are presumed to be lawful. It is therefore only exceptionally that the judge hearing an application for interim measures may order the suspension of operation of an act challenged before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] or prescribe any interim measures (see order of 19 July 2016, Belgium v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑131/16 R, EU:T:2016:427, paragraph 12 and the case-law cited). 17 The first sentence of Article 156(4) of the Rules of Procedure provides that applications for interim measures are to state ‘the subject matter of the proceedings, the circumstances giving rise to urgency and the pleas of fact and law establishing a prima facie case for the interim measure applied for’. 18 The judge hearing an application for interim relief may thus order the suspension of operation of an act and other interim measures if it is established that such an order is justified, prima facie, in fact and in law, and that it is urgent in so far as, in order to avoid serious and irreparable harm to the applicant’s interests, it must be made and produce its effects before a decision is reached in the main action. Those conditions are cumulative, and consequently an application for interim measures must be dismissed if any one of them is not satisfied. The judge hearing an application for interim relief is also to undertake, when necessary, a weighing of the competing interests (see order of 2 March 2016, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑162/15 P‑R, EU:C:2016:142, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited). 19 In the context of that overall examination, the judge hearing the application for interim measures enjoys a broad discretion and is free to determine, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, the manner and order in which those various conditions are to be examined, there being no rule of law imposing a pre‑established scheme of analysis within which the need to order interim measures must be assessed (see order of 19 July 2012, Akhras v Council , C‑110/12 P(R), not published, EU:C:2012:507, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited). 20 Having regard to the material in the case file, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considers that he has all the information needed to decide on the present application for interim measures, without there being any need first to hear oral argument from the parties. 21 In the circumstances of the present case, it is appropriate to examine, first of all, whether the condition relating to urgency is satisfied. The condition relating to urgency 22 In order to determine whether the interim measures sought are urgent, it should be noted that the purpose of the procedure for interim relief is to guarantee the full effectiveness of the future final decision, in order to prevent a lacuna in the legal protection afforded by the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. To attain that objective, urgency must, generally, be assessed in the light of the need of an interlocutory order to avoid serious and irreparable damage to the party requesting the interim measure. That party must demonstrate that it cannot await the outcome of the main proceedings without suffering serious and irreparable damage (see order of 14 January 2016, AGC [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑517/15 P‑R, EU:C:2016:21, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited). 23 Furthermore, according to well-established case-law, there is urgency only if the serious and irreparable damage feared by the party requesting the interim measures is so imminent that its occurrence can be foreseen with a sufficient degree of probability. That party remains, in any event, required to prove the facts that form the basis of its claim that such damage is likely, it being clear that purely hypothetical damage, based on future and uncertain events, cannot justify the granting of interim measures (see order of 16 February 2017, Gollnisch v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑624/16 R, not published, EU:T:2017:94, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited). 24 It is in the light of those criteria that it must be examined whether the applicant has succeeded in demonstrating urgency. 25 In order to demonstrate urgency, the applicant submits that having to comply with the contested decision pending the outcome of the action for annulment would cause two types of serious and irreparable damage resulting, first, from significantly prolonging the investigation and, second, from serious and irreversible harm to its rights of defence. 26 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] disputes that line of argument. 27 As regards the first type of damage alleged, the applicant submits, in essence, that the fact of being required to respond to the questions asked in the contested decision – which, it claims, go beyond the scope of the decision to initiate the in-depth investigation – inevitably has an impact on the duration of the procedure and necessarily means that the 18-month period laid down in Article 11(5) of Regulation 2022/2560 can no longer be complied with. It maintains that, due to the uncertainty which the investigation is generating for its activities, the longer the investigation lasts, the more the commercial and reputational damage it claims to be suffering as a result will accumulate. 28 In that regard, first, as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] correctly points out, the 18-month period to which the applicant refers will not expire until August 2027, meaning that there is still more than a year remaining before it ends. At the present stage, the significant prolongation of the duration of the investigation, as contemplated by the applicant, is a future and uncertain event that remains hypothetical. 29 Second, the answer to the question whether the occurrence of the alleged damage can be foreseen with a sufficient degree of probability depends not only on the content of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s request for information at issue in the present case, but also on the conduct of the applicant itself. 30 As regards the content of the request for information, the applicant does not explain how responding to questions which, in essence, were put to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] as early as request for information No 1 of 9 April 2024 – and which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had indicated might be asked in the decision to initiate the in-depth investigation adopted on 3 February 2026 – would, as such, be capable of significantly prolonging the investigation. 31 In that regard, the applicant cannot, in principle, rely on difficulties arising from the way in which its activities are organised for the purpose of claiming that it is not required to respond to questions put by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in order to determine whether financial contributions provided by a third country confer a benefit on the applicant within the internal market. Engaging in activities in the internal market entails an obligation for the undertakings concerned to comply with the rules governing its proper functioning, which includes the obligation to respond to requests for information provided for in Article 13 of Regulation 2022/2560. 32 Moreover, it is apparent from the circumstances of the present case that the applicant was informed of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s intention to request information relating to contributions other than the three categories of subsidies identified in the decision to initiate the in-depth investigation. Irrespective of whether or not such an approach is lawful, those indications enabled the applicant to understand that other requests for information would be addressed to it and, therefore, to prepare its response to such requests. 33 The applicant’s conduct also appears to have affected the duration of the investigation, in so far as, since request for information No 1 of 9 April 2024, and again in response to the request for information which is the subject of the contested decision, the applicant has, on several occasions, requested and been granted extensions to the time limit for responding or limitations on the scope of certain questions. 34 Third, the applicant appears to regard the 18-month period on which it relies as mandatory, whereas it is merely an indicative period with which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] endeavours to comply as far as possible. 35 In any event, it is unclear what specific damage could be caused to the applicant as a result of exceeding such an indicative 18-month period. 36 First of all, the question whether the final decision was not adopted within a reasonable period of time should be addressed in the action which the applicant may bring against any adverse decision that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] might issue to it following the investigation. 37 Next, even if the applicant claims that the duration of the investigation is harming its reputation, it is settled case-law that, if such harm exists, the subsequent annulling judgment will, in principle, afford the applicant appropriate redress (see order of 15 October 2010, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Joint undertaking Fusion for Energy , T‑415/10 R, not published, EU:T:2010:436, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited). 38 Furthermore, as regards the claim that the significant prolongation of the investigation is affecting the applicant’s commercial activities, it must be held that the two examples put forward in that regard are not sufficient. On their own, those two examples do not establish the existence of a situation of urgency, since they concern only a very limited number of projects; they refer to difficulties which are not, as such, linked to the contested decision, but more broadly to the fact that there is an ongoing investigation into the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]; and it is difficult to understand in what respect the damage alleged in relation to those projects has occurred or is merely possible. The applicant cannot simply allege serious and irreparable damage without adducing evidence capable of establishing the existence of such damage with regard to the scope of its activities. 39 Lastly, it is unclear how suspending the operation of the contested decision or part thereof, as requested by the applicant, could help to remove the uncertainty regarding the outcome of the investigation and reduce the alleged commercial and reputational risk. On the contrary, such a suspension could have the effect of prolonging the period of uncertainty. 40 Consequently, the first type of damage alleged has not been sufficiently established to justify a finding of urgency warranting the adoption of an interim measure for the purposes of the case-law referred to in paragraphs 22 and 23 above. 41 As regards the second type of damage alleged, the applicant submits that the mere fact of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] receiving the information requested would cause irreversible harm to its rights of defence. It maintains in that respect that the provision of such information would have irreversible consequences which could not be remedied by the subsequent annulment of the contested decision. By analogy with the approach adopted by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice in the judgment of 18 June 2015, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (C‑583/13 P, EU:C:2015:404, paragraph 58), the rights of the defence would be seriously endangered if the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] were to rely on evidence obtained in response to a request for information that was unrelated to the subject matter of the investigation. It argues that no judgment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] can compel the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to disregard information of which it has become aware. 42 In that regard, assuming that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was not entitled to request the information and if, consequently, the contested decision were to be annulled by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], it is apparent from settled case-law that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] would be prevented from using the information which it may have obtained in response to the contested decision in the context of a procedure relating to foreign subsidies distorting the internal market, as otherwise its decision might, in so far as it was based on such information, be annulled by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Therefore, if the contested decision were to be declared unlawful, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] would be required to remove the information in question from its file and would thus be unable to use it as evidence (see, to that effect, order of 29 January 2020, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑808/19 R, not published, EU:T:2020:16, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited). 43 Such an approach has not been called into question by – but, on the contrary, is entirely consistent with – the judgment of 18 June 2015, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (C‑583/13 P, EU:C:2015:404), cited by the applicant, which confirms that the rights of the defence would be seriously endangered if it were possible for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to rely on evidence unlawfully obtained in the context of an inspection for the purpose of finding an infringement of EU law. In this instance, however, the present case differs from the one which gave rise to that judgment, inasmuch as the question that arises here is not whether the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], following an inspection characterised by certain irregularities, had relevant evidence to justify an inspection decision. In the present case, the question that arises, rather, is whether the applicant is required to respond to a request for information made by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] which, in full transparency, forms part of a process that was intended from the outset to obtain information concerning all the entities and financial contributions granted to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in order to determine whether those contributions confer a benefit on it within the internal market. 44 Consequently, the second type of damage alleged has not been sufficiently established to justify a finding of urgency warranting the adoption of an interim measure for the purposes of the case-law referred to in paragraphs 22 and 23 above. 45 It follows from the foregoing that the application for interim measures must be dismissed as the applicant has failed to establish that the condition relating to urgency is satisfied, without it being necessary to rule on whether there is a prima facie case or to undertake a weighing of the competing interests. 46 In the light of all of the foregoing, the present application for interim measures must accordingly be dismissed. 47 Pursuant to Article 158(5) of the Rules of Procedure, the costs are to be reserved. On those grounds, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] hereby orders: 1. The application for interim measures is dismissed. 2. The costs are reserved. Luxembourg, 20 July 2026. V. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] M. van der [OSCURATO:PERSONA] * Language of the case: English.