Corte di giustizia UE n. 2015/2026

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) 2 September 2026 ( * ) ( Action for annulment – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EU) 2015/1589 – Formal notice addressed to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – Refusal by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to issue an injunction to suspend or provisionally recover aid – Non-actionable measure – Manifest inadmissibility ) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑629/24, Ryanair DAC, established in Swords (Ireland), represented by F.-C. Laprévote, E. Vahida, S. Rating, L. Geiger and A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], lawyers, applicant, v [OSCURATO:PERSONA], represented by L. Flynn, J. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and C.‑M. Carrega, acting as Agents, defendant, supported by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Germany, represented by J. Möller and V. Piegsa, acting as Agents, and by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] AG, established in Cologne (Germany), represented by U. Soltész and H. Weiß, lawyers, interveners, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), composed of G. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA], C. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and D. Jočienė (Rapporteur), [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: V. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], having regard to the written part of the procedure, makes the following [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1 By its action under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU, the applicant, Ryanair DAC, seeks the annulment of the letter from the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 26 September 2024 (‘the contested measure’), by which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] refused, in response to the applicant’s request, to issue a suspension injunction or a provisional recovery injunction within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 13(1) and (2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 108 [TFEU] (OJ 2015 L 248, p. 9) with regard to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid SA.57153 (2020/N) – Germany – COVID-19 – Aid to [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Background to the dispute 2 On 12 June 2020, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Germany notified the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid measure benefiting [OSCURATO:PERSONA] AG (‘DLH’). 3 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C(2020) 4372 final of 25 June 2020 on [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid SA.57153 (2020/N) – Germany – COVID-19 – Aid to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (‘the initial decision’), adopted on completion of the preliminary examination procedure, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] authorised that aid measure subject to certain conditions, pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 107(3)(b) TFEU and the Communication from the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] entitled ‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA] for [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid measures to support the economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak’ (OJ 2020 C 91I, p. 1), applicable from 19 March 2020, as amended from 3 April 2020 (OJ 2020 C 112I, p. 1) and subsequently from 8 May 2020 (OJ 2020 C 164, p. 3). The aid measure took the form of a recapitalisation of EUR 6 billion by means of an equity participation and two ‘silent participations’ (‘the aid measure’ or ‘the aid at issue’). 4 By judgment of 10 May 2023, Ryanair and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]; COVID-19) (T‑34/21 and T‑87/21, ‘ [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ’, EU:T:2023:248), the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] annulled the initial decision on account of a number of errors made by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. The appeal lodged by DLH against the judgment of 10 May 2023, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (T‑34/21 and T‑87/21, EU:T:2023:248), was dismissed by the judgment of 23 April 2026, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Ryanair and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (C‑457/23 P, EU:C:2026:331). 5 On 17 August 2023, the applicant requested the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to order the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Germany to recover the advantages arising from the aid measure and to reassess the compatibility of that measure with the internal market. 6 In response to that request, on 26 September 2023, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] informed the applicant that it would in due time take the necessary steps to comply with the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] findings in the judgment of 10 May 2023, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (T‑34/21 and T‑87/21, EU:T:2023:248). 7 On 29 February 2024, the applicant gave the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] formal notice to comply, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 266 TFEU, with the judgment of 10 May 2023, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (T‑34/21 and T‑87/21, EU:T:2023:248). It requested the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to adopt a negative decision declaring the aid at issue incompatible with the internal market and ordering the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Germany to recover it or otherwise to define its position in that regard. In the alternative, the applicant asked the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to issue a provisional recovery injunction pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 13(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2015/1589, and to adopt a decision opening a formal investigation procedure under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 108(2) TFEU, or, failing that, to define its position in that regard. 8 On 26 April 2024, in the first place, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] informed the applicant that it intended to open a formal investigation procedure, and that a negative decision requiring the recovery of the aid at issue could be adopted only after such a procedure was closed. In the second place, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] stated that a provisional recovery injunction could be issued, subject to certain conditions, in the course of the formal investigation procedure, and that issuing such an injunction was at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s discretion. It stated that, at that stage, the elements identified by the applicant did not appear sufficient to justify such an injunction, and asked the applicant to provide additional information in the formal investigation procedure. 9 On 8 July 2024, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] decided to initiate the formal investigation procedure, provided for in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 108(2) TFEU, in relation to the aid measure and invited the interested parties to submit comments on that decision. 10 By letter to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 5 September 2024, the applicant ‘develops and reiterates’ the formal notice given in the letter of 29 February 2024. It asked the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to order the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Germany, pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 13(1) and (2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2015/1589, to recover the aid at issue provisionally or, at the very least, to suspend that aid and all the advantages arising from it. In that regard, the applicant argued that, without such measures, there was a serious risk of substantial and irreparable damage for a competitor. 11 By the contested measure, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] replied to the applicant’s letter of 5 September 2024. With regard to the request for a suspension injunction, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] found that such an injunction did not seem necessary because the aid measure had already been fully executed and no further aid disbursements were pending that could be halted. As for the request for a provisional recovery injunction, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] stated that the applicant had not provided any evidence that appeared to demonstrate conclusively a serious risk of substantial and irreparable damage directly linked to the unlawfully implemented aid measure. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] also found that issuing such an injunction remained at its discretion. Forms of order sought 12 The applicant claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should: –        annul the contested measure; –        order the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Germany and DLH to pay the costs, including those incurred by it in connection with the interventions of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Germany and DLH; –        order the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Germany and DLH to bear their own costs associated with their interventions. 13 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should: –        dismiss the action as inadmissible or, in the alternative, as unfounded; –        order the applicant to pay the costs. 14 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Germany contends that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should: –        dismiss the action; –        order the applicant to pay the costs. 15 DLH contends that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should: –        dismiss the action as inadmissible or, in the alternative, as unfounded; –        order the applicant to pay the costs incurred by DLH. Law 16 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 126 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], where an action is manifestly inadmissible, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may decide to give a decision by reasoned order without taking further steps in the proceedings. 17 In the present case, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considers that it has sufficient information from the material in the file and decides, pursuant to that article, to give a decision without taking further steps in the proceedings. Admissibility of the action 18 Without raising a plea of inadmissibility by a separate document on the basis of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 130(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims, in its defence, that the action is inadmissible. 19 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] argues that the contested measure does not produce binding legal effects and that, therefore, it does not constitute a challengeable measure which may form the subject matter of an action for annulment under the first paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU. According to the wording of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 13(1) and (2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2015/1589, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has a power and not an obligation to issue a suspension or provisional recovery injunction. The existence of such a discretionary power precludes the right of individuals to require the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to adopt a particular position and to bring an action for annulment against its refusal to take action. 20 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Germany and DLH support the form of order sought by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. DLH adds that legal remedies are available under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] national law and that, while the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must examine the compatibility of aid, the primary role of national courts is to protect the rights of individuals. 21 The applicant disputes the arguments raised by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the interveners. 22 First, it argues that the contested measure constitutes a challengeable act for the purposes of the first paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU since that measure produces binding legal effects. According to the applicant, those effects consist inter alia in the fact that, by virtue of the contested measure, DLH is not obliged to hold the necessary sums as provision for possible subsequent repayments of the aid at issue, in that the aid alters DLH’s use of resources and the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is allowed to tolerate indefinitely the implementation of the aid measure. In addition, a provisional recovery injunction would be binding on the national authorities and thus have an impact on any future actions for recovery and for damages. The contested measure would also affect the speed with which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] courts would settle the matter of the recovery of the aid at issue. 23 Second, the applicant argues that, given the annulment of the initial decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is obliged to order the provisional recovery of the aid at issue pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 266 TFEU, which takes precedence over [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 13 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2015/1589. In the applicant’s view, it should be entitled to bring an action for annulment where the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] exercises its discretionary power in a manner that results in an infringement of the Treaties. The applicant adds that the existence of a discretionary power is not a barrier to judicial review. 24 Third, the applicant contends that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 13 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2015/1589 should not be compared with Articles 106 and 258 TFEU, but rather with interim measures adopted under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles [101 and 102 TFEU] (OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1), against which an action may be brought despite the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s discretion. 25 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the applicant argues that an action for annulment on the basis of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU and an action for failure to act under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 265 TFEU are mutually exclusive. The present action must therefore be admissible since, if it were not, the applicant would be left with no effective legal remedy. 26 In that regard, it should be recalled that, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU, the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] have jurisdiction to review the legality of acts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], other than recommendations and opinions, intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. 27 The action for annulment established in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU is available in the case of all measures adopted by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], whatever their nature or form, which are intended to have binding legal effects vis-à-vis third parties (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 February 2026, WhatsApp Ireland v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑97/23 P, EU:C:2026:81, paragraphs 65 and 66 and the case-law cited). 28 In order to determine whether the contested measure produces such effects and may, accordingly, form the subject matter of an action for annulment under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU, it is necessary to examine the substance of that measure and to assess those effects in the light of objective criteria, such as the content of the measure, taking into account, as appropriate, the context in which it was adopted and the powers of the institution which adopted the measure (see judgment of 10 February 2026, WhatsApp Ireland v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑97/23 P, EU:C:2026:81, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited). 29 In addition, according to the case-law, when an act of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] amounts to a rejection, it must be appraised in the light of the nature of the request to which it constitutes a reply (see order of 23 January 2019, Prigent v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑436/18, not published, EU:T:2019:33, paragraph 10 and the case-law cited). 30 Moreover, it should be recalled that it follows from settled case-law that, where an EU institution, body, office or agency is not bound to initiate a procedure, but has a discretion which excludes the right for individuals to require it to adopt a specific position, the latter are not entitled to challenge a refusal to initiate such a procedure, as that refusal does not constitute a challengeable act for the purposes of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU. Actions brought by natural or legal persons against the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s refusal to initiate a procedure for a declaration of failure to fulfil obligations under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 258 TFEU, or against the refusal to bring an action under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 106(3) TFEU, have thus been declared inadmissible (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 February 2005, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v max.mobil , C‑141/02 P, EU:C:2005:98, paragraphs 69 and 70; orders of 23 January 2019, Prigent v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑436/18, not published, EU:T:2019:33, paragraphs 11, 12 and 17 and the case-law cited; and of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v EIOPA , T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347, paragraphs 22 and 23 and the case-law cited). 31 However, even in a situation such as that referred to in paragraph 30 above, a possibility of bringing an action before the EU judicature would arise only if the individuals had procedural rights, comparable to those they might have in the case of a procedure under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1/2003, enabling them to require the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies concerned to inform them and to grant them a hearing (see, to that effect, orders of 17 July 1998, Sateba v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑422/97 P, EU:C:1998:395, paragraph 42, and of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v EIOPA , T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited). 32 It is in the light of those considerations that the admissibility of the present action must be examined. 33 In the present case, in the first place, it is apparent from the content of the contested measure that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] refused to issue injunctions to suspend and to recover provisionally the aid at issue pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 13(1) and (2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2015/1589 on the ground that there were insufficient reasons for issuing such injunctions at that stage and, in any case, the decision to issue them fell within its discretion. 34 According to the wording of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 13(1) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2015/1589, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ‘may, after giving the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concerned the opportunity to submit its comments, adopt a decision requiring the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to suspend any unlawful aid until the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has taken a decision on the compatibility of the aid with the internal market’. 35 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 13(2) of the same regulation, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ‘may, after giving the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concerned the opportunity to submit its comments, adopt a decision requiring the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] provisionally to recover any unlawful aid until the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has taken a decision on the compatibility of the aid with the internal market’, if certain conditions are fulfilled. More specifically, that paragraph 2 requires that there are no doubts about the aid character of the measure concerned, that there is an urgency to act, and that there is a serious risk of substantial and irreparable damage to a competitor. 36 It is therefore apparent from the wording of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 13(1) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2015/1589, and, in particular, from the use of the verb ‘may’, that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has a power and not an obligation to adopt a decision imposing a suspension injunction (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 4 June 2020, Hungary v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑456/18 P, EU:C:2020:421, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited). 37 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 13(1) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2015/1589 does not require the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], if certain conditions are fulfilled, to adopt a suspension injunction, but provides only that it may adopt such an injunction, where it deems it necessary (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 22 April 2016, Ireland and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑50/06 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and T‑69/06 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], EU:T:2016:227, paragraphs 79 and 259). Even if the conditions imposed in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 13(1) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2015/1589 are met, particular grounds must lead the institution to adopt such a decision (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 4 June 2020, Hungary v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑456/18 P, EU:C:2020:421, paragraph 58). 38 The findings in paragraphs 36 and 37 above are also applicable to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 13(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2015/1589, which concerns the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s power to issue provisional recovery injunctions and is worded in similar terms to paragraph 1 of that same article (see paragraphs 34 and 35 above). 39 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] thus has a discretionary power under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 13(1) and (2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2015/1589 which excludes the right for individuals to require it to adopt a specific position, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 30 above. 40 It should be observed, in addition, that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is not prevented by the contested measure from deciding to issue an injunction pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 13(1) and (2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2015/1589 at a later stage of the formal investigation procedure, if it were to obtain information leading it to deem such an injunction necessary. 41 In the second place, it should be stated that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 13 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2015/1589 does not provide for procedural rights for the interested parties within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 31 above. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], contrary to what the applicant claims, the contested measure cannot be compared with a decision not to initiate the formal investigation procedure under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 108(2) TFEU, against which an action is admissible in so far as it seeks to safeguard the procedural rights of the interested parties (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 17 July 2008, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑521/06 P, EU:C:2008:422, paragraph 36, and of 9 September 2015, SV Capital v EBA , T‑660/14, EU:T:2015:608, paragraph 49). 42 In the third place, and in any case, it is necessary to recall the context in which the contested measure was adopted, and more specifically the fact that the formal investigation procedure, initiated on 8 July 2024, was still underway when both the contested measure was adopted and the present action was brought. 43 On completion of the formal investigation procedure, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] will decide on the compatibility of the aid at issue with the internal market and on its potential recovery. By the contested measure, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not therefore decide on the compatibility of the aid measure and does not end its investigation in that regard. 44 Accordingly, contrary to what the applicant argues, first, the effects of the contested measure are not comparable to those of a decision by which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] endorses commitments by a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concerning an aid scheme and therefore closes its investigation of that scheme, which produces legal effects, specifically by allowing the national authorities to continue to implement the aid scheme (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 March 2009, TF1 v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑354/05, EU:T:2009:66, paragraphs 79 and 81). [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not, by the contested measure, end its investigation of the aid measure. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], contrary to what the applicant claims, the contested measure does not allow the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] authorities to continue to ‘tolerate’ the implementation of that measure, especially since, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 4(3) TEU, the principle of sincere cooperation between the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] applies throughout the procedure for the examination of a measure in relation to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 November 2018, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Ferracci , C‑622/16 P to C‑624/16 P, EU:C:2018:873, paragraph 83 and the case-law cited). 45 Second, nor are the effects of the contested measure comparable to those of a decision by which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] classifies aid, which was in the course of implementation, as new aid, whereas the national authorities had classified it as existing aid. It is true, as indicated by the applicant, that such a decision produces legal effects in that it alters the legal position of the aid and of the beneficiaries because it raises a significant element of doubt as to the legality of the aid, with the result that the beneficiaries may hold the necessary sums as provision for possible subsequent repayments of that aid (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 October 2001, Italy v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑400/99, EU:C:2001:528, paragraphs 59 and 62, and of 24 October 2013, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑77/12 P, not published, EU:C:2013:695, paragraph 52). However, the contested measure does not raise such doubts since the initial decision approving the aid measure has already been annulled by the judgment of 10 May 2023, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (T‑34/21 and T‑87/21, EU:T:2023:248), as confirmed by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice in the judgment of 23 April 2026, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Ryanair and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (C‑457/23 P, EU:C:2026:331). In the present case, as noted in paragraph 42 above, the formal investigation procedure was continued. 46 In addition, it should be observed that, pending the outcome of the formal investigation procedure, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] authorities and courts may recover the aid at issue provisionally (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 November 1991, Fédération nationale du commerce extérieur des produits alimentaires and Syndicat national des négociants et transformateurs de saumon , C‑354/90, EU:C:1991:440, paragraphs 12 and 14). The fact that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] stated in the contested measure that, at that stage of its investigation, it would not issue a provisional recovery injunction does not therefore prevent the national authorities and courts, on their own initiative, from effecting such recovery. 47 In those circumstances, it must be found that the contested measure does not produce binding legal effects vis-à-vis third parties, including with respect to the applicant. 48 That conclusion cannot be called into question by the applicant’s other arguments. 49 In the first place, the argument that the contested measure produces binding legal effects because the aid measure alters DLH’s use of resources and therefore distorts competition, as the contested measure leaves wholly unaffected the distortive effects produced by that aid, cannot succeed. Such effects are the result of the implementation of the aid measure itself and not of the refusal to issue injunctions within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 13 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2015/1589. 50 In the second place, the argument that the contested measure produces legal effects because it will have an impact on any future actions for damages must be rejected. The potential effects which the applicant attributes to the recovery injunction requested are purely speculative and do not therefore constitute binding legal effects vis-à-vis third parties arising from the contested measure. It is necessary, on the same grounds, to reject the applicant’s argument that, since the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] authorities refuse to recover the aid at issue, the contested measure would have an impact on the speed with which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] courts would settle that matter, as those courts would probably have to request the opinion of an expert in order to calculate the amount to be recovered. 51 In the third place, although [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 266 TFEU, which requires the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of 10 May 2023, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (T‑34/21 and T‑87/21, EU:T:2023:248), is a provision of primary law, the applicant has not shown that that article would require the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to issue a suspension or provisional recovery injunction within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 13 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2015/1589 as a result of that judgment. The applicant’s argument has no basis in law. It must also be recalled in that regard that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] opened the formal investigation procedure with regard to the aid measure in order to comply with the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] findings in the judgment of 10 May 2023, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (T‑34/21 and T‑87/21, EU:T:2023:248). 52 In the fourth place, the applicant’s argument that the present case should be compared with interim measures under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1/2003, against which an action may be brought despite the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s discretionary power in such matters, must be rejected. As the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] argues, the applicant has not established either that a party complaining of a cartel or of the abuse of a dominant position would have the right to require the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to adopt an interim measure, or that such a party would have the possibility of challenging a refusal by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to adopt such a measure. 53 In the fifth place, the applicant’s argument that it would be left with no legal remedy if the present action for annulment were found to be inadmissible cannot succeed. In that regard, it is sufficient to recall that, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 46 above, the applicant retains the possibility of applying for the provisional recovery of the aid at issue before the national courts. 54 In those circumstances, the contested measure cannot be classified as a challengeable act for the purposes of the first paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU. The action must thus be dismissed as manifestly inadmissible in its entirety. The request for a measure of organisation of procedure and the additional evidence produced by the applicant 55 The applicant’s request for the adoption of a measure of organisation of procedure requiring the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to provide information about a potential breach by DLH of the commitments set out in the initial decision must be refused. The facts that that measure would seek to establish cannot call into question the conclusion that the action is manifestly inadmissible. 56 In addition, the applicant lodged additional evidence on 18 November 2025. It relates to a number of requests made by the applicant to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] after the closure of the written part of the procedure in the present case, seeking information and access to documents relating to DLH’s potential breach of its commitments set out in the initial decision, as well as a provisional recovery injunction pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 13 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2015/1589. That evidence also includes the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s replies to those requests. 57 The possible legal effects that may arise from those requests, which were made after the date of the contested measure, cannot stem from the contested measure, as that measure is separate from and unrelated to those requests. Moreover, to the extent that the additional evidence concerns the merits of the action, it cannot call into question the considerations set out in paragraphs 26 to 54 above relating to the admissibility thereof. To the extent that that evidence concerns the request for measures of organisation of procedure, it is sufficient to recall that that request has been refused, as is apparent from paragraph 55 above. 58 Accordingly, without it being necessary to rule on the admissibility of that additional evidence under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 85(3) of the Rules of Procedure, that evidence must be found to be irrelevant in the context of the present proceedings. 59 In the light of all of the foregoing, the action must be dismissed as manifestly inadmissible. Costs 60 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 61 In addition, pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and institutions which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. 62 Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in accordance with the form of order sought by the latter. 63 The applicant must also be ordered to pay the costs incurred by DLH, which intervened in support of the form of order sought by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in accordance with the form of order sought by DLH. 64 In addition, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Germany is to bear its own costs. On those grounds, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby orders: 1. The action is dismissed as manifestly inadmissible. 2. Ryanair DAC shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] AG. 3. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Germany shall bear its own costs. Luxembourg, 2 September 2026. V. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] G. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] * Language of the case: English.