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Corte di giustizia UEsentenza

Corte di giustizia UE n. 1092/2013

ECLI:EU:C:2013:296
Testo integrale del provvedimento

Testo integrale del provvedimento

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA])

8 May 2013 ( * ) (Appeal – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice – Community trade mark – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 40/94 – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1)(b) – Likelihood of confusion – Word mark ZYDUS – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] by the proprietor of the Community trade mark ZIMBUS – Partial refusal of registration by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of [OSCURATO:PERSONA])

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑268/12 P,

APPEAL under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 23 May 2012,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA],

established in Ahmedabad (India), represented by S. Malynicz, Barrister, appellant, the other parties to the proceedings being: Office for Harmonisation in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Designs) ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), represented by A. Folliard-Monguiral, acting as Agent, defendant at first instance,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] AG,

established in Basle (Switzerland), represented by N. Hebeis, Rechtsanwalt, intervener at first instance,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]),

composed of E. Jarašiūnas, President of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], A. Ó Caoimh and C.G.

Fernlund (Rapporteur), [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: J. Kokott, Registrar: A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], having decided, after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], to give a decision by reasoned order, pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, makes the following

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

1 By its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA]’) seeks to have set aside the judgment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 15 March 2012 in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑288/08

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

–

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] (ZYDUS)

(‘the judgment under appeal’), by which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed its action for annulment of the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Designs) ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) of 7 May 2008 ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] R 1092/2007‑2), relating to opposition proceedings between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] AG (‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA]’) and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (‘the contested decision’).

Legal context 2 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] the heading ‘Relative grounds for refusal’, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1)(b) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1) states: ‘Upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for shall not be registered: … (b) if because of its identity with or similarity to the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected; the likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.’ 3 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 113 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] provides: ‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA] may at any time, of its own motion, after hearing the parties, decide whether there exists any absolute bar to proceeding with an action or declare that the action has become devoid of purpose and that there is no need to adjudicate on it …’.

Background to the dispute 4 On 18 July 2003 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] filed an application for registration of a Community trade mark with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94. 5 The mark for which registration was sought is the word sign ‘ZYDUS’. 6 The goods in respect of which registration was sought fall within, inter alia, Class 5 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concerning the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, and correspond, in particular, to the following description: ‘Pharmaceutical, veterinary and sanitary preparations; dietetic substances adapted for medical use; disinfectants; fungicides.’ 7 On 3 August 2004 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the intervener at first instance, filed a notice of opposition to the registration of the mark at issue in respect of all of the goods covered by the application for registration. 8 The opposition was based on the earlier Community word mark ZIMBUS, filed on 29 August 2001 and registered on 6 February 2003, under number 2 356 954, for pharmaceutical preparations falling within Class 5 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 9 The grounds relied on in support of the opposition were those set out in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1)(b) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94. 10 By decision of 31 May 2007 the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] upheld the opposition in respect of pharmaceutical, veterinary and sanitary preparations and fungicides, but rejected it in respect of dietetic substances adapted for medical use and disinfectants. 11 On 13 July 2007 the appellant filed a notice of appeal with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] against that decision. 12 In the contested decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] upheld the appeal in part, in respect of fungicides, and, accordingly, annulled the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in so far as it had refused, in respect of those goods, the application for registration as a Community trade mark. 13 By contrast, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal confirmed the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in so far as it upheld the opposition in respect of pharmaceutical, veterinary and sanitary preparations.

The action before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the judgment under appeal 14 By application lodged at the Registry of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 25 July 2008, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] brought an action seeking annulment of the contested decision.

In support of that action it raised a single plea in law, alleging infringement of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1)(b) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94.

It complained that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had, wrongly, found the veterinary and sanitary preparations covered by the mark for which registration was sought to be identical or very similar to the pharmaceutical preparations covered by the earlier trade mark.

It disputed the existence of a phonetic similarity and of a likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue. 15 By letter lodged at the Registry of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 13 September 2011, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] applied to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for a declaration that there was no longer any need to adjudicate, on the ground that the earlier mark had not been in force since 29 August 2011, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] having failed to renew its registration.

Both [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] opposed that application. 16 In the judgment under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed the action brought by [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 17 As regards the application for a declaration that there was no need to adjudicate, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held, in paragraphs 21 to 23 of the judgment under appeal: ‘21 It is common ground between the parties that [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] did not submit a request for renewal of the registration of the earlier mark within the six-month period provided for by the first sentence of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 47(3) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [40/94], that is to say, before 31 August 2011.

However, as [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] still has the possibility of submitting such a request, and of paying the requisite fees, within the further period of six months referred to in the third sentence of that provision, which expires in the present case on 1 March 2012, it is only if, by that latter date, it has not made use of that possibility that the registration may once and for all be regarded as having expired on 29 August 2011.

It is not apparent from the case-file whether [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] has acted to that effect or not. 22 In any event, even if it were to appear that the registration of the earlier mark expired on 29 August 2011, it could not be held that the present action has become devoid of purpose.

It is only as of that date that that mark no longer has the effects provided for by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94 … and not in respect of the earlier period with regard to which the contested decision was adopted (see, by analogy, judgment of 4 November 2008 in [OSCURATO:PERSONA]161/07

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA])

, not published in the ECR, paragraphs 49 and 50).

Consequently, no account can be taken of a possible non-renewal of the earlier mark for the purpose of assessing the validity of the contested decision.

The action brought in the present case does indeed relate to an earlier mark which produced effects at the time when that decision was adopted. 23 The application for a ruling that there is no need to adjudicate must therefore be dismissed.’ 18 As regards the similarity of the signs, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held, in paragraphs 51 to 57 of the judgment under appeal, that the marks at issue must be regarded as being similar overall because of a certain degree of visual similarity and a strong phonetic similarity, at least in certain languages of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], such as Spanish and Portuguese, even though they have no meaning conceptually. 19 In relation to visual similarity, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held, in paragraphs 52 and 53 of the judgment under appeal: ‘52 Secondly, it must be pointed out that the mark ZIMBUS and the mark ZYDUS consist of a single word comprising almost the same number of letters, namely, six and five respectively.

Those marks begin with the same letter “z” and end in the same group of letters “us”.

Furthermore, as [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] correctly points out, the letters “b” (in the case of the earlier mark) and “d” (in the case of the mark applied for), which directly precede that group of letters, are themselves very similar.

In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, in relatively short word signs, the elements at the beginning and end of the sign are as important as the central elements (see judgment of 16 September 2009 in [OSCURATO:PERSONA]221/06 Hipp & Co v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (Bebimil) , not published in the ECR, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).

Consequently, in visual terms, the only notable difference between the marks at issue is the presence, between their initial letter and their three final letters, of the letters “i” and “m” (in the case of the earlier mark) and of the letter “y” (in the case of the mark applied for).

In the context of the overall visual assessment of the marks at issue, that difference is not, however, sufficient to preclude all visual similarity between those marks.

In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the consumer is deemed only rarely to have the chance to make a direct comparison between the different marks but must place his trust in the imperfect picture of them that he has kept in his mind ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]342/97

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

[1999] ECR I-3819, paragraph 26). 53 Consequently, it must be held, as had the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in its decision of 31 May 2007, that there is a certain degree of visual similarity between the marks at issue.’ 20 In paragraphs 54 and 55 of the judgment under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held, as regards phonetic similarity: ‘54 In the second place, as regards the phonetic comparison of the marks at issue, first, it must be pointed out that each of them consists of two syllables.

Secondly, it must be stated that in several [OSCURATO:PERSONA] languages, including Spanish and Portuguese, the letters “i” and “y” are pronounced identically, with the result that the marks at issue begin with the same sound “zi”.

Furthermore, as [OSCURATO:PERSONA] correctly points out, the first syllables of those marks, that is to say, “zim” and “zy”, respectively, are very close phonetically in so far as the sound produced by the letter “m” at the end of the first syllable of the earlier mark is absorbed by that produced by the consonant “b”, which directly follows that letter and is more audible.

The fact that the letter “m” is not present in the first syllable of the mark applied for cannot therefore call into question the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal’s finding that the marks at issue are phonetically similar.

Lastly, it must be pointed out that those marks end in the same sound “us”.

It is true that the group of letters “us” is preceded by the letter “b” in the case of the earlier mark and by the letter “d” in the case of the mark applied for and that those two letters are pronounced differently.

However, as [OSCURATO:PERSONA] correctly points out, that difference will go unnoticed by most consumers since it affects the second syllable of each of the marks at issue and that is not the syllable on which the main stress falls.

In particular in Spanish and Portuguese, if a word contains only two syllables, the main stress falls, as a general rule, on the first syllable.

In the present case, consumers will therefore remember more the fact that the marks at issue have a very similar beginning and ending. 55 Consequently, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal’s finding that there is a strong phonetic similarity between the marks at issue, at least in some languages of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], such as Spanish and Portuguese, must be upheld.’ 21 So far as concerns the assessment of the likelihood of confusion, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in paragraph 62 of the judgment under appeal, held that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had not erred in law in finding that there was a likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue.

In paragraphs 63 to 66 of the judgment under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held: ‘63 The foregoing considerations are not called into question by the applicant’s argument that, given that pharmaceutical preparations and sanitary preparations are not generally purchased orally, the phonetic similarity between the marks at issue is of limited significance. 64 Admittedly, according to settled case‑law, in the context of the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, the visual, phonetic or conceptual aspects of the signs at issue do not always have the same weight and it is appropriate then to examine the objective conditions under which the marks may be present on the market ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]129/01 Alejandro v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – Anheuser-Busch (BUDMEN) [2003] [OSCURATO:PERSONA]-2251, paragraph 57, and [OSCURATO:PERSONA]117/03 to T-119/03 and T-171/03

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – Naulover (NLSPORT, NLJEANS, NLACTIVE and NLCollection) [2004] [OSCURATO:PERSONA]-3471, paragraph 49).

The extent of the similarity or difference between the signs at issue may depend, in particular, on the inherent qualities of the signs or the conditions under which the goods or services covered by them are marketed.

If the goods covered by the marks in question are usually sold in self-service stores where consumers choose the product themselves and must therefore rely primarily on the image of the trade mark applied to the product, the visual similarity between the signs will, as a general rule, be more important.

If, on the other hand, the product is primarily sold orally, greater weight will usually be attributed to any phonetic similarity between the signs ( NLSPORT, NLJEANS, NLACTIVE and NLCollection , paragraph 49). 65 In the present case, the relevant consumers are faced both visually and phonetically with the marks designating the goods at issue.

There is no factor which makes it possible to attribute a preponderant weight to the visual aspect or, conversely, to the phonetic aspect in the overall assessment of the likelihood of confusion.

In certain cases, those goods are sold by means of self-service in commercial establishments (pharmacies, supermarkets or specialist shops) by being placed on shelves where they may be examined by consumers.

In other cases, for example if what are involved are pharmaceutical or veterinary preparations dispensed exclusively on prescription or goods sold over the counter but kept in a place which is not directly accessible to the public, the purchases are made with the assistance of a professional and involve a verbal reference to the marks concerned. 66 In any event, even if one were to assume that the goods at issue – including veterinary preparations, which the applicant does not refer to in the argument currently being examined – are usually purchased without the name of the mark having to be pronounced, and the visual aspect is therefore of greater importance in the overall assessment of the likelihood of confusion, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal’s finding that such a likelihood exists would still be fully justified because, as was stated in paragraphs 52 and 53 above, the marks at issue indeed also display a certain degree of visual similarity.’ Forms of order sought by the parties before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 22 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should set aside the judgment under appeal and order [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to pay the costs. 23 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contend that the appeal should be dismissed and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ordered to pay the costs.

The appeal 24 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of its Rules of Procedure, where the appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice may at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], decide by reasoned order to dismiss that appeal in whole or in part. 25 It is appropriate to apply that provision to the present case. 26 In support of its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relies, essentially, on two grounds of appeal.

The first ground of appeal alleges infringement of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 113 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

The second ground of appeal alleges infringement of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1)(b) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94.

First ground of appeal Arguments of the parties 27 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] complains that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed to find that there was no need to adjudicate.

According to paragraph 21 of the judgment under appeal, the period of time for submitting a request for renewal of the registration of the earlier mark ZIMBUS expired on 1 March 2012.

The earlier mark had therefore definitively ceased to exist when the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] delivered its judgment.

As the earlier mark expired in the course of the proceedings, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should have found that there was no need to adjudicate, as has been held in certain cases. 28 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should have, of its own motion, between 1 March 2012 and the delivery of the judgment under appeal, invited the parties to clarify whether [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had renewed the registration of its mark and, if [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had not, should have granted the application for a declaration that there was no need to adjudicate.

It submits that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] could not justify its position by relying, in paragraph 22 of the judgment under appeal, on the judgment in

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA])

.

That judgment, it argues, concerns the date on which the rights of the proprietor of a registered trade mark may be declared to be revoked on the ground of non-use, in accordance with the provisions of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 43(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94, which expressly provides for a period of time and a framework within which an applicant for registration of a trade mark may defend himself in opposition proceedings by invoking the failure to use the earlier mark. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submits that there is, however, no equivalent rule for the non-renewal of an earlier mark and its consequences for opposition proceedings. 29 According to [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 113 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] allows the latter to declare an action devoid of purpose, without, however, requiring it to do so or prescribing the measures to be taken. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may not annul or vary a decision on grounds that emerge subsequent to its adoption.

As the earlier mark was valid on the date of the contested decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] could legitimately hold, in paragraph 22 of the judgment under appeal, that ‘no account can be taken of a possible non-renewal of the earlier mark for the purpose of assessing the validity of the contested decision’. 30 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] states that it continues to have an interest in ensuring that the mark ZYDUS is not registered.

That interest may be based on the fact that it is the proprietor of a trade mark that is similar or even identical to the (now expired) earlier mark. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] accordingly takes the view that it must be able to rely on the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of [OSCURATO:PERSONA], according to which there is a likelihood of confusion.

Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 31 The purpose of the proceedings must continue to exist, like the interest in bringing proceedings, until the final decision, failing which there will be no need to adjudicate; this presupposes that the action must be liable, if successful, to procure an advantage to the party bringing it ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑362/05 P Wunenburger v Commission [2007] ECR I‑4333, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited). 32 In dismissing the plea, raised by [OSCURATO:PERSONA], that there was no need to adjudicate, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held, in paragraph 22 of the judgment under appeal, that the proceedings still had a purpose. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] took the view, in essence, that the possible expiry of the earlier mark did not affect the assessment of the validity of the contested decision since that mark produced effects at the time when that decision was adopted. 33 The expiry of the earlier mark, which occurred after the action had been brought, did not deprive the contested decision of its purpose or of its effects.

In addition, the assessment in that decision, to the effect that a likelihood of confusion exists between the marks ZYDUS and ZIMBUS as regards pharmaceutical, veterinary or sanitary preparations, continued to produce its effects at the time when the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] delivered the judgment under appeal. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not, therefore, err in law in holding, in paragraph 22 of the judgment under appeal, that the action had not become devoid of purpose. 34 Contrary to what [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has claimed, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was not under an obligation, before giving judgment in the proceedings, to ask the parties about the renewal of the earlier mark.

By contrast, [OSCURATO:PERSONA], as applicant at first instance, had the option, if it took the view that the purpose of the proceedings had ceased to exist, to discontinue the proceedings. 35 It follows from the foregoing that the first ground of appeal is manifestly unfounded. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ground of appeal Arguments of the parties 36 The second ground of appeal consists of three parts.

By the first part, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] clearly distorted the facts and the evidence when, in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the judgment under appeal, it found that there was a strong phonetic similarity between the marks at issue in languages such as Spanish and Portuguese.

That finding, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submits, is contradicted by an expert’s report which it submitted in the proceedings at first instance, a report which [OSCURATO:PERSONA] never disputed. 37 By the second part of the second ground of appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] complains that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in paragraph 52 of the judgment under appeal, misapplied its own case-law according to which, on a visual comparison of two relatively short marks, the central elements of the signs at issue may take on exactly the same importance as the elements at the beginning and at the end of those signs ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑273/02 Krüger v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – Calpis (CALPICO) [2005] [OSCURATO:PERSONA]‑1271, paragraph 39, and judgment of 21 October 2008 in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑95/07

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – Nycomed (PRAZOL) , paragraph 43).

In paragraph 52 of the judgment under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] misapplied that case-law in holding that, for short signs, the elements at the beginning and at the end are more important than the central elements. 38 By the third part of the second ground of appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was wrong to hold that the verbal use of the marks at issue gives rise to a likelihood of confusion.

It criticises the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for having held, in paragraph 65 of the judgment under appeal, that there were situations in which the marks at issue might be the subject of verbal use, in particular where the goods designated by the marks are on sale over-the-counter.

It was on this basis that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] found there to be a ‘strong’ phonetic similarity between the marks at issue, giving rise to a likelihood of confusion.

However, it submits, those findings are incorrect and distort commonly known facts.

A consumer cannot help himself to a pharmaceutical preparation that is not directly accessible but has to rely on the intervention of a professional.

In all situations involving verbal use of those marks, a knowledgeable person will be present to assist the consumer with his purchase, thereby limiting the possibility of any confusion resulting from the phonetic similarity of the marks at issue. 39 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contend, in essence, that the first and second parts of the second ground of appeal are inadmissible as they effectively seek to have the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] undertake a fresh assessment of the facts. 40 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that the third part of the second ground of appeal is inadmissible and/or ineffective.

It submits that it is in any event unfounded, a view shared by [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 256(1) TFEU and the first paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], an appeal lies on points of law only. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has exclusive jurisdiction to find and appraise the relevant facts and to assess the evidence.

The appraisal of those facts and the assessment of that evidence thus do not, save where the facts or evidence are distorted, constitute points of law subject, as such, to review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice on appeal (see, inter alia, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑104/00 P DKV v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

[2002] ECR I‑7561, paragraph 22, and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑16/06 P

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

[2008] ECR I‑10053, paragraph 68). 42 As regards the first and second parts of the second ground of appeal, it is true that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has been careful to refer to a point of law, namely the alleged misapplication by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of its own case-law relating to the visual comparison of relatively short word marks, and to plead distortion of an expert’s report placed on the case-file, which, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] argues, establishes that there is no phonetic similarity between the marks at issue in Spanish and Portuguese. 43 Those points of criticism, however, seek, in reality, to challenge the factual assessments made by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in the exercise of its own jurisdiction, in paragraphs 52, 54 and 55 of the judgment under appeal, in the course of its review of the degrees of visual and phonetic similarity of the marks at issue. 44 As regards [OSCURATO:PERSONA] arguments directed at paragraph 52 of the judgment under appeal, that paragraph states that ‘the only notable difference between the marks at issue is the presence, between their initial letter and their three final letters, of the letters “i” and “m” (in the case of the earlier mark) and of the letter “y” (in the case of the mark applied for).

In the context of the overall visual assessment of the marks at issue, that difference is not, however, sufficient to preclude all visual similarity between those marks’.

However, the assessments that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] disputes by relying on an alleged error of law relate, in reality, to matters of fact, and are consequently not amenable to review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the context of an appeal. 45 As for the argument relating to a distortion of the evidence, it must be noted that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held, in paragraph 55 of the judgment under appeal, that ‘there is a strong phonetic similarity between the marks at issue, at least in some languages of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], such as Spanish and Portuguese’.

That conclusion is based on the findings set out in paragraph 54 of the judgment under appeal, according to which the marks at issue begin with syllables which ‘are very close phonetically’ and ‘end in the same sound “us”‘, such that ‘consumers will therefore remember more the fact that the marks at issue have a very similar beginning and ending’.

Those findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] are purely factual in nature and are not, as such, amenable to review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the context of an appeal. 46 Furthermore, the report that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] alleges was distorted by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] merely lists and describes the pronunciation of, and phonological and phonetical differences between, the marks at issue in Spanish, German, English, French, Italian and Portuguese. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is thus seeking, not to demonstrate that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] distorted that report by altering its clear sense, but rather to challenge the validity of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] factual assessments as to the significance of the phonetic similarities which it had established. 47 The first and second parts of the second ground of appeal are, therefore, manifestly inadmissible. 48 As for the third part of the second ground of appeal, that part seeks to challenge the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] factual assessments in paragraph 65 of the judgment under appeal.

That third part is, therefore, also manifestly inadmissible. 49 It follows that the second ground of appeal must be rejected as being manifestly inadmissible. 50 In the light of the foregoing, the appeal must be dismissed as being in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly unfounded.

Costs 51 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, which applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] have applied for costs and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has been unsuccessful, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must be ordered to pay the costs.

On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby orders:

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] shall pay the costs. [Signatures] * Language of the case: English.

Anonimizzato ex art. 52 D.Lgs. 196/2003
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) 8 May 2013 ( * ) (Appeal – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice – Community trade mark – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 40/94 – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1)(b) – Likelihood of confusion – Word mark ZYDUS – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] by the proprietor of the Community trade mark ZIMBUS – Partial refusal of registration by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of [OSCURATO:PERSONA]) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑268/12 P, APPEAL under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 23 May 2012, [OSCURATO:PERSONA], established in Ahmedabad (India), represented by S. Malynicz, Barrister, appellant, the other parties to the proceedings being: Office for Harmonisation in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Designs) ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), represented by A. Folliard-Monguiral, acting as Agent, defendant at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] AG, established in Basle (Switzerland), represented by N. Hebeis, Rechtsanwalt, intervener at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), composed of E. Jarašiūnas, President of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], A. Ó Caoimh and C.G. Fernlund (Rapporteur), [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: J. Kokott, Registrar: A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], having decided, after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], to give a decision by reasoned order, pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, makes the following [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1 By its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA]’) seeks to have set aside the judgment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 15 March 2012 in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑288/08 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (ZYDUS) (‘the judgment under appeal’), by which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed its action for annulment of the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Designs) ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) of 7 May 2008 ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] R 1092/2007‑2), relating to opposition proceedings between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] AG (‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA]’) and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (‘the contested decision’). Legal context 2 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] the heading ‘Relative grounds for refusal’, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1)(b) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1) states: ‘Upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for shall not be registered: … (b)      if because of its identity with or similarity to the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected; the likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.’ 3 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 113 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] provides: ‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA] may at any time, of its own motion, after hearing the parties, decide whether there exists any absolute bar to proceeding with an action or declare that the action has become devoid of purpose and that there is no need to adjudicate on it …’. Background to the dispute 4 On 18 July 2003 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] filed an application for registration of a Community trade mark with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94. 5 The mark for which registration was sought is the word sign ‘ZYDUS’. 6 The goods in respect of which registration was sought fall within, inter alia, Class 5 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concerning the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, and correspond, in particular, to the following description: ‘Pharmaceutical, veterinary and sanitary preparations; dietetic substances adapted for medical use; disinfectants; fungicides.’ 7 On 3 August 2004 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the intervener at first instance, filed a notice of opposition to the registration of the mark at issue in respect of all of the goods covered by the application for registration. 8 The opposition was based on the earlier Community word mark ZIMBUS, filed on 29 August 2001 and registered on 6 February 2003, under number 2 356 954, for pharmaceutical preparations falling within Class 5 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 9 The grounds relied on in support of the opposition were those set out in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1)(b) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94. 10 By decision of 31 May 2007 the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] upheld the opposition in respect of pharmaceutical, veterinary and sanitary preparations and fungicides, but rejected it in respect of dietetic substances adapted for medical use and disinfectants. 11 On 13 July 2007 the appellant filed a notice of appeal with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] against that decision. 12 In the contested decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] upheld the appeal in part, in respect of fungicides, and, accordingly, annulled the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in so far as it had refused, in respect of those goods, the application for registration as a Community trade mark. 13 By contrast, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal confirmed the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in so far as it upheld the opposition in respect of pharmaceutical, veterinary and sanitary preparations. The action before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the judgment under appeal 14 By application lodged at the Registry of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 25 July 2008, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] brought an action seeking annulment of the contested decision. In support of that action it raised a single plea in law, alleging infringement of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1)(b) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94. It complained that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had, wrongly, found the veterinary and sanitary preparations covered by the mark for which registration was sought to be identical or very similar to the pharmaceutical preparations covered by the earlier trade mark. It disputed the existence of a phonetic similarity and of a likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue. 15 By letter lodged at the Registry of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 13 September 2011, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] applied to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for a declaration that there was no longer any need to adjudicate, on the ground that the earlier mark had not been in force since 29 August 2011, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] having failed to renew its registration. Both [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] opposed that application. 16 In the judgment under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed the action brought by [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 17 As regards the application for a declaration that there was no need to adjudicate, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held, in paragraphs 21 to 23 of the judgment under appeal: ‘21      It is common ground between the parties that [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] did not submit a request for renewal of the registration of the earlier mark within the six-month period provided for by the first sentence of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 47(3) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [40/94], that is to say, before 31 August 2011. However, as [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] still has the possibility of submitting such a request, and of paying the requisite fees, within the further period of six months referred to in the third sentence of that provision, which expires in the present case on 1 March 2012, it is only if, by that latter date, it has not made use of that possibility that the registration may once and for all be regarded as having expired on 29 August 2011. It is not apparent from the case-file whether [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] has acted to that effect or not. 22      In any event, even if it were to appear that the registration of the earlier mark expired on 29 August 2011, it could not be held that the present action has become devoid of purpose. It is only as of that date that that mark no longer has the effects provided for by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94 … and not in respect of the earlier period with regard to which the contested decision was adopted (see, by analogy, judgment of 4 November 2008 in [OSCURATO:PERSONA]161/07 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) , not published in the ECR, paragraphs 49 and 50). Consequently, no account can be taken of a possible non-renewal of the earlier mark for the purpose of assessing the validity of the contested decision. The action brought in the present case does indeed relate to an earlier mark which produced effects at the time when that decision was adopted. 23      The application for a ruling that there is no need to adjudicate must therefore be dismissed.’ 18 As regards the similarity of the signs, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held, in paragraphs 51 to 57 of the judgment under appeal, that the marks at issue must be regarded as being similar overall because of a certain degree of visual similarity and a strong phonetic similarity, at least in certain languages of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], such as Spanish and Portuguese, even though they have no meaning conceptually. 19 In relation to visual similarity, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held, in paragraphs 52 and 53 of the judgment under appeal: ‘52      Secondly, it must be pointed out that the mark ZIMBUS and the mark ZYDUS consist of a single word comprising almost the same number of letters, namely, six and five respectively. Those marks begin with the same letter “z” and end in the same group of letters “us”. Furthermore, as [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] correctly points out, the letters “b” (in the case of the earlier mark) and “d” (in the case of the mark applied for), which directly precede that group of letters, are themselves very similar. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, in relatively short word signs, the elements at the beginning and end of the sign are as important as the central elements (see judgment of 16 September 2009 in [OSCURATO:PERSONA]221/06 Hipp & Co v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (Bebimil) , not published in the ECR, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited). Consequently, in visual terms, the only notable difference between the marks at issue is the presence, between their initial letter and their three final letters, of the letters “i” and “m” (in the case of the earlier mark) and of the letter “y” (in the case of the mark applied for). In the context of the overall visual assessment of the marks at issue, that difference is not, however, sufficient to preclude all visual similarity between those marks. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the consumer is deemed only rarely to have the chance to make a direct comparison between the different marks but must place his trust in the imperfect picture of them that he has kept in his mind ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]342/97 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [1999] ECR I-3819, paragraph 26). 53      Consequently, it must be held, as had the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in its decision of 31 May 2007, that there is a certain degree of visual similarity between the marks at issue.’ 20 In paragraphs 54 and 55 of the judgment under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held, as regards phonetic similarity: ‘54      In the second place, as regards the phonetic comparison of the marks at issue, first, it must be pointed out that each of them consists of two syllables. Secondly, it must be stated that in several [OSCURATO:PERSONA] languages, including Spanish and Portuguese, the letters “i” and “y” are pronounced identically, with the result that the marks at issue begin with the same sound “zi”. Furthermore, as [OSCURATO:PERSONA] correctly points out, the first syllables of those marks, that is to say, “zim” and “zy”, respectively, are very close phonetically in so far as the sound produced by the letter “m” at the end of the first syllable of the earlier mark is absorbed by that produced by the consonant “b”, which directly follows that letter and is more audible. The fact that the letter “m” is not present in the first syllable of the mark applied for cannot therefore call into question the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal’s finding that the marks at issue are phonetically similar. Lastly, it must be pointed out that those marks end in the same sound “us”. It is true that the group of letters “us” is preceded by the letter “b” in the case of the earlier mark and by the letter “d” in the case of the mark applied for and that those two letters are pronounced differently. However, as [OSCURATO:PERSONA] correctly points out, that difference will go unnoticed by most consumers since it affects the second syllable of each of the marks at issue and that is not the syllable on which the main stress falls. In particular in Spanish and Portuguese, if a word contains only two syllables, the main stress falls, as a general rule, on the first syllable. In the present case, consumers will therefore remember more the fact that the marks at issue have a very similar beginning and ending. 55      Consequently, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal’s finding that there is a strong phonetic similarity between the marks at issue, at least in some languages of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], such as Spanish and Portuguese, must be upheld.’ 21 So far as concerns the assessment of the likelihood of confusion, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in paragraph 62 of the judgment under appeal, held that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had not erred in law in finding that there was a likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue. In paragraphs 63 to 66 of the judgment under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held: ‘63      The foregoing considerations are not called into question by the applicant’s argument that, given that pharmaceutical preparations and sanitary preparations are not generally purchased orally, the phonetic similarity between the marks at issue is of limited significance. 64      Admittedly, according to settled case‑law, in the context of the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, the visual, phonetic or conceptual aspects of the signs at issue do not always have the same weight and it is appropriate then to examine the objective conditions under which the marks may be present on the market ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]129/01 Alejandro v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – Anheuser-Busch (BUDMEN) [2003] [OSCURATO:PERSONA]-2251, paragraph 57, and [OSCURATO:PERSONA]117/03 to T-119/03 and T-171/03 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – Naulover (NLSPORT, NLJEANS, NLACTIVE and NLCollection) [2004] [OSCURATO:PERSONA]-3471, paragraph 49). The extent of the similarity or difference between the signs at issue may depend, in particular, on the inherent qualities of the signs or the conditions under which the goods or services covered by them are marketed. If the goods covered by the marks in question are usually sold in self-service stores where consumers choose the product themselves and must therefore rely primarily on the image of the trade mark applied to the product, the visual similarity between the signs will, as a general rule, be more important. If, on the other hand, the product is primarily sold orally, greater weight will usually be attributed to any phonetic similarity between the signs ( NLSPORT, NLJEANS, NLACTIVE and NLCollection , paragraph 49). 65      In the present case, the relevant consumers are faced both visually and phonetically with the marks designating the goods at issue. There is no factor which makes it possible to attribute a preponderant weight to the visual aspect or, conversely, to the phonetic aspect in the overall assessment of the likelihood of confusion. In certain cases, those goods are sold by means of self-service in commercial establishments (pharmacies, supermarkets or specialist shops) by being placed on shelves where they may be examined by consumers. In other cases, for example if what are involved are pharmaceutical or veterinary preparations dispensed exclusively on prescription or goods sold over the counter but kept in a place which is not directly accessible to the public, the purchases are made with the assistance of a professional and involve a verbal reference to the marks concerned. 66      In any event, even if one were to assume that the goods at issue – including veterinary preparations, which the applicant does not refer to in the argument currently being examined – are usually purchased without the name of the mark having to be pronounced, and the visual aspect is therefore of greater importance in the overall assessment of the likelihood of confusion, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal’s finding that such a likelihood exists would still be fully justified because, as was stated in paragraphs 52 and 53 above, the marks at issue indeed also display a certain degree of visual similarity.’ Forms of order sought by the parties before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 22 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should set aside the judgment under appeal and order [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to pay the costs. 23 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contend that the appeal should be dismissed and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ordered to pay the costs. The appeal 24 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of its Rules of Procedure, where the appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice may at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], decide by reasoned order to dismiss that appeal in whole or in part. 25 It is appropriate to apply that provision to the present case. 26 In support of its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relies, essentially, on two grounds of appeal. The first ground of appeal alleges infringement of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 113 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. The second ground of appeal alleges infringement of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1)(b) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94. First ground of appeal Arguments of the parties 27 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] complains that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed to find that there was no need to adjudicate. According to paragraph 21 of the judgment under appeal, the period of time for submitting a request for renewal of the registration of the earlier mark ZIMBUS expired on 1 March 2012. The earlier mark had therefore definitively ceased to exist when the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] delivered its judgment. As the earlier mark expired in the course of the proceedings, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should have found that there was no need to adjudicate, as has been held in certain cases. 28 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should have, of its own motion, between 1 March 2012 and the delivery of the judgment under appeal, invited the parties to clarify whether [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had renewed the registration of its mark and, if [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had not, should have granted the application for a declaration that there was no need to adjudicate. It submits that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] could not justify its position by relying, in paragraph 22 of the judgment under appeal, on the judgment in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) . That judgment, it argues, concerns the date on which the rights of the proprietor of a registered trade mark may be declared to be revoked on the ground of non-use, in accordance with the provisions of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 43(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40/94, which expressly provides for a period of time and a framework within which an applicant for registration of a trade mark may defend himself in opposition proceedings by invoking the failure to use the earlier mark. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submits that there is, however, no equivalent rule for the non-renewal of an earlier mark and its consequences for opposition proceedings. 29 According to [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 113 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] allows the latter to declare an action devoid of purpose, without, however, requiring it to do so or prescribing the measures to be taken. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may not annul or vary a decision on grounds that emerge subsequent to its adoption. As the earlier mark was valid on the date of the contested decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] could legitimately hold, in paragraph 22 of the judgment under appeal, that ‘no account can be taken of a possible non-renewal of the earlier mark for the purpose of assessing the validity of the contested decision’. 30 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] states that it continues to have an interest in ensuring that the mark ZYDUS is not registered. That interest may be based on the fact that it is the proprietor of a trade mark that is similar or even identical to the (now expired) earlier mark. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] accordingly takes the view that it must be able to rely on the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of [OSCURATO:PERSONA], according to which there is a likelihood of confusion. Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 31 The purpose of the proceedings must continue to exist, like the interest in bringing proceedings, until the final decision, failing which there will be no need to adjudicate; this presupposes that the action must be liable, if successful, to procure an advantage to the party bringing it ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑362/05 P Wunenburger v Commission [2007] ECR I‑4333, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited). 32 In dismissing the plea, raised by [OSCURATO:PERSONA], that there was no need to adjudicate, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held, in paragraph 22 of the judgment under appeal, that the proceedings still had a purpose. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] took the view, in essence, that the possible expiry of the earlier mark did not affect the assessment of the validity of the contested decision since that mark produced effects at the time when that decision was adopted. 33 The expiry of the earlier mark, which occurred after the action had been brought, did not deprive the contested decision of its purpose or of its effects. In addition, the assessment in that decision, to the effect that a likelihood of confusion exists between the marks ZYDUS and ZIMBUS as regards pharmaceutical, veterinary or sanitary preparations, continued to produce its effects at the time when the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] delivered the judgment under appeal. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not, therefore, err in law in holding, in paragraph 22 of the judgment under appeal, that the action had not become devoid of purpose. 34 Contrary to what [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has claimed, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was not under an obligation, before giving judgment in the proceedings, to ask the parties about the renewal of the earlier mark. By contrast, [OSCURATO:PERSONA], as applicant at first instance, had the option, if it took the view that the purpose of the proceedings had ceased to exist, to discontinue the proceedings. 35 It follows from the foregoing that the first ground of appeal is manifestly unfounded. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ground of appeal Arguments of the parties 36 The second ground of appeal consists of three parts. By the first part, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] clearly distorted the facts and the evidence when, in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the judgment under appeal, it found that there was a strong phonetic similarity between the marks at issue in languages such as Spanish and Portuguese. That finding, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submits, is contradicted by an expert’s report which it submitted in the proceedings at first instance, a report which [OSCURATO:PERSONA] never disputed. 37 By the second part of the second ground of appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] complains that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in paragraph 52 of the judgment under appeal, misapplied its own case-law according to which, on a visual comparison of two relatively short marks, the central elements of the signs at issue may take on exactly the same importance as the elements at the beginning and at the end of those signs ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑273/02 Krüger v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – Calpis (CALPICO) [2005] [OSCURATO:PERSONA]‑1271, paragraph 39, and judgment of 21 October 2008 in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑95/07 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – Nycomed (PRAZOL) , paragraph 43). In paragraph 52 of the judgment under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] misapplied that case-law in holding that, for short signs, the elements at the beginning and at the end are more important than the central elements. 38 By the third part of the second ground of appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was wrong to hold that the verbal use of the marks at issue gives rise to a likelihood of confusion. It criticises the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for having held, in paragraph 65 of the judgment under appeal, that there were situations in which the marks at issue might be the subject of verbal use, in particular where the goods designated by the marks are on sale over-the-counter. It was on this basis that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] found there to be a ‘strong’ phonetic similarity between the marks at issue, giving rise to a likelihood of confusion. However, it submits, those findings are incorrect and distort commonly known facts. A consumer cannot help himself to a pharmaceutical preparation that is not directly accessible but has to rely on the intervention of a professional. In all situations involving verbal use of those marks, a knowledgeable person will be present to assist the consumer with his purchase, thereby limiting the possibility of any confusion resulting from the phonetic similarity of the marks at issue. 39 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contend, in essence, that the first and second parts of the second ground of appeal are inadmissible as they effectively seek to have the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] undertake a fresh assessment of the facts. 40 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that the third part of the second ground of appeal is inadmissible and/or ineffective. It submits that it is in any event unfounded, a view shared by [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 256(1) TFEU and the first paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], an appeal lies on points of law only. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has exclusive jurisdiction to find and appraise the relevant facts and to assess the evidence. The appraisal of those facts and the assessment of that evidence thus do not, save where the facts or evidence are distorted, constitute points of law subject, as such, to review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice on appeal (see, inter alia, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑104/00 P DKV v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [2002] ECR I‑7561, paragraph 22, and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑16/06 P [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [2008] ECR I‑10053, paragraph 68). 42 As regards the first and second parts of the second ground of appeal, it is true that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has been careful to refer to a point of law, namely the alleged misapplication by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of its own case-law relating to the visual comparison of relatively short word marks, and to plead distortion of an expert’s report placed on the case-file, which, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] argues, establishes that there is no phonetic similarity between the marks at issue in Spanish and Portuguese. 43 Those points of criticism, however, seek, in reality, to challenge the factual assessments made by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in the exercise of its own jurisdiction, in paragraphs 52, 54 and 55 of the judgment under appeal, in the course of its review of the degrees of visual and phonetic similarity of the marks at issue. 44 As regards [OSCURATO:PERSONA] arguments directed at paragraph 52 of the judgment under appeal, that paragraph states that ‘the only notable difference between the marks at issue is the presence, between their initial letter and their three final letters, of the letters “i” and “m” (in the case of the earlier mark) and of the letter “y” (in the case of the mark applied for). In the context of the overall visual assessment of the marks at issue, that difference is not, however, sufficient to preclude all visual similarity between those marks’. However, the assessments that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] disputes by relying on an alleged error of law relate, in reality, to matters of fact, and are consequently not amenable to review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the context of an appeal. 45 As for the argument relating to a distortion of the evidence, it must be noted that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held, in paragraph 55 of the judgment under appeal, that ‘there is a strong phonetic similarity between the marks at issue, at least in some languages of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], such as Spanish and Portuguese’. That conclusion is based on the findings set out in paragraph 54 of the judgment under appeal, according to which the marks at issue begin with syllables which ‘are very close phonetically’ and ‘end in the same sound “us”‘, such that ‘consumers will therefore remember more the fact that the marks at issue have a very similar beginning and ending’. Those findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] are purely factual in nature and are not, as such, amenable to review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the context of an appeal. 46 Furthermore, the report that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] alleges was distorted by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] merely lists and describes the pronunciation of, and phonological and phonetical differences between, the marks at issue in Spanish, German, English, French, Italian and Portuguese. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is thus seeking, not to demonstrate that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] distorted that report by altering its clear sense, but rather to challenge the validity of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] factual assessments as to the significance of the phonetic similarities which it had established. 47 The first and second parts of the second ground of appeal are, therefore, manifestly inadmissible. 48 As for the third part of the second ground of appeal, that part seeks to challenge the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] factual assessments in paragraph 65 of the judgment under appeal. That third part is, therefore, also manifestly inadmissible. 49 It follows that the second ground of appeal must be rejected as being manifestly inadmissible. 50 In the light of the foregoing, the appeal must be dismissed as being in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly unfounded. Costs 51 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, which applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] have applied for costs and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has been unsuccessful, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must be ordered to pay the costs. On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby orders: 1. The appeal is dismissed. 2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] shall pay the costs. [Signatures] * Language of the case: English.
Sentenza Corte di giustizia UE n. 1092/2013 — Fons Iuris — Fons Iuris