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Corte di giustizia UEsentenza

Corte di giustizia UE/2026

ECLI:EU:C:2026:582
Testo integrale del provvedimento

Testo integrale del provvedimento

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA])

15 July 2026 ( * ) ( Appeal – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice – Obligation for non-privileged parties to be represented before the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – Third and seventh paragraphs of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statue of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – Prohibition on ‘self-representation’ – University teacher – Right of audience – Proof – Appeal clearly inadmissible )

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑876/25 P,

APPEAL under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 29 December 2025,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA],

residing in Rotterdam (Netherlands), appellant, the other party to the proceedings being:

[OSCURATO:PERSONA],

defendant at first instance,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]),

composed of I. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], A. Kumin and M. Bošnjak (Rapporteur), [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: T. Ćapeta,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]: A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA],

having decided, after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], to rule by reasoned order, pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, makes the following

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

1 By his appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] seeks to have set aside the order of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 31 October 2025,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

(T‑319/25, ‘the order under appeal’, EU:T:2025:1012), by which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed, in part as having been brought before a court manifestly lacking jurisdiction to hear and determine it, in part as manifestly inadmissible, and in part as manifestly lacking any foundation in law, his action for a finding by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had unlawfully failed to define a position on his letter of 28 January 2025 seeking the interpretation of a number of provisions of EU law (‘the letter of 28 January 2025’).

Legal context 2 The first to third and the seventh paragraphs of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] state: ‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the institutions of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] shall be represented before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice by an agent appointed for each case; the agent may be assisted by an adviser or by a lawyer. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], other than the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which are parties to the Agreement on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and also the EFTA [OSCURATO:PERSONA] referred to in that Agreement shall be represented in same manner.

Other parties must be represented by a lawyer. … University teachers being nationals of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] whose law accords them a right of audience shall have the same rights before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] as are accorded by this [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to lawyers.’ 3 Title IV of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, entitled ‘Direct actions’, includes [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 119, paragraph 1 of which provides: ‘A party may be represented only by his agent or lawyer.’ 4 Title V of the Rules of Procedure, entitled ‘Appeals against decisions of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’, consists of Articles 167 to 190 of those rules. 5 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 168(2) of the Rules of Procedure provides: ‘Articles 119 … of these Rules shall apply to appeals.’ 6 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 185(1) of the Rules of Procedure states: ‘A party who is wholly or in part unable to meet the costs of the proceedings may at any time apply for legal aid.’ Background to the dispute 7 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] set out the background to the dispute in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the order under appeal as follows: ‘2 On 28 January 2025, [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] sent a letter to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in which he claimed that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 5.2 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2001 (Law on income tax of 2001) of 11 May 2000 (Stb. 2000, No 215), as amended, infringed a number of provisions of EU law … [He], in essence, requested that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] confirm or contest his interpretation of the provisions of EU law at issue. 3 On 12 March 2025, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] replied to that letter, stating, in essence, that it did not see any immediate grounds to open an infringement procedure and that it was unclear how the national provision relied on by [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] was incompatible with EU law.’ The procedure before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the order under appeal 8 By application lodged at the Registry of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 18 May 2025, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] brought an action under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 265 TFEU claiming, primarily, that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should declare a failure to act by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in that it unlawfully failed to define a position on his letter of 28 January 2025 and that it should order the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to define a position on that letter; in the alternative, he sought to have the case referred to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice so that it could be treated as a request for a preliminary ruling. 9 By the order under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed the action. 10 In the first place, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in paragraph 8 of that order, rejected the first head of claim relating to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s alleged failure to act as manifestly inadmissible, finding that, having regard to the contents of the reply which it had sent to [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had in fact defined a position on the letter of 28 January 2025.

In addition, in paragraph 10 of the order, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] observed that, in any event, an action for a declaration that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in refusing to initiate an infringement procedure, has failed to act, in breach of the FEU Treaty, is inadmissible. 11 In the second place, in paragraph 15 of the order under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] rejected the head of claim, on the grounds of a lack of jurisdiction, relating to the issuing of an order with regard to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and to clarification of the scope of certain provisions of EU law. 12 In that respect, in paragraph 14 of that order, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] observed that, in the context of an action for failure to act based on [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 265 TFEU, it is not entitled either to issue directions to the EU institutions or to rule whether the conduct of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is compatible with the Treaties. 13 In the third place, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in paragraph 18 of the order under appeal, also rejected as manifestly lacking any foundation in law the head of claim raised in the alternative, by which [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had requested that the case be treated as a reference for a preliminary ruling and that, in accordance with the second paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 54 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], it be referred to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice. 14 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held, in paragraph 17 of that order, that the action brought before it had to be regarded as an action for failure to act under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 256 TFEU and that, consequently, it fell within its exclusive jurisdiction.

It also observed that, in any event, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 267 TFEU it is only the courts or tribunals of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] that are empowered to make requests for preliminary rulings to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice. 15 Lastly, in paragraph 19 of that order, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed the action in its entirety, stating that ‘it is not necessary to rule on the question of whether the applicant is validly represented in the proceedings by a professor, that is to say, whether the latter person satisfies the conditions laid down in the seventh paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’.

The form of order sought by the appellant and the procedure before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice 16 By his appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice should: – set aside the order under appeal; – dispose of the dispute and find: – that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 265 TFEU must be interpreted as allowing the appellant to bring proceedings first before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and then before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in order to obtain an authoritative interpretation on the hitherto unclarified aspects of EU law that are relevant, both to EU-wide uniformity and to his action at national level, since the national supreme court has failed to make a request itself to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for a preliminary ruling, – that he may act for himself, without being represented, in proceedings based on [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 265 TFEU since he enjoyed that right before the national courts and has demonstrated a sufficient knowledge of EU law so as to be capable of defending his own interests, – in the alternative, that the seventh paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must be interpreted as meaning that university law professors from all EU [OSCURATO:PERSONA] have a right of audience before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], provided they are sufficiently qualified in the domain of EU law, – that EU law, in particular [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 131 TFEU and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 10 of the Charter of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], must be interpreted in the manner indicated in the appeal; – order each party to bear its own costs. 17 By document of 26 January 2026, the Registry of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice informed [OSCURATO:PERSONA] that the provisions of the third and seventh paragraphs of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] required him to be represented before the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] by a lawyer or, as the case may be, by a university teacher who is a national of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] whose law accords him or her a right of audience.

He was requested to produce, within a specified period, any evidence capable of establishing that the law of the Netherlands ‘accords’ Ms de Roo, in her capacity as a professor, ‘a right of audience’ within the meaning of the seventh paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA]

19. Furthermore, he was informed that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice was likely to examine of its own motion, in the light of the evidence which he would produce, the validity of his representation, and that he could in any event regularise his appeal within that period by appointing another person authorised to represent him. 18 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submitted observations in that regard within the prescribed period.

Admissibility of the appeal 19 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of its Rules of Procedure, where the appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], decide by reasoned order to dismiss that appeal in whole or in part. 20 It is necessary to apply that provision in the present appeal. 21 It is apparent from the third paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] that parties other than the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the institutions of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], other than those [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which are parties to the Agreement on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 2 May 1992, and also the EFTA [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ‘must be represented by a lawyer’.

That requirement is also clear from [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 119(1) of the Rules of Procedure, which is applicable to appeals on the basis of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 168(2) of those rules. 22 In the present case, the appeal has been signed by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] himself and, in the alternative, by Ms de Roo, in her capacity as a professor. 23 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that he has the right to bring proceedings himself before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], by analogy with the preliminary ruling procedure, in which individuals may submit written observations in their own name.

He also maintains that Ms de Roo is entitled, like any Netherlands citizen, to bring proceedings before the Netherlands courts.

He argues that limiting the right of representation to professors who are nationals of certain [OSCURATO:PERSONA] would be discriminatory.

He adds that he has been unable to obtain representation by a lawyer, in particular because of the cost of such representation. 24 In the first place, it is clear from the provisions referred to in paragraph 21 above that natural persons cannot bring an appeal before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice without being represented by a person authorised for that purpose.

In the absence of any derogation provided for in the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] or the Rules of Procedure, the appellant’s signature by itself is not capable of satisfying that requirement (see, to that effect, order of 11 November 2024, Papasotiriou v Council and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑344/24 P, EU:C:2024:949, paragraphs 19 and 20, and judgment of 4 September 2025, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] e [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v

EUIPO

, C‑776/22 P, EU:C:2025:644, paragraphs 59 and 60 and the case-law cited). 25 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] cannot rely to any effect, in that regard, on the rules applicable to the preliminary ruling procedure. 26 That procedure, which is intended to ensure that EU law is interpreted uniformly, institutes direct cooperation between the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice and the national courts, which is completely independent of any initiative by the parties to the main proceedings (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 November 2010,

VB [OSCURATO:PERSONA]

, C‑137/08, EU:C:2010:659, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited, and of 3 June 2021, Bankia , C‑910/19, EU:C:2021:433, paragraph 22).

It therefore cannot be equated with an appeal, which is a legal remedy brought on the initiative of a party against a judicial decision. 27 The fact that parties to the main proceedings may, in some circumstances, submit written observations in a preliminary ruling procedure without the involvement of a lawyer thus has no bearing on the obligation to be represented that is applicable to the present appeal. 28 Nor is it possible to accept the argument based on the cost of being represented by a lawyer.

In fact, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 185(1) of the Rules of Procedure permits any party who is wholly or in part unable to meet the costs of the proceedings to apply at any time for legal aid. 29 In the second place, under the seventh paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], ‘university teachers being nationals of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] whose law accords them a right of audience shall have the same rights before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] as are accorded by this [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to lawyers.’ It follows from that provision that according a right of audience before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to a university teacher who is a national of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is subject to the condition that that right is conferred on him or her by the law of that [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

The meaning and scope of that condition must thus be interpreted by reference to the national law concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 July 2022,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

v REA , C‑110/21 P, EU:C:2022:555, paragraph 41). 30 The seventh paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] merely gives due effect to the choices made by national laws as to the persons entitled to plead before the national courts.

By according university teachers the same rights as those granted to lawyers, for the purposes of the third paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute, the seventh paragraph of that article allows account to be taken of the fact that, in a number of [OSCURATO:PERSONA], some categories of university teacher may be granted, in accordance with specific requirements laid down to that end by national law, the right to represent parties before national courts. 31 However, in the present case, [OSCURATO:PERSONA], when asked by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to adduce any evidence capable of establishing that Netherlands law accords Ms de Roo, in her capacity as a professor, a right of audience before the Netherlands courts, for the purposes of the seventh paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], has not produced any evidence to that effect.

The mere assertion, moreover wholly unsubstantiated, that any Netherlands national is permitted to represent himself or herself before the Netherlands administrative courts is, in any event, ineffective under that provision.

It does not make it possible to establish that Ms de Roo is authorised on that basis to represent a third party before the Netherlands courts. 32 It is also apparent from the procedural documents before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], referred to in paragraphs 17 and 18 above, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was informed that his appeal could be declared inadmissible on account of the irregular nature of his being represented by Ms de Roo, that he was given time to produce the relevant evidence or to regularise his appeal by appointing another person authorised to represent him, and that no regularisation was made within that deadline. 33 In those circumstances, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not have valid representation at the appeal stage.

Consequently, the appeal must be dismissed as manifestly inadmissible.

Costs 34 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 137 of the Rules of Procedure, applicable to proceedings on appeal pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) of those rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings. 35 In the present case, since the present order has been adopted before the appeal was served on the defendant at first instance and, therefore, before the latter could incur any costs, it is appropriate to decide that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is to bear his own costs.

On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby orders:

1. The appeal is dismissed as manifestly inadmissible.

2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] shall bear his own costs.

Luxembourg, 15 July 2026.

A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA]

I. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] * Language of the case: English.

Anonimizzato ex art. 52 D.Lgs. 196/2003
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) 15 July 2026 ( * ) ( Appeal – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice – Obligation for non-privileged parties to be represented before the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – Third and seventh paragraphs of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statue of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – Prohibition on ‘self-representation’ – University teacher – Right of audience – Proof – Appeal clearly inadmissible ) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑876/25 P, APPEAL under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 29 December 2025, [OSCURATO:PERSONA], residing in Rotterdam (Netherlands), appellant, the other party to the proceedings being: [OSCURATO:PERSONA], defendant at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), composed of I. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], A. Kumin and M. Bošnjak (Rapporteur), [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: T. Ćapeta, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], having decided, after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], to rule by reasoned order, pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, makes the following [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1 By his appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] seeks to have set aside the order of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 31 October 2025, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (T‑319/25, ‘the order under appeal’, EU:T:2025:1012), by which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed, in part as having been brought before a court manifestly lacking jurisdiction to hear and determine it, in part as manifestly inadmissible, and in part as manifestly lacking any foundation in law, his action for a finding by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had unlawfully failed to define a position on his letter of 28 January 2025 seeking the interpretation of a number of provisions of EU law (‘the letter of 28 January 2025’). Legal context 2 The first to third and the seventh paragraphs of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] state: ‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the institutions of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] shall be represented before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice by an agent appointed for each case; the agent may be assisted by an adviser or by a lawyer. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], other than the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which are parties to the Agreement on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and also the EFTA [OSCURATO:PERSONA] referred to in that Agreement shall be represented in same manner. Other parties must be represented by a lawyer. … University teachers being nationals of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] whose law accords them a right of audience shall have the same rights before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] as are accorded by this [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to lawyers.’ 3 Title IV of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, entitled ‘Direct actions’, includes [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 119, paragraph 1 of which provides: ‘A party may be represented only by his agent or lawyer.’ 4 Title V of the Rules of Procedure, entitled ‘Appeals against decisions of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’, consists of Articles 167 to 190 of those rules. 5 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 168(2) of the Rules of Procedure provides: ‘Articles 119 … of these Rules shall apply to appeals.’ 6 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 185(1) of the Rules of Procedure states: ‘A party who is wholly or in part unable to meet the costs of the proceedings may at any time apply for legal aid.’ Background to the dispute 7 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] set out the background to the dispute in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the order under appeal as follows: ‘2      On 28 January 2025, [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] sent a letter to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in which he claimed that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 5.2 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2001 (Law on income tax of 2001) of 11 May 2000 (Stb. 2000, No 215), as amended, infringed a number of provisions of EU law … [He], in essence, requested that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] confirm or contest his interpretation of the provisions of EU law at issue. 3      On 12 March 2025, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] replied to that letter, stating, in essence, that it did not see any immediate grounds to open an infringement procedure and that it was unclear how the national provision relied on by [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] was incompatible with EU law.’ The procedure before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the order under appeal 8 By application lodged at the Registry of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 18 May 2025, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] brought an action under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 265 TFEU claiming, primarily, that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should declare a failure to act by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in that it unlawfully failed to define a position on his letter of 28 January 2025 and that it should order the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to define a position on that letter; in the alternative, he sought to have the case referred to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice so that it could be treated as a request for a preliminary ruling. 9 By the order under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed the action. 10 In the first place, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in paragraph 8 of that order, rejected the first head of claim relating to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s alleged failure to act as manifestly inadmissible, finding that, having regard to the contents of the reply which it had sent to [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had in fact defined a position on the letter of 28 January 2025. In addition, in paragraph 10 of the order, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] observed that, in any event, an action for a declaration that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in refusing to initiate an infringement procedure, has failed to act, in breach of the FEU Treaty, is inadmissible. 11 In the second place, in paragraph 15 of the order under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] rejected the head of claim, on the grounds of a lack of jurisdiction, relating to the issuing of an order with regard to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and to clarification of the scope of certain provisions of EU law. 12 In that respect, in paragraph 14 of that order, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] observed that, in the context of an action for failure to act based on [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 265 TFEU, it is not entitled either to issue directions to the EU institutions or to rule whether the conduct of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is compatible with the Treaties. 13 In the third place, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in paragraph 18 of the order under appeal, also rejected as manifestly lacking any foundation in law the head of claim raised in the alternative, by which [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had requested that the case be treated as a reference for a preliminary ruling and that, in accordance with the second paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 54 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], it be referred to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice. 14 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held, in paragraph 17 of that order, that the action brought before it had to be regarded as an action for failure to act under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 256 TFEU and that, consequently, it fell within its exclusive jurisdiction. It also observed that, in any event, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 267 TFEU it is only the courts or tribunals of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] that are empowered to make requests for preliminary rulings to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice. 15 Lastly, in paragraph 19 of that order, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed the action in its entirety, stating that ‘it is not necessary to rule on the question of whether the applicant is validly represented in the proceedings by a professor, that is to say, whether the latter person satisfies the conditions laid down in the seventh paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’. The form of order sought by the appellant and the procedure before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice 16 By his appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice should: –        set aside the order under appeal; –        dispose of the dispute and find: –        that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 265 TFEU must be interpreted as allowing the appellant to bring proceedings first before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and then before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in order to obtain an authoritative interpretation on the hitherto unclarified aspects of EU law that are relevant, both to EU-wide uniformity and to his action at national level, since the national supreme court has failed to make a request itself to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for a preliminary ruling, –        that he may act for himself, without being represented, in proceedings based on [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 265 TFEU since he enjoyed that right before the national courts and has demonstrated a sufficient knowledge of EU law so as to be capable of defending his own interests, –        in the alternative, that the seventh paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must be interpreted as meaning that university law professors from all EU [OSCURATO:PERSONA] have a right of audience before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], provided they are sufficiently qualified in the domain of EU law, –        that EU law, in particular [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 131 TFEU and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 10 of the Charter of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], must be interpreted in the manner indicated in the appeal; –        order each party to bear its own costs. 17 By document of 26 January 2026, the Registry of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice informed [OSCURATO:PERSONA] that the provisions of the third and seventh paragraphs of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] required him to be represented before the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] by a lawyer or, as the case may be, by a university teacher who is a national of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] whose law accords him or her a right of audience. He was requested to produce, within a specified period, any evidence capable of establishing that the law of the Netherlands ‘accords’ Ms de Roo, in her capacity as a professor, ‘a right of audience’ within the meaning of the seventh paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19. Furthermore, he was informed that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice was likely to examine of its own motion, in the light of the evidence which he would produce, the validity of his representation, and that he could in any event regularise his appeal within that period by appointing another person authorised to represent him. 18 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submitted observations in that regard within the prescribed period. Admissibility of the appeal 19 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of its Rules of Procedure, where the appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], decide by reasoned order to dismiss that appeal in whole or in part. 20 It is necessary to apply that provision in the present appeal. 21 It is apparent from the third paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] that parties other than the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the institutions of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], other than those [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which are parties to the Agreement on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 2 May 1992, and also the EFTA [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ‘must be represented by a lawyer’. That requirement is also clear from [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 119(1) of the Rules of Procedure, which is applicable to appeals on the basis of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 168(2) of those rules. 22 In the present case, the appeal has been signed by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] himself and, in the alternative, by Ms de Roo, in her capacity as a professor. 23 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that he has the right to bring proceedings himself before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], by analogy with the preliminary ruling procedure, in which individuals may submit written observations in their own name. He also maintains that Ms de Roo is entitled, like any Netherlands citizen, to bring proceedings before the Netherlands courts. He argues that limiting the right of representation to professors who are nationals of certain [OSCURATO:PERSONA] would be discriminatory. He adds that he has been unable to obtain representation by a lawyer, in particular because of the cost of such representation. 24 In the first place, it is clear from the provisions referred to in paragraph 21 above that natural persons cannot bring an appeal before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice without being represented by a person authorised for that purpose. In the absence of any derogation provided for in the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] or the Rules of Procedure, the appellant’s signature by itself is not capable of satisfying that requirement (see, to that effect, order of 11 November 2024, Papasotiriou v Council and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑344/24 P, EU:C:2024:949, paragraphs 19 and 20, and judgment of 4 September 2025, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] e [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v EUIPO , C‑776/22 P, EU:C:2025:644, paragraphs 59 and 60 and the case-law cited). 25 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] cannot rely to any effect, in that regard, on the rules applicable to the preliminary ruling procedure. 26 That procedure, which is intended to ensure that EU law is interpreted uniformly, institutes direct cooperation between the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice and the national courts, which is completely independent of any initiative by the parties to the main proceedings (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 November 2010, VB [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑137/08, EU:C:2010:659, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited, and of 3 June 2021, Bankia , C‑910/19, EU:C:2021:433, paragraph 22). It therefore cannot be equated with an appeal, which is a legal remedy brought on the initiative of a party against a judicial decision. 27 The fact that parties to the main proceedings may, in some circumstances, submit written observations in a preliminary ruling procedure without the involvement of a lawyer thus has no bearing on the obligation to be represented that is applicable to the present appeal. 28 Nor is it possible to accept the argument based on the cost of being represented by a lawyer. In fact, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 185(1) of the Rules of Procedure permits any party who is wholly or in part unable to meet the costs of the proceedings to apply at any time for legal aid. 29 In the second place, under the seventh paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], ‘university teachers being nationals of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] whose law accords them a right of audience shall have the same rights before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] as are accorded by this [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to lawyers.’ It follows from that provision that according a right of audience before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to a university teacher who is a national of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is subject to the condition that that right is conferred on him or her by the law of that [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. The meaning and scope of that condition must thus be interpreted by reference to the national law concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 July 2022, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v REA , C‑110/21 P, EU:C:2022:555, paragraph 41). 30 The seventh paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] merely gives due effect to the choices made by national laws as to the persons entitled to plead before the national courts. By according university teachers the same rights as those granted to lawyers, for the purposes of the third paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute, the seventh paragraph of that article allows account to be taken of the fact that, in a number of [OSCURATO:PERSONA], some categories of university teacher may be granted, in accordance with specific requirements laid down to that end by national law, the right to represent parties before national courts. 31 However, in the present case, [OSCURATO:PERSONA], when asked by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to adduce any evidence capable of establishing that Netherlands law accords Ms de Roo, in her capacity as a professor, a right of audience before the Netherlands courts, for the purposes of the seventh paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], has not produced any evidence to that effect. The mere assertion, moreover wholly unsubstantiated, that any Netherlands national is permitted to represent himself or herself before the Netherlands administrative courts is, in any event, ineffective under that provision. It does not make it possible to establish that Ms de Roo is authorised on that basis to represent a third party before the Netherlands courts. 32 It is also apparent from the procedural documents before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], referred to in paragraphs 17 and 18 above, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was informed that his appeal could be declared inadmissible on account of the irregular nature of his being represented by Ms de Roo, that he was given time to produce the relevant evidence or to regularise his appeal by appointing another person authorised to represent him, and that no regularisation was made within that deadline. 33 In those circumstances, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not have valid representation at the appeal stage. Consequently, the appeal must be dismissed as manifestly inadmissible. Costs 34 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 137 of the Rules of Procedure, applicable to proceedings on appeal pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) of those rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings. 35 In the present case, since the present order has been adopted before the appeal was served on the defendant at first instance and, therefore, before the latter could incur any costs, it is appropriate to decide that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is to bear his own costs. On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby orders: 1. The appeal is dismissed as manifestly inadmissible. 2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] shall bear his own costs. Luxembourg, 15 July 2026. A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] I. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] * Language of the case: English.
Sentenza Corte di giustizia UE/2026 — Fons Iuris — Fons Iuris