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Corte di giustizia UEsentenza

Corte di giustizia UE n. 1094/2026

ECLI:EU:T:2026:353
Testo integrale del provvedimento

Testo integrale del provvedimento

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA])

20 May 2026 ( * ) ( Action for annulment – Economic and monetary policy – Request to initiate an investigation – Refusal by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the Board of Appeal to dismiss the appeal as inadmissible – Manifest lack of jurisdiction in part – Action in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly lacking any foundation in law )

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑247/24,

Evroins inshurans grup AD, established in Sofia ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), represented by A. Morogai, H. Drăghici and F. Giurgea, lawyers, applicant, v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), represented by S. Rosenbaum, A. Terstegen-Verhaag and S. Dispiter, acting as Agents, and by H.-G.

Kamann, Z. Mzee and F. Boos, lawyers, defendant,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]),

composed of E. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA], J. Schwarcz and F. Bestagno (Rapporteur), [OSCURATO:PERSONA],

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]: V. [OSCURATO:PERSONA],

having regard to the written part of the procedure, in particular the measure of organisation of procedure of 4 December 2025 inviting the parties to submit their observations on the consequences to be drawn, for the present case, from the order of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

(T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347), and the response by the applicant and by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] lodged at the Registry of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 22 and 15 December 2025 respectively, makes the following

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

1 By its action under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU, the applicant, Evroins inshurans grup AD, seeks the annulment of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] BoA-D-2024-02 of the Board of Appeal of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 11 March 2024 dismissing as inadmissible the appeal that it brought under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EU) No 1094/2010 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 24 November 2010 establishing a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA]), amending [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 716/2009/EC and repealing [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2009/79/EC (OJ 2010 L 331, p. 48) (‘the contested decision’).

Background to the dispute 2 The applicant is a Bulgarian joint stock company with its registered office in Sofia ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]).

It owns almost all the shares in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – Reasigurare SA (‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA]’), an insurance undertaking domiciled in [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 3 For the purposes of the supervision of a group which includes the applicant, a college of supervisors, within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 212(1)(e) of Directive 2009/138/EC of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Reinsurance (Solvency II) (OJ 2009 L 335, p. 1) (‘the Solvency II Directive’), composed of the Autoritatea de Supraveghere Financiară ([OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]) (‘the Romanian supervisory authority’) and the Komisiya za finansov nadzor ([OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]) was put in place. 4 On 17 March 2023, the Romanian supervisory authority adopted a decision withdrawing [OSCURATO:PERSONA] operating licence (‘the withdrawal decision’) and, after verifying that that undertaking was insolvent, applied for a declaration of insolvency. 5 By several letters which it sent to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) during the period between March and August 2023, the applicant raised its concerns regarding a potential infringement of EU law by the Romanian supervisory authority when adopting the withdrawal decision.

In that context, it requested [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to initiate an investigation. 6 On 11 April 2023, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] challenged the withdrawal decision before the Curtea de Apel București ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal, Bucharest, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]). 7 By letter of 19 September 2023, the chairperson of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] decided that an investigation in respect of an infringement of EU law against the Romanian supervisory authority would not be appropriate and closed the applicant’s request without initiating an investigation (‘the letter of 19 September 2023’). 8 By application lodged at the Registry of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 20 November 2023, the applicant brought an action, registered as [OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑1094/23, seeking the annulment of the letter of 19 September 2023.

By order of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

(T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347), the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed that action as inadmissible. 9 On 20 November 2023, the applicant brought an appeal against the letter of 19 September 2023 before the Board of Appeal, pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010.

On 11 March 2024, by the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed that appeal as inadmissible.

Forms of order sought 10 The applicant claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should: – annul the contested decision; – and, consequently, annul the letter of 19 September 2023; – or, in the alternative, order the Board of Appeal to re-assess its appeal against the letter of 19 September 2023; – order the ‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA] supervisory authorities’ and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to pay the costs. 11 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should: – dismiss the action as inadmissible; – in the alternative, dismiss the action as manifestly lacking any foundation in law; – order the applicant to pay the costs.

Law 12 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 126 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], where it is clear that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has no jurisdiction to hear and determine an action or where the action is manifestly inadmissible or manifestly lacking any foundation in law, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may, on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur, at any time decide to give a decision by reasoned order without taking further steps in the proceedings. 13 In the present case, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], considering that it has sufficient information available to it from the material in the file, has decided to give a decision without taking further steps in the proceedings.

The jurisdiction of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to rule on the applicant’s third head of claim 14 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends, in essence, that the third head of claim of the action is inadmissible and that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has no jurisdiction to order the Board of Appeal to re-assess the appeal lodged by the applicant against the letter of 19 September 2023. 15 The applicant submits, in essence, that, by its third head of claim, raised in the alternative, it is not asking the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to substitute itself for the Board of Appeal, but only to give legal effect to any annulment of the decision of the Board of Appeal. 16 In the present case, it should be noted that, by its third head of claim, the applicant requests that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] order the Board of Appeal to re-assess the applicant’s appeal against the letter of 19 September 2023.

Accordingly, that head of claim amounts, in essence, to a request for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to issue a direction to the Board of Appeal. 17 It is settled case-law that, when exercising judicial review of legality under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU, the EU judicature has no jurisdiction to issue directions to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (see judgment of 14 March 2024, D & A Pharma v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and EMA , C‑291/22 P, EU:C:2024:228, paragraph 160 and the case-law cited).

It is however for the institution, body, office or agency concerned, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 266 TFEU, to adopt the measures required to give effect to a judgment delivered in an action for annulment (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 September 2018, Sweden v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

, T‑260/16, EU:T:2018:597, paragraph 104 and the case-law cited). 18 In those circumstances, the third head of claim requesting that the Board of Appeal be ordered to re-assess the appeal against the letter of 19 September 2023 must be rejected on the ground of manifest lack of jurisdiction.

Admissibility of the applicant’s second head of claim 19 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] initially submitted, in its defence, that the applicant’s second head of claim, seeking annulment of the letter of 19 September 2023, was destined to fail, because the Board of Appeal had correctly dismissed the applicant’s appeal against that letter as inadmissible.

In the alternative, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] also disputed the admissibility of that head of claim, on the grounds of lis pendens with the action for annulment brought against the letter of 19 September 2023 in the case which gave rise to the order of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

(T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347), cited in paragraph 8 above. Next, in its response to the measures of organisation of procedure adopted by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] stated that the order of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

(T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347), resulted in the inadmissibility of the second head of claim in the present case, on the basis that it had become res judicata , since that head of claim and the action brought in the case giving rise to that order referred to the same act, were between the same parties and were based on similar arguments. 20 The applicant submits that there is no overlap between the present case and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑1094/23 to enable a plea of lis pendens to be upheld in accordance with the case-law.

The two actions seek the annulment of different decisions adopted on different legal bases and raise different pleas in law. 21 It should be noted that, according to settled case-law, the fact that a judicial decision, namely a judgment or order, has become res judicata is such as to bar the admissibility of an action if the proceedings disposed of by the judgment or order in question were between the same parties, had the same purpose and had the same legal basis, those conditions necessarily being cumulative (see, to that effect, judgments of 25 June 2010,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

, T‑66/01, EU:T:2010:255, paragraph 197, and of 25 February 2015, Walton v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

, T‑261/14 P, EU:T:2015:110, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited, and order of 13 November 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

, T‑586/23, not published, EU:T:2025:1055, paragraph 23). 22 In the present case, it must be held that the action, as regards the second head of claim, is between the same parties, has the same purpose and has the same legal basis as the case which gave rise to the order of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

(T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347).

In that case, the applicant also sought, on the basis of essentially similar arguments, the annulment of the letter of 19 September 2023. 23 In other words, by its second head of claim, the applicant seeks, for a second time before the EU judicature, the annulment of the letter of 19 September 2023, which is the same application that was dismissed by the order of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

(T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347). 24 Therefore, to accept the admissibility of the applicant’s second head of claim would be tantamount to conferring on that party the possibility of reviving, to its advantage, a right of appeal against the letter of 19 September 2023 and to allowing it to call into question the res judicata status ascribed to the order of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

(T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347), by which its action for annulment against that letter had been dismissed as inadmissible. 25 On those grounds, the second head of claim must be rejected as manifestly inadmissible.

The applicant’s first head of claim 26 As regards the plea of inadmissibility raised by [OSCURATO:PERSONA], alleging that the applicant’s first head of claim is inadmissible in so far as [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 61(1) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010 requires, as a prior condition for the admissibility of an action for annulment before the EU Courts, the existence of an appeal admissible by the Board of Appeal, it should be noted that, in the circumstances of the present case, the proper administration of justice justifies ruling on the merits of that head of claim in order to reject it, without first examining its admissibility (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 February 2002,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

v Boehringer , C‑23/00 P, EU:C:2002:118, paragraph 52). 27 In support of the first head of claim in the action, the applicant raises several complaints which can be grouped, in essence, into six pleas in law, alleging: first, infringement of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010, of the Solvency II Directive and of the rules of procedure before the Board of Appeal; second, breach of the principle of equal treatment; third, breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations; fourth, breach of the principle of effective judicial protection; fifth, infringement of the Charter of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]; and sixth, errors committed by the Board of Appeal in not finding that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had incorrectly refused to initiate an investigation.

The first plea in law, alleging infringement of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010, the Solvency II Directive and the rules of procedure before the Board of Appeal 28 The applicant claims that the contested decision incorrectly classified the letter of 19 September 2023, since the Board of Appeal found that that letter was not a challengeable act for the purposes of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60(1) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010. 29 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the applicant submits that, since [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60(1) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010 expressly lists the acts which may be subject to an appeal, the Board of Appeal should, first of all, have identified the legal basis of the letter of 19 September 2023, in order to determine whether that letter constituted such an act. 30 Second, the applicant claims that, in order to determine whether the letter of 19 September 2023 constituted a challengeable act, the Board of Appeal should have reviewed the specific context and purpose of the proposed investigation and the content of that letter and its practical effects.

Its analysis within the contested decision appears to be fully based on general prerequisites unrelated to the specificity of the situation under the request.

The applicant is of the view that the Board of Appeal was, more specifically, required to examine carefully all of the matters of fact and law which it brought to [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s attention in order to determine the action that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should have taken in relation to its complaint.

Similarly, according to the applicant, the Board of Appeal or [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must provide sufficient clarity and information in their reasoning if it is decided not to proceed with the investigation of a complaint so that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] can examine the exercise of discretion by those bodies in setting priorities.

Furthermore, the applicant submits that [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s discretion to decide to initiate an investigation is not and should not be construed as unlimited.

The EU judicature has found that the discretionary power of the EU authorities should be subject to two levels of review, on the one hand, by the boards of appeal which exercise a wide control having the same competences as the authority which issued the decision, and, on the other hand, by the EU instances whose control is limited to examining whether the exercise of the ‘entirely’ discretionary power is not affected by a manifest error or an abuse of power. 31 Third, as regards the case-law relied on by the Board of Appeal in the contested decision, the applicant claims that the latter applied it without taking into account the specific features of the present case.

Contrary to the present case, the EU authorities did not rule, in any of the decisions relied on by the Board of Appeal, on whether EU law was infringed, either because those authorities were not provided with sufficient evidence in that regard or because the legislation allegedly infringed did not apply and was therefore irrelevant.

In all those cases, those authorities rejected the various requests to initiate an investigation as part of the exercise of their discretionary power, which, according to the applicant, is not the case here. 32 Fourth, the applicant submits that, by not taking into account the particularity of the present case, the Board of Appeal infringed the principle of proportionality.

According to the applicant, the particularity of the present case as compared to the cases on which the Board of Appeal relied – which was not taken into account by the Board of Appeal – is that, although [OSCURATO:PERSONA] formally closed its request to initiate an investigation against the Romanian supervisory authority to assess whether that authority had infringed EU law, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] proceeded in fact to an investigation, in breach of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010 and the Rules of Procedure on [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for applying [OSCURATO:PERSONA]

17. Consequently, the letter of 19 September 2023 is not a mere decision to refuse to open an investigation rendered by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the exercise of the discretion conferred on it by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010, as the Board of Appeal found, but an act by which [OSCURATO:PERSONA], following a review process, expresses its view that the Romanian supervisory authority did not infringe EU law, the effects of which are binding upon its addressee, and is therefore a challengeable ‘decision’ before the Board of Appeal. 33 Fifth, the applicant claims that, since the present case concerns a decision by which [OSCURATO:PERSONA] found that the Romanian supervisory authority had not infringed EU law, it is not relevant that it was not one of the entities expressly referred to in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010, as the Board of Appeal incorrectly alleged in the contested decision.

According to the applicant, under that article, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] can initiate an investigation on its own initiative, and this would be such a case.

The applicant further submits that it is apparent from a combined reading of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60 and recital 58 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010, as well as the case-law, that in order for an action to be brought before the Board of Appeal against a decision of [OSCURATO:PERSONA], that decision must be either a decision referred to in Articles 17 to 19 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010 or a decision taken in accordance with the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] acts referred to in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1(2) of that regulation, addressed to the applicant or of direct and individual concern to it.

No other condition is required.

Consequently, the Board of Appeal should have analysed whether the refusal of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to initiate investigation proceedings constitutes one of those decisions or not.

According to the applicant, the letter of 19 September 2023, in which [OSCURATO:PERSONA] found that there was no infringement of EU law by the Romanian supervisory authority, is, pursuant to the case-law, a decision taken in accordance with the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] acts referred to in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010. 34 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] disputes the applicant’s arguments. 35 It should be noted, first of all, that, according to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010, the types of acts which [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may establish include guidelines, recommendations, opinions and individual decisions in the specific cases referred to in Articles 17, 18 and 19 of that regulation.

In that context, it should be recalled that the fourth and fifth paragraphs of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 288 TFEU state that a decision is binding in its entirety, whereas recommendations and opinions have no binding force. 36 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60(1) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010, ‘any natural or legal person, including competent authorities, may appeal against a decision of [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] referred to in Articles 17, 18 and 19 and any other decision taken by [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] in accordance with the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] acts referred to in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1(2) which is addressed to that person, or against a decision which, although in the form of a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to that person.’ 37 Moreover, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60(4) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010, ‘if the appeal is admissible, the Board of Appeal shall examine whether it is well-founded.’ [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 9(1) of its rules of procedure, the Board of Appeal is to determine whether or not an appeal is admissible before examining whether it is well founded, if the respondent contends that the appeal is not admissible. 38 In the present case, it is clear from the information in the file that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] lodged a response dated 12 December 2023 before the Board of Appeal, which was limited to questions of admissibility.

In that response [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submitted that the appeal should be dismissed as inadmissible. 39 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal as inadmissible, on the ground, in essence, that the letter of 19 September 2023 was not a decision within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60(1) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010. 40 In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal stated, in essence, in the first place, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s power to initiate an investigation was, in accordance with the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] case-law, entirely discretionary and not open to review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] or by the Board of Appeal.

In the second place, the Board of Appeal stated that its competence is limited by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010; in particular, the refusal to initiate an investigation falls outside of its jurisdiction to the extent that, where it follows a request made by a legal person, it does not constitute a decision taken on the basis of the provisions of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010.

Lastly, the Board of Appeal found that the factual and legal circumstances of the present case do not differ from those at issue in previous relevant Board of Appeal decisions and relevant case-law and they do not therefore allow for a different conclusion on the admissibility of the appeal. 41 In that regard, it must be borne in mind, from the outset, that, by order of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

(T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347), the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed the action for annulment of the letter of 19 September 2023 as inadmissible.

In particular, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] stated that the applicant could not require [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to initiate investigation proceedings under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010. [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s refusal to initiate such proceedings on its own initiative was not capable of affecting the applicant’s interests by bringing about a distinct change in its legal position (order of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

, T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347, paragraph 30). [OSCURATO:PERSONA] therefore found that the letter of 19 September 2023 could not be categorised as a challengeable act for the purposes of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU.

It must also be held that that letter cannot be categorised as a decision within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60(1) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010. 42 It follows from settled case-law that, where an EU institution, body, office or agency is not bound to initiate a procedure, but has a discretion which excludes the right for individuals to require it to adopt a specific position, it is not open to persons who have lodged a complaint to bring an action before the EU judicature against a decision to take no further action on their complaint.

That possibility would arise only if those persons had procedural rights, comparable to those they might have in the case of a procedure under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles [101 TFEU] and [102 TFEU] (OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1), enabling them to require that institution, body, office or agency to inform them and to grant them a hearing (see judgment of 9 September 2015, SV Capital v EBA , T‑660/14, EU:T:2015:608, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited). 43 Actions brought by natural or legal persons against the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s refusal (i) to initiate a procedure for a declaration of failure to fulfil obligations under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 258 TFEU (order of 17 July 1998, Sateba v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

, C‑422/97 P, EU:C:1998:395, paragraph 42), (ii) to bring an action under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 106(3) TFEU (judgment of 22 February 2005,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

v max.mobil , C‑141/02 P, EU:C:2005:98, paragraphs 68 to 70) and (iii) to examine complaints put forward for failure to respect merger decisions (judgment of 9 October 2018, 1&1 Telecom v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

, T‑43/16, EU:T:2018:660, paragraphs 37 to 49) have thus been declared inadmissible. 44 Similarly, the action brought against [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s refusal of a request for an investigation to be initiated under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010 was declared inadmissible (order of 24 June 2016, Onix Asigurări v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

, T‑590/15, EU:T:2016:374, paragraphs 50 to 57). 45 In the present case, as [OSCURATO:PERSONA] correctly states, it is common ground that the applicant submitted a request to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010, as amended by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EU) 2019/2175 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 18 December 2019 (OJ 2019 L 334, p. 1).

That provision provides [OSCURATO:PERSONA] with a mechanism for dealing with infringements of EU law by the national authorities in their supervisory activities. 46 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17(2), (3) and (6) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010 sets out three stages to the mechanism enabling [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to deal with infringements of EU law by the national authorities in their supervisory activities.

In particular, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17(2) of that regulation provides that, ‘upon request from one or more competent authorities, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the relevant [OSCURATO:PERSONA], or on its own initiative, including when this is based on [well-substantiated] information from natural or legal persons, and after having informed the competent authority concerned, [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] shall outline how it intends to proceed with the case and, where appropriate, investigate the alleged breach or non-application of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] law.’ 47 It is thus apparent from [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010 that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has discretion, as regards the initiation of an investigation under that provision, as evidenced by the use of the expression ‘outline how it intends to proceed with the case and, where appropriate, investigate’, both when it receives a request from one of the entities expressly mentioned in that provision and when it acts on its own initiative (see, by analogy, order of 10 August 2021, Jakeliūnas v

ESMA

, T‑760/20, not published, EU:T:2021:512, paragraph 29). 48 It follows that the Board of Appeal correctly held that [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s power to initiate an investigation under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010 was entirely discretionary. 49 That interpretation is also consistent with [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s objectives and tasks as well as with the general scheme of the mechanism established by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010.

In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has already held that the objective of that mechanism was not to provide individual protection or redress in disputes between a natural or legal person and a competent authority at the national level (see, to that effect, order of 24 June 2016, Onix Asigurări v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

, T‑590/15, EU:T:2016:374, paragraph 55). 50 In the light of those factors, it must be noted that the lodging of a request, such as that made by the applicant in the present case, does not create any special legal relationship between the applicant and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and cannot require [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to carry out an investigation under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010 (see, to that effect, order of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

, T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347, paragraph 29). 51 In those circumstances, it must be held, as the Board of Appeal did in the contested decision, that the letter of 19 September 2023 does not produce binding legal effects.

In particular, since the applicant could not require [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to initiate investigation proceedings under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s refusal to initiate such proceedings on its own initiative was not capable of affecting the applicant’s interests by bringing about a distinct change in its legal position. 52 Accordingly, the Board of Appeal correctly held, in essence, that the letter of 19 September 2023 was not a decision within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60(1) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010. 53 Furthermore, it must be stated that the Board of Appeal’s jurisdiction as regards any decision of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010 is limited by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60 of that regulation.

Thus, the Board of Appeal correctly stated in the contested decision that it did not have jurisdiction to decide on the applicant’s appeal against the refusal of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to initiate an investigation, in so far as it does not fall within the scope of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60 of that regulation.

The applicant is not one of the entities expressly mentioned in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010, which may request [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to initiate an investigation into an alleged infringement of or failure to apply EU law, which are limited to the competent authorities, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 14 December 2016, SV Capital v EBA , C‑577/15 P, EU:C:2016:947, paragraphs 35, 36 and 40, and of 9 September 2015, SV Capital v EBA , T‑660/14, EU:T:2015:608, paragraphs 69 and 72). 54 That finding cannot be called into question by the applicant’s argument that the Board of Appeal did not find that the letter of 19 September 2023 was not a mere refusal to initiate an investigation, but a decision to close an investigation under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010, by which [OSCURATO:PERSONA] found that the Romanian supervisory authority had not infringed EU law. 55 In that regard, it must be stated that [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in the letter of 19 September 2023, pointed out several times that it was a letter refusing to initiate an investigation under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010.

The fact that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] states in that letter to have ‘carefully and thoroughly’ assessed the application of the provisions of EU law in question in no way indicates that it had opened, carried out or closed an investigation under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010, but simply that it had carefully assessed the material submitted to it and found, on the basis of that material, that an investigation under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17 was not appropriate. 56 Accordingly, the Board of Appeal did not, on any view, err in law in that regard. 57 In those circumstances, the first plea in law must be rejected as manifestly lacking any foundation in law.

The second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth pleas in law 58 By it second plea in law, concerning the principle of equal treatment, the applicant claims that the Board of Appeal infringed that principle in so far as, in essence, it did not find that, by refusing its request to initiate a more detailed investigation, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] acted in a discriminatory manner towards the applicant and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] as compared with similar undertakings in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] or in other EU [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 59 By its third plea in law, concerning the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, the applicant claims that the Board of Appeal and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] infringed that principle in so far as the Board of Appeal did not find that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had incorrectly refused to initiate an investigation. 60 By its fourth plea in law, concerning the principle of effective judicial protection, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal, by refusing to rule on the merits of the appeal, did not correctly assess the real nature of its request to initiate an investigation of the possible infringement of EU law and to assess the actual implications of such an infringement and therefore failed to have regard to that principle. 61 By its fifth plea in law, the applicant claims that the Board of Appeal infringed [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 47 of the Charter of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in that its right to bring an appeal against the letter of 19 September 2023 before the Board of Appeal was illusory and was not effective, since the Board of Appeal did not proceed to a judicious assessment of the facts and evidence which it provided. 62 By its sixth plea in law, the applicant claims that, by refusing to initiate an investigation, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] acted contrary to its core fundamental mission, and exceeded its regulated competences under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010.

Furthermore, the Board of Appeal failed to observe that mission in the contested decision.

The applicant reiterates that by not finding that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had failed to initiate an investigation of a potential infringement of EU law, including [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010 and certain provisions of Articles 7 and 8 TFEU, the Board of Appeal also infringed EU law and all of those provisions.

Lastly, it submits that the contested decision did not thoroughly investigate all the factors triggering the need to initiate an investigation and did not find there was a failure to state reasons in the letter of 19 September 2023 in that regard. 63 In the present case, it should be noted at the outset that the arguments raised by the applicant in the second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth pleas in law seek, in essence, to challenge again the Board of Appeal’s dismissal, in the contested decision, of its appeal against the letter of 19 September 2023 as inadmissible.

However, it should be stated that, as set out in paragraph 52 above, the Board of Appeal was correct to dismiss the appeal as inadmissible by finding that that letter did not constitute a decision within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60(1) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010. 64 In those circumstances, the second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth pleas in law must also be rejected. 65 The applicant’s first head of claim, seeking the annulment of the contested decision, must therefore be dismissed as manifestly lacking any foundation in law. 66 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the action must be dismissed as brought in part before a court which manifestly lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the case, in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly lacking any foundation in law.

Costs 67 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

On those grounds,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA])

hereby orders: 1. The action is dismissed. 2. Evroins inshurans grup AD shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]). Luxembourg, 20 May 2026.

V. [OSCURATO:PERSONA]

E. [OSCURATO:PERSONA]

* Language of the case: English.

Anonimizzato ex art. 52 D.Lgs. 196/2003
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) 20 May 2026 ( * ) ( Action for annulment – Economic and monetary policy – Request to initiate an investigation – Refusal by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the Board of Appeal to dismiss the appeal as inadmissible – Manifest lack of jurisdiction in part – Action in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly lacking any foundation in law ) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑247/24, Evroins inshurans grup AD, established in Sofia ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), represented by A. Morogai, H. Drăghici and F. Giurgea, lawyers, applicant, v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), represented by S. Rosenbaum, A. Terstegen-Verhaag and S. Dispiter, acting as Agents, and by H.-G. Kamann, Z. Mzee and F. Boos, lawyers, defendant, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), composed of E. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA], J. Schwarcz and F. Bestagno (Rapporteur), [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: V. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], having regard to the written part of the procedure, in particular the measure of organisation of procedure of 4 December 2025 inviting the parties to submit their observations on the consequences to be drawn, for the present case, from the order of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347), and the response by the applicant and by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] lodged at the Registry of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 22 and 15 December 2025 respectively, makes the following [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1 By its action under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU, the applicant, Evroins inshurans grup AD, seeks the annulment of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] BoA-D-2024-02 of the Board of Appeal of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 11 March 2024 dismissing as inadmissible the appeal that it brought under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EU) No 1094/2010 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 24 November 2010 establishing a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA]), amending [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 716/2009/EC and repealing [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2009/79/EC (OJ 2010 L 331, p. 48) (‘the contested decision’). Background to the dispute 2 The applicant is a Bulgarian joint stock company with its registered office in Sofia ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]). It owns almost all the shares in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – Reasigurare SA (‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA]’), an insurance undertaking domiciled in [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 3 For the purposes of the supervision of a group which includes the applicant, a college of supervisors, within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 212(1)(e) of Directive 2009/138/EC of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Reinsurance (Solvency II) (OJ 2009 L 335, p. 1) (‘the Solvency II Directive’), composed of the Autoritatea de Supraveghere Financiară ([OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]) (‘the Romanian supervisory authority’) and the Komisiya za finansov nadzor ([OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]) was put in place. 4 On 17 March 2023, the Romanian supervisory authority adopted a decision withdrawing [OSCURATO:PERSONA] operating licence (‘the withdrawal decision’) and, after verifying that that undertaking was insolvent, applied for a declaration of insolvency. 5 By several letters which it sent to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) during the period between March and August 2023, the applicant raised its concerns regarding a potential infringement of EU law by the Romanian supervisory authority when adopting the withdrawal decision. In that context, it requested [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to initiate an investigation. 6 On 11 April 2023, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] challenged the withdrawal decision before the Curtea de Apel București ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal, Bucharest, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]). 7 By letter of 19 September 2023, the chairperson of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] decided that an investigation in respect of an infringement of EU law against the Romanian supervisory authority would not be appropriate and closed the applicant’s request without initiating an investigation (‘the letter of 19 September 2023’). 8 By application lodged at the Registry of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 20 November 2023, the applicant brought an action, registered as [OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑1094/23, seeking the annulment of the letter of 19 September 2023. By order of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347), the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed that action as inadmissible. 9 On 20 November 2023, the applicant brought an appeal against the letter of 19 September 2023 before the Board of Appeal, pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010. On 11 March 2024, by the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed that appeal as inadmissible. Forms of order sought 10 The applicant claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should: –        annul the contested decision; –        and, consequently, annul the letter of 19 September 2023; –        or, in the alternative, order the Board of Appeal to re-assess its appeal against the letter of 19 September 2023; –        order the ‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA] supervisory authorities’ and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to pay the costs. 11 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should: –        dismiss the action as inadmissible; –        in the alternative, dismiss the action as manifestly lacking any foundation in law; –        order the applicant to pay the costs. Law 12 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 126 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], where it is clear that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has no jurisdiction to hear and determine an action or where the action is manifestly inadmissible or manifestly lacking any foundation in law, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may, on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur, at any time decide to give a decision by reasoned order without taking further steps in the proceedings. 13 In the present case, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], considering that it has sufficient information available to it from the material in the file, has decided to give a decision without taking further steps in the proceedings. The jurisdiction of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to rule on the applicant’s third head of claim 14 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends, in essence, that the third head of claim of the action is inadmissible and that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has no jurisdiction to order the Board of Appeal to re-assess the appeal lodged by the applicant against the letter of 19 September 2023. 15 The applicant submits, in essence, that, by its third head of claim, raised in the alternative, it is not asking the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to substitute itself for the Board of Appeal, but only to give legal effect to any annulment of the decision of the Board of Appeal. 16 In the present case, it should be noted that, by its third head of claim, the applicant requests that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] order the Board of Appeal to re-assess the applicant’s appeal against the letter of 19 September 2023. Accordingly, that head of claim amounts, in essence, to a request for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to issue a direction to the Board of Appeal. 17 It is settled case-law that, when exercising judicial review of legality under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU, the EU judicature has no jurisdiction to issue directions to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (see judgment of 14 March 2024, D & A Pharma v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and EMA , C‑291/22 P, EU:C:2024:228, paragraph 160 and the case-law cited). It is however for the institution, body, office or agency concerned, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 266 TFEU, to adopt the measures required to give effect to a judgment delivered in an action for annulment (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 September 2018, Sweden v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑260/16, EU:T:2018:597, paragraph 104 and the case-law cited). 18 In those circumstances, the third head of claim requesting that the Board of Appeal be ordered to re-assess the appeal against the letter of 19 September 2023 must be rejected on the ground of manifest lack of jurisdiction. Admissibility of the applicant’s second head of claim 19 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] initially submitted, in its defence, that the applicant’s second head of claim, seeking annulment of the letter of 19 September 2023, was destined to fail, because the Board of Appeal had correctly dismissed the applicant’s appeal against that letter as inadmissible. In the alternative, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] also disputed the admissibility of that head of claim, on the grounds of lis pendens with the action for annulment brought against the letter of 19 September 2023 in the case which gave rise to the order of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347), cited in paragraph 8 above. Next, in its response to the measures of organisation of procedure adopted by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] stated that the order of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347), resulted in the inadmissibility of the second head of claim in the present case, on the basis that it had become res judicata , since that head of claim and the action brought in the case giving rise to that order referred to the same act, were between the same parties and were based on similar arguments. 20 The applicant submits that there is no overlap between the present case and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑1094/23 to enable a plea of lis pendens to be upheld in accordance with the case-law. The two actions seek the annulment of different decisions adopted on different legal bases and raise different pleas in law. 21 It should be noted that, according to settled case-law, the fact that a judicial decision, namely a judgment or order, has become res judicata is such as to bar the admissibility of an action if the proceedings disposed of by the judgment or order in question were between the same parties, had the same purpose and had the same legal basis, those conditions necessarily being cumulative (see, to that effect, judgments of 25 June 2010, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑66/01, EU:T:2010:255, paragraph 197, and of 25 February 2015, Walton v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑261/14 P, EU:T:2015:110, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited, and order of 13 November 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑586/23, not published, EU:T:2025:1055, paragraph 23). 22 In the present case, it must be held that the action, as regards the second head of claim, is between the same parties, has the same purpose and has the same legal basis as the case which gave rise to the order of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347). In that case, the applicant also sought, on the basis of essentially similar arguments, the annulment of the letter of 19 September 2023. 23 In other words, by its second head of claim, the applicant seeks, for a second time before the EU judicature, the annulment of the letter of 19 September 2023, which is the same application that was dismissed by the order of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347). 24 Therefore, to accept the admissibility of the applicant’s second head of claim would be tantamount to conferring on that party the possibility of reviving, to its advantage, a right of appeal against the letter of 19 September 2023 and to allowing it to call into question the res judicata status ascribed to the order of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347), by which its action for annulment against that letter had been dismissed as inadmissible. 25 On those grounds, the second head of claim must be rejected as manifestly inadmissible. The applicant’s first head of claim 26 As regards the plea of inadmissibility raised by [OSCURATO:PERSONA], alleging that the applicant’s first head of claim is inadmissible in so far as [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 61(1) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010 requires, as a prior condition for the admissibility of an action for annulment before the EU Courts, the existence of an appeal admissible by the Board of Appeal, it should be noted that, in the circumstances of the present case, the proper administration of justice justifies ruling on the merits of that head of claim in order to reject it, without first examining its admissibility (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 February 2002, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Boehringer , C‑23/00 P, EU:C:2002:118, paragraph 52). 27 In support of the first head of claim in the action, the applicant raises several complaints which can be grouped, in essence, into six pleas in law, alleging: first, infringement of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010, of the Solvency II Directive and of the rules of procedure before the Board of Appeal; second, breach of the principle of equal treatment; third, breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations; fourth, breach of the principle of effective judicial protection; fifth, infringement of the Charter of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]; and sixth, errors committed by the Board of Appeal in not finding that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had incorrectly refused to initiate an investigation. The first plea in law, alleging infringement of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010, the Solvency II Directive and the rules of procedure before the Board of Appeal 28 The applicant claims that the contested decision incorrectly classified the letter of 19 September 2023, since the Board of Appeal found that that letter was not a challengeable act for the purposes of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60(1) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010. 29 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the applicant submits that, since [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60(1) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010 expressly lists the acts which may be subject to an appeal, the Board of Appeal should, first of all, have identified the legal basis of the letter of 19 September 2023, in order to determine whether that letter constituted such an act. 30 Second, the applicant claims that, in order to determine whether the letter of 19 September 2023 constituted a challengeable act, the Board of Appeal should have reviewed the specific context and purpose of the proposed investigation and the content of that letter and its practical effects. Its analysis within the contested decision appears to be fully based on general prerequisites unrelated to the specificity of the situation under the request. The applicant is of the view that the Board of Appeal was, more specifically, required to examine carefully all of the matters of fact and law which it brought to [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s attention in order to determine the action that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should have taken in relation to its complaint. Similarly, according to the applicant, the Board of Appeal or [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must provide sufficient clarity and information in their reasoning if it is decided not to proceed with the investigation of a complaint so that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] can examine the exercise of discretion by those bodies in setting priorities. Furthermore, the applicant submits that [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s discretion to decide to initiate an investigation is not and should not be construed as unlimited. The EU judicature has found that the discretionary power of the EU authorities should be subject to two levels of review, on the one hand, by the boards of appeal which exercise a wide control having the same competences as the authority which issued the decision, and, on the other hand, by the EU instances whose control is limited to examining whether the exercise of the ‘entirely’ discretionary power is not affected by a manifest error or an abuse of power. 31 Third, as regards the case-law relied on by the Board of Appeal in the contested decision, the applicant claims that the latter applied it without taking into account the specific features of the present case. Contrary to the present case, the EU authorities did not rule, in any of the decisions relied on by the Board of Appeal, on whether EU law was infringed, either because those authorities were not provided with sufficient evidence in that regard or because the legislation allegedly infringed did not apply and was therefore irrelevant. In all those cases, those authorities rejected the various requests to initiate an investigation as part of the exercise of their discretionary power, which, according to the applicant, is not the case here. 32 Fourth, the applicant submits that, by not taking into account the particularity of the present case, the Board of Appeal infringed the principle of proportionality. According to the applicant, the particularity of the present case as compared to the cases on which the Board of Appeal relied – which was not taken into account by the Board of Appeal – is that, although [OSCURATO:PERSONA] formally closed its request to initiate an investigation against the Romanian supervisory authority to assess whether that authority had infringed EU law, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] proceeded in fact to an investigation, in breach of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010 and the Rules of Procedure on [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for applying [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17. Consequently, the letter of 19 September 2023 is not a mere decision to refuse to open an investigation rendered by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the exercise of the discretion conferred on it by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010, as the Board of Appeal found, but an act by which [OSCURATO:PERSONA], following a review process, expresses its view that the Romanian supervisory authority did not infringe EU law, the effects of which are binding upon its addressee, and is therefore a challengeable ‘decision’ before the Board of Appeal. 33 Fifth, the applicant claims that, since the present case concerns a decision by which [OSCURATO:PERSONA] found that the Romanian supervisory authority had not infringed EU law, it is not relevant that it was not one of the entities expressly referred to in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010, as the Board of Appeal incorrectly alleged in the contested decision. According to the applicant, under that article, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] can initiate an investigation on its own initiative, and this would be such a case. The applicant further submits that it is apparent from a combined reading of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60 and recital 58 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010, as well as the case-law, that in order for an action to be brought before the Board of Appeal against a decision of [OSCURATO:PERSONA], that decision must be either a decision referred to in Articles 17 to 19 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010 or a decision taken in accordance with the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] acts referred to in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1(2) of that regulation, addressed to the applicant or of direct and individual concern to it. No other condition is required. Consequently, the Board of Appeal should have analysed whether the refusal of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to initiate investigation proceedings constitutes one of those decisions or not. According to the applicant, the letter of 19 September 2023, in which [OSCURATO:PERSONA] found that there was no infringement of EU law by the Romanian supervisory authority, is, pursuant to the case-law, a decision taken in accordance with the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] acts referred to in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010. 34 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] disputes the applicant’s arguments. 35 It should be noted, first of all, that, according to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010, the types of acts which [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may establish include guidelines, recommendations, opinions and individual decisions in the specific cases referred to in Articles 17, 18 and 19 of that regulation. In that context, it should be recalled that the fourth and fifth paragraphs of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 288 TFEU state that a decision is binding in its entirety, whereas recommendations and opinions have no binding force. 36 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60(1) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010, ‘any natural or legal person, including competent authorities, may appeal against a decision of [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] referred to in Articles 17, 18 and 19 and any other decision taken by [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] in accordance with the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] acts referred to in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1(2) which is addressed to that person, or against a decision which, although in the form of a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to that person.’ 37 Moreover, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60(4) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010, ‘if the appeal is admissible, the Board of Appeal shall examine whether it is well-founded.’ [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 9(1) of its rules of procedure, the Board of Appeal is to determine whether or not an appeal is admissible before examining whether it is well founded, if the respondent contends that the appeal is not admissible. 38 In the present case, it is clear from the information in the file that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] lodged a response dated 12 December 2023 before the Board of Appeal, which was limited to questions of admissibility. In that response [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submitted that the appeal should be dismissed as inadmissible. 39 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal as inadmissible, on the ground, in essence, that the letter of 19 September 2023 was not a decision within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60(1) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010. 40 In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal stated, in essence, in the first place, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s power to initiate an investigation was, in accordance with the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] case-law, entirely discretionary and not open to review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] or by the Board of Appeal. In the second place, the Board of Appeal stated that its competence is limited by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010; in particular, the refusal to initiate an investigation falls outside of its jurisdiction to the extent that, where it follows a request made by a legal person, it does not constitute a decision taken on the basis of the provisions of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010. Lastly, the Board of Appeal found that the factual and legal circumstances of the present case do not differ from those at issue in previous relevant Board of Appeal decisions and relevant case-law and they do not therefore allow for a different conclusion on the admissibility of the appeal. 41 In that regard, it must be borne in mind, from the outset, that, by order of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347), the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed the action for annulment of the letter of 19 September 2023 as inadmissible. In particular, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] stated that the applicant could not require [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to initiate investigation proceedings under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010. [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s refusal to initiate such proceedings on its own initiative was not capable of affecting the applicant’s interests by bringing about a distinct change in its legal position (order of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347, paragraph 30). [OSCURATO:PERSONA] therefore found that the letter of 19 September 2023 could not be categorised as a challengeable act for the purposes of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU. It must also be held that that letter cannot be categorised as a decision within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60(1) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010. 42 It follows from settled case-law that, where an EU institution, body, office or agency is not bound to initiate a procedure, but has a discretion which excludes the right for individuals to require it to adopt a specific position, it is not open to persons who have lodged a complaint to bring an action before the EU judicature against a decision to take no further action on their complaint. That possibility would arise only if those persons had procedural rights, comparable to those they might have in the case of a procedure under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles [101 TFEU] and [102 TFEU] (OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1), enabling them to require that institution, body, office or agency to inform them and to grant them a hearing (see judgment of 9 September 2015, SV Capital v EBA , T‑660/14, EU:T:2015:608, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited). 43 Actions brought by natural or legal persons against the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s refusal (i) to initiate a procedure for a declaration of failure to fulfil obligations under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 258 TFEU (order of 17 July 1998, Sateba v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑422/97 P, EU:C:1998:395, paragraph 42), (ii) to bring an action under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 106(3) TFEU (judgment of 22 February 2005, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v max.mobil , C‑141/02 P, EU:C:2005:98, paragraphs 68 to 70) and (iii) to examine complaints put forward for failure to respect merger decisions (judgment of 9 October 2018, 1&1 Telecom v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑43/16, EU:T:2018:660, paragraphs 37 to 49) have thus been declared inadmissible. 44 Similarly, the action brought against [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s refusal of a request for an investigation to be initiated under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010 was declared inadmissible (order of 24 June 2016, Onix Asigurări v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑590/15, EU:T:2016:374, paragraphs 50 to 57). 45 In the present case, as [OSCURATO:PERSONA] correctly states, it is common ground that the applicant submitted a request to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010, as amended by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EU) 2019/2175 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 18 December 2019 (OJ 2019 L 334, p. 1). That provision provides [OSCURATO:PERSONA] with a mechanism for dealing with infringements of EU law by the national authorities in their supervisory activities. 46 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17(2), (3) and (6) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010 sets out three stages to the mechanism enabling [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to deal with infringements of EU law by the national authorities in their supervisory activities. In particular, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17(2) of that regulation provides that, ‘upon request from one or more competent authorities, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the relevant [OSCURATO:PERSONA], or on its own initiative, including when this is based on [well-substantiated] information from natural or legal persons, and after having informed the competent authority concerned, [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] shall outline how it intends to proceed with the case and, where appropriate, investigate the alleged breach or non-application of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] law.’ 47 It is thus apparent from [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010 that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has discretion, as regards the initiation of an investigation under that provision, as evidenced by the use of the expression ‘outline how it intends to proceed with the case and, where appropriate, investigate’, both when it receives a request from one of the entities expressly mentioned in that provision and when it acts on its own initiative (see, by analogy, order of 10 August 2021, Jakeliūnas v ESMA , T‑760/20, not published, EU:T:2021:512, paragraph 29). 48 It follows that the Board of Appeal correctly held that [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s power to initiate an investigation under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010 was entirely discretionary. 49 That interpretation is also consistent with [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s objectives and tasks as well as with the general scheme of the mechanism established by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has already held that the objective of that mechanism was not to provide individual protection or redress in disputes between a natural or legal person and a competent authority at the national level (see, to that effect, order of 24 June 2016, Onix Asigurări v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑590/15, EU:T:2016:374, paragraph 55). 50 In the light of those factors, it must be noted that the lodging of a request, such as that made by the applicant in the present case, does not create any special legal relationship between the applicant and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and cannot require [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to carry out an investigation under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010 (see, to that effect, order of 26 March 2025, Evroins inshurans grup v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑1094/23, not published, EU:T:2025:347, paragraph 29). 51 In those circumstances, it must be held, as the Board of Appeal did in the contested decision, that the letter of 19 September 2023 does not produce binding legal effects. In particular, since the applicant could not require [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to initiate investigation proceedings under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s refusal to initiate such proceedings on its own initiative was not capable of affecting the applicant’s interests by bringing about a distinct change in its legal position. 52 Accordingly, the Board of Appeal correctly held, in essence, that the letter of 19 September 2023 was not a decision within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60(1) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010. 53 Furthermore, it must be stated that the Board of Appeal’s jurisdiction as regards any decision of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010 is limited by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60 of that regulation. Thus, the Board of Appeal correctly stated in the contested decision that it did not have jurisdiction to decide on the applicant’s appeal against the refusal of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to initiate an investigation, in so far as it does not fall within the scope of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60 of that regulation. The applicant is not one of the entities expressly mentioned in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010, which may request [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to initiate an investigation into an alleged infringement of or failure to apply EU law, which are limited to the competent authorities, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 14 December 2016, SV Capital v EBA , C‑577/15 P, EU:C:2016:947, paragraphs 35, 36 and 40, and of 9 September 2015, SV Capital v EBA , T‑660/14, EU:T:2015:608, paragraphs 69 and 72). 54 That finding cannot be called into question by the applicant’s argument that the Board of Appeal did not find that the letter of 19 September 2023 was not a mere refusal to initiate an investigation, but a decision to close an investigation under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010, by which [OSCURATO:PERSONA] found that the Romanian supervisory authority had not infringed EU law. 55 In that regard, it must be stated that [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in the letter of 19 September 2023, pointed out several times that it was a letter refusing to initiate an investigation under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010. The fact that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] states in that letter to have ‘carefully and thoroughly’ assessed the application of the provisions of EU law in question in no way indicates that it had opened, carried out or closed an investigation under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010, but simply that it had carefully assessed the material submitted to it and found, on the basis of that material, that an investigation under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17 was not appropriate. 56 Accordingly, the Board of Appeal did not, on any view, err in law in that regard. 57 In those circumstances, the first plea in law must be rejected as manifestly lacking any foundation in law. The second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth pleas in law 58 By it second plea in law, concerning the principle of equal treatment, the applicant claims that the Board of Appeal infringed that principle in so far as, in essence, it did not find that, by refusing its request to initiate a more detailed investigation, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] acted in a discriminatory manner towards the applicant and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] as compared with similar undertakings in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] or in other EU [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 59 By its third plea in law, concerning the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, the applicant claims that the Board of Appeal and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] infringed that principle in so far as the Board of Appeal did not find that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had incorrectly refused to initiate an investigation. 60 By its fourth plea in law, concerning the principle of effective judicial protection, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal, by refusing to rule on the merits of the appeal, did not correctly assess the real nature of its request to initiate an investigation of the possible infringement of EU law and to assess the actual implications of such an infringement and therefore failed to have regard to that principle. 61 By its fifth plea in law, the applicant claims that the Board of Appeal infringed [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 47 of the Charter of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in that its right to bring an appeal against the letter of 19 September 2023 before the Board of Appeal was illusory and was not effective, since the Board of Appeal did not proceed to a judicious assessment of the facts and evidence which it provided. 62 By its sixth plea in law, the applicant claims that, by refusing to initiate an investigation, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] acted contrary to its core fundamental mission, and exceeded its regulated competences under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010. Furthermore, the Board of Appeal failed to observe that mission in the contested decision. The applicant reiterates that by not finding that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had failed to initiate an investigation of a potential infringement of EU law, including [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010 and certain provisions of Articles 7 and 8 TFEU, the Board of Appeal also infringed EU law and all of those provisions. Lastly, it submits that the contested decision did not thoroughly investigate all the factors triggering the need to initiate an investigation and did not find there was a failure to state reasons in the letter of 19 September 2023 in that regard. 63 In the present case, it should be noted at the outset that the arguments raised by the applicant in the second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth pleas in law seek, in essence, to challenge again the Board of Appeal’s dismissal, in the contested decision, of its appeal against the letter of 19 September 2023 as inadmissible. However, it should be stated that, as set out in paragraph 52 above, the Board of Appeal was correct to dismiss the appeal as inadmissible by finding that that letter did not constitute a decision within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60(1) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1094/2010. 64 In those circumstances, the second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth pleas in law must also be rejected. 65 The applicant’s first head of claim, seeking the annulment of the contested decision, must therefore be dismissed as manifestly lacking any foundation in law. 66 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the action must be dismissed as brought in part before a court which manifestly lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the case, in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly lacking any foundation in law. Costs 67 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. On those grounds, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby orders: 1. The action is dismissed. 2. Evroins inshurans grup AD shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]). Luxembourg, 20 May 2026. V. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] E. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] * Language of the case: English.
Sentenza Corte di giustizia UE n. 1094/2026 — Fons Iuris — Fons Iuris