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Corte di giustizia UEsentenza

Corte di giustizia UE n. 207/2018

ECLI:EU:C:2018:5
Testo integrale del provvedimento

Testo integrale del provvedimento

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA])

11 January 2018 ( * ) (Appeal — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure — Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — EU trade mark — Figurative mark containing the word elements ‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA]’ — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 51(1)(a) — Declaration of revocation — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 15(1), second paragraph, point (a) — No genuine use of the trade mark — Probative value of the evidence)

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑559/17 P,

APPEAL under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 21 September 2017,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] SL,

established in Sabadell (Spain), represented by E. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], abogado, appellant, the other parties to the proceedings being:

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO),

defendant at first instance,

[OSCURATO:SOCIETA],

established in Diano d’Alba (Italy), represented by F. Jacobacci and L. Ghedina, avvocati, intervener at first instance,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]),

composed of E. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], M. Berger (Rapporteur) and F. Biltgen, Judges, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: Y. Bot,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]: A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA],

makes the following

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

1 By its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] SL asks the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], first, to set aside the judgment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 20 July 2017,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

v

EUIPO — [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA])

(T‑309/16, not published, EU:T:2017:535), by which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed its action for annulment of the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO) of 1 April 2016 ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] R 1110/2015-2), relating to revocation proceedings between [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] SL, and, secondly, to order EUIPO and [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] to pay the costs.

The appeal 2 Pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of its Rules of Procedure, where the appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may, at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], decide by reasoned order to dismiss that appeal in whole or in part. 3 That provision must be applied in the present case. 4 On 27 November 2017, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] took the following position: ‘For the reasons which I shall discuss below, I propose that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should dismiss the appeal brought in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑559/17 P,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

v

EUIPO

, as manifestly inadmissible and order the appellant to pay the costs, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 137 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice.

The appellant relies on a single ground of appeal alleging that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in paragraphs 19 to 21 of its judgment of 20 July 2017,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

v

EUIPO — [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA])

(T‑309/16, not published, EU:T:2017:535), erred in finding that the evidence provided was not capable of demonstrating the genuine use of the mark at issue during the relevant period.

1. That ground may be dismissed as manifestly inadmissible in so far as it seeks to have the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] carry out a fresh examination of the evidence, which is a matter to be appraised by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] alone.

2. It is apparent from [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 256(1) TFEU and the first paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] that an appeal lies on points of law only.

3. Furthermore, according to the settled case-law of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has exclusive jurisdiction to assess the facts and, in principle, to examine the evidence it accepts in support of those facts.

Provided that the evidence has been properly obtained and the general principles of law and the rules of procedure in relation to the burden of proof and the taking of evidence have been observed, it is for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] alone to assess the value which should be attached to the evidence produced before it.

That assessment does not, therefore, constitute, save where the clear sense of that evidence has been distorted, a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice (judgments of 20 January 2016,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

v Commission , C‑373/14 P, EU:C:2016:26, paragraph 40, and of 16 June 2016, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and AlzChem v Commission , C‑155/14 P, EU:C:2016:446, paragraph 23).

Moreover, such a distortion must be obvious from the documents on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and evidence (judgment of 28 January 2016,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

v Commission , C‑514/14 P, not published, EU:C:2016:55, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited).

4. In the present case, by its appeal, the appellant confines itself to challenging, before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the definitive assessment made by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the facts and evidence adduced by it concerning the genuine use of the mark at issue, without invoking the existence of any distortion of that evidence by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

5. Therefore, those criticisms are manifestly inadmissible.

6. In view of the foregoing, the single ground of appeal raised by the applicant must be rejected as manifestly inadmissible.

7. In the light of all those considerations, the appeal brought by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must therefore be dismissed and the latter be ordered to pay the costs incurred in the proceedings, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 137 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice.’ 5 On the same grounds as those stated by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the appeal must be dismissed.

Costs 6 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 137 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, applicable to the procedure on appeal pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) of those rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings.

In the present case, since the present order was adopted before the appeal was served on the other parties and, therefore, before they could have incurred costs, the appellant must be ordered to bear its own costs.

On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby orders:

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] SL shall bear its own costs.

Luxembourg, 11 January 2018.

A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA]

E. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] * Language of the case: English.

Anonimizzato ex art. 52 D.Lgs. 196/2003
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) 11 January 2018 ( * ) (Appeal — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure — Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — EU trade mark — Figurative mark containing the word elements ‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA]’ — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 51(1)(a) — Declaration of revocation — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 15(1), second paragraph, point (a) — No genuine use of the trade mark — Probative value of the evidence) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑559/17 P, APPEAL under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 21 September 2017, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] SL, established in Sabadell (Spain), represented by E. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], abogado, appellant, the other parties to the proceedings being: [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO), defendant at first instance, [OSCURATO:SOCIETA], established in Diano d’Alba (Italy), represented by F. Jacobacci and L. Ghedina, avvocati, intervener at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), composed of E. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], M. Berger (Rapporteur) and F. Biltgen, Judges, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: Y. Bot, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], makes the following [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1 By its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] SL asks the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], first, to set aside the judgment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 20 July 2017, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v EUIPO — [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) (T‑309/16, not published, EU:T:2017:535), by which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed its action for annulment of the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO) of 1 April 2016 ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] R 1110/2015-2), relating to revocation proceedings between [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] SL, and, secondly, to order EUIPO and [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] to pay the costs. The appeal 2 Pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of its Rules of Procedure, where the appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may, at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], decide by reasoned order to dismiss that appeal in whole or in part. 3 That provision must be applied in the present case. 4 On 27 November 2017, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] took the following position: ‘For the reasons which I shall discuss below, I propose that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should dismiss the appeal brought in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑559/17 P, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v EUIPO , as manifestly inadmissible and order the appellant to pay the costs, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 137 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice. The appellant relies on a single ground of appeal alleging that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in paragraphs 19 to 21 of its judgment of 20 July 2017, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v EUIPO — [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) (T‑309/16, not published, EU:T:2017:535), erred in finding that the evidence provided was not capable of demonstrating the genuine use of the mark at issue during the relevant period. 1.      That ground may be dismissed as manifestly inadmissible in so far as it seeks to have the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] carry out a fresh examination of the evidence, which is a matter to be appraised by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] alone. 2.      It is apparent from [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 256(1) TFEU and the first paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] that an appeal lies on points of law only. 3.      Furthermore, according to the settled case-law of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has exclusive jurisdiction to assess the facts and, in principle, to examine the evidence it accepts in support of those facts. Provided that the evidence has been properly obtained and the general principles of law and the rules of procedure in relation to the burden of proof and the taking of evidence have been observed, it is for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] alone to assess the value which should be attached to the evidence produced before it. That assessment does not, therefore, constitute, save where the clear sense of that evidence has been distorted, a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice (judgments of 20 January 2016, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Commission , C‑373/14 P, EU:C:2016:26, paragraph 40, and of 16 June 2016, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and AlzChem v Commission , C‑155/14 P, EU:C:2016:446, paragraph 23). Moreover, such a distortion must be obvious from the documents on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and evidence (judgment of 28 January 2016, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Commission , C‑514/14 P, not published, EU:C:2016:55, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited). 4.      In the present case, by its appeal, the appellant confines itself to challenging, before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the definitive assessment made by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the facts and evidence adduced by it concerning the genuine use of the mark at issue, without invoking the existence of any distortion of that evidence by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 5.      Therefore, those criticisms are manifestly inadmissible. 6.      In view of the foregoing, the single ground of appeal raised by the applicant must be rejected as manifestly inadmissible. 7.      In the light of all those considerations, the appeal brought by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must therefore be dismissed and the latter be ordered to pay the costs incurred in the proceedings, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 137 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice.’ 5 On the same grounds as those stated by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the appeal must be dismissed. Costs 6 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 137 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, applicable to the procedure on appeal pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) of those rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings. In the present case, since the present order was adopted before the appeal was served on the other parties and, therefore, before they could have incurred costs, the appellant must be ordered to bear its own costs. On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby orders: 1. The appeal is dismissed. 2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] SL shall bear its own costs. Luxembourg, 11 January 2018. A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] E. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] * Language of the case: English.
Sentenza Corte di giustizia UE n. 207/2018 — Fons Iuris — Fons Iuris