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Corte di giustizia UEsentenza

Corte di giustizia UE n. 1407/2014

ECLI:EU:C:2014:2446
Testo integrale del provvedimento

Testo integrale del provvedimento

62014CO0099_EN

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] part

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑99/14 P,

APPEAL under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 24 February 2014, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] de Empresarios de Minas de Carbón ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) , established in Madrid (Spain), represented by K. Desai, solicitor, and S. Cisnal de Ugarte, abogado, appellant, the other parties to the proceedings being: [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , represented by F. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and P. Mahnič Bruni, acting as Agents, defendant at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , represented by L. Flynn, É. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and C. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], acting as Agents, with an address for service in Luxembourg, intervener at first instance,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]),

composed of T. von Danwitz (Rapporteur), President of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], C. Vajda, A. Rosas, E. Juhász and D. Šváby, [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: M. Wathelet, Registrar: A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], having decided, after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], to rule by reasoned order in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], makes the following

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

1. By its appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] de Empresarios de Minas de Carbón ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) seeks to have set aside the order of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (T‑176/11, EU:T:2013:686; ‘the order under appeal’) whereby that court dismissed as inadmissible its action seeking the partial annulment of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2010/787/EU of 10 December 2010 on [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid to facilitate the closure of uncompetitive coal mines (OJ 2010 L 336, p. 24; ‘the contested decision’).

Background to the dispute and the contested decision

2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 1407/2002 of 23 July 2002 on [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid to the coal industry (OJ 2002 L 205, p. 1), which established a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid regime specific to the coal sector, expired on 31 December 2010, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] adopted, on 10 December 2010, the contested decision.

3. Recitals 2 to 4 and 6 to 8 in the preamble to that decision are as follows: ‘(2) The small contribution of subsidised coal to the overall energy mix no longer justifies the maintenance of such subsidies for securing the supply of energy in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. (3) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] policy of encouraging renewable energy sources and a sustainable and safe low-carbon economy does not justify the indefinite support for uncompetitive coal mines.

The categories of aid permitted by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] … No 1407/2002 should therefore not be continued indefinitely. (4) However, in the absence of sector-specific [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid rules, only the general [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid rules apply to coal.

In this context, uncompetitive coal mines, currently benefiting from aid under [[OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1407/2002], may no longer be eligible for aid and may be forced to close. … (6) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] marks the transition, for the coal sector, from the application of sector-specific rules to the application of general [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid rules which are applicable to all sectors. (7) In order to minimise the distortion of competition in the internal market resulting from [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid to facilitate the closure of uncompetitive coal mines, such aid should be degressive and strictly limited to coal production units that are irrevocably planned for closure. (8) In order to mitigate the environmental impact of the production of coal by coal production units to which closure aid is granted, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should establish a plan of appropriate measures, for example in the field of energy efficiency, renewable energy or carbon capture and storage.’

4. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(1) of that decision provides that, in the context of closure of uncompetitive mines, aid to the coal industry may be considered compatible with the proper functioning of the internal market if it complies with the provisions of that decision.

5. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 3 of the contested decision, titled ‘Closure aid’, provides: ‘1.

Aid to an undertaking intended specifically to cover the current production losses of coal production units may be considered compatible with the internal market only if it satisfies the following conditions: (a) the operation of the coal production units concerned must form part of a closure plan the deadline of which does not extend beyond 31 December 2018; (b) the coal production units concerned must be closed definitively in accordance with the closure plan; … (f) the overall amount of closure aid granted by a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must follow a downward trend: by the end of 2013 the reduction must not be less than 25%, by the end of 2015 not less than 40%, by the end of 2016 not less than 60% and by the end of 2017 not less than 75% of the aid granted in 2011; … (h) the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must establish a plan to take measures aimed at mitigating the environmental impact of the production of coal by production units to which aid is granted pursuant to this [OSCURATO:PERSONA], for example in the field of energy efficiency, renewable energy or carbon capture and storage. …

3. If the coal production units to which aid is granted pursuant to paragraph 1 are not closed at the date fixed in the closure plan as authorised by the [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concerned shall recover all aid granted in respect of the whole period covered by the closure plan.’

6. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(2) and (3) of the contested decision is worded as follows: ‘2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] which intend to grant closure aid as referred to in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 3 shall notify a closure plan for the coal production units concerned to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

The plan shall contain at least the following: (a) identification of the coal production units; (b) the real or estimated production costs for each coal production unit per coal year; (c) estimated coal production, per coal year, of coal production units forming the subject of a closure plan; (d) the estimated amount of closure aid per coal year.

3. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] shall notify any amendments to the closure plan to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].’ Proceedings before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the order under appeal

7. By application lodged at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 14 March 2011, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] brought an action seeking the annulment of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 3(1)(a), (b) and (f), and (3) of the contested decision (‘the contested provisions’).

8. By order of the President of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 1 August 2011, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was granted leave to intervene in support of the form of order sought by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

9. By separate document, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] raised an objection of inadmissibility under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 114(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], arguing inter alia that the contested provisions were not severable from the remainder of the decision under appeal. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submitted observations on that objection of inadmissibility.

10. By the order under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] upheld the objection of inadmissibility raised by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], supported by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and dismissed [OSCURATO:PERSONA] action as inadmissible. Forms of order sought by the parties

11. By its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should: – declare the appeal admissible and well founded; – set aside the order under appeal in its entirety, including the order to pay the costs; – itself give final judgment in the dispute, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 61 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and to annul the contested provisions in so far as they affect [OSCURATO:PERSONA]; and – order the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to pay the costs.

12. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] requests the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to declare the appeal inadmissible and to order [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to pay the costs.

13. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] asks that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismiss the appeal and order [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to pay the costs. The appeal

14. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of its Rules of Procedure, where an appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], decide by reasoned order to dismiss that appeal in whole or in part.

That provision should be applied in the present case.

Admissibility

15. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that the appeal is inadmissible in its entirety on the grounds, first, that it was brought before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] out of time and, secondly, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] merely reproduces in its appeal the pleas and arguments already put forward before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

16. With regard to the first objection of inadmissibility, it should be stated that, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the time-limit for bringing an appeal is two months from the notification of the decision appealed against. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 51 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], that time-limit is to be extended on account of distance by a single period of 10 days.

If the time-limit ends on a Sunday, according to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 49(2) of those rules, it is extended until the following working day. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 57(7) of those rules provides that the date and time at which a copy of the signed original of a procedural document is received at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] by telefax or any other technical means of communication available to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] will be deemed to be the date and time of lodgment for the purposes of compliance with the procedural time-limits, provided that the signed original of the procedural document is lodged at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] no later than 10 days thereafter.

17. As the appellant received notification of the order under appeal on 13 December 2013, the time-limit for bringing an action against that order thus ended two months and 10 days after that date, namely on 23 February 2014.

That day being a Sunday, the time-limit was extended until 24 February 2014, the date on which a copy of the signed original of the appeal was received, by telefax, at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

That signed original was lodged at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 28 February 2014, thus less than 10 days after the lodgment by telefax.

Therefore, the first objection of inadmissibility, based on the appeal having been lodged out of time, must be rejected.

18. In relation to the second objection of inadmissibility, according to which the appeal is merely a repetition of the pleas already put forward before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], an appeal which merely repeats or reproduces verbatim the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], does not satisfy the requirements to state reasons under the second subparagraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 256(1) TFEU, the first subparagraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 168(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

However, the points of law examined at first instance may be argued again in the course of an appeal, provided that the appellant challenges the interpretation or application of EU law by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

Indeed, if an appellant could not thus base his appeal on pleas in law and arguments already relied on before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], an appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose (see, to that effect, judgment in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v Parliament and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraphs 46 and 47 and the case-law cited).

19. In its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not merely reiterate or reproduce verbatim the pleas and arguments it raised before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] but challenges specific paragraphs of the order under appeal that it considers to be vitiated by errors of law. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] maintains in particular that such errors of law were committed by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the context of the interpretation under which it found the contested provisions to be conditions for the grant of aid intrinsically linked to the substance of the contested decision.

It thus challenges an essential part of the reasoning of the order under appeal.

Therefore, the second ground of inadmissibility must also be rejected.

20. It follows that the appeal is admissible. The first ground of appeal Arguments of the parties

21. By its first ground of appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] alleges that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] committed an error of law in paragraphs 33, 35 to 37 and 40 of the order under appeal in so far as it found the contested provisions to be intrinsically linked to the substance of the contested decision.

22. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] maintains that that finding is based on an incorrect method of assessment, namely on a limited purposive interpretat ion under which the contested decision purports to create a specific legal framework for granting of aid for the closure of uncompetitive coal mines. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] view, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should have used a comprehensive purposive interpretation as regards that decision, by taking into account in particular Recitals 3 and 8 in the preamble thereto as well as [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 3(1)(h) of the same decision, so as to find that its purpose was to promote the environment and renewable energy sources.

23. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should have used a counterfactual scenario for the assessment of whether the contested provisions were severable; specifically, it should have analysed whether removing the contested provisions would have prevented the contested decision from attaining its specific purpose.

24. Lastly, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] committed an error of law by examining whether collectively the contested provisions were severable instead of undertaking an individual examination of each contested provision in respect of its severability from the remainder of the contested decision.

25. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] disputes the merits of the first ground of appeal. Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]

26. According to the settled case-law of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], partial annulment of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] act is possible only if the elements whose annulment is sought may be severed from the remainder of the act (see, inter alia, judgments in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑29/99, EU:C:2002:734, paragraph 45, and Germany v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑239/01, EU:C:2003:514, paragraph 33). [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has repeatedly ruled that that requirement of severability is not satisfied where the partial annulment of an act would have the effect of altering its substance (judgments in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Poland , C‑504/09 P, EU:C:2012:178, paragraph 98, and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Parliament and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑427/12, EU:C:2014:170, paragraph 16).

27. In the present case, those conditions are clearly not met.

28. In that regard, it should be recalled that the contested decision, as is apparent from its title, purports to establish a specific legal framework for the grant of aid to facilitate the closure of uncompetitive coal mines.

It is apparent from Recitals 4 and 6 in the preamble to that decision that the decision marks the transition from the application of rules specific to the coal sector to the application of general rules applicable to all sectors.

In particular, it is based on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s view, set out in Recitals 2 and 3 in the preamble to the decision, that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] policy of encouraging renewable energy sources and a sustainable and safe low-carbon economy does not justify the indefinite granting, to those uncompetitive coal mines, of aid permitted by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1407/2002.

29. Against that background, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is wrong to argue that the contested decision purports to promote the protection of the environment and renewable energy sources.

That argument in fact stems from a confusion between the purpose of that decision and the considerations justifying its adoption.

Those elements are mentioned in Recital 3 in the preamble to the contested decision only to justify its purpose of facilitating the closure of uncompetitive coal mines. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], while [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 3(1)(h) of the contested decision and Recital 8 in the preamble thereto provide for the establishment of a plan to take measures aimed at mitigating the effects of coal production on the environment, those planned measures concern only production units to which closure aid has been granted and which, according to Recital 7 in the preamble to that decision, are irrevocably planned for closure.

30. As regards the review of whether the contested provisions are severable, that review requires consideration of the scope of those provisions, in order to be able to assess whether their annulment would alter the spirit and substance of the contested decision (judgment in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Estonia , C‑505/09 P, EU:C:2012:179, paragraph 112 and the case-law cited).

31. In that regard, it should be recalled that the contested provisions specifically limit the grant of coal production aid only to aid for closing uncompetitive coal mines. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] those provisions, the grant of that aid is subject to the condition that the coal production units be definitively closed at the date fixed in the closure plan — 31 December 2018 at the latest — failing which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concerned must recover all aid granted.

In those conditions, partial annulment of the contested decision, which would be limited to the contested provisions, would have the effect of removing that temporal requirement, meaning that uncompetitive coal mines would not have to cease operations by 31 December 2018, but could continue to run and to receive [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid indefinitely, contrary to the purpose of the contested decision, set out in paragraph 28 of this judgment.

32. It follows that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] committed no error of law in finding, in paragraphs 33, 35 to 37 and 40 of the order under appeal, that the contested provisions were intrinsically linked with the very substance of the contested decision.

33. With regard to the complaint that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], for the assessment of whether the contested provisions were severable, should have used a counterfactual scenario consisting of analysing whether removing the contested provisions would have prevented the contested decision from attaining its specific purpose, it must be considered that, even if it is true that it was required to do so, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did in fact undertake such an analysis.

In fact, in paragraph 38 of the order under appeal, it found that the partial annulment sought by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] would result in the contested decision, under which [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid to the coal sector can be authorised only until the definitive closure of the production units receiving the aid, namely by 31 December 2018 at the latest, being replaced by a different decision authorising the grant of such aid without any limitation in time.

Therefore, the complaint is based on a manifestly erroneous reading of the order under appeal.

34. The same is true of the complaint that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not individually analyse the severability of the contested provisions, without it being necessary to assess whether it was required to undertake such an analysis.

In paragraphs 45 and 46 of the order under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did in fact individually analyse Articles 3(1)(a) and (f) of the contested decision in relation to their severability from the remainder of that decision.

With regard to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 3(1)(b) and (3) thereof, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is similarly not entitled to challenge, before this [OSCURATO:PERSONA], a lack of individual analysis of those provisions, given that it did not put forward arguments supporting the severability of those provisions before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], as is apparent from paragraph 44 of the order under appeal.

35. Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the first ground relied on by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in support of its appeal must be rejected as manifestly unfounded. The third and fourth grounds of appeal Arguments of the parties

36. By its third and fourth grounds of appeal, which should be examined together, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] maintains that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] committed an error of law in holding that the provisions of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 3(1)(a) and (f) of the contested decision taken individually were not severable from that decision.

37. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] view, contrary to the finding of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in paragraph 45 of the order under appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 3(1)(a) of the contested decision defines the temporal scope of the contested decision.

Thus, on the basis of its own case-law to the effect that the provisions determining the temporal effects of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] act may be subject to a partial annulment of that act (judgment in Vischim v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑380/06, EU:T:2009:392, paragraph 54), the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should have found that that provision was severable from the remainder of the contested decision.

38. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] also maintains that, in paragraph 46 of the order under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] incorrectly interpreted [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 3(1)(f) of that decision, in finding that the compatibility with the internal market of the aid provided for by that provision was conditional on the gradual decrease of the aid. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] view, that gradual decrease is merely an arrangement for granting [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid in support of a specific industry that is severable from the remainder of the contested decision, in accordance with the solution adopted by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the judgment in Germany v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EU:C:2003:514, paragraphs 35 to 37).

39. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that those grounds of appeal are unfounded. Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]

40. Those grounds of appeal are manifestly unfounded.

41. It is clear, from the wording of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 3(1)(a) of the contested decision, as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has stated in its written observations, that that provision makes the grant of closure aid subject to the establishment of a closure plan the deadline of which does not extend beyond 31 December 2018, but does not determine the temporal scope of the contested decision. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the temporal scope of that decision is subject to a specific requirement, in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 9 thereof, to the effect that the decision expires only on 31 December 2027.

Therefore, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was right to hold, in paragraph 45 of the order under appeal, that the judgment in Vischim v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EU:T:2009:392) could not be used to support, by analogy, the argument that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 3(1)(a) of the contested decision was severable from the remainder of that decision.

42. With regard to the gradual decrease of the aid pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 3(1)(f) of the contested decision, it is sufficient to state that, according to the introductory wording of that paragraph, read in the light of Recital 7 in the preamble to that decision, that gradual decrease is a condition for the compatibility of closure aid for uncompetitive coal mines with the internal market which is intrinsically linked to the very purpose of the contested decision.

It is clear from those considerations that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was right to find, in paragraph 46 of the order under appeal, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 3(1)(f) of the contested decision was not severable from the remainder of it, unlike the provision in question in the case that led to the judgment in Germany v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EU:C:2003:514) which related only to the financing rules of the aid scheme at issue in that case.

43. Accordingly, the third and fourth grounds of appeal put forward by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in support of its appeal must be rejected as manifestly unfounded. The second and fifth grounds of appeal Arguments of the parties

44. By its second and fifth grounds of appeal, which should be examined together, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] maintains that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] committed, in paragraph 39 of the order under appeal, an error of law, first, in finding that annulment of the contested provisions would deprive [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(2) and (3) of the contested decision of its intended effect and, secondly, in relying on that finding to conclude that the contested provisions could not be severed from the remainder of that decision.

45. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that those grounds of appeal are ineffective and that, in any event, they are unfounded. Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]

46. Those grounds of appeal stem from a manifestly erroneous reading of the order under appeal.

While the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considered, in paragraph 39 of the order under appeal, that the partial annulment sought by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] would deprive [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(2) and (3) of the contested decision of its intended effect, it nevertheless follows clearly from the wording used and, in particular, from the fact that that paragraph starts with the word ‘moreover’, that it is a supererogatory argument on which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not rely to find, in paragraph 40 of the order under appeal, that the contested provisions were not severable from the remainder of the contested decision.

47. In those conditions, the second and fifth grounds of appeal must be rejected as ineffective.

48. It follows from all of the foregoing considerations that the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs

49. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, which applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

Since the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] have applied for costs and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] part On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby:

1. Dismisses the appeal;

2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] de Empresarios de Minas de Carbón ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) to pay the costs.

Anonimizzato ex art. 52 D.Lgs. 196/2003
62014CO0099_EN [OSCURATO:PERSONA] part [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑99/14 P, APPEAL under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 24 February 2014, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] de Empresarios de Minas de Carbón ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) , established in Madrid (Spain), represented by K. Desai, solicitor, and S. Cisnal de Ugarte, abogado, appellant, the other parties to the proceedings being: [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , represented by F. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and P. Mahnič Bruni, acting as Agents, defendant at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , represented by L. Flynn, É. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and C. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], acting as Agents, with an address for service in Luxembourg, intervener at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), composed of T. von Danwitz (Rapporteur), President of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], C. Vajda, A. Rosas, E. Juhász and D. Šváby, [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: M. Wathelet, Registrar: A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], having decided, after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], to rule by reasoned order in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], makes the following [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1. By its appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] de Empresarios de Minas de Carbón ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) seeks to have set aside the order of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (T‑176/11, EU:T:2013:686; ‘the order under appeal’) whereby that court dismissed as inadmissible its action seeking the partial annulment of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2010/787/EU of 10 December 2010 on [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid to facilitate the closure of uncompetitive coal mines (OJ 2010 L 336, p. 24; ‘the contested decision’). Background to the dispute and the contested decision 2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 1407/2002 of 23 July 2002 on [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid to the coal industry (OJ 2002 L 205, p. 1), which established a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid regime specific to the coal sector, expired on 31 December 2010, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] adopted, on 10 December 2010, the contested decision. 3. Recitals 2 to 4 and 6 to 8 in the preamble to that decision are as follows: ‘(2) The small contribution of subsidised coal to the overall energy mix no longer justifies the maintenance of such subsidies for securing the supply of energy in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. (3) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] policy of encouraging renewable energy sources and a sustainable and safe low-carbon economy does not justify the indefinite support for uncompetitive coal mines. The categories of aid permitted by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] … No 1407/2002 should therefore not be continued indefinitely. (4) However, in the absence of sector-specific [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid rules, only the general [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid rules apply to coal. In this context, uncompetitive coal mines, currently benefiting from aid under [[OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1407/2002], may no longer be eligible for aid and may be forced to close. … (6) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] marks the transition, for the coal sector, from the application of sector-specific rules to the application of general [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid rules which are applicable to all sectors. (7) In order to minimise the distortion of competition in the internal market resulting from [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid to facilitate the closure of uncompetitive coal mines, such aid should be degressive and strictly limited to coal production units that are irrevocably planned for closure. (8) In order to mitigate the environmental impact of the production of coal by coal production units to which closure aid is granted, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should establish a plan of appropriate measures, for example in the field of energy efficiency, renewable energy or carbon capture and storage.’ 4. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(1) of that decision provides that, in the context of closure of uncompetitive mines, aid to the coal industry may be considered compatible with the proper functioning of the internal market if it complies with the provisions of that decision. 5. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 3 of the contested decision, titled ‘Closure aid’, provides: ‘1. Aid to an undertaking intended specifically to cover the current production losses of coal production units may be considered compatible with the internal market only if it satisfies the following conditions: (a) the operation of the coal production units concerned must form part of a closure plan the deadline of which does not extend beyond 31 December 2018; (b) the coal production units concerned must be closed definitively in accordance with the closure plan; … (f) the overall amount of closure aid granted by a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must follow a downward trend: by the end of 2013 the reduction must not be less than 25%, by the end of 2015 not less than 40%, by the end of 2016 not less than 60% and by the end of 2017 not less than 75% of the aid granted in 2011; … (h) the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must establish a plan to take measures aimed at mitigating the environmental impact of the production of coal by production units to which aid is granted pursuant to this [OSCURATO:PERSONA], for example in the field of energy efficiency, renewable energy or carbon capture and storage. … 3. If the coal production units to which aid is granted pursuant to paragraph 1 are not closed at the date fixed in the closure plan as authorised by the [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concerned shall recover all aid granted in respect of the whole period covered by the closure plan.’ 6. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(2) and (3) of the contested decision is worded as follows: ‘2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] which intend to grant closure aid as referred to in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 3 shall notify a closure plan for the coal production units concerned to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. The plan shall contain at least the following: (a) identification of the coal production units; (b) the real or estimated production costs for each coal production unit per coal year; (c) estimated coal production, per coal year, of coal production units forming the subject of a closure plan; (d) the estimated amount of closure aid per coal year. 3. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] shall notify any amendments to the closure plan to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].’ Proceedings before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the order under appeal 7. By application lodged at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 14 March 2011, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] brought an action seeking the annulment of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 3(1)(a), (b) and (f), and (3) of the contested decision (‘the contested provisions’). 8. By order of the President of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 1 August 2011, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was granted leave to intervene in support of the form of order sought by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 9. By separate document, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] raised an objection of inadmissibility under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 114(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], arguing inter alia that the contested provisions were not severable from the remainder of the decision under appeal. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submitted observations on that objection of inadmissibility. 10. By the order under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] upheld the objection of inadmissibility raised by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], supported by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and dismissed [OSCURATO:PERSONA] action as inadmissible. Forms of order sought by the parties 11. By its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should: – declare the appeal admissible and well founded; – set aside the order under appeal in its entirety, including the order to pay the costs; – itself give final judgment in the dispute, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 61 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and to annul the contested provisions in so far as they affect [OSCURATO:PERSONA]; and – order the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to pay the costs. 12. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] requests the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to declare the appeal inadmissible and to order [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to pay the costs. 13. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] asks that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismiss the appeal and order [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to pay the costs. The appeal 14. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of its Rules of Procedure, where an appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], decide by reasoned order to dismiss that appeal in whole or in part. That provision should be applied in the present case. Admissibility 15. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that the appeal is inadmissible in its entirety on the grounds, first, that it was brought before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] out of time and, secondly, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] merely reproduces in its appeal the pleas and arguments already put forward before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 16. With regard to the first objection of inadmissibility, it should be stated that, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the time-limit for bringing an appeal is two months from the notification of the decision appealed against. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 51 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], that time-limit is to be extended on account of distance by a single period of 10 days. If the time-limit ends on a Sunday, according to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 49(2) of those rules, it is extended until the following working day. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 57(7) of those rules provides that the date and time at which a copy of the signed original of a procedural document is received at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] by telefax or any other technical means of communication available to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] will be deemed to be the date and time of lodgment for the purposes of compliance with the procedural time-limits, provided that the signed original of the procedural document is lodged at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] no later than 10 days thereafter. 17. As the appellant received notification of the order under appeal on 13 December 2013, the time-limit for bringing an action against that order thus ended two months and 10 days after that date, namely on 23 February 2014. That day being a Sunday, the time-limit was extended until 24 February 2014, the date on which a copy of the signed original of the appeal was received, by telefax, at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. That signed original was lodged at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 28 February 2014, thus less than 10 days after the lodgment by telefax. Therefore, the first objection of inadmissibility, based on the appeal having been lodged out of time, must be rejected. 18. In relation to the second objection of inadmissibility, according to which the appeal is merely a repetition of the pleas already put forward before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], an appeal which merely repeats or reproduces verbatim the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], does not satisfy the requirements to state reasons under the second subparagraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 256(1) TFEU, the first subparagraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 168(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. However, the points of law examined at first instance may be argued again in the course of an appeal, provided that the appellant challenges the interpretation or application of EU law by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Indeed, if an appellant could not thus base his appeal on pleas in law and arguments already relied on before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], an appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose (see, to that effect, judgment in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v Parliament and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraphs 46 and 47 and the case-law cited). 19. In its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not merely reiterate or reproduce verbatim the pleas and arguments it raised before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] but challenges specific paragraphs of the order under appeal that it considers to be vitiated by errors of law. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] maintains in particular that such errors of law were committed by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the context of the interpretation under which it found the contested provisions to be conditions for the grant of aid intrinsically linked to the substance of the contested decision. It thus challenges an essential part of the reasoning of the order under appeal. Therefore, the second ground of inadmissibility must also be rejected. 20. It follows that the appeal is admissible. The first ground of appeal Arguments of the parties 21. By its first ground of appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] alleges that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] committed an error of law in paragraphs 33, 35 to 37 and 40 of the order under appeal in so far as it found the contested provisions to be intrinsically linked to the substance of the contested decision. 22. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] maintains that that finding is based on an incorrect method of assessment, namely on a limited purposive interpretat ion under which the contested decision purports to create a specific legal framework for granting of aid for the closure of uncompetitive coal mines. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] view, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should have used a comprehensive purposive interpretation as regards that decision, by taking into account in particular Recitals 3 and 8 in the preamble thereto as well as [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 3(1)(h) of the same decision, so as to find that its purpose was to promote the environment and renewable energy sources. 23. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should have used a counterfactual scenario for the assessment of whether the contested provisions were severable; specifically, it should have analysed whether removing the contested provisions would have prevented the contested decision from attaining its specific purpose. 24. Lastly, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] committed an error of law by examining whether collectively the contested provisions were severable instead of undertaking an individual examination of each contested provision in respect of its severability from the remainder of the contested decision. 25. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] disputes the merits of the first ground of appeal. Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 26. According to the settled case-law of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], partial annulment of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] act is possible only if the elements whose annulment is sought may be severed from the remainder of the act (see, inter alia, judgments in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑29/99, EU:C:2002:734, paragraph 45, and Germany v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑239/01, EU:C:2003:514, paragraph 33). [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has repeatedly ruled that that requirement of severability is not satisfied where the partial annulment of an act would have the effect of altering its substance (judgments in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Poland , C‑504/09 P, EU:C:2012:178, paragraph 98, and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Parliament and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑427/12, EU:C:2014:170, paragraph 16). 27. In the present case, those conditions are clearly not met. 28. In that regard, it should be recalled that the contested decision, as is apparent from its title, purports to establish a specific legal framework for the grant of aid to facilitate the closure of uncompetitive coal mines. It is apparent from Recitals 4 and 6 in the preamble to that decision that the decision marks the transition from the application of rules specific to the coal sector to the application of general rules applicable to all sectors. In particular, it is based on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s view, set out in Recitals 2 and 3 in the preamble to the decision, that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] policy of encouraging renewable energy sources and a sustainable and safe low-carbon economy does not justify the indefinite granting, to those uncompetitive coal mines, of aid permitted by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1407/2002. 29. Against that background, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is wrong to argue that the contested decision purports to promote the protection of the environment and renewable energy sources. That argument in fact stems from a confusion between the purpose of that decision and the considerations justifying its adoption. Those elements are mentioned in Recital 3 in the preamble to the contested decision only to justify its purpose of facilitating the closure of uncompetitive coal mines. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], while [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 3(1)(h) of the contested decision and Recital 8 in the preamble thereto provide for the establishment of a plan to take measures aimed at mitigating the effects of coal production on the environment, those planned measures concern only production units to which closure aid has been granted and which, according to Recital 7 in the preamble to that decision, are irrevocably planned for closure. 30. As regards the review of whether the contested provisions are severable, that review requires consideration of the scope of those provisions, in order to be able to assess whether their annulment would alter the spirit and substance of the contested decision (judgment in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Estonia , C‑505/09 P, EU:C:2012:179, paragraph 112 and the case-law cited). 31. In that regard, it should be recalled that the contested provisions specifically limit the grant of coal production aid only to aid for closing uncompetitive coal mines. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] those provisions, the grant of that aid is subject to the condition that the coal production units be definitively closed at the date fixed in the closure plan — 31 December 2018 at the latest — failing which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concerned must recover all aid granted. In those conditions, partial annulment of the contested decision, which would be limited to the contested provisions, would have the effect of removing that temporal requirement, meaning that uncompetitive coal mines would not have to cease operations by 31 December 2018, but could continue to run and to receive [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid indefinitely, contrary to the purpose of the contested decision, set out in paragraph 28 of this judgment. 32. It follows that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] committed no error of law in finding, in paragraphs 33, 35 to 37 and 40 of the order under appeal, that the contested provisions were intrinsically linked with the very substance of the contested decision. 33. With regard to the complaint that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], for the assessment of whether the contested provisions were severable, should have used a counterfactual scenario consisting of analysing whether removing the contested provisions would have prevented the contested decision from attaining its specific purpose, it must be considered that, even if it is true that it was required to do so, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did in fact undertake such an analysis. In fact, in paragraph 38 of the order under appeal, it found that the partial annulment sought by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] would result in the contested decision, under which [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid to the coal sector can be authorised only until the definitive closure of the production units receiving the aid, namely by 31 December 2018 at the latest, being replaced by a different decision authorising the grant of such aid without any limitation in time. Therefore, the complaint is based on a manifestly erroneous reading of the order under appeal. 34. The same is true of the complaint that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not individually analyse the severability of the contested provisions, without it being necessary to assess whether it was required to undertake such an analysis. In paragraphs 45 and 46 of the order under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did in fact individually analyse Articles 3(1)(a) and (f) of the contested decision in relation to their severability from the remainder of that decision. With regard to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 3(1)(b) and (3) thereof, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is similarly not entitled to challenge, before this [OSCURATO:PERSONA], a lack of individual analysis of those provisions, given that it did not put forward arguments supporting the severability of those provisions before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], as is apparent from paragraph 44 of the order under appeal. 35. Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the first ground relied on by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in support of its appeal must be rejected as manifestly unfounded. The third and fourth grounds of appeal Arguments of the parties 36. By its third and fourth grounds of appeal, which should be examined together, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] maintains that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] committed an error of law in holding that the provisions of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 3(1)(a) and (f) of the contested decision taken individually were not severable from that decision. 37. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] view, contrary to the finding of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in paragraph 45 of the order under appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 3(1)(a) of the contested decision defines the temporal scope of the contested decision. Thus, on the basis of its own case-law to the effect that the provisions determining the temporal effects of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] act may be subject to a partial annulment of that act (judgment in Vischim v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑380/06, EU:T:2009:392, paragraph 54), the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should have found that that provision was severable from the remainder of the contested decision. 38. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] also maintains that, in paragraph 46 of the order under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] incorrectly interpreted [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 3(1)(f) of that decision, in finding that the compatibility with the internal market of the aid provided for by that provision was conditional on the gradual decrease of the aid. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] view, that gradual decrease is merely an arrangement for granting [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid in support of a specific industry that is severable from the remainder of the contested decision, in accordance with the solution adopted by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the judgment in Germany v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EU:C:2003:514, paragraphs 35 to 37). 39. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that those grounds of appeal are unfounded. Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40. Those grounds of appeal are manifestly unfounded. 41. It is clear, from the wording of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 3(1)(a) of the contested decision, as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has stated in its written observations, that that provision makes the grant of closure aid subject to the establishment of a closure plan the deadline of which does not extend beyond 31 December 2018, but does not determine the temporal scope of the contested decision. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the temporal scope of that decision is subject to a specific requirement, in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 9 thereof, to the effect that the decision expires only on 31 December 2027. Therefore, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was right to hold, in paragraph 45 of the order under appeal, that the judgment in Vischim v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EU:T:2009:392) could not be used to support, by analogy, the argument that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 3(1)(a) of the contested decision was severable from the remainder of that decision. 42. With regard to the gradual decrease of the aid pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 3(1)(f) of the contested decision, it is sufficient to state that, according to the introductory wording of that paragraph, read in the light of Recital 7 in the preamble to that decision, that gradual decrease is a condition for the compatibility of closure aid for uncompetitive coal mines with the internal market which is intrinsically linked to the very purpose of the contested decision. It is clear from those considerations that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was right to find, in paragraph 46 of the order under appeal, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 3(1)(f) of the contested decision was not severable from the remainder of it, unlike the provision in question in the case that led to the judgment in Germany v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EU:C:2003:514) which related only to the financing rules of the aid scheme at issue in that case. 43. Accordingly, the third and fourth grounds of appeal put forward by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in support of its appeal must be rejected as manifestly unfounded. The second and fifth grounds of appeal Arguments of the parties 44. By its second and fifth grounds of appeal, which should be examined together, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] maintains that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] committed, in paragraph 39 of the order under appeal, an error of law, first, in finding that annulment of the contested provisions would deprive [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(2) and (3) of the contested decision of its intended effect and, secondly, in relying on that finding to conclude that the contested provisions could not be severed from the remainder of that decision. 45. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that those grounds of appeal are ineffective and that, in any event, they are unfounded. Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 46. Those grounds of appeal stem from a manifestly erroneous reading of the order under appeal. While the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considered, in paragraph 39 of the order under appeal, that the partial annulment sought by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] would deprive [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(2) and (3) of the contested decision of its intended effect, it nevertheless follows clearly from the wording used and, in particular, from the fact that that paragraph starts with the word ‘moreover’, that it is a supererogatory argument on which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not rely to find, in paragraph 40 of the order under appeal, that the contested provisions were not severable from the remainder of the contested decision. 47. In those conditions, the second and fifth grounds of appeal must be rejected as ineffective. 48. It follows from all of the foregoing considerations that the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 49. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, which applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] have applied for costs and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] part On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby: 1. Dismisses the appeal; 2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] de Empresarios de Minas de Carbón ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) to pay the costs.
Sentenza Corte di giustizia UE n. 1407/2014 — Fons Iuris — Fons Iuris