Corte di giustizia UE n. 1932/2017

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) 11 May 2017 ( * ) (Appeal — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice — EU trade mark — Application for registration of the word mark neonart — Application lodged with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] signed by a ‘lawyer’ — Manifest inadmissibility — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] — No representation by a lawyer — Appeal manifestly unfounded) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑22/17 P, APPEAL under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 16 January 2017, Neonart svetlobni in reklamni napisi Krevh d.o.o., established in Maribor (Slovenia), represented by J. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], appellant, the other party to the proceedings being: [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO), defendant at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), composed of A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], C. Toader and E. Jarašiūnas (Rapporteur), [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: E. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], having decided, after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], to give a decision by reasoned order, pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, makes the following [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1 By its appeal, Neonart svetlobni in reklamni napisi Krevh d.o.o. seeks to have set aside the order of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 14 November 2016, Neonart svetlobni in reklamni napisi Krevh v EUIPO (neonart) (T‑221/16, not published, ‘the order under appeal’, EU:T:2016:673), by which that court dismissed as manifestly inadmissible its action for annulment of the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO) of 25 January 2016 ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] R 1932/2015-2) concerning an application for registration of the word sign ‘neonart’ as an EU trade mark. 2 Neonart svetlobni in reklamni napisi Krevh also requests that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] refer the case back to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in the event that the appeal is upheld, and order EUIPO to pay the costs. 3 In support of its appeal, the appellant relies on a single ground of appeal, alleging infringement of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 45(4)(a) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. The appeal 4 Pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of its Rules of Procedure, where an appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], decide by reasoned order to dismiss the appeal in whole or in part. 5 It is appropriate to apply that provision to the present case. 6 On 6 April 2017, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] took the following position: ‘1.      I propose that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should dismiss the appeal in the present case as manifestly unfounded and order the appellant to pay the costs, in accordance with Articles 137 and 184(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, for the following reasons. 2.      In support of its appeal, the appellant puts forward a single ground, alleging that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] infringed [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (‘the Statute’) and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 45(4)(a) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in concluding that its representative, [OSCURATO:PERSONA], could not validly represent the appellant before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] came to this conclusion on the ground that [OSCURATO:PERSONA], not having been admitted to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], is not a lawyer for the purposes of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute. 3.      The appellant submits that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in law by applying the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] version, instead of the English version, of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute to define the term ‘lawyer’, since English had been chosen as the language of the case before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. The appellant also contends that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should have applied national law to determine whether [OSCURATO:PERSONA] could validly represent a party in proceedings before the courts of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Furthermore, the appellant affirms that if [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is not a member of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], that is because it does not allow its members to practice at the Bar and at the same time be employed as university professors, as [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is, or advertise their business freely. 4.      According to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s settled case-law, it is clear from the fourth paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute that two cumulative conditions must be satisfied for a person to be validly permitted to represent parties, other than the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] institutions, before the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: first, that person must be a lawyer; and second, he or she must be authorised to practice before a court of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] or of another [OSCURATO:PERSONA] which is a party to the Agreement on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 2 May 1992 (OJ 1994 L 1, p. 3) (see, to that effect, order of 17 July 2014, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v OHIM , C‑101/4 P, not published, EU:C:2014:2115, paragraph 15 and case-law cited). With regard to the first of those conditions, the person who signs the application must be a member of the Bar in order to be regarded as a lawyer for the purposes of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute; it is not sufficient that that person is entitled to represent parties in proceedings before the courts of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (see, to that effect, order of 20 February 2008, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] de Valencia v Commission , C‑363/06 P, not published, EU:C:2008:99, paragraphs 22 and 23, and order of 28 February 2005, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ET v OHIM — Aparellaje eléctrico (UNEX) , T‑445/04, EU:T:2005:70, paragraph 9). 5.      In the present case, it is common ground that [OSCURATO:PERSONA], who signed the application lodged with the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], is not a member of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. It follows from the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s case-law that even if, as the appellant asserts, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has been awarded a law degree, has passed the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] examination in law and is entitled to represent clients in various proceedings before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] courts, he cannot be regarded as a lawyer for the purposes of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute. Consequently, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was correct to hold, in paragraph 8 of the order under appeal, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not fulfil the first of the two cumulative conditions set out in the preceding paragraph and, therefore, was not authorised to represent the applicant before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Moreover, as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was correct to find in paragraph 9 of the order under appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has not demonstrated that he is covered by the exception laid down in the seventh paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute for university teachers being nationals of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] whose law accords them a right of audience. 6.      It is also well-established that the notion of lawyer, for the purposes of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute, must be interpreted, as far as possible, independently and without reference to national law (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 September 2012, Prezes Urzędu [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Poland v Commission , C‑422/11 P and C‑423/11 P, EU:C:2012:553, paragraphs 34 and 35, and order of 20 October 2008, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v OHIM ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) , T‑487/07, not published, EU:T:2008:453, paragraphs 20 and 21 and the case-law cited). 7.      Lastly, as it is not disputed that the Republic of Slovenia is the pertinent jurisdiction with regard to the verification of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] legal credentials to represent the applicant before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], that court did not err in law by seeking to establish whether [OSCURATO:PERSONA] could properly be described as ‘ odvetnik ’, the term which corresponds to ‘lawyer’ in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] version of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute. 8.      Having regard to the foregoing, I am of the view that the appeal in the present case should be dismissed, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, as manifestly unfounded, and that the appellant should be ordered to bear its own costs.’ 7 For the same reasons as those given by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the appeal must be dismissed as, in any event, manifestly unfounded. Costs 8 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 137 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], applicable to appeal proceedings by virtue of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) of those Rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings. As the present order was adopted before the appeal was served on the defendant at first instance and, therefore, before the latter has incurred costs, Neonart svetlobni in reklamni napisi Krevh must be ordered to bear its own costs. On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby orders: 1. The appeal is dismissed. 2. Neonart svetlobni in reklamni napisi Krevh d.o.o. is to bear its own costs. Luxembourg, 11 May 2017. A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] * Language of the case: English.