Corte di giustizia UE n. 207/2017

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) 1 June 2017 ( * ) (Appeal — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice — EU trade mark — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 207/2009 — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1)(b) — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] proceedings — Figurative mark including the word elements ‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA]-[OSCURATO:PERSONA]’ — Partial rejection of the opposition) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑10/17 P, APPEAL under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 11 January 2017, [OSCURATO:PERSONA], established in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (France), represented by D. Masson, avocat, appellant, the other parties to the proceedings being: [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO), defendant at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] CV, established in Amsterdam (Netherlands), represented by D. Russo, avvocato, intervener at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), composed of M. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (Rapporteur), E. Levits and F. Biltgen, Judges, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: M. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], having decided, after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], to give a decision by reasoned order, pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, makes the following [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1 By its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] asks, first, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to set aside the judgment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 10 November 2016, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v EUIPO — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]-[OSCURATO:PERSONA]) (T‑67/15, not published, ‘the judgment under appeal’, EU:T:2016:657), by which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed its action against the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO) of 21 November 2014 ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] R 1882/2013-5), relating to opposition proceedings between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] CV and [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and, second, to order EUIPO to pay all the costs. The appeal 2 Pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of its Rules of Procedure, where the appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], decide by reasoned order to dismiss that appeal in whole or in part. 3 That provision should be applied in the present case. 4 On 7 April 2017, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] took the following position: ‘1. I am of the view that the appeal in the case in question should be dismissed as being, in part, manifestly inadmissible and, in part, manifestly unfounded and that the appellant should be ordered to pay its own costs in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], for the following reasons. 2. The sole ground of appeal, alleging infringement of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1)(b) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1), is divided, in essence, into four parts. 3. By the first three parts, the applicant disputes the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] conclusions concerning the existence of the likelihood of confusion between the signs at issue. It submits that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] committed an error: –        having found that the image of a polo player had distinctive character, with regard to the goods and services at issue (paragraph 54 of the judgment under appeal); –        having relied on the fact that the services at issue in Class 41 are identical or similar, –        having found that the signs at issue are similar. 4. I note that the appraisal of the facts and the assessment of the evidence do not, save where the facts or evidence are distorted, constitute points of law subject, as such, to review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice on appeal. By the first three parts of the ground of appeal, the appellant does not rely on any distortion of the facts by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] but seeks to call into question the factual assessments made by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the context of the assessment of the likelihood of confusion between the signs at issue. 5. Consequently, those three parts must be rejected as being manifestly inadmissible. 6. By the fourth part, the appellant alleges that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] misapplied the principle that the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must be based on the overall impression produced by the signs at issue. According to the appellant, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in law in isolating, in the context of the visual comparison of the signs, the image of a polo player and the words “polo club” (paragraph 61 of the judgment under appeal). 7. I note that that argument rests on a selective and manifestly incorrect reading of the judgment under appeal. A reading of paragraphs 58 to 64 and 78 of the judgment under appeal confirms, without any doubt, that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] analysis is based, correctly, on the overall impression of the signs at issue, account being taken of their distinctive and dominant elements. 8. Moreover, in so far as the appellant intends to complain that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed to carry out a global assessment while noting the requirement to assess the signs on the basis of the overall impression, I will limit myself to observing that such a complaint must be interpreted strictly in order to preserve the practical effect of the first paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which does not allow the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to be sanctioned in relation to its sovereign assessment of the facts (see my opinion in OHIM v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (C‑597/14 P, EU:C:2016:2, point 108). 9. The fourth part is therefore manifestly unfounded. 10. Finally, in the context of the first part of the ground of appeal, the appellant makes a procedural argument, complaining that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] confirmed the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal’s reasoning that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was wrong to have refused to take into consideration the additional evidence provided for the purpose of assessing the enhanced distinctive character of the earlier marks. 11. In view of the fact that the submission of that complaint which is limited to that mere criticism is incomplete and does not refer to any specific provision of EU law that had allegedly been infringed by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], that argument must be rejected as being manifestly inadmissible. 12. Consequently, the single ground of appeal must be rejected in its entirety as being in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly unfounded.’ 5 On the same grounds as those stated by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the appeal must be dismissed. Costs 6 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 137 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, applicable to the procedure on appeal pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) of those rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings. In the present case, since the present order was adopted before the appeal was served on the other parties to the proceedings and, consequently, before they could have incurred costs, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must be ordered to bear its own costs. On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby orders: 1. The appeal is dismissed. 2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] shall bear its own costs. Luxembourg, 1 June 2017. A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] M. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] * Language of the case: English.