Corte di giustizia UE n. 1241/2019

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) 12 June 2019 ( * ) (Appeal — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice — EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for registration of the word sign [OSCURATO:PERSONA] — Application lodged with the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] signed by a ‘licensed legal counsel’ — Manifest inadmissibility — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] — No representation by a lawyer — Appeal manifestly unfounded) [OSCURATO:PERSONA]805/18 P, APPEAL under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 18 December 2018, [OSCURATO:PERSONA], located in Vantaa (Finland), represented by J. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], luvan saanut oikeudenkäyntiavustaja, appellant, the other parties to the proceedings being: [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO), defendant at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] AB, established in Sunne (Sweden), intervener at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), composed of F. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (Rapporteur), [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], J. Malenovský and C.G. Fernlund, Judges, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: H. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], having decided, after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], to give a decision by reasoned order, pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, makes the following [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1 By its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should set aside the order of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 12 October 2018, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v EUIPO – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) (T-313/18, not published, ‘the order under appeal’, EU:T:2018:701), by which that court dismissed as manifestly inadmissible its action for annulment of the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO) of 8 March 2018 ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] R 1241/2017-2) concerning opposition proceedings between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] AB and [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and to refer the present case back to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 2 In support of its appeal, the appellant relies on a single ground of appeal, alleging that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] infringed [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. The appeal 3 Pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of its Rules of Procedure, where an appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], decide by reasoned order to dismiss the appeal in whole or in part. 4 That provision must be applied in the present case. 5 On 11 April 2019, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] took the following position: ‘1.      By its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should set aside the order under appeal, by which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed as manifestly inadmissible its action for annulment of the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO) of 8 March 2018 ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] R 1241/2017-2) concerning opposition proceedings between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] AB and [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and to refer the present case back to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 2.      For the reasons set out below, I propose that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismiss the present appeal as manifestly unfounded, pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice. 3.      In support of its appeal, the appellant relies on a single ground of appeal, alleging that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] infringed [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in holding that its representative, [OSCURATO:PERSONA], did not meet the conditions set out in that article. The appellant submits that, since Law 715/2011 on licensed legal counsel came into force, [OSCURATO:PERSONA], as a legal counsel, is authorised to represent his clients before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] courts and that access to the profession of lawyer is no longer conditional upon admission to the Bar of Finland, contrary to what the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] wrongly held in paragraph 8 of the order under appeal. 4.      According to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s settled case-law, it is clear from the fourth paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] that two cumulative conditions must be satisfied for a person to be validly permitted to represent parties, other than the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the EU institutions, before the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], namely, first, that person must be a lawyer, and secondly, he or she must be authorised to practice before a court of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] or of another [OSCURATO:PERSONA] which is a party to the Agreement on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 2 May 1992 (OJ 1994 L 1, p. 3) (see, inter alia, orders of 17 July 2014, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v OHIM , C-101/4 P, not published, EU:C:2014:2115, paragraph 15, and of 4 December 2014, ADR Center v Commission , C-259/14 P, not published, EU:C:2014:2417, paragraph 34). 5.      With regard to the first of those cumulative conditions, the person who signs the application must be a member of the Bar in order to be regarded as having the status of lawyer for the purposes of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of that statute; it is not sufficient that that person is entitled to represent parties in proceedings before the courts of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (see, to that effect, orders of 20 February 2008, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] de Valencia v Commission , C-363/06 P, not published, EU:C:2008:99, paragraphs 22 and 23, and of 11 May 2017, Neonart svetlobni in reklamni napisi Krevh v EUIPO , C-22/17 P, not published, EU:C:2017:369, paragraph 6). 6.      In that respect, it should be borne in mind that the concept of “lawyer”, within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of that statute, must be interpreted autonomously and without reference to national law (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 September 2012, Prezes Urzędu [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Commission , C-422/11 P and C-423/11 P, EU:C:2012:553, paragraphs 34 and 35, and order of 11 May 2017, Neonart svetlobni in reklamni napisi Krevh v EUIPO , C-22/17 P, not published, EU:C:2017:369, paragraph 6). 7.      In the light of that consideration, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held, in the orders of 17 July 2014, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v OHIM (C-101/14 P, not published, EU:C:2014:2115, paragraphs 16 and 17), and of 11 May 2017, Neonart svetlobni in reklamni napisi Krevh v EUIPO (C-22/17 P, not published, EU:C:2017:369, paragraph 6), that a person who was entitled to represent his clients before the courts of Sweden and Slovenia, but who was not a member of the respective Bars of those two [OSCURATO:PERSONA], was not a ‘lawyer’, within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 8.      In the present case, it is common ground that [OSCURATO:PERSONA], who signed the application lodged with the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], is not a member of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. It follows from the above case-law that, even if, as the appellant argues, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was granted authorisation to exercise the functions of legal counsel and to represent his clients before all courts of law in Finland, he cannot be regarded as a “lawyer” for the purposes of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of that statute. 9.      The circumstance, alleged by the appellant, that the status of licensed legal counsel, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 715/2011, is in line with the justification of the requirement laid down in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19, fourth paragraph, of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], referred to in paragraph 11 of the order under appeal, could not lead to a different outcome. 10.      It follows that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was correct in holding, in paragraph 12 of the order under appeal, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not meet the first of the two cumulative conditions set out in paragraph 4 above and that he was therefore not authorised to represent the appellant before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 11.      In view of the foregoing, I take the view that the single ground of appeal must be rejected as manifestly unfounded. Accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety and the appellant must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 137 and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) of the Rules of Procedure.’ 6 For the same reasons as those given by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the appeal must be dismissed as manifestly unfounded. Costs 7 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 137 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], applicable to appeal proceedings by virtue of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) of those rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings. As the present order has been adopted without notification of the appeal to the defendant, and as the latter could therefore not have incurred costs, it is appropriate to decide that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must bear its own costs. On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby orders: 1. The appeal is dismissed. 2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is ordered to pay its own costs. Luxembourg, 12 June 2019. A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] F. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] * Language of the case: English.