Corte di giustizia UE n. 1215/2021

62019CC0913 [OSCURATO:PERSONA]-BORDONA delivered on 14 January 2021 ( 1 ) Case C‑913/19 CNP spółka z ograniczoną odpowiedzialnością v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] A/S (Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku ([OSCURATO:PERSONA], Białystok, [OSCURATO:PERSONA])) (Reference for a preliminary ruling – Judicial cooperation in civil matters – Jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters – Special jurisdiction – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] against civil liability – Assignment of claims – Concept of branch, agency or establishment) 1. In the dispute giving rise to these proceedings, an issue has arisen as to whether a Polish court has international jurisdiction to rule on a dispute between, on the one hand, a company to which a person injured in a road traffic accident that occurred in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had assigned his rights, and, on the other, the insurance undertaking, established in [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which insures the risks of the person who caused the accident. 2. In its request for a preliminary ruling, the Polish court asks the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice to interpret the special jurisdictional rules in matters relating to insurance contained in Section 3 of Chapter II of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EU) No 1215/2012, ( 2 ) in conjunction with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(2) and (5) of that regulation. In accordance with the latter provisions, jurisdiction lies with the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred (paragraph 2), and with the courts for the place where a branch, agency or other establishment of the principal undertaking is situated, in the case of proceedings brought against the principal undertaking on grounds of activities involving the branch, agency or establishment (paragraph 5). 3. In the judgment to be delivered (which will supplement those previously given on the section dealing with insurance), ( 3 ) the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] will also be able to look at the relationship between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2009/138/EC. ( 4 ) I. Legal framework A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1215/2012 ( 5 ) 4. Recital 16 reads: ‘In addition to the defendant’s domicile, there should be alternative grounds of jurisdiction based on a close connection between the court and the action or in order to facilitate the sound administration of justice. The existence of a close connection should ensure legal certainty and avoid the possibility of the defendant being sued in a court of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] which he could not reasonably have foreseen. …’. 5. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 4(1) states: ‘Subject to this [OSCURATO:PERSONA], persons domiciled in a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’. 6. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 5(1) provides: ‘Persons domiciled in a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may be sued in the courts of another [OSCURATO:PERSONA] only by virtue of the rules set out in Sections 2 to 7 of this Chapter’. 7. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7 provides: ‘A person domiciled in a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may be sued in another [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: … (2) in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur; … (5) as regards a dispute arising out of the operations of a branch, agency or other establishment, in the courts for the place where the branch, agency or other establishment is situated’. 8. The rules for determining jurisdiction in matters of insurance, which form the subject of Chapter II, Section 3, of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], are found in Articles 10 to 16 thereof. 9. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 10 provides: ‘In matters relating to insurance, jurisdiction shall be determined by this Section, without prejudice to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 6 and point 5 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7’. B. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2009/138 10. In accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 145 (‘Conditions for branch establishment’): ‘1.   [OSCURATO:PERSONA] shall ensure that an insurance undertaking which proposes to establish a branch within the territory of another [OSCURATO:PERSONA] notifies the supervisory authorities of its home [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Any permanent presence of an undertaking in the territory of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] shall be treated in the same way as a branch, even where that presence does not take the form of a branch, but consists merely of an office managed by the own staff of the undertaking or by a person who is independent but has permanent authority to act for the undertaking as an agency would. …’. 11. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 151 (‘Non-discrimination of persons pursuing claims’) provides: ‘The host [OSCURATO:PERSONA] shall require the non-life insurance undertaking to ensure that persons pursuing claims arising out of events occurring in its territory are not placed in a less favourable situation as a result of the fact that the undertaking is covering a risk, other than carrier’s liability, classified under class 10 in Part A of Annex I by way of provision of services rather than through an establishment situated in that [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’. 12. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 152 (‘Representative’) provides: ‘1.   For the purposes referred to in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 151, the host [OSCURATO:PERSONA] shall require the non-life insurance undertaking to appoint a representative resident or established in its territory who shall collect all necessary information in relation to claims, and shall possess sufficient powers to represent the undertaking in relation to persons suffering damage who could pursue claims, including the payment of such claims, and to represent it or, where necessary, to have it represented before the courts and authorities of that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in relation to those claims. …’. II. Facts and questions referred 13. CNP spółka z ograniczoną odpowiedzialnością (‘CNP’) is a limited liability company established in [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 14. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] A/S (‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA]’) is an insurance undertaking established in [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 15. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] sp. z o.o. (‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA]’), established in [OSCURATO:PERSONA], is the undertaking authorised by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ( 6 ) to ‘settle claims in full’, as well as to ‘represent [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in all proceedings … before the courts and other public authorities’. 16. Polins spółka z ograniczoną odpowiedzialnością (‘Polins’), a second undertaking located in Żychlin ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), also represents [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. ( 7 ) 17. On 28 February 2018 a road traffic accident occurred in [OSCURATO:PERSONA], involving a collision between the vehicle belonging to the injured party and the vehicle belonging to the party responsible for the accident. At that time, the latter had taken out with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] a contract of insurance against the civil liability of the owner of the motor vehicle. 18. On 1 March 2018, while the car was being repaired, the injured party concluded with the repair workshop a contract for the rental of a replacement vehicle. 19. By way of payment for the rental service, that person assigned his claim against [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to the repair workshop. At the end of the rental, the workshop issued a VAT invoice for the service. 20. On 25 June 2018, CNP acquired from the repair workshop, by way of a contract for the assignment of claims, the right to pursue against [OSCURATO:PERSONA] the claim for reimbursement of the costs of renting the replacement vehicle. 21. On the same date, CNP requested [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to pay the amount on the invoice. It sent the request to Polins’ address. 22. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] instructed [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to assume responsibility for payment of the claim. Acting for and on behalf of [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] validated the invoice in part and accepted part of the amount claimed. 23. In the same document relating to the aforementioned matters, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] referred to the possibility of making a claim against it as the entity authorised by the insurance undertaking. It also included information on the possibility of claiming against [OSCURATO:PERSONA], either under the general provisions on jurisdiction or before the court with jurisdiction for the place where the policyholder, the insured person, the beneficiary or any other person entitled under the insurance contract is resident or established. 24. On 20 August 2018, CNP brought an action against [OSCURATO:PERSONA] before the Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku ([OSCURATO:PERSONA], Białystok, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]). With respect to the international jurisdiction [of that court], [CNP] cited the information published by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to the effect that its principal representative in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is Polins. It asked for service of documents intended for [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to be effected at Polins’ address. 25. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], as defendant, opposed the grant of the application on the ground that the Polish court lacked jurisdiction. It cited, as the provision applicable to jurisdiction, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 5(1) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. After arguing that CNP is a business entity engaged in the purchase of claims arising from insurance contracts, it submitted that CNP is not a policyholder, insured person or beneficiary and that, consequently, it does not have the capacity to bring an action before the court of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] other than that where the insured person is established. 26. CNP submitted in reply that the defendant is on the list of insurance undertakings from EU/EFTA [OSCURATO:PERSONA] notified in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and supervised by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]); that it sells policies in Polish territory; and that it is unacceptable that someone subrogated to the injured party’s claim should not be able to seek reimbursement of the repair costs in question before the court for the place where the harmful event and the repair took place. 27. In those circumstances, the Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku ([OSCURATO:PERSONA], Białystok) has referred the following questions to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 13(2), in conjunction with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 10, of [[OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1215/2012] be interpreted as meaning that, in a dispute between a trader and an insurance company, the former having acquired from an injured party a claim arising from civil liability insurance against that insurance company, the establishment of court jurisdiction on the basis of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(2) or [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the regulation is not precluded? (2) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1 is answered in the affirmative, should [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of [[OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EU) No 1215/2012] be interpreted as meaning that a commercial company operating in a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] which adjusts losses under compulsory insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles pursuant to a contract with an insurance undertaking established in another [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is a branch, agency or other establishment of that undertaking? (3) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1 is answered in the affirmative, should [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(2) of [[OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1215/2012] be interpreted as meaning that it constitutes an independent basis for the jurisdiction of the court of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in which the harmful event occurred, before which court the creditor who has acquired the claim from the injured party under compulsory insurance against civil liability brings an action against an insurance undertaking established in another [OSCURATO:PERSONA]?’ III. Procedure 28. This reference for a preliminary ruling was received at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 13 December 2019. 29. Written observations have been lodged by CNP, [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the Government of the Republic of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. It was not considered necessary to hold a hearing. IV. Analysis 30. As directed by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], I shall confine myself to giving my opinion on the second question referred. By this question, as produced, the referring court seeks an interpretation of the concept of ‘branch, agency or other establishment’, contained in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in circumstances such as those of this dispute. 31. In my view, the answer to this question may be inferred from the case-law of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in relation to that concept since it was included in the 1968 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], ( 8 ) as I shall explain below. 32. In so far as the referring court and some of the parties which have intervened in the preliminary ruling proceedings suggest, tangentially or otherwise, that the debate should be extended to other provisions on insurance (the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA]), I shall refer also to those provisions. A. Preliminary observations 33. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has its immediate predecessor in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 5(5) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 44/2001, ( 9 ) which, in turn, has its immediate predecessor in the 1968 [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. The wording of that provision has remained unchanged. 34. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has interpreted those three texts in judgments forming a settled line of case-law ( 10 ) with which the reply to the present reference for a preliminary ruling should, of course, be consistent. This will ensure continuity in the interpretation of the present instrument and those that precede it, in accordance with recital 34 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 35. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is located in Section 2 (‘Special jurisdiction’) of Chapter II thereof. It is, moreover, the provision that governs disputes relating to insurance, or, more specifically, disputes falling within the scope of Section 3 (‘Jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance’) of that chapter, where these meet the prescribed conditions. ( 11 ) This follows by inference from the proviso contained in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 10 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. ( 12 ) 36. The criteria for interpreting [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which I shall set out below, do not vary depending on whether a dispute involves one party that is ‘weaker’ than the other: this fact does not affect the way in which the provision must be understood or applied. ( 13 ) 37. My view will be the same, therefore, whether the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] answers the first question referred in the affirmative or reaches the contrary conclusion and decides in favour of the application of Section 3 of Chapter II of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to the dispute in the main proceedings. In the second scenario, the ground of jurisdiction provided for in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is available to the applicant by virtue of the internal reference thereto contained in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 10 of the same text. B. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] case-law 38. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contains a special jurisdictional rule which derogates from the principle that international jurisdiction lies, in the first place, with the courts of the defendant’s domicile. 39. That special jurisdictional rule must, as such, be interpreted restrictively, so as not to apply it in cases other than those expressly envisaged by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. ( 14 ) 40. The interpretation of that provision must, moreover, be autonomous. ( 15 ) 41. Like all the special jurisdictional rules laid down in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the one contained in paragraph 5 is based on the existence of a particularly close connection between the dispute and the courts that may be called upon to hear and determine it. That proximity justifies the conferral of jurisdiction on grounds of the sound administration of justice and the efficacious conduct of proceedings. ( 16 ) 42. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] case-law requires that the question of whether a legal action relating to the operation of a branch, agency or other establishment of an undertaking situated in a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has a sufficient connection with another [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ( 17 ) must be determined by reference to two criteria: a) one, which I shall call the ‘subjective criterion’, concerns the entities in question; and b) the other, which I shall describe as the ‘objective criterion’, relates to the activity giving rise to the dispute. 43. Ascertaining whether there is a branch, agency or other establishment (within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]) is a task that calls for a specific assessment of the facts, ( 18 ) an exercise which is also essential for the purposes of evaluating the adequacy of the link between the dispute and the activities of the branch, agency or establishment. 44. That task of establishing the facts, inasmuch as it entails an assessment specific to the case in question, falls not to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice but to the national court. (a) The subjective criterion 45. The concepts of ‘branch’, ‘agency’ or ‘other establishment’ ( 19 ) presuppose the existence of a centre of operations, or ‘unity of action’, which has the appearance of permanency, such as the extension of a parent body. ( 20 ) 46. That centre of operations must have a management body and have the material facilities to negotiate business with third parties, so that the latter, ‘although knowing that there will if necessary be a legal link with the parent body, … do not have to deal directly with such parent body’. ( 21 ) 47. The activities of an entity operating as a ‘branch’, ‘agency’ or ‘establishment’ of the parent body may be split into two spheres, one internal and the other external. 48. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which recognises the relevance of both spheres, ( 22 ) attaches particular importance to the appearance created by the two entities through their conduct as a factor that may establish a close relationship between subsequent disputes and the court hearing and determining them. ( 23 ) 49. In accordance with that criterion, and so far as concerns the interpretation of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: – ‘An independent ‘commercial agent …[Handelsvertreter (Vermittlungsvertreter)] …who [is] free to arrange his own work and decide what proportion of his time to devote to the interests of that undertaking which he agrees to represent and whom that undertaking may not prevent from representing at the same time several firms competing in the same …sector, and who, moreover, merely transmits orders to the parent undertaking without being involved in either their terms or their execution’ is not to be classified as a branch, agency or establishment. ( 24 ) – Conversely, that provision is to be applied to an undertaking located in a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] which ‘maintains no dependent branch, agency or establishment in another [OSCURATO:PERSONA] but nevertheless pursues its activities [in the latter [OSCURATO:PERSONA]] through an independent company with the same name and identical management which negotiates and conducts business in its name and which it uses as an extension of itself’. ( 25 ) (b) The objective criterion 50. In the context of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the dispute must concern legal acts relating to the management of the branch, agency or other establishment of the parent body or the obligations entered into by them on behalf of the parent body. ( 26 ) 51. In the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] view, this is the case where the dispute is the consequence of operations carried on by the branch, agency or establishment. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not apply, on the other hand, where there is no evidence serving to establish the involvement of those entities in the legal relationship between the parties to the main proceedings. ( 27 ) 52. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] went on to say, in particular, that a dispute based on tortious liability ( 28 ) may arise from the operations of a branch if that branch ‘has actually participated in some of the actions constituting the tort’. ( 29 ) 2. Application of that case-law to the dispute (a) Relevant entity for the purposes of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 53. It follows from the documents before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is represented by two companies in [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: Polins and [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 54. According to the order for reference, this leads to difficulties when it comes to determining exactly which entity is to be responsible for processing the claim and as regards the judicial proceedings in respect of the insurer. ( 30 ) 55. Legitimate as those concerns may be, they do not fall to be addressed in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to be given here, which must be confined to an interpretation of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. ( 31 ) 56. It is important, however, to know for certain which of the entities representing the insurer in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is to be regarded as being responsible for the activity giving rise to the dispute. The presence of the factors defining a branch, agency or other establishment within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must be determined by reference to that entity. 57. The order for reference is not quite as clear as one might wish in this regard. However, I incline to the view that that undertaking is [OSCURATO:PERSONA], an inference that might be supported by that order, which states, moreover, that the dispute has its origin in the insurance claim settlement made by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] itself. ( 32 ) 58. Subject to the verification that will ultimately fall to the referring court, I shall therefore proceed on the premise that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is the relevant entity for the purposes of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. (b) Classification of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and assessment of its conduct 59. In order to answer the second question referred, it is necessary to determine, on the one hand, whether [OSCURATO:PERSONA] meets the conditions for classification as a branch, agency or other establishment under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and, on the other hand, to what extent it was actively involved in the facts that gave rise to the dispute in the main proceedings. 60. Both are distinctly factual criteria the presence of which the referring court alone is in an ideal position to determine by reason of its proximity to the events in question. I shall therefore confine myself to providing a few clarifications. 61. The first concerns [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s opposition to the notion of classifying [OSCURATO:PERSONA] as a branch, agency or other establishment on the ground that it is an independent entity and handles claims on behalf of further insurers and other entities. ( 33 ) 62. To my mind, neither of those factors (independence and non-exclusivity) would render [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] inapplicable where other considerations, taken together, create the appearance characteristic of the entities referred to in that provision and the secondary entity in question is, moreover, materially equipped to transact business with third parties. 63. I therefore concur with the assessment arrived at by the referring court and the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], ( 34 ) on the basis of the following information concerning the status and activities of [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: – It takes the form of a limited company, which means, under Polish law, that it has a board of directors (it therefore has a management). – It represents [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s interests in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and emphasises in its correspondence that it acts on behalf of [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in its capacity as the latter’s agent. – Under powers of attorney granted in 2016, it has full competence to carry out activities involving the handling and processing of claims which produce legal effects for the insurer, meaning that third parties do not need to approach [OSCURATO:PERSONA] directly in connection with matters relating to those activities. 64. It is logical to assume, moreover, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has the material resources necessary to perform those activities. It is this criterion that is essential to its classification as a ‘centre of operations which has the appearance of permanency, such as the extension of a parent body’ for the purposes of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. The referring court must satisfy itself that this is the case and, if so, gather any relevant information to that effect that is required by its legal order. 65. My second observation has to do with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] involvement in the activity that gave rise to the dispute, that is to say the handling and settlement of the claim in question, and in the decision to award only part of the amount claimed. 66. According to the referring court’s account of the facts, it was [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (not [OSCURATO:PERSONA]) that took that decision, which was key to the genesis of the dispute. ( 35 ) If this is confirmed, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was not a mere intermediary passing on information without further consideration, but an active contributor to the legal situation that led to the dispute. 67. By the same token, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] met the conditions conferring on the courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] where it is located international jurisdiction to hear and determine an action brought by the insured person (or his successors in title) against [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 68. The foregoing provides a sufficient basis on which to answer the second question referred, as it is worded. There would be no need for any further consideration of the bearing on the matter of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which I shall address only for reasons of completeness and in order not to fail to respond to those who have lodged written observations in the course of this reference. C. Bearing of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on the interpretation of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 69. The referring court (in passing), [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] refer to Articles 145 and 152 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA] as provisions which might have a bearing on the outcome of the dispute. 70. The observations lodged by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] point to a relationship between those provisions and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. More precisely: – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] arguments appear to show ( 36 ) that, in its opinion, where an insurer carries on its economic activity in another [OSCURATO:PERSONA] through a ‘permanent presence’ within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 145 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA], ( 37 ) there is a branch, agency or other establishment for the purposes of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. ( 38 ) – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] argues that the appointment of a representative under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 152 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not confer capacity to sue the insurer under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. It states that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 152(3) itself precludes the representative’s classification as a ‘branch’ within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 145 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. ( 39 ) 71. For its part, the referring court suggests that an entity’s classification under the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA] supports the inference that ‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA] […] must be treated as ‘[an]other establishment’ of the defendant [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] […]’. ( 40 ) 72. I shall examine these arguments below, but would recall that I have already commented on the interpretation of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which must be independent, in the light of the scheme and the objectives of that regulation. 1. ‘Permanent presence’ and ‘representative’ in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 73. Under the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the exercise of the activity of insurance by an undertaking established in a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] that wishes to carry on that activity in another [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is subject to certain controls ( 41 ) which differ depending on the legal form chosen by that undertaking. 74. An insurer wishing to expand its activities under the freedom of establishment must notify the supervisory authorities of the home [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of its intention to establish itself in another [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and provide them with the information required by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 145 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. ( 42 ) 75. On that basis, the supervisory authorities of the home [OSCURATO:PERSONA] analyse the viability of the planned establishment. If the evaluation is positive, they communicate the information described in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 146(1) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. ( 43 ) The insurance undertaking can then begin its cross-border activities in the host [OSCURATO:PERSONA], through a branch or a permanent presence treated as such. 76. If the insurance undertaking chooses to carry on its activities outside the home [OSCURATO:PERSONA] under the freedom to provide services , it must also notify its intention to do so to the supervisory authorities of that [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. ( 44 ) 77. In the specific field of insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] also requires the insurance undertaking to appoint ‘a representative resident or established in its territory who shall collect all necessary information in relation to claims, and shall possess sufficient powers to represent the undertaking in relation to persons suffering damage who could pursue claims, including the payment of such claims, and to represent it or, where necessary, to have it represented before the courts and authorities of that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in relation to those claims’ ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] 152). 78. Thus, persons who bring a claim based on events having taken place in the territory of the host [OSCURATO:PERSONA] which relate to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles are not in a less favourable situation depending on the legal form chosen by the insurance undertaking. 79. For these particular purposes, therefore, it is irrelevant whether the insurance undertaking acts by way of provision of services or through an establishment (branch or permanent presence treated as such) in the host [OSCURATO:PERSONA] where the harmful event occurred. ( 45 ) 80. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is not too explicit in relation to ‘permanent presence’ and does not lay down detailed rules of law governing the insurance undertaking’s representative, ( 46 ) beyond stating that the latter must have sufficient powers to represent the undertaking in relation to persons suffering damage who could pursue claims against the undertaking, or before the courts and other authorities in connection with those claims. 81. Indirectly, however, that is to say via Articles 145 (in the case of permanent presence) and 152 (in the case of the representative), that directive provides certain details that assist in defining those concepts: – The permanent presence does not necessarily have to take the form of a branch. It may be treated as such, inasmuch as it manifests itself as an office managed by staff from the parent body or by an independent person with permanent authority to act for the undertaking as an agency would. It must, in both cases, have the power to bind the insurance undertaking in relation to third parties. – The representative’s functions preclude him from being automatically treated as a branch: in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 152(3) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA], ‘the appointment of the representative shall not in itself constitute the opening of a branch for the purpose of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 145’. ( 47 ) 82. The foregoing details are supplemented by those which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has set out over the course of various references for a preliminary ruling. I shall spell these out below, inasmuch as they serve to support my view that the aforementioned concepts are different from those referred to in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 2. Relationship between a branch or permanent presence treated as such and a representative, on the one hand, and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], on the other (a) A ‘permanent presence’ as a ‘branch, agency or other establishment’ 83. For the purposes of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], a branch, agency or establishment is a centre of operations which has a management body, has the material facilities to transact business with third parties, binds the parent body and has the appearance of permanency, such as an extension of that permanent body. 84. It may be simpler to show that those conditions are met if, in order to expand its activities to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] other than the home [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the insurance undertaking operates under the freedom of establishment, after completing the appropriate formalities, and sets up a branch or a permanent presence treated as such within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 145 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 85. Where matters giving rise to legal proceedings against an insurer established in a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] have involved a branch , acting for and on behalf of the insurer, which is situated in another [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and meets the conditions laid down in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 145 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA], there will usually, in fact, be a ‘branch’, an ‘agency’ or an ‘establishment’ within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. ( 48 ) 86. This will also be the case, in the light of the content of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 145 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA], if the insurance undertaking chooses to have, as the form for exercising its freedom of establishment, a permanent presence such as to warrant its treatment as a branch. ( 49 ) 87. If that permanent presence consists ‘merely of an office managed by the own staff of the undertaking or by a person who is independent but has permanent authority to act for the undertaking as an agency would’ ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] 145(1) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA]), it can without too much difficulty be regarded as also meeting the condition laid down in Article7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] case-law with respect to ‘permanent presence’ in the context of the freedom of establishment, recognised by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 43 TFEU, requires that it must be possible to establish the existence of that permanent presence ‘on the basis of objective factors which are ascertainable having regard, in particular, to the extent of its physical existence in terms of premises, staff and equipment’. ( 50 ) – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 145(2) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA] requires an insurance undertaking wishing to establish itself in another [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to inform the supervisory authorities of the home [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the name of the person within the branch or the permanent presence who is empowered to bind it in relation to third parties. 88. The debate as to whether the permanent presence would have to demonstrate compliance with other conditions in order to be classified as an ‘establishment’ remains open: this is true in particular of the question whether the permanent presence must be subject to the management and control of the insurance undertaking and whether, in the performance of its activities, it must be exclusively or predominantly linked to that undertaking. ( 51 ) 89. This is not a debate that needs to be settled here. Those two criteria are not decisive with respect to the application of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 90. Criteria that are decisive, on the other hand, and crucially so, are whether a permanent presence treated as a branch has the resources (management, premises, staff, equipment) necessary to be able to operate and whether it has been involved in the legal relationship giving rise to the dispute, in the manner identified by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the case-law cited above. ( 52 ) 91. As I have recalled, that case-law states the proximity between the dispute and the court called upon to hear and determine it is not assessed by exclusive reference to the legal relationships in existence between entities established in different [OSCURATO:PERSONA] but on the basis also of how they conduct themselves in corporate life and deal with third parties in their commercial dealings. 92. It will therefore be the combination of those factors in a particular case (and not the level of control exercised by the insurance undertaking over the entities situated in the host [OSCURATO:PERSONA] or the extent to which the latter are exclusively linked to the former) which will determine whether there is a close relationship between a dispute and the court called upon to hear and determine it. (b) The ‘representative’ under Articles 151 and 152 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 93. Where an insurance undertaking extends its business activities to another [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in exercise of the freedom to provide services, it may be ( 53 ) that the material signs warranting recognition of the existence of a branch, agency or other establishment for the purposes of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] are lacking. 94. In the specific context of insurance against civil liability arising from the use of motor vehicles, it will be difficult for the representative to be appointed by the insurer in the host [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to give rise to a dispute ‘arising out of the operations of a branch, agency or other establishment’, within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], if he restricts his activities to the tasks listed in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 152 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 95. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 152(4) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA] authorises [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ( 54 ) to entrust to a single representative the functions of handling and settling claims which are set out in that self-same article, as well as those provided for in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 21 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2009/103/EC. ( 55 ) It thus implicitly recognises a correspondence between the functions of the respective representatives which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] too has confirmed. ( 56 ) 96. The like treatment of those two forms of representative means that the role of the representative provided for in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 152 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is generally confined to receiving and forwarding information to facilitate the settlement of a claim, and paying the compensation granted by the insurance undertaking. ( 57 ) What is more, the representative’s function in those processes is merely passive. 97. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has stated that the representative’s powers as provided for in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 4 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2000/26 (which corresponds to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 21 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2009/103) are those of a mere representative, inasmuch as offers of compensation come from the insurer alone. ( 58 ) 98. That separation of functions is consistent with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 21(6) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2009/103, which states that the claims representative ‘shall not be regarded as an establishment within the meaning of …[OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 44/2001’. 99. I would recall that the appointment of a representative provided for in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 152 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which is required ‘for the purposes of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 151’, arises from the duty to ensure that the insurance undertaking treats all claimants equally, it being for the host [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to ensure that that duty is discharged. Claimants must not find themselves in a less favourable situation on account of the fact that that undertaking covers a risk by way of provision of services rather than through an establishment. 100. However, equal treatment does not stretch to imposing an interpretation of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] which automatically gives cover to claims pursued against an insurer in a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in which that insurer has not established itself on the sole ground that it has a claims representative there. 101. In the abstract, therefore, there is not a sufficient basis on which to extend the application of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to a representative appointed under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 152 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA], whose role is confined to performing the functions set out in that provision in the context of the vicissitudes of insurance against civil liability arising from the use of motor vehicles. 102. In order for [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to be applicable in the case where the insurance undertaking has only a representative performing in the host [OSCURATO:PERSONA] the functions provided for in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 152 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA], there must be other grounds present that warrant the conferral of international jurisdiction on courts other than those of the defendant’s domicile. ( 59 ) 103. This will be the case if the representative meets the conditions for classification as a branch, agency or other establishment of the insurance undertaking and has taken an active part in the activity giving rise to the third party’s claim against that undertaking. 104. Furthermore, the possibility cannot be ruled out that the exercise of the activity of insurance outside the home [OSCURATO:PERSONA] by way of provision of services may give rise to claims against an insurer which ought reasonably (from the point of view of international jurisdiction) to be capable of being disposed of in a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] other than the insurer’s domicile. 105. Although the balance between the respective rights of the parties and the sound administration of justice is reflected first and foremost in the rule that the defendant is subject to the courts for the place where he is domiciled, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] offers the applicant alternatives, such as bringing the action in the place where the events occurred. ( 60 ) 106. Furthermore, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] protects a defendant who is the ‘weaker party’ to the insurance relationship through specific provisions on international jurisdiction (contained in Section 3 of Chapter II) unconnected with the type of presence which the insurance undertaking has in a territory. The same treatment is available to an injured party who is able to bring a direct action. (c) Application to the case at issue 107. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submits that it carries on its activities in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in exercise of the freedom to provide services, with the consent of the supervisory authorities of the home and host [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 108. It follows from the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] observations, however, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] activities actually fall within the scope of the freedom of establishment. The referring court appears to be (implicitly) of the same opinion. 109. As I have tried to explain, in the context of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the basis on which an insurance undertaking carries on its activities in a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may reveal either that the conditions requiring the application of that article are in fact present (which will usually be the case in the event that the undertaking is operating under the freedom of establishment), or that the opposite is true (which will generally be the case where it is operating under the freedom to provide services). 110. That basis of operation, as I have said, does not predetermine one way or the other the application of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which will be determined in the light of the criteria for its interpretation that follow from the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] case-law. 111. In accordance with those criteria, the activities which [OSCURATO:PERSONA] carries on in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] through [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may justify the exercise of international jurisdiction by the Polish courts, on the basis which I have already set out, in the case of an action brought by third parties against [OSCURATO:PERSONA] as a result of a decision by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] which is binding on that insurance undertaking. 112. The fact that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] operated under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 147 et seq. of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA] would not therefore be decisive. V. Conclusion 113. In the light of the foregoing, I propose that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] answer to the second question referred for a preliminary ruling by the Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku ([OSCURATO:PERSONA], Białystok, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]) should be as follows: ‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EU) No 1215/2012 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that a commercial company established in a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] which operates under a contract with an insurance undertaking established in another [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may be classified as a ‘branch, agency or other establishment’ of that undertaking if, cumulatively: – it operates in a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] by providing compensation for material damage on the basis of insurance against civil liability arising from the use of motor vehicles the risks connected with which are covered by the insurance undertaking; – it has the appearance of an extension of the insurance undertaking; and – it has a management body and material facilities such as to enable it to transact business with third parties, so that the latter, although knowing that there will if necessary be a legal link with the insurance undertaking, do not have to deal directly with that undertaking.’ ( 1 ) Original language: Spanish. ( 2 ) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters ( OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1 ; ‘the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’). ( 3 ) See, most recently, the judgments of 27 February 2020, BALTA ( C‑803/18 , EU:C:2020:123 ); of 31 January 2018, Hofsoe ( C‑106/17 , EU:C:2018:50 ); and of 21 January 2016, SOVAG ( C‑521/14 , EU:C:2016:41 ). ( 4 ) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Reinsurance ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] II) ( OJ 2009 L 335, p .1 ; ‘the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’). ( 5 ) In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 22 on the position of [OSCURATO:PERSONA], annexed to the Treaty on [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the Treaty on the Functioning of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not take part in the adoption of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and is not bound by that regulation or subject to its application; however, it notified to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] its decision to apply the content of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] by note of 20 December 2012 ( OJ 2013 L 79, p. 4 ). ( 6 ) Under a power of attorney of 31 May 2016, granted by the authorised members of [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s management body to [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. ( 7 ) It acts as an insurance agent, in accordance with the Polish legislation transposing [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EU) 2016/97 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 20 January 2016 on insurance distribution (recast) ( OJ 2016 L 26, p. 19 ). ( 8 ) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters ( OJ 1978 L 304, p. 36 ; consolidated text in OJ 1998 C 27, p. 1 ). ( 9 ) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters ( OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1 ). ( 10 ) In some of these judgments, the operative part clearly flows from the circumstances of the case in question: see the judgments of 18 March 1981, Blanckaert & Willems ( 139/80 , EU:C:1981:70 ; ‘the judgment in Blanckaert & Willems ’); and of 9 December 1987, SAR Schotte ( 218/86 , EU:C:1987:536 ; ‘the judgment in SAR Schotte ’). This has not precluded the establishment of general criteria that lay emphasis, first, on the relationship between the foreign and local entities and its perception by third parties, and, secondly, on the proximity between the matter in issue and the ground of jurisdiction (see point 38 et seq. of this [OSCURATO:PERSONA]). ( 11 ) Those conditions are not met by disputes in which the applicant is a professional in the [insurance] sector: judgment of 31 January 2018, Hofsoe ( C‑106/17 , EU:C:2018:50 ). ( 12 ) Articles 17(1) and 20 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] also retain the application of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) in the case of disputes concerning certain consumer contracts and individual employment contracts respectively. ( 13 ) This is confirmed by the judgment of 19 July 2012, Mahamdia ( C‑154/11 , EU:C:2012:491 ), concerning [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 18 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 44/2001 (now [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 20 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]). ( 14 ) Judgment of 5 July 2018, flyLAL-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ( C‑27/17 , EU:C:2018:533 ; ‘judgment in flyLAL-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ’), paragraphs 26 and 62. ( 15 ) Judgment of 22 November 1978, Somafer ( 33/78 , EU:C:1978:205 ; ‘judgment in Somafer ’), paragraph 8. ( 16 ) See the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on the 1968 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ( OJ 1979 C 59, p. 22 ) and recital 16 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. This refers to alternative grounds of jurisdiction ‘based on a close connection between the court and the action or in order to facilitate the sound administration of justice’. It further emphasises that that close connection ‘should ensure legal certainty and avoid […] the defendant being sued in a court of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] which he could not reasonably have foreseen’. ( 17 ) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] where the branch, agency or establishment is located. ( 18 ) This was recalled by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in his [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in flyLAL-LithuanianAirlines ( C‑27/17 , EU:C:2018:136 , point 134 ). ( 19 ) In the context of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not differentiate between those three concepts: judgment of 6 October 1976, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ( 14/76 , EU:C:1976:134 , paragraph 21 ). ( 20 ) Judgments in Somafer , paragraphs 11 and 12; Blanckaert & Willems , paragraph 11; flyLAL-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] , paragraph 59; and order of 19 November 2019, INA and Others ( C‑200/19 , not published, EU:C:2019:985 , paragraph 35 ). ( 21 ) Judgments in Somafer , paragraph 12; SAR Schotte , paragraph 10; and of 6 April 1995, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Shipping ( C‑439/93 , EU:C:1995:104 , paragraph 18 ). ( 22 ) Judgment in SAR Schotte , paragraph 16: ‘the close connection between the dispute and the court called upon to hear it must be assessed not only on the basis of the legal relations between legal entities established in different [OSCURATO:PERSONA] but also by reference to the way in which these two undertakings behave in their business relations and present themselves vis-à-vis third parties in their commercial dealings’. ( 23 ) Judgment of 6 April 1995, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Shipping ( C‑439/93 , EU:C:1995:104 , paragraph 19 ): ‘a branch, agency or another ancillary establishment […] is therefore an entity capable of being the principal, or even exclusive, interlocutor for third parties in the negotiation of contracts’. ( 24 ) Judgment in Blanckaert & Willems , paragraphs 12 and 13. ( 25 ) Judgment in SAR Schotte , paragraph 17. I do not see any contradiction between that judgment and the judgment in Blanckaert & Willems , but, rather, two specific applications of the same rule. In the case culminating in the second judgment, the commercial agent did not maintain a relationship of dependence on the other undertaking within the internal sphere, and did not give the appearance of doing so within the external sphere either, unlike in the situation in the judgment in SAR Schotte . ( 26 ) Judgments in Somafer , paragraphs 11 and 13; of 19 July 2012, Mahamdia ( C‑154/11 , EU:C:2012:491 , paragraph 48 ); flyLAL-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] , paragraph 59; or order of 19 November 2019, INA and Others ( C‑200/19 , not published, EU:C:2019:985 , paragraph 35 ). ( 27 ) Judgment of 11 April 2019, Ryanair ( C‑464/18 , EU:C:2019:311 , paragraphs 34 and 35 ). ( 28 ) The classification of CNP’s action against [OSCURATO:PERSONA] as ‘tortious’ within the meaning of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is not in dispute. ( 29 ) Judgment in flyLAL-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] , paragraph 63. ( 30 ) Paragraph 24 of the order for reference. The Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku ([OSCURATO:PERSONA], Białystok) refers, by way of evidence of those difficulties, to the reference for a preliminary ruling made in another set of proceedings, also against [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which culminated in the judgment of 27 February 2020, Corporis ( C‑25/19 , EU:C:2020:126 ; ‘judgment in Corporis ’). ( 31 ) I recognise that disaggregating insurance activities in the way that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] appears to do might have a bearing on the applicability of the provision in question, because, for example, it makes it difficult for the public to perceive a local undertaking as an extension of the parent body. However, the interpretation of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must be strict. Indeed, the very wording of that provision limits the criteria governing its application to ones that are relevant to the dispute in question. In other words, for the purposes of, and in keeping with, its raison d’être (the existence of a close connection between the dispute and the ground of jurisdiction), the mere fact that the defendant is present in a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not count; what matters is that the entity involved in the activity giving rise to the dispute should be present there. ( 32 ) According to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which starts from the same assumption, that is the entity which the referring court has in mind in its question. I find this plausible, in the light, in particular, of paragraphs 26 and 28 of the order for reference. ( 33 ) [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s observations, paragraphs 20 and 21. In this context, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] sets out its own thoughts on [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 152 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA], suggesting that, in accordance with that provision, such an entity is never a branch, agency or other establishment within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. I shall address this matter later. ( 34 ) Order for reference, paragraph 26, and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] observations, paragraphs 56, 58 and 60. In that same context, the referring court and the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] refer to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 145 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which I shall address later. ( 35 ) Paragraph 5 of the order for reference. ( 36 ) I say ‘appear to show’ because the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not, in fact, expressly state that there is an automatic correlation between the two situations. ( 37 ) This provides that an insurance undertaking intending to establish a branch within the territory of another [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must notify the supervisory authorities of the home [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of its intention to do so and provide them with certain information. Paragraph 1 states that ‘any permanent presence of an undertaking in the territory of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] shall be treated in the same way as a branch, even where that presence does not take the form of a branch, but consists merely of an office managed by the own staff of the undertaking or by a person who is independent but has permanent authority to act for the undertaking as an agency would’. ( 38 ) Paragraph 61 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] observations. ( 39 ) [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s observations, paragraph 21. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submits that its activities in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] are carried on in exercise of the freedom to provide services, that those activities have met the conditions laid down in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and that neither the Danish nor the Polish supervisory authorities have expressed any reservations in this regard. This argument, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] goes on to say, is sufficient to render [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] inapplicable. ( 40 ) Paragraph 28 of the order for reference, in fine . ( 41 ) According to recital 11 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA], that directive brings about the ‘harmonisation […] necessary and sufficient to achieve the mutual recognition of authorisations and supervisory systems, and thus a single authorisation which is valid throughout the Community and which allows the supervision of an undertaking to be carried out by the home [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’. ( 42 ) This information includes, inter alia, the type of business envisaged, the structural organisation of the branch and the name of the person within it who is empowered to bind the insurer in relation to third parties. ( 43 ) To the supervisory authorities of the host [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and to the undertaking itself. They must also certify that the undertaking meets the solvency capital and minimum capital requirements. ( 44 ) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 148(1) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA] provides that the supervisory authorities of the home [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must, in those circumstances, communicate certain information to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the territory of which the undertaking intends to operate. ( 45 ) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 151 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. See the judgment in Corporis , paragraph 35. ( 46 ) See, to that effect, the judgment in Corporis , paragraph 37: ‘that provision [first subparagraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 152(1) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA]] does not specify the exact scope of the powers conferred for that purpose on the insurance undertaking’s representative’. ( 47 ) According to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 152(2), ‘the host [OSCURATO:PERSONA] shall not require that representative to undertake activities on behalf of the […] undertaking which appointed him other than those set out in paragraph 1’. ( 48 ) This case is not concerned with the automatic equivalence between the concepts of ‘branch’ in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA] respectively. Although, intuitively, the answer to that question must be in the affirmative, I should recall that, in that directive, ‘branch’ is used in different senses: a general one, in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 13(11), under the heading ‘Definitions’; it is used in another, specific sense, for the purposes of Chapter IX of Title I, in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 162(2); and in another sense, for the purposes of Title IV, in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 268(1)(b). Any analysis of whether all those meanings are by definition compliant with the requirements of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] falls outside the subject matter of this [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. ( 49 ) The like treatment of branches and permanent presences dates back to the judgment of 4 December 1986, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Germany ( 205/84 , EU:C:1986:463 ). It was later enshrined by the legislature in the form, first, of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 3 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 88/357/EEC of 22 June 1988, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct insurance other than life assurance and laying down provisions to facilitate the effective exercise of freedom to provide services and amending [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 73/239/EEC ( OJ 1988 L 172, p. 1 ). ( 50 ) Judgment of 26 October 2010, Schmelz ( C‑97/09 , EU:C:2010:632 , paragraph 38 ). ( 51 ) In its [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – Freedom to provide services and the general good in the insurance sector ( OJ 2000 C 43, p. 5 ), pp. 9 to 12, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] states that both conditions must be met. ( 52 ) Points 38 to 52 of this [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. ( 53 ) Since the exercise of that freedom does not mean that the service provider may not maintain some degree of stable infrastructure in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of destination (judgment of 30 November 1995, Gebhard, C‑55/94 , EU:C:1995:411 ), I do not rule out the possibility that certain operators will give the appearance required in order for the provision in question to apply. In those circumstances, a third party would be able to pursue his claim against the insurer in the jurisdiction in which that infrastructure is located in the case of disputes linked to the operation of that infrastructure. ( 54 ) In the event that the undertaking itself has failed to do so. ( 55 ) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 16 September 2009 relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability ( OJ 2009 L 263, p. 11 ). [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 152 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA] continues to refer by name to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 4 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2000/26/EC, now reproduced, with the exception of paragraph 7, in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 21 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2009/103. ( 56 ) Judgments of 10 October 2013, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ( C‑306/12 , EU:C:2013:650 , paragraphs 21 and 23 ); and of 15 December 2016, Vieira de Azevedo and Others ( C‑558/15 , EU:C:2016:957 , paragraph 33 ), concerning the representative provided for in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 21 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2009/103 (then [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 4 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2000/26); and judgment in Corporis , concerning the representative envisaged in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 152 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] II [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. ( 57 ) This includes the power to take receipt of a document bringing against an insurer located in another [OSCURATO:PERSONA] a claim seeking compensation for a road traffic accident such as that under analysis in the judgment in Corporis . ( 58 ) Judgment of 15 December 2016, Vieira de Azevedo and Others ( C‑558/15 , EU:C:2016:957 , paragraphs 25 and 26 ). ( 59 ) See recital 16 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. ( 60 ) In the case of a claim such as that at issue here, which is presented as being non-contractual in nature.