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Corte di giustizia UEsentenza

Corte di giustizia UE/2014

ECLI:EU:C:2014:2417
Testo integrale del provvedimento

Testo integrale del provvedimento

62014CO0259_EN

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] part

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑259/14 P,

APPEAL under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 23 May 2014, [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] , established in Rome (Italy), represented by L. Tantalo and G. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], avvocati, appellant, the other party to the proceedings being:

[OSCURATO:PERSONA],

defendant at first instance,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]),

composed of S. Rodin, President of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], M. Berger and F. Biltgen (Rapporteur), [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: N. Jääskinen, Registrar: A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], having decided, after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], to give a decision by reasoned order, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, makes the following

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

1. By its appeal, [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] (‘[OSCURATO:SOCIETA]’) seeks to have set aside the order of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (T‑110/14, EU:T:2014:170; ‘the order under appeal’), by which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed, as being manifestly inadmissible, [OSCURATO:SOCIETA]’s action for annulment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] decision, taken after an audit, to proceed with partial recovery of an advance payment made to [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] pursuant to contracts No JLS/CJ/2007‑1/18, No JLS/CJ/2007‑1/19 and No JLS/CJ/2007‑1/21 relating to projects on the mediation procedure.

Procedure before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the order under appeal

2. By application lodged at the Registry of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 13 February 2014, [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] brought an action seeking annulment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] decision cited in paragraph 1 of the present order.

3. The application stated that [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] was represented by [OSCURATO:PERSONA], ‘avvocato’, a shareholder in [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] and president of its board of administration.

4. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], deeming [OSCURATO:SOCIETA]’s action to be manifestly inadmissible, decided to give a decision on the action by reasoned order without taking further steps in the proceedings, pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 111 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

5. In that regard, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] pointed out, at paragraph 7 of the order under appeal, that it is settled case-law that — in accordance with Articles 19 and 21 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and in particular the third paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19, according to which ‘parties must be represented by a lawyer’ — a ‘party’ within the meaning of those provisions is not authorised to act in person before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] but is required to use the services of a third party, who must be authorised to practise before a court of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (order in Lopes v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice , C‑174/96 P, EU:C:1996:473, paragraph 11).

6. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] stated, in paragraph 8 of the order under appeal, that it is apparent from paragraph 24 of the judgment in AM & S Europe v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (155/79, EU:C:1982:157) that that requirement of representation is based on the conception of the lawyer’s role as collaborating in the administration of justice and as being required to provide, in full independence and in the overriding interests of justice, such legal assistance as the client requires. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concluded from this, in paragraph 9 of the order under appeal, that, in the light of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] case-law (order in EREF v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑74/10 P and C‑75/10 P, EU:C:2010:557, paragraphs 50 and 51), a lawyer who has administrative and financial powers within the company which he represents cannot act as that company’s legal representative before the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] as an independent third party.

7. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] added, in paragraph 10 of the order under appeal, that the provisions concerning the representation of non-privileged parties before the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must be interpreted independently, without reference to the laws of the different [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

8. Having established that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] position within [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] was therefore not compatible with the requirements of the representation of non-privileged parties before the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in paragraph 12 of the order under appeal, dismissed the action as being manifestly inadmissible.

Form of order sought by the parties before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice

9. [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] requests the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice to set aside the order under appeal and to refer the case back to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for a decision on the merits. The appeal

10. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, where an appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], decide to dismiss that appeal in whole or in part by reasoned order.

11. In the present case, it is appropriate to make a ruling under that provision.

12. [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] puts forward three grounds in support of its appeal.

The first ground alleges an incorrect interpretation of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

By its second ground, [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] contends that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] infringed [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 67(1) TFEU.

The third ground alleges an incorrect interpretation of the concept of legal privilege and a failure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to observe the principle of the right to respect for private life, as set out in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7 of the Charter of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (‘the Charter’) and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for the Protection of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA], signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘ECHR’).

The first ground of appeal Arguments of the appellant

13. By its first ground of appeal, [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] criticises the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on the ground that it misinterpreted [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and distorted the facts by finding that there was an employment relationship between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] such as to prevent [OSCURATO:PERSONA] from acting as [OSCURATO:SOCIETA]’s legal representative.

14. [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] disputes the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] finding that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] could not validly represent [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] before that [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], it submits, incorrectly assessed the factual circumstances of the case before it.

Furthermore, the case-law cited in support of its reasoning is not applicable to the present case.

15. [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] claims that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is neither its employee nor bound to it by any employment relationship.

He is an external consultant and is remunerated in that capacity.

Moreover, although [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is the president of the board of administration of [OSCURATO:SOCIETA], he does not have any administrative or financial powers within the company.

Furthermore, as a minority shareholder of [OSCURATO:SOCIETA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] cannot influence the company’s decisions or strategy.

According to [OSCURATO:SOCIETA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must therefore be regarded as independent of that company.

Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]

16. As regards, first, the factual claims raised by [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] in this ground relating to the duties and responsibilities of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] within [OSCURATO:SOCIETA], it should be noted that those claims concern, in essence, the description of the functions performed by the president of the board of administration of that company, the detailed rules governing that company’s administrative and financial management and also details about the decision-making procedures within that company.

17. In that regard, it must be recalled that, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 256 TFEU and the first paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], an appeal is limited to points of law and must be based on grounds of lack of competence of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], breach of procedure before it which adversely affects the interests of the appellant, or infringement of EU law by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (judgment in Poland v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑335/09 P, EU:C:2012:385, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).

18. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] therefore has exclusive jurisdiction to establish the facts, except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it, and to assess the evidence relied on.

The establishment of those facts and the assessment of that evidence do not therefore, save where they are distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject as such to review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice (see, to that effect, judgments in EIB v Hautem , C‑449/99 P, EU:C:2001:502, paragraph 44, and in Poland v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , EU:C:2012:385, paragraph 24).

19. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the distortion must be obvious from the documents in the case-file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and evidence (see, to that effect, judgments in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑551/03 P, EU:C:2006:229, paragraph 54, and in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Makarov v Council and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑419/08 P, EU:C:2010:147, paragraph 32).

20. In the present case, since it must be held that [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] is seeking, by its claims, to secure a re-examination of the findings of fact made by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the order under appeal as they relate to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] position in relation to that company, those claims must be rejected as being manifestly inadmissible.

21. In so far as [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] criticises the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on the ground that it distorted the facts by finding that there was an employment relationship between [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA], it is evident that this argument is based on a manifestly erroneous reading of the order under appeal.

It is clear from paragraph 11 of that order that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relied on the fact that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is associated with [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] and is, moreover, the president of its board of administration.

22. Second, [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in law in the application of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

23. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], however, correctly pointed out, in paragraph 9 of the order under appeal, that a legal person cannot be properly represented before the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] by a lawyer who has, within the body which he represents, administrative and financial powers (see, to that effect, orders in EREF v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , EU:C:2010:557, paragraph 50 and 51, and in ClientEarth v Council , C‑573/11 P, EU:C:2013:564, paragraph 12).

24. The requirement imposed by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] law that a party be represented in legal proceedings by an independent third party cannot be regarded as being a requirement designed solely to exclude the represented party from being represented by its employees or by those who are financially dependent on it (order in ClientEarth v Council , EU:C:2013:564, paragraph 13).

25. The essence of that requirement is, first, to prevent private parties from acting on their own behalf before the Courts without using an intermediary.

Second, the purpose of the requirement for representation by a third party is to ensure that legal persons are defended by a representative who is sufficiently distant from the legal person which he represents (order in ClientEarth v Council , EU:C:2013:564, paragraph 14).

26. The conception of the lawyer’s role in the legal order of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which is derived from the legal traditions common to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and on which [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is based, is that of collaborating in the administration of justice and of being required to provide, in full independence and in the overriding interests of that cause, such legal assistance as the client needs (see, inter alia, judgments in AM & S Europe v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , EU:C:1982:157, paragraph 24; in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑550/07 P, EU:C:2010:512, paragraph 42; and in Prezes Urzędu [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Poland v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑422/11 P and C‑423/11 P, EU:C:2012:553, paragraph 23).

27. The requirement that a lawyer should be independent also applies to a situation such as that at issue in the present case, in which the lawyer, albeit not employed by the company which he represents and in which he owns shares, is the president of its board of administration.

28. Consequently, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not err in law in relation to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] by holding, in paragraph 11 of the order under appeal, that, in the light of the documents submitted by [OSCURATO:SOCIETA], the nature of the position held by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] is not compatible with representation of that company before the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

29. [OSCURATO:SOCIETA]’s first ground of appeal must, therefore, be rejected as being in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly unfounded. The second ground of appeal Arguments of the appellant

30. By its second ground of appeal, [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] claims that, by holding that the provisions of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had to be interpreted without reference to national law, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] infringed [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 67(1) TFEU.

31. [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] points out that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] specifically refers to national law. Moreover, there are no specific rules of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] law regulating the legal profession.

32. [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] argues that, since Italian law guarantees the independence of the lawyer and allows a lawyer who is associated with a company to represent that company before the national courts, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ought to have been allowed to represent [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] before the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

33. [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] adds that the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] have, on numerous occasions, denied lawyers authorised to represent certain organisations in their own [OSCURATO:PERSONA] the right to represent those organisations before the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

Consequently, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice should reconsider its position on this point in order to take account of changes in the different [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]

34. It should be noted that, with regard to the two cumulative conditions set out in the fourth paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], namely, that the representative, first, be a qualified lawyer and, secondly, be authorised to practise before a court of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] or of another [OSCURATO:PERSONA] which is a party to the Agreement on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 2 May 1992 (OJ 1994 L 1, p. 3), unlike the authorisation to practise before a court of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] or of another [OSCURATO:PERSONA] party to that agreement, the notion of a lawyer contains no express reference to the law of those [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope.

Therefore, according to settled case-law, the need for uniform application of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] law and the principle of equality require that the terms of such a provision of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] law must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], having regard to the context of that provision and the purpose of the legislation in question (see, inter alia, judgments in Linster , C‑287/98, EU:C:2000:468, paragraph 43, and in Nokia , C‑316/05, EU:C:2006:789, paragraph 21; order in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] de Valencia v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑363/06 P, EU:C:2008:99, paragraphs 21 and 25).

35. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] therefore acted correctly in holding, in paragraph 10 of the order under appeal, that the provisions concerning the representation of non-privileged parties before the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must be interpreted, as far as possible, independently, without reference to national law (judgment in Prezes Urzędu [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Poland v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , EU:C:2012:553, paragraph 35).

36. It follows that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 67(1) TFEU, relied on by [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] in order to support a claim of infringement of respect for the different legal systems and traditions of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], is irrelevant, since [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], at issue in the present case, does not govern the representation of parties before national courts but deals with the representation of parties before the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (judgment in Prezes Urzędu [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Poland v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , EU:C:2012:553, paragraph 36).

37. Consequently, the second ground of appeal must be rejected as being manifestly unfounded. The third ground of appeal Arguments of the appellant

38. By its third ground of appeal, [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] argues that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] incorrectly analysed the relationship between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:SOCIETA].

39. [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] contends that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8 of the ECHR must be construed as granting substantial safeguards for individuals, such as lawyers, who are tasked with undertakings of general interest.

Thus, denying a lawyer associated with a company the protection of legal privilege between the lawyer and that company would amount to interference with that company’s right to privacy.

Such a denial of the protection of legal privilege would also, [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] submits, amount to interference with a company’s right to privacy under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7 of the Charter.

Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]

40. First, it must be recalled that, as is clear from the case law cited in paragraph 18 of the present order, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has exclusive jurisdiction to establish the facts.

41. [OSCURATO:SOCIETA]’s argument that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in its assessment of the relationship between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] therefore does not fall within the jurisdiction of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, save where the facts or evidence are distorted, which, however, is not pleaded in the present case, and that argument must therefore be declared to be manifestly inadmissible.

42. Second, it follows from [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 256 TFEU and the first paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and also from [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 112(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment or order which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (see, inter alia, judgments in Bergaderm and Goupil v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑352/98 P, EU:C:2000:361, paragraph 34, and in Poland v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , EU:C:2012:385, paragraph 25).

43. A plea by which the appellant confines itself to alleging, by means of a mere abstract statement of legal principles, an error of law purportedly made by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not satisfy those requirements (see, to that effect, order in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑129/06 P, EU:C:2006:775, paragraphs 30 and 31).

44. In the present case, the claim that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] disregarded the principle of the right to respect for private life set out in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7 of the Charter and in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8 of the ECHR is too general and imprecise to be amenable to a legal assessment by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice in the context of the present appeal.

45. The third ground of appeal put forward by [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] must therefore also be rejected as being manifestly inadmissible.

46. Since none of the grounds of appeal raised by [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] can thus be upheld, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs

47. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 137 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, which applies to the procedure on appeal by virtue of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) thereof, provides that a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings.

48. Since the present order has been adopted before the appeal was notified to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and therefore before the latter could have incurred costs, it is appropriate to decide that [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] is to bear its own costs. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] part On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby orders:

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] shall bear its own costs.

Anonimizzato ex art. 52 D.Lgs. 196/2003
62014CO0259_EN [OSCURATO:PERSONA] part [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑259/14 P, APPEAL under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 23 May 2014, [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] , established in Rome (Italy), represented by L. Tantalo and G. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], avvocati, appellant, the other party to the proceedings being: [OSCURATO:PERSONA], defendant at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), composed of S. Rodin, President of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], M. Berger and F. Biltgen (Rapporteur), [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: N. Jääskinen, Registrar: A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], having decided, after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], to give a decision by reasoned order, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, makes the following [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1. By its appeal, [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] (‘[OSCURATO:SOCIETA]’) seeks to have set aside the order of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (T‑110/14, EU:T:2014:170; ‘the order under appeal’), by which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed, as being manifestly inadmissible, [OSCURATO:SOCIETA]’s action for annulment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] decision, taken after an audit, to proceed with partial recovery of an advance payment made to [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] pursuant to contracts No JLS/CJ/2007‑1/18, No JLS/CJ/2007‑1/19 and No JLS/CJ/2007‑1/21 relating to projects on the mediation procedure. Procedure before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the order under appeal 2. By application lodged at the Registry of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 13 February 2014, [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] brought an action seeking annulment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] decision cited in paragraph 1 of the present order. 3. The application stated that [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] was represented by [OSCURATO:PERSONA], ‘avvocato’, a shareholder in [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] and president of its board of administration. 4. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], deeming [OSCURATO:SOCIETA]’s action to be manifestly inadmissible, decided to give a decision on the action by reasoned order without taking further steps in the proceedings, pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 111 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 5. In that regard, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] pointed out, at paragraph 7 of the order under appeal, that it is settled case-law that — in accordance with Articles 19 and 21 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and in particular the third paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19, according to which ‘parties must be represented by a lawyer’ — a ‘party’ within the meaning of those provisions is not authorised to act in person before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] but is required to use the services of a third party, who must be authorised to practise before a court of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (order in Lopes v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice , C‑174/96 P, EU:C:1996:473, paragraph 11). 6. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] stated, in paragraph 8 of the order under appeal, that it is apparent from paragraph 24 of the judgment in AM & S Europe v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (155/79, EU:C:1982:157) that that requirement of representation is based on the conception of the lawyer’s role as collaborating in the administration of justice and as being required to provide, in full independence and in the overriding interests of justice, such legal assistance as the client requires. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concluded from this, in paragraph 9 of the order under appeal, that, in the light of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] case-law (order in EREF v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑74/10 P and C‑75/10 P, EU:C:2010:557, paragraphs 50 and 51), a lawyer who has administrative and financial powers within the company which he represents cannot act as that company’s legal representative before the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] as an independent third party. 7. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] added, in paragraph 10 of the order under appeal, that the provisions concerning the representation of non-privileged parties before the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must be interpreted independently, without reference to the laws of the different [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 8. Having established that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] position within [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] was therefore not compatible with the requirements of the representation of non-privileged parties before the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in paragraph 12 of the order under appeal, dismissed the action as being manifestly inadmissible. Form of order sought by the parties before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice 9. [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] requests the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice to set aside the order under appeal and to refer the case back to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for a decision on the merits. The appeal 10. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, where an appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], decide to dismiss that appeal in whole or in part by reasoned order. 11. In the present case, it is appropriate to make a ruling under that provision. 12. [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] puts forward three grounds in support of its appeal. The first ground alleges an incorrect interpretation of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. By its second ground, [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] contends that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] infringed [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 67(1) TFEU. The third ground alleges an incorrect interpretation of the concept of legal privilege and a failure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to observe the principle of the right to respect for private life, as set out in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7 of the Charter of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (‘the Charter’) and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for the Protection of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA], signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘ECHR’). The first ground of appeal Arguments of the appellant 13. By its first ground of appeal, [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] criticises the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on the ground that it misinterpreted [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and distorted the facts by finding that there was an employment relationship between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] such as to prevent [OSCURATO:PERSONA] from acting as [OSCURATO:SOCIETA]’s legal representative. 14. [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] disputes the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] finding that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] could not validly represent [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] before that [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], it submits, incorrectly assessed the factual circumstances of the case before it. Furthermore, the case-law cited in support of its reasoning is not applicable to the present case. 15. [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] claims that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is neither its employee nor bound to it by any employment relationship. He is an external consultant and is remunerated in that capacity. Moreover, although [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is the president of the board of administration of [OSCURATO:SOCIETA], he does not have any administrative or financial powers within the company. Furthermore, as a minority shareholder of [OSCURATO:SOCIETA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] cannot influence the company’s decisions or strategy. According to [OSCURATO:SOCIETA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must therefore be regarded as independent of that company. Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 16. As regards, first, the factual claims raised by [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] in this ground relating to the duties and responsibilities of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] within [OSCURATO:SOCIETA], it should be noted that those claims concern, in essence, the description of the functions performed by the president of the board of administration of that company, the detailed rules governing that company’s administrative and financial management and also details about the decision-making procedures within that company. 17. In that regard, it must be recalled that, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 256 TFEU and the first paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], an appeal is limited to points of law and must be based on grounds of lack of competence of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], breach of procedure before it which adversely affects the interests of the appellant, or infringement of EU law by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (judgment in Poland v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑335/09 P, EU:C:2012:385, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited). 18. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] therefore has exclusive jurisdiction to establish the facts, except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it, and to assess the evidence relied on. The establishment of those facts and the assessment of that evidence do not therefore, save where they are distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject as such to review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice (see, to that effect, judgments in EIB v Hautem , C‑449/99 P, EU:C:2001:502, paragraph 44, and in Poland v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , EU:C:2012:385, paragraph 24). 19. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the distortion must be obvious from the documents in the case-file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and evidence (see, to that effect, judgments in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑551/03 P, EU:C:2006:229, paragraph 54, and in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Makarov v Council and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑419/08 P, EU:C:2010:147, paragraph 32). 20. In the present case, since it must be held that [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] is seeking, by its claims, to secure a re-examination of the findings of fact made by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the order under appeal as they relate to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] position in relation to that company, those claims must be rejected as being manifestly inadmissible. 21. In so far as [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] criticises the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on the ground that it distorted the facts by finding that there was an employment relationship between [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA], it is evident that this argument is based on a manifestly erroneous reading of the order under appeal. It is clear from paragraph 11 of that order that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relied on the fact that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is associated with [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] and is, moreover, the president of its board of administration. 22. Second, [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in law in the application of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 23. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], however, correctly pointed out, in paragraph 9 of the order under appeal, that a legal person cannot be properly represented before the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] by a lawyer who has, within the body which he represents, administrative and financial powers (see, to that effect, orders in EREF v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , EU:C:2010:557, paragraph 50 and 51, and in ClientEarth v Council , C‑573/11 P, EU:C:2013:564, paragraph 12). 24. The requirement imposed by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] law that a party be represented in legal proceedings by an independent third party cannot be regarded as being a requirement designed solely to exclude the represented party from being represented by its employees or by those who are financially dependent on it (order in ClientEarth v Council , EU:C:2013:564, paragraph 13). 25. The essence of that requirement is, first, to prevent private parties from acting on their own behalf before the Courts without using an intermediary. Second, the purpose of the requirement for representation by a third party is to ensure that legal persons are defended by a representative who is sufficiently distant from the legal person which he represents (order in ClientEarth v Council , EU:C:2013:564, paragraph 14). 26. The conception of the lawyer’s role in the legal order of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which is derived from the legal traditions common to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and on which [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is based, is that of collaborating in the administration of justice and of being required to provide, in full independence and in the overriding interests of that cause, such legal assistance as the client needs (see, inter alia, judgments in AM & S Europe v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , EU:C:1982:157, paragraph 24; in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑550/07 P, EU:C:2010:512, paragraph 42; and in Prezes Urzędu [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Poland v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑422/11 P and C‑423/11 P, EU:C:2012:553, paragraph 23). 27. The requirement that a lawyer should be independent also applies to a situation such as that at issue in the present case, in which the lawyer, albeit not employed by the company which he represents and in which he owns shares, is the president of its board of administration. 28. Consequently, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not err in law in relation to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] by holding, in paragraph 11 of the order under appeal, that, in the light of the documents submitted by [OSCURATO:SOCIETA], the nature of the position held by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] is not compatible with representation of that company before the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 29. [OSCURATO:SOCIETA]’s first ground of appeal must, therefore, be rejected as being in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly unfounded. The second ground of appeal Arguments of the appellant 30. By its second ground of appeal, [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] claims that, by holding that the provisions of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had to be interpreted without reference to national law, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] infringed [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 67(1) TFEU. 31. [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] points out that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] specifically refers to national law. Moreover, there are no specific rules of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] law regulating the legal profession. 32. [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] argues that, since Italian law guarantees the independence of the lawyer and allows a lawyer who is associated with a company to represent that company before the national courts, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ought to have been allowed to represent [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] before the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 33. [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] adds that the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] have, on numerous occasions, denied lawyers authorised to represent certain organisations in their own [OSCURATO:PERSONA] the right to represent those organisations before the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Consequently, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice should reconsider its position on this point in order to take account of changes in the different [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 34. It should be noted that, with regard to the two cumulative conditions set out in the fourth paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], namely, that the representative, first, be a qualified lawyer and, secondly, be authorised to practise before a court of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] or of another [OSCURATO:PERSONA] which is a party to the Agreement on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 2 May 1992 (OJ 1994 L 1, p. 3), unlike the authorisation to practise before a court of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] or of another [OSCURATO:PERSONA] party to that agreement, the notion of a lawyer contains no express reference to the law of those [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope. Therefore, according to settled case-law, the need for uniform application of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] law and the principle of equality require that the terms of such a provision of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] law must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], having regard to the context of that provision and the purpose of the legislation in question (see, inter alia, judgments in Linster , C‑287/98, EU:C:2000:468, paragraph 43, and in Nokia , C‑316/05, EU:C:2006:789, paragraph 21; order in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] de Valencia v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑363/06 P, EU:C:2008:99, paragraphs 21 and 25). 35. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] therefore acted correctly in holding, in paragraph 10 of the order under appeal, that the provisions concerning the representation of non-privileged parties before the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must be interpreted, as far as possible, independently, without reference to national law (judgment in Prezes Urzędu [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Poland v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , EU:C:2012:553, paragraph 35). 36. It follows that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 67(1) TFEU, relied on by [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] in order to support a claim of infringement of respect for the different legal systems and traditions of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], is irrelevant, since [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 19 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], at issue in the present case, does not govern the representation of parties before national courts but deals with the representation of parties before the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (judgment in Prezes Urzędu [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Poland v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , EU:C:2012:553, paragraph 36). 37. Consequently, the second ground of appeal must be rejected as being manifestly unfounded. The third ground of appeal Arguments of the appellant 38. By its third ground of appeal, [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] argues that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] incorrectly analysed the relationship between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:SOCIETA]. 39. [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] contends that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8 of the ECHR must be construed as granting substantial safeguards for individuals, such as lawyers, who are tasked with undertakings of general interest. Thus, denying a lawyer associated with a company the protection of legal privilege between the lawyer and that company would amount to interference with that company’s right to privacy. Such a denial of the protection of legal privilege would also, [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] submits, amount to interference with a company’s right to privacy under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7 of the Charter. Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 40. First, it must be recalled that, as is clear from the case law cited in paragraph 18 of the present order, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has exclusive jurisdiction to establish the facts. 41. [OSCURATO:SOCIETA]’s argument that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in its assessment of the relationship between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] therefore does not fall within the jurisdiction of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, save where the facts or evidence are distorted, which, however, is not pleaded in the present case, and that argument must therefore be declared to be manifestly inadmissible. 42. Second, it follows from [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 256 TFEU and the first paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and also from [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 112(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment or order which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (see, inter alia, judgments in Bergaderm and Goupil v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑352/98 P, EU:C:2000:361, paragraph 34, and in Poland v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , EU:C:2012:385, paragraph 25). 43. A plea by which the appellant confines itself to alleging, by means of a mere abstract statement of legal principles, an error of law purportedly made by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not satisfy those requirements (see, to that effect, order in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑129/06 P, EU:C:2006:775, paragraphs 30 and 31). 44. In the present case, the claim that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] disregarded the principle of the right to respect for private life set out in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7 of the Charter and in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8 of the ECHR is too general and imprecise to be amenable to a legal assessment by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice in the context of the present appeal. 45. The third ground of appeal put forward by [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] must therefore also be rejected as being manifestly inadmissible. 46. Since none of the grounds of appeal raised by [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] can thus be upheld, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 47. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 137 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, which applies to the procedure on appeal by virtue of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) thereof, provides that a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings. 48. Since the present order has been adopted before the appeal was notified to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and therefore before the latter could have incurred costs, it is appropriate to decide that [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] is to bear its own costs. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] part On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby orders: 1. The appeal is dismissed. 2. [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] shall bear its own costs.
Sentenza Corte di giustizia UE/2014 — Fons Iuris — Fons Iuris