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Corte di giustizia UEsentenza

Corte di giustizia UE n. 2494/2019

ECLI:EU:C:2019:745
Testo integrale del provvedimento

Testo integrale del provvedimento

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) 16 September 2019( * ) (Appeal — EU trade mark — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 170b of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure — Request failing to demonstrate a significant issue of law with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law — Appeal not allowed to proceed)

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑421/19 P,

APPEAL under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 29 May 2019, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] GmbH, established in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (Germany), represented by R. Ingerl, Rechtsanwalt, appellant, the other parties to the proceedings being: Prim, SA, established in Móstoles (Spain), represented by L. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], abogada, applicant at first instance,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO),

defendant at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed), composed of R. Silva de [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA][OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], K. Jürimäe and N. Piçarra, Judge-[OSCURATO:PERSONA],

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]: M. [OSCURATO:PERSONA],

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]: A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA],

having regard to the proposal from the Judge-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] and after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], makes the following

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

1 By its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] asks the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to set aside the judgment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 20 March 2019, Prim v

EUIPO

—

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA])

(T‑138/17, not published, EU:T:2019:174), whereby the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] annulled the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO) of 19 December 2016 ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] R 2494/2015-4 and R 163/2016-4), in relation to cancellation proceedings between Prim and [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

Whether the appeal should be allowed to proceed 2 Pursuant to the first paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58a of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], an appeal brought against a decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concerning a decision of an independent [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of EUIPO is not to proceed unless the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] first decides that it should be allowed to do so. 3 In accordance with the third paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58a of that Statute, an appeal is to be allowed to proceed, wholly or in part, in accordance with the detailed rules set out in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure, where it raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] law. 4 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 170a(1) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure, in the situations referred to in the first paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58a of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the appellant is to annex to the appeal a request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, setting out the issue raised by the appeal that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] law and containing all the information necessary to enable the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice to rule on that request. 5 In accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 170b(3) of those rules, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is to rule on the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed in the form of a reasoned order. 6 In this case, in support of its request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, the appellant argues, first, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58a of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is inapplicable ratione temporis and, second, that its right to have its case handled impartially and fairly, as laid down in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41(1) of the Charter of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (‘the Charter’), has been infringed. 7 As regards the first argument, the appellant argues that the application of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58a of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to appeals brought after 1 May 2019 against decisions of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] delivered before that date is a breach of the right to an effective remedy before a court laid down in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 47 of the Charter, read in conjunction with the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations.

The appellant claims, in particular, that the conditions governing the admissibility of an appeal against a judicial decision must be in force and be known to the parties at least on the date when that decision is delivered. 8 In the first place, it must be recalled that the admissibility of an action must be determined on the basis of the rules in force on the date when that action was brought (see, to that effect, judgments of 8 May 1973, Campogrande v Commissio n, 60/72, EU:C:1973:50, paragraph 4 and, by analogy, of 24 October 2013,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

v Commission , C‑77/12 P, not published, EU:C:2013:695, paragraph 65).

The procedure that is the subject of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58a of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was in force when the appellant brought its appeal. 9 Further, the scope of the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations cannot be extended to the point of generally preventing new rules from applying to the future effects of situations which arose when the earlier rules applied (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 September 2015, A2A , C‑89/14, EU:C:2015:537, paragraphs 37 and 38). 10 It follows from the foregoing that, contrary to what is asserted by the appellant in its first argument, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58a of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is applicable in this case. 11 As regards the second argument, the appellant claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in holding that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of EUIPO had infringed the right to be heard of the applicant at first instance, infringed the appellant’s right to sound administration, in particular its right to have its case handled impartially and fairly as laid down in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41(1) of the Charter. 12 In this case, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held that that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal, in finding that there was no genuine use of the earlier marks in a period that had not been discussed by the parties, infringed the right to be heard of the applicant at first instance. 13 In that regard, the arguments submitted by the appellant fail to establish that the error of law which, according to the appellant, vitiates the judgment under appeal raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law, within the meaning of the third paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58a of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], capable of justifying a decision to allow the appeal to proceed. 14 Without prejudice to the significant place occupied, within the EU legal order, by the right to impartial and fair treatment and the right to be heard, it is clear that the appellant fails to demonstrate how the infringement of its right to impartial and fair treatment laid down in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41(1) of the Charter, even if it were established, raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law. 15 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed must be dismissed.

Costs 16 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 137 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure, applicable to the procedure on appeal pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) of those rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings. 17 In this case, since the present order is adopted before the appeal is served on the other parties to the proceedings and, therefore, before they could have incurred costs, it is appropriate to decide that the appellant is to bear its own costs.

On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) hereby orders:

1. The appeal is not allowed to proceed.

2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] GmbH shall bear its own costs.

Luxembourg, 16 September 2019.

A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA]

R. Silva de [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed * Language of the case: English.

Anonimizzato ex art. 52 D.Lgs. 196/2003
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) 16 September 2019( * ) (Appeal — EU trade mark — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 170b of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure — Request failing to demonstrate a significant issue of law with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law — Appeal not allowed to proceed) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑421/19 P, APPEAL under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 29 May 2019, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] GmbH, established in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (Germany), represented by R. Ingerl, Rechtsanwalt, appellant, the other parties to the proceedings being: Prim, SA, established in Móstoles (Spain), represented by L. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], abogada, applicant at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO), defendant at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed), composed of R. Silva de [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA][OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], K. Jürimäe and N. Piçarra, Judge-[OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: M. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], having regard to the proposal from the Judge-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] and after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], makes the following [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1 By its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] asks the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to set aside the judgment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 20 March 2019, Prim v EUIPO — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) (T‑138/17, not published, EU:T:2019:174), whereby the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] annulled the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO) of 19 December 2016 ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] R 2494/2015-4 and R 163/2016-4), in relation to cancellation proceedings between Prim and [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Whether the appeal should be allowed to proceed 2 Pursuant to the first paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58a of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], an appeal brought against a decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concerning a decision of an independent [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of EUIPO is not to proceed unless the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] first decides that it should be allowed to do so. 3 In accordance with the third paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58a of that Statute, an appeal is to be allowed to proceed, wholly or in part, in accordance with the detailed rules set out in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure, where it raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] law. 4 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 170a(1) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure, in the situations referred to in the first paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58a of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the appellant is to annex to the appeal a request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, setting out the issue raised by the appeal that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] law and containing all the information necessary to enable the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice to rule on that request. 5 In accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 170b(3) of those rules, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is to rule on the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed in the form of a reasoned order. 6 In this case, in support of its request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, the appellant argues, first, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58a of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is inapplicable ratione temporis and, second, that its right to have its case handled impartially and fairly, as laid down in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41(1) of the Charter of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (‘the Charter’), has been infringed. 7 As regards the first argument, the appellant argues that the application of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58a of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to appeals brought after 1 May 2019 against decisions of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] delivered before that date is a breach of the right to an effective remedy before a court laid down in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 47 of the Charter, read in conjunction with the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations. The appellant claims, in particular, that the conditions governing the admissibility of an appeal against a judicial decision must be in force and be known to the parties at least on the date when that decision is delivered. 8 In the first place, it must be recalled that the admissibility of an action must be determined on the basis of the rules in force on the date when that action was brought (see, to that effect, judgments of 8 May 1973, Campogrande v Commissio n, 60/72, EU:C:1973:50, paragraph 4 and, by analogy, of 24 October 2013, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Commission , C‑77/12 P, not published, EU:C:2013:695, paragraph 65). The procedure that is the subject of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58a of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was in force when the appellant brought its appeal. 9 Further, the scope of the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations cannot be extended to the point of generally preventing new rules from applying to the future effects of situations which arose when the earlier rules applied (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 September 2015, A2A , C‑89/14, EU:C:2015:537, paragraphs 37 and 38). 10 It follows from the foregoing that, contrary to what is asserted by the appellant in its first argument, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58a of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is applicable in this case. 11 As regards the second argument, the appellant claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in holding that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of EUIPO had infringed the right to be heard of the applicant at first instance, infringed the appellant’s right to sound administration, in particular its right to have its case handled impartially and fairly as laid down in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41(1) of the Charter. 12 In this case, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held that that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal, in finding that there was no genuine use of the earlier marks in a period that had not been discussed by the parties, infringed the right to be heard of the applicant at first instance. 13 In that regard, the arguments submitted by the appellant fail to establish that the error of law which, according to the appellant, vitiates the judgment under appeal raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law, within the meaning of the third paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58a of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], capable of justifying a decision to allow the appeal to proceed. 14 Without prejudice to the significant place occupied, within the EU legal order, by the right to impartial and fair treatment and the right to be heard, it is clear that the appellant fails to demonstrate how the infringement of its right to impartial and fair treatment laid down in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41(1) of the Charter, even if it were established, raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law. 15 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed must be dismissed. Costs 16 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 137 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Procedure, applicable to the procedure on appeal pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) of those rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings. 17 In this case, since the present order is adopted before the appeal is served on the other parties to the proceedings and, therefore, before they could have incurred costs, it is appropriate to decide that the appellant is to bear its own costs. On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) hereby orders: 1. The appeal is not allowed to proceed. 2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] GmbH shall bear its own costs. Luxembourg, 16 September 2019. A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] R. Silva de [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed * Language of the case: English.
Sentenza Corte di giustizia UE n. 2494/2019 — Fons Iuris — Fons Iuris