Corte di giustizia UE n. 2015/2018

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]) 13 December 2018 ( * ) ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid — Agreements between the Syndicat mixte des aéroports de [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and its subsidiary [OSCURATO:PERSONA] — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] services — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] services — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] declaring the aid incompatible with the internal market and ordering its recovery — Notion of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid — Imputability to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Commerce and Industry — Advantage — Private investor test — Recovery — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41 of the Charter of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] — Right of access to the file — Right to be heard) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑111/15, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] DAC, formerly [OSCURATO:PERSONA], established in Dublin (Ireland), [OSCURATO:PERSONA], established in Dublin, represented by G. Berrisch, E. Vahida, I.-G. Metaxas-Maranghidis, lawyers, and B. Byrne, Solicitor, applicants, v [OSCURATO:PERSONA], represented by L. Flynn and S. Noë, acting as Agents, defendant, APPLICATION under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU seeking the partial annulment of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EU) 2015/1226 of 23 July 2014 on [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid SA.33963 (2012/C) (ex 2012/NN) implemented by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in favour of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Commerce and Industry, SNC-[OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (OJ 2015 L 201, p. 48), [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]), composed of G. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA], S. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], D. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (Rapporteur), Z. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and O. [OSCURATO:PERSONA]-[OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: P. Cullen, Administrator, having regard to the written part of the procedure and further to the hearing on 25 October 2017, gives the following [OSCURATO:PERSONA] I. Background to the dispute A. Measures at issue 1 The applicants, namely [OSCURATO:PERSONA] DAC, formerly [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (‘AMS’), are, the former, an airline established in Ireland which operates more than 1 600 flights daily connecting 189 destinations in 30 countries across Europe and [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and, the latter, a subsidiary of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] which provides marketing strategy solutions, principally online, its activity consisting primarily of selling advertising space on [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s website. 2 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport (‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport’) is situated in the Department of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and was operated jointly in the period concerned by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Commerce and Industry (CCI) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] acting as manager (‘CCI-airport’) and the Syndicat mixte des aéroports de [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (‘SMAC’), whose members include the Department of [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Braconne and [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] CCI, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Cognac and the Cognac CCI. By order of the Prefect of 22 December 2006, ownership of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport was transferred from the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to SMAC. 3 Following the publication of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] call for projects, SMAC entered into an initial agreement with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and a second with AMS on 8 February 2008 (together ‘the 2008 agreements’). The initial term of those agreements was five years. 4 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] the first of those agreements, entitled ‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA]’, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] undertook to operate an initial flight programme of the route between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport, three times per week during the summer months. [ confidential ] ( 1 ) SMAC granted [OSCURATO:PERSONA] certain reductions on aeronautical charges compared with the general schedule of charges in force at the latter airport (passenger charge, landing charge and ground-handling charge). 5 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] the second of the agreements, entitled ‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA]’, AMS undertook to provide services for the first three years consisting in advertising on [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s website, in return for payment by SMAC of EUR 400 000 in 2008, EUR 300 000 in 2009 EUR 225 000 in 2010. 6 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] operated the route between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport during the summer seasons of 2008 and 2009. Taking the view that the route had ceased to be economically viable, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] terminated the 2008 agreements and stopped operating that route in February 2010. B. Administrative procedure 7 On 26 January 2010, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] registered a complaint lodged by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concerning advantages which [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had allegedly received at a number of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airports, including [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport. 8 By letter of 21 March 2012, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] notified the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of its decision to open the procedure laid down in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 108(2) TFEU with respect to the measures from which [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was alleged to have benefited in respect of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport (‘the opening decision’). In the publication of that decision in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 25 May 2012 (OJ 2012 C 149, p. 29), the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] called on the interested parties to submit their comments on those measures. 9 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] authorities submitted their comments to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and answered the questions set out by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the opening decision and subsequently. 10 By letters of 29 May and 20 July 2012, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s legal counsel requested, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41(1) and (2) of the Charter of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (‘the Charter’), that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] inform [OSCURATO:PERSONA], before adopting a final decision, of the facts and considerations on which it intended to base its decision, grant it access to the file, particularly to the evidence on which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] intended to base its decision, and afford it an opportunity to present its views, within a reasonable period of time after notification of the abovementioned facts and considerations. By letters of 19 June and 4 October 2012, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] refused those requests. 11 By letters of 25 June 2012, the applicants submitted their comments on the opening decision. By several subsequent letters, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] sent further comments. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] forwarded their comments to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] authorities, which did not comment on them. 12 By letters of 24 February, 13 and 19 March 2014, in accordance with the Guidelines on [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid to airports and airlines, published in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 4 April 2014 (OJ 2014 C 99, p. 3; ‘the 2014 Guidelines’), the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] invited the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] authorities and the interested parties to submit their comments on the application of those guidelines in particular to the measures concerning [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport and [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. On 19 March 2014, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] authorities submitted comments. 13 In addition, by a notice published in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 15 April 2014 (OJ 2014 C 113, p. 30), the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] invited the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and interested parties to submit their comments, including with regard to the measures concerning [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport in the light of the entry into force of the 2014 Guidelines. 14 In response to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] letters of 24 February and 13 March 2014, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submitted, by letter of 2 May 2014, comments on the application of the 2014 Guidelines to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid cases in which it was involved. In its letter, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] also gave its views on those guidelines. C. Contested decision 15 At the end of the formal investigation procedure, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] adopted [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EU) 2015/1226 of 23 July 2014 on [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid SA.33963 (2012/C) (ex 2012/NN) implemented by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in favour of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Commerce and Industry, SNC-[OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (OJ 2015 L 201, p. 48; ‘the contested decision’). 16 In the contested decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] gave a detailed description of the measures at issue. Those measures consisted of financial support to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport concerning investments in airport infrastructure and the costs associated with sovereign tasks and the operation of the airport (recitals 18 to 29) and the 2008 agreements entered into by SMAC with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and AMS (recitals 32 to 42). 17 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considered that the measures in favour of the operators of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport constituted aid within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 107(1) TFEU, and were nevertheless compatible with the internal market on the basis of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 106(2) TFEU and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2012/21/EU of 20 December 2011 on the application of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 106(2) [TFEU] to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest (OJ 2012 L 7, p. 3) (recitals 170 to 293 of the contested decision). 18 As regards the 2008 agreements which SMAC entered into with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and AMS, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concluded that they granted them [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 107(1) TFEU. 19 In that regard, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] found that the decision to enter into the 2008 agreements could be imputed to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (see recitals 297 and 298 of the contested decision). In order to determine whether any advantage had been conferred, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considered whether a hypothetical market economy operator motivated by the prospect of profits and managing [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport in place of SMAC and CCI-airport, would have entered into those agreements. 20 In that regard, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] began by taking the view that it was necessary, first, to analyse the 2008 agreements jointly as a single transaction (recitals 304 to 313 of the contested decision). Second, account should be taken only of the possible positive effect of the services performed under the second agreement concerning the number of passengers using the routes covered by those agreements during the period of operation of those routes, to the exclusion of any other excessively uncertain benefits (recitals 314 to 338 of the contested decision). Third, it was necessary to depart, for the purposes of applying the operator in a market economy test, from the method consisting of making a comparison with the ‘price on the market’ (‘the comparative analysis’) and to confine itself to an ex ante incremental profitability analysis (‘the incremental profitability analysis’) (recitals 339 to 349 of that decision). 21 Next, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] carried out its own incremental profitability analysis concerning the 2008 agreements. On concluding that analysis, it found that the anticipated annual incremental flows (revenues less costs) for the entire contractual period specified were negative. It inferred from that that those agreements conferred an economic advantage on [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and AMS (recitals 354 to 389 of the contested decision). 22 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] found that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid granted to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and to AMS constituted start-up aid for the opening of new routes, which did not satisfy the conditions laid down in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] guidelines on financing of airports and start-up aid to airlines departing from regional airports (OJ 2005 C 312, p. 1), which, according to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], were applicable in the present case and were accordingly incompatible with the internal market. 23 Finally, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] determined the amount of recoverable aid using the negative part, for each year in which the 2008 agreements were applicable, of the annual incremental flows estimated at the time when the agreements were concluded. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] assessed the recoverable aid at approximately EUR 868 695 in total. 24 In so far as is relevant, the operative part of the contested decision reads as follows: ‘ [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1 ... 2.      The payments made to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [AMS] by [SMAC] pursuant to [the 2008 agreements] constitute [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 107(1) TFEU granted unlawfully by [the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]], in breach of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 108(3) TFEU. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2 ... 4.      The aid granted in favour of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [AMS] by [SMAC] under [the 2008 agreements] is incompatible with the internal market. ... [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 3 1.      [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] shall recover the aid referred to in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(4) from the beneficiaries. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [AMS] are jointly liable for repayment of the aid. 2.      The sums to be recovered shall bear interest from the date on which they were made available to the beneficiaries until the date of their actual recovery. 3.      The interest shall be calculated on a compound basis in accordance with Chapter V of [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 794/2004 and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 271/2008 amending [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 794/2004. 4.      [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] shall cancel all outstanding payments of the aid referred to in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2 with effect from the date of adoption of this [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 4 1.      The recovery of the aid specified in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(4) shall be immediate and effective. 2.      [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] shall ensure that this [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is implemented within four months following the date of its notification. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 5 1.      Within two months following notification of this [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]] shall submit the following information to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: (a)       the amounts of aid to be recovered under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 3; (b)      a detailed description of the measures already taken and planned to comply with this [OSCURATO:PERSONA]; (c)      documents demonstrating that the beneficiaries have been given formal notice to repay the aid. 2.      [[OSCURATO:PERSONA]] shall keep the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] informed of the progress of the national measures taken to implement this [OSCURATO:PERSONA] until the aid referred to in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(4) has been fully recovered. At the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] request, it shall immediately submit all information on the measures already adopted and planned for the purpose of complying with this [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. It shall also provide detailed information concerning the amounts of aid and interest already recovered from the beneficiaries.’ II. Procedure and forms of order sought 25 By application lodged at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 1 March 2015, the applicants brought the present action. 26 By separate document lodged at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 11 August 2015, the applicants made an application for measures of organisation of procedure and, if necessary, measures of inquiry, by which they requested that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] produce certain documents. 27 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submitted its observations within the prescribed period. 28 Upon hearing the Judge-Rapporteur, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] invited, in the context of the measures of organisation of procedure provided for in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 89 of the Rules of Procedure, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the applicants to reply to some questions and requested the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to produce certain documents. Those parties replied within the prescribed periods. 29 By decision of 17 May 2017, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] decided to refer the case to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 30 On a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] decided to open the oral part of the procedure. 31 By decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA], of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 28 August 2017, the parties having been heard, Cases T‑111/15, T‑165/15 and T‑53/16 were joined for the purposes of the oral part of the procedure, pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 68(1) of the Rules of Procedure. 32 The parties presented oral argument at the hearing on 25 October 2017. 33 The applicants claim that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should: –        annul [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1(2), [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(4), and Articles 3 to 5 of the contested decision; –        order the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to pay the costs. 34 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should: –        dismiss the action; –        order the applicants to pay the costs. III. Law 35 In their application the applicants rely on four pleas in law in support of the action. 36 In response to a written question from the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the applicants withdrew the fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 107(1) and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 108(2) TFEU, in that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had manifestly erred when determining the amount of recoverable aid. 37 It is therefore necessary to examine only the first three pleas in law, alleging (i) infringement of the principle of good administration enshrined in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41 of the Charter and of the rights of the defence, (ii) incorrect imputation of the 2008 agreements to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and (iii) infringement of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 107(1) TFEU in so far as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed properly to apply the operator in a market economy test. 1. The first plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of good administration enshrined in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41 of the Charter and of the rights of the defence 38 The applicants maintain that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] infringed the principle of good administration enshrined in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41(1) and (2)(a) and (b) of the Charter by failing to allow them access to the investigation file and by failing to inform them of the facts and considerations on which it intended to base its decision and thereby depriving them of the opportunity to make their views known effectively. According to the applicants, those procedural errors also infringed their rights of defence and should result in the annulment of the contested decision. 39 In particular, the applicants state that, since the entry into force of the FEU Treaty on 1 December 2009, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41 of the Charter forms part of primary EU law and overrides any contrary provisions of secondary EU law, such as [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [108 TFEU] (OJ 1999 L 83, p. 1). 40 In support of the present plea, the applicants claim that they have the right to invoke the right to good administration under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41 of the Charter, since the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid investigation conducted by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in respect of their agreements with the SMAC constitutes an ‘affair’ of the applicants within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41(1) of the Charter. They consider that they enjoy the procedural rights laid down in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41(1) and (2) of the Charter, which go beyond the rights conferred by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 659/1999. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41(2)(b) of the Charter grants every person a right to have access to ‘his or her’ file, in the present case the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid file relating to the 2008 agreements. Second, the right to be heard, laid down in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41(2)(a) of the Charter requires that the applicants should be put in a position to make their views known effectively, which implies access to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] file and prior notification of the facts and considerations on which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] intends to base its final decision. 41 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] disputes that line of argument. 42 In that regard, in the first place, it should be noted that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41 of the Charter provides for the right of good administration. As set out in paragraph 1 of that article, every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. In addition, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41(2) of the Charter, that right includes in particular (i) the right of every person to be heard, before any individual measure which would affect him or her adversely is taken, and (ii) the right of every person to have access to his or her file, while respecting the legitimate interests of confidentiality and of professional and business secrecy. 43 The explanations relating to the Charter, published in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 14 December 2007 (OJ 2007 C 303, p. 17), state that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41 of the Charter is based on the existence of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] as subject to the rule of law, whose characteristics were developed in the case-law which enshrined inter alia good administration as a general principle of law. Moreover, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 52(7) of the Charter, those explanations are to be given due regard by the Courts of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 44 In addition, according to the case-law, it is for the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case (judgment of 21 November 1991, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑269/90, EU:C:1991:438, paragraph 14). 45 Furthermore, according to settled case-law, observance of the rights of the defence is, in all proceedings initiated against a person which are liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting that person, a fundamental principle of EU law. That principle requires that a person against whom the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has initiated administrative proceedings must have been afforded the opportunity during those proceedings to make known its views on the truth and relevance of the facts and circumstances alleged and on the documents used by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to support its claim that there has been an infringement of EU law (see judgment of 30 April 2014, Tisza Erőmű v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑468/08, not published, EU:T:2014:235, paragraph 204 and the case-law cited). 46 In the second place, it must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the procedure for reviewing [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid provided for in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 108 TFEU is a procedure opened only against the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] responsible for granting the aid. Only the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concerned, as the addressee of the future [OSCURATO:PERSONA] decision, may therefore rely on actual rights of defence. By contrast, the recipient undertakings of aid and their competitors are considered only to be parties concerned in the procedure for the purpose of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 108(2) TFEU. No provision reserves any special role to the recipients of aid, among all the parties concerned. They cannot rely on rights as extensive as the rights of the defence as such and cannot seek to engage in an adversarial debate with the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (see, to that effect, judgments of 24 September 2002, Falck and Acciaierie di Bolzano v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑74/00 P and C‑75/00 P, EU:C:2002:524, paragraphs 81 to 83, and of 12 May 2011, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]Pas-de-Calais and Communauté d’agglomération du Douaisis v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑267/08 and T‑279/08, EU:T:2011:209, paragraphs 71 and 78). 47 Thus, the parties concerned, unlike the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] responsible for granting the aid, do not have a right under the procedure for reviewing [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid to consult the documents of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] administrative file (judgment of 29 June 2010, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑139/07 P, EU:C:2010:376, paragraph 58). 48 The parties concerned have essentially the role of information sources for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the procedure for reviewing [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid. It follows that, far from enjoying the same rights of defence as those which individuals against whom a procedure has been instituted are recognised as having, parties concerned have only the right to be involved in the procedure to the extent appropriate in the light of the circumstances of the case (see judgment of 12 May 2011, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]Pas-de-Calais and Communauté d’agglomération du Douaisis v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑267/08 and T‑279/08, EU:T:2011:209, paragraph 74 and the case-law cited). 49 The applicants’ first plea in law must be examined in the light of those principles. 50 In this respect, it should be noted that the applicants, as parties concerned within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 108(2) TFEU, have a right to see the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] investigation into the 2008 agreements conducted impartially and fairly within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41(1) of the Charter, especially since the finding of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid in relation to their trade agreements with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport is likely to result in financial consequences for them in terms of the recovery of amounts received. 51 However, the reasoning of the applicants cannot be followed where they consider that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41(2) of the Charter grants them the right of access to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] administrative file in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid matters and the right to be heard on matters on which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] intends to base its final decision. 52 While the right to good administration under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41(1) of the Charter reflects the obligation to examine carefully and impartially all the elements of the case, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41(2) of the Charter lists a set of rights to be observed by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] administration, including the rights of defence, which include the right to be heard and the right to have access to the file. 53 However, in the procedure for reviewing [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid, the applicants, as beneficiaries of the aid, cannot rely on actual rights of defence. 54 It has already been held that the Charter was not intended to alter the nature of the review of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid established by the FEU Treaty or to confer on third parties a right of scrutiny which [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 108 TFEU did not provide (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 December 2014, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑140/13, not published, EU:T:2014:1029, paragraph 60, and of 6 July 2017, SNCM v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑1/15, not published, EU:T:2017:470, paragraph 86). The applicants’ argument that the Charter would be rendered meaningless if a right which it lays down could be excluded simply because it was not expressly reproduced in the FEU Treaty must therefore be rejected. 55 In that regard, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has held that if the persons concerned by a procedure for reviewing [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid were able to obtain access to the documents in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] administrative file, the system for the review of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid would be called into question. Whatever the legal basis on which it is granted, access to the file enables the parties concerned to obtain all the observations and documents submitted to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and, as the case may be, to adopt a position on those matters in their own observations, which is likely to modify the nature of that procedure (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 June 2010, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑139/07 P, EU:C:2010:376, paragraphs 58 and 59). 56 Similarly, the obligation for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to send the applicants prior notification of the evidence on which it intends to base its final decision would amount to establishing an adversarial debate such as that initiated for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] responsible for granting the aid (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2011, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Spain v Government of Gibraltar and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑106/09 P and C‑107/09 P, EU:C:2011:732, paragraphs 180 and 181). 57 Therefore, the applicants’ argument that the exercise of additional procedural rights of access to the file and the right to be heard, as claimed on the basis of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41 of the Charter, is not excluded by Articles 107 and 108 TFEU must be rejected. 58 It follows that, by adopting the contested decision without having granted access to the file and without having given notice beforehand of the facts and considerations on which it intended to base that decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not disregard the principle of good administration in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41(1) and (2) of the Charter or the applicants’ rights of defence, without prejudice, however, to their procedural rights as parties concerned guaranteed by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 108(2) TFEU. 59 None of the other arguments put forward by the applicants is capable of undermining those conclusions. 60 In the first place, the applicants cannot rely on the judgment of 12 July 1973, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Germany , (70/72, EU:C:1973:87, paragraph 19), concerning the aim of the communication required by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 108(2) TFEU, in order to claim that that provision does not preclude the granting to the parties concerned of rights additional to the right to submit their observations during the administrative procedure. On the contrary, that judgment essentially confers on the parties concerned the role of information sources. Likewise, according to the case-law, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is not obliged, under the system of Articles 107 and 108 TFEU, to involve third parties in the administrative procedure in an extensive manner (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 October 1996, Skibsværftsforeningen and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑266/94, EU:T:1996:153, paragraph 258). It cannot be deduced from that case-law, therefore, that the extensive involvement of third parties, as claimed by the applicants, is compatible with the general scheme of the procedure for monitoring [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid established by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 108 TFEU. 61 In the second place, the applicants submit that observance of the right of access to the file and of the right to be heard, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41 of the Charter, furthers the aim of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 108(2) TFEU, which is the gathering by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the most pertinent and comprehensive information. The observance of the procedural rights of private parties is especially important in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid proceedings, in which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] responsible for the aid and the beneficiary of it often have conflicting interests, as is demonstrated in the present case by the fact that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is a major shareholder in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] which leads to conflicts of interests, by the national litigation between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport and the applicants and the minimal, not to say harmful, participation of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] investigation. 62 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to case-law, the parties concerned cannot rely on actual rights of defence comparable to those of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] even if that [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which granted the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid, and the parties concerned, as the recipients thereof, may have diverging interests in the context of such a procedure (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 December 2009, EDF v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑156/04, EU:T:2009:505, paragraph 104, and of 16 March 2016, Frucona Košice v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑103/14, EU:T:2016:152, paragraph 54). 63 The fact that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concerned does not defend the interests of the recipient of the aid is not capable of altering the role of the recipient during the administrative procedure or the nature of its participation in that procedure, so as to confer on it, in respect of the rights of the defence, guarantees comparable to those of that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (judgment of 16 March 2016, Frucona Košice v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑103/14, EU:T:2016:152, paragraph 77). 64 In the third place, to the extent that the applicants call into question the validity of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 659/1999 as being contrary to the Charter, it is necessary, in any event, to reject that argument, since it is also based on the erroneous premiss that the Charter grants to recipients of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid the right of access to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid file and the right to be informed in advance of the facts and considerations on which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] intends to base its final decision. 65 For the same reasons, and contrary to what is claimed by the applicants, the fact that they could take note only of relevant information contained in the opening decision, as laid down in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 6 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 659/1999 cannot constitute an infringement of their rights. 66 In the fourth place, as regards the applicants’ argument that the judgment of 9 December 2014, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (T‑140/13, not published, EU:T:2014:1029), is irrelevant in the present case owing to the fact that the applicant was a complainant in the case giving rise to that judgment, it is sufficient to recall that, according to settled case-law, no special role is reserved to the recipients within the framework of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid control (see paragraph 46 above). Likewise, the applicants’ argument that the judgment of 29 June 2010, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (C‑139/07 P, EU:C:2010:376), is no longer relevant in the present case, in so far as it concerned [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid proceedings which were closed before the Charter became part of primary EU law, cannot succeed since that judgment highlights the fact that the granting to recipients of aid of a right of access to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] file would call into question the system for the review of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid. 67 In the fifth place, in so far as it follows from the foregoing that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not infringe either [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41 of the Charter or the applicants’ rights of defence, it is unnecessary to address the argument put forward by the applicants that the outcome of the procedure might have been different if the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had granted them access to the file and had informed them of the considerations and evidence on which it intended to base its final decision. 68 It follows that the applicants’ arguments referred to in paragraphs 60 to 67 above must be rejected. 69 However, in so far as, in the context of the present plea, an infringement of the rights of the defence is invoked, it is necessary to examine the right which the parties concerned, within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 108(2) TFEU, have to be involved in the administrative procedure to the extent appropriate in the light of the circumstances of the case (see the case-law cited in paragraph 48 above). 70 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that it is settled case-law that, in the context of an examination under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 108(2) TFEU, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is obliged to give notice to the parties concerned to submit their comments (see judgment of 8 May 2008, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑49/05 P, not published, EU:C:2008:259, paragraph 68 and the case-law cited). With regard to that obligation, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has ruled that the publication of a notice in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is an appropriate means of informing all the parties concerned that a formal investigation procedure has been initiated (judgment of 14 November 1984, Intermills v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , 323/82, EU:C:1984:345, paragraph 17), while also pointing out that the sole aim of this communication is to obtain from persons concerned all information required for the guidance of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] with regard to its future action (see judgment of 16 March 2016, Frucona Košice v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑103/14, EU:T:2016:152, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited). 71 In addition, according to the case-law, where the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] decides to initiate the formal investigation procedure, it is permissible for that decision merely to summarise the relevant issues of fact and law, include a preliminary assessment as to the aid character of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] measure in question and set out its doubts as to the measure’s compatibility with the internal market (judgment of 23 October 2002, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] de Guipúzcoa and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑269/99, T‑271/99 and T‑272/99, EU:T:2002:258, paragraph 104). 72 Thus, a decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure must give the parties concerned the opportunity effectively to participate in that procedure, during which they will have the opportunity to put forward their arguments. For that purpose, it is sufficient for the parties concerned to be aware of the reasoning which has led the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to conclude provisionally that the measure in issue might constitute new aid incompatible with the internal market (judgment of 30 April 2002, Government of Gibraltar v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑195/01 and T‑207/01, EU:T:2002:111, paragraph 138). 73 In the present case, it is common ground that, following publication of the letter informing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the opening decision, together with a summary of that decision calling on all the parties concerned to submit their comments, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] received comments from the applicants. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and AMS both submitted their comments by letters of 25 June 2012. They also lodged a number of additional documents during the formal investigation procedure. 74 In the opening decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] explained sufficiently clearly the reasons on which it had based its provisional conclusion that the 2008 agreements conferred aid within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 107(1) TFEU on the applicants and that that aid was incompatible with the internal market. 75 After having described, inter alia, the characteristics of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport and its traffic, the operators and owners of the infrastructure and the 2008 agreements, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] made a provisional assessment of the aid contained in those agreements in the light of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid criteria laid down in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 107(1) TFEU, including the private investor in a market economy test, in order finally to examine their compatibility with the internal market. In particular, as regards the application of the private investor test, it considered at that stage that the airport services agreement and the marketing services agreement should be assessed together. It also found that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] authorities had not provided any basis for comparison which could be used to assess whether the price paid by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] corresponded to the normal price and considered that the study of the costs incurred by the operator of that airport in providing the airport services in question could be part of the assessment of the ‘normal market conditions’. It invited the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] authorities to provide details of all the operating costs associated with or attributable to accommodating [OSCURATO:PERSONA] under those agreements. 76 Moreover, it is common ground that, further to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] letters of 24 February and 13 March 2014 and the publication of the notice of 15 April 2014 in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] inter alia submitted, by letter of 2 May 2014, comments on the approaches set out in the 2014 Guidelines as an assessment method for the purposes of the application of the market economy operator test, namely the comparative analysis and the incremental profitability analysis. 77 As regards their mere right to be involved in the administrative procedure in an appropriate manner, the applicants have adduced no evidence to show that they did not have sufficient knowledge of the reasoning provisionally followed and, therefore, that they were not able properly to submit their observations in that regard. 78 It follows that, during the formal investigation procedure which resulted in the adoption of the contested decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not infringe the applicants’ procedural rights. 79 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the first plea in law must be rejected in its entirety. 2. The second plea in law, concerning the imputability of the measures in question to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 80 The applicants claim that the contested decision is vitiated by a failure to state reasons and errors of assessment regarding the imputability to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the 2008 agreements. By an initial complaint, they claim that the reasoning of the contested decision concerning the imputability to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of those agreements is practically non-existent. By a second complaint, they claim that, by imputing to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] SMAC’s decision to enter into the 2008 agreements, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] applied criteria based purely on the nature of the entity, although the judgment of 16 May 2002, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (C‑482/99, EU:C:2002:294), requires confirmation of the existence of several indicators in order to establish that public authorities were involved in one way or another in the adoption by SMAC of measures in their favour. By a third complaint, they consider that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in its assessment since CCIs are not entities whose decisions are necessarily imputable to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. By a fourth complaint, they consider that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] views on the role of CCI-airport in the context of the imputability to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of those agreements are contradictory. 81 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contests that line of argument. (a) The first complaint, alleging failure to state reasons 82 The applicants maintain that the contested decision is vitiated by a failure to state reasons, given that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] reasoning concerning the imputability to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the 2008 agreements is practically non-existent, in so far as it refers generally to an earlier passage of the contested decision which concerns the imputability to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of aid measures granted to successive operators of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport. 83 In that regard, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, the statement of reasons required by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 296 TFEU must be appropriate to the act at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the court having jurisdiction to exercise its power of review. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment of 2 April 1998, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Sytraval and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑367/95 P, EU:C:1998:154, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited). 84 In the present case, it should be noted that, when analysing the imputability to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the 2008 agreements in recital 297 of the contested decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] referred to its analysis of the imputability to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the aid measures in favour of the operators of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport, made in recitals 206 to 210 of that decision. 85 However, that does not permit the conclusion that there was a failure to state reasons within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 296 TFEU. 86 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] reasoning concerning the imputability to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the 2008 agreements is clearly apparent from recitals 206 to 210 and 297 of the contested decision, read together. 87 It should thus be noted that, in recital 297 of the contested decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] stated that ‘SMAC’s decision authorising signature of the 2008 agreements’ was approved unanimously by the public bodies that are members of SMAC, which is itself directly or indirectly composed of local authorities and CCIs. Moreover, referring to point 8.1.2.2 of that decision, which concerns the imputability to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of aid measures in favour of the operators of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport, it noted that the characteristics of those entities meant that the decisions of SMAC concerning airport activities were imputable to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 88 In addition, under point 8.1.2.2 of the contested decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] observed, in recital 207 of that decision, that SMAC was a public body which had no employees and administratively formed part of the local authorities which it grouped together directly or indirectly. It added that, SMAC’s budgetary decisions, which are binding on its members, were taken by a committee made up of representatives of its members. Taking account of those factors, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] found that the decisions taken by SMAC relating to the activity of the airport were imputable to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 89 Furthermore, as regards the measures taken by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] CCI, which is one of the members of SMAC, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] pointed out, in recital 208 of the contested decision, that CCIs were public administrative bodies and as such were subject to public law. It added that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] law classed CCIs as ‘intermediary bodies of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’ and conferred on them the task of contributing to economic development, the attractiveness and land planning of the territory and support for businesses and business associations. It also explained that the airport operation task entrusted to the CCIs also derived from their role of supporting local and regional development, even though the activity of operating [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport is in itself an economic activity. Moreover, it found, in recital 209 of that decision that that law subjected CCIs to the supervision of representatives of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and that the authority exercising supervision had access to all CCI general meetings and could have items added to the agenda. In particular, decisions relating to initial, amending or implemented budgets were binding only once they had been approved, even tacitly, by the authority exercising supervision. It inferred, in recital 210 of that decision that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] CCI, in its capacity as CCI-airport, forms part of the public administration and that the measures adopted by it in favour of the operators of that airport are necessarily imputable to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 90 Moreover, as regards the question whether the resources of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] CCI constituted [OSCURATO:PERSONA] resources, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considered, in recital 205 of the contested decision, that local authority resources constituted [OSCURATO:PERSONA] resources for the purposes of applying [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 107(1) TFEU. 91 It follows that the contested decision clearly shows the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] reasoning to the effect that decisions taken by SMAC, in particular those authorising the signing of the 2008 agreements, on account of the characteristics of its members, namely local authorities and CCIs, were imputable to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 92 The fact that, in the contested decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] developed its reasoning regarding the nature of SMAC, local authorities and CCIs in relation to the aid measures in favour of the operators of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport did not prevent the applicants from understanding the reasoning followed with regard to the 2008 agreements. The reasoning is valid irrespective of the aid measure adopted by SMAC or its members. 93 In the light of the foregoing, the complaint alleging failure to state reasons must be rejected. (b) The second complaint, alleging an error of assessment regarding the imputability to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the decision taken by SMAC to enter into the 2008 agreements 94 The applicants claims that, since SMAC is an undertaking engaged in an economic activity, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was required, in accordance with the judgment of 16 May 2002, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (C‑482/99, EU:C:2002:294), to confirm the existence of several indicators in order to establish that public authorities were involved in one way or another in the adoption by SMAC of measures in favour of the applicants. The applicants claim, however, that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], disregarding that judgment, applied criteria based purely on the nature of the entity, such as the composition and powers of the SMAC committee approving the agreements, the provision of administrative services by members of SMAC and the fact that SMAC is owned by public-law entities including regional, local and municipal authorities and two CCIs. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not examine the involvement of public authorities in SMAC’s decision to enter into the 2008 agreements. 95 At the outset, it must be noted that, in the context of the present complaint, the applicants do not call into question the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] findings concerning the CCIs which are members of SMAC. It is only in the context of the third complaint, formulated in the alternative, that the applicants maintain that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] incorrectly considered the CCIs to form part of the public administration, whose decisions are necessarily imputable to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 96 Next, it should be noted that, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 107(1) TFEU, any aid granted by a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] or through [OSCURATO:PERSONA] resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods is, in so far as it affects trade between [OSCURATO:PERSONA], incompatible with the internal market. 97 In that regard, for advantages to be capable of being categorised as aid within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 107(1) TFEU, they must be granted directly or indirectly through [OSCURATO:PERSONA] resources and be imputable to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (see judgment of 15 July 2004, Pearle and Others , C‑345/02, EU:C:2004:448, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited). 98 Furthermore, intervention by a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] or through [OSCURATO:PERSONA] resources is not necessarily effected by the central [OSCURATO:PERSONA] authority of the respective [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. It may equally be effected by an authority situated below the national level. According to settled case-law, a measure adopted by a regional or local authority and not the central authorities can constitute aid if the conditions laid down by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 107(1) TFEU are satisfied (judgments of 14 October 1987, Germany v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , 248/84, EU:C:1987:437, paragraph 17, and of 6 September 2006, Portugal v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑88/03, EU:C:2006:511, paragraph 55). In other words, measures adopted by infra-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] entities (decentralised, federated, regional or other) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], whatever their status and description, fall, in the same way as measures taken by the federal or central authority, within the ambit of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 107(1) TFEU, if the conditions laid down by that provision are satisfied (see judgment of 12 May 2011, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]Pas-de-Calais and Communauté d’agglomération du Douaisis v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑267/08 and T‑279/08, EU:T:2011:209, paragraph 108 and the case-law cited). 99 In the present case, it must be noted that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] noted, in recitals 206 to 210 and 297 of the contested decision, that SMAC was a public body including local authorities and CCIs and that, moreover, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] CCI formed part of the public administration. 100 In addition, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] found, in recital 297 of the contested decision, that ‘SMAC’s decision authorising signature of the 2008 agreements’ was approved unanimously by the public bodies that are members of SMAC, which is itself directly or indirectly composed of local authorities and CCIs. 101 In particular, it is commonly accepted that the four members of SMAC which make up its committee dealing with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport have 13 votes between them, while the Department of [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] CCI have four votes each and the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Braconne and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has one vote and that those four members unanimously voted in the committee in favour of the decision to enter into the 2008 agreements. 102 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] inferred, in recital 298 of the contested decision, that the ‘decisions to conclude’ the 2008 agreements are imputable to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 103 Since the four members of SMAC are sub-national entities within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraphs 97 and 98 above, that finding must be upheld. 104 That finding is not vitiated by the applicants’ argument that since SMAC is an undertaking engaged in an economic activity, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was required, in accordance with the judgment of 16 May 2002, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (C‑482/99, EU:C:2002:294), to confirm on the basis of several indicators whether public authorities were involved in the adoption by SMAC of measures in favour of the applicants, namely the conclusion of the 2008 agreements. 105 Without there being any need to specify whether SMAC was a public undertaking within the meaning of the judgment of 16 May 2002, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (C‑482/99, EU:C:2002:294), it must be noted that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] inferred the imputability to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the 2008 agreements directly in so far as the local authorities and CCIs unanimously approved the signature of those agreements. 106 In those circumstances, it must be held that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not err, in any event, in establishing the involvement of public authorities in SMAC’s decision to enter into the 2008 agreements. 107 Thus, contrary to what the applicants claim, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not base its examination of imputability to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] merely on criteria allegedly based purely on the nature of the entity, namely the composition and powers of the SMAC committee of representatives and the control of SMAC by local authorities and CCIs. It only considered that the measures in question were imputable to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] after finding that the local authorities and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport CCI had exercised their decision-making power within SMAC with regard to the 2008 agreements. 108 For that same reason, the applicants’ reasoning cannot be followed, where they claim in essence that the unanimous vote of the members within the SMAC committee reflects their total control over that body and therefore indicates the application of a criterion based purely on the nature of the entity, which was condemned in the judgment of 16 May 2002, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (C‑482/99, EU:C:2002:294). That reasoning does not take into account the fact that the members of SMAC exercised their decision-making power within that committee. 109 In addition, for the purposes of its analysis of the imputability to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the 2008 agreements, it is without committing any error that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was entitled to refer, in recital 207 of the contested decision, to the administrative integration of SMAC in the local authorities. The case-law considers integration in the structures of the public administration to be a relevant indicator, among others, which may be taken into account in concluding that an aid measure is imputable to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (see, by analogy, judgment of 16 May 2002, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑482/99, EU:C:2002:294, paragraph 56). 110 It is also necessary to reject the other arguments raised by the applicants in the context of their second complaint. 111 In the first place, the applicants claim that the initiative for entering into the 2008 agreements lies with SMAC’s management and not with the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. According to the applicants, the approval of those agreements by the SMAC committee merely constitutes ex post confirmation of the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of SMAC, who took the initiative for those agreements alone. The members of that committee were not involved in the agreements themselves and they were not informed of their content in advance. 112 In that regard, it suffices to point out that, as follows from the foregoing, the members of SMAC played a direct and explicit role in SMAC’s decision, which was approved unanimously, to enter into the 2008 agreements, with the result that they must be considered to have been involved in that decision. Consequently, the fact that SMAC’s management was entitled to take the initiative to enter into those agreements is no obstacle to their imputability to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], since the local authorities and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] CCI took part in approving, as the case may be, without even discussing it, the conclusion of those agreements. 113 In the second place, the applicants claim that, in any event, the unanimous vote in the SMAC committee is merely one of several indicators and is by no means sufficient to establish imputability to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] within the meaning of the judgment of 16 May 2002, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (C‑482/99, EU:C:2002:294). 114 In that regard, it suffices to recall that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] found that the public authorities were involved in adopting SMAC’s decision to enter into the 2008 agreements directly on the basis of the unanimous vote of the three local authorities and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] CCI in favour of signing those agreements. Thus, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] performed its duty to provide evidence of the involvement of those entities in the adoption of that decision to the requisite legal standard. 115 The fact that the contested decision did not take into account the draft resolution of the SMAC committee and does not refer to any steps taken by the members regarding their preference or opposition to SMAC’s management’s entering into the 2008 agreements does not affect that finding. In accordance with what was stated in paragraph 112 above, the fact that the participation of the members in that committee was focused primarily on the approval of the proposal made by SMAC’s management, even if it were not discussed, sufficed to conclude that the members should be regarded as being involved in SMAC’s decision to enter into those agreements. 116 Moreover, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was not required to follow the analytical approaches it used in other decisions when finding that aid existed. Each case must be assessed separately according to the circumstances of the particular case (judgment of 9 December 2014, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑140/13, not published, EU:T:2014:1029, paragraph 110). 117 In the third place, the applicants claim that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should have included both SMAC’s decisions and those of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] CCI, taken into consideration as CCI-airport, in its analysis of the imputability to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the 2008 agreements. 118 In that regard, while recognising that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] CCI, taken into consideration as CCI-airport, plays a dominant role compared with the three local authorities in the decisions concerning the applicants, as they claim, the fact remains that SMAC was the sole signatory of the 2008 agreements with the applicants. Accordingly, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not err in examining the imputability to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the 2008 agreements by means of SMAC. 119 In the light of the foregoing, the second complaint of the second plea in law must be rejected. (c) The third complaint, alleging an error of assessment concerning the nature of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] CCI 120 The applicants claim that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in considering [OSCURATO:PERSONA] CCIs to be public authorities whose decisions are necessarily imputable to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], when they are hybrid entities whose statutory and actual role is that of undertakings which are independent of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] CCI, in particular, performs airport management activity. 121 In that regard, it must be noted that it is not disputed that the unanimous decision of the SMAC committee to sign the 2008 agreements was the result, on the one hand, of the nine votes cast by the local authorities and, on the other hand, the four votes cast by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] CCI. 122 Consequently, even if the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] CCI’s approval of SMAC’s decision to enter into the 2008 agreements was not imputable to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], it must be held that the votes of the three local authorities were necessary, or even sufficient, for SMAC to be able to include those agreements. 123 Even supposing that the approval of the decision to enter into the 2008 agreements required a qualified majority of two thirds within the SMAC committee, it must be held that the votes of the three local authorities constituted such a qualified majority and that those entities accordingly had the power to approve the conclusion of those 2008 agreements without the assent of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] CCI. In any event, those votes were necessary into order to make it possible to enter into those agreements. 124 It follows that, for that reason alone, as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] notes, public authorities must be considered to have been involved, in one way or another, in the adoption of SMAC’s decision to enter into the 2008 agreements, irrespective of any involvement on the part of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] CCI in SMAC. 125 Consequently, SMAC’s decision to enter into the 2008 agreements was imputable to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], irrespective of any involvement on the part of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] CCI. 126 Accordingly, it must be held that the third complaint is ineffective in so far as it criticises the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for having considered that the decisions taken by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] CCI concerning the conclusion of the 2008 agreements were imputable to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 127 In the light of the foregoing, the first complaint of the second plea in law must be rejected. (d) The fourth complaint, alleging contradictory reasoning 128 The applicants claim that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] gave contradictory reasons in the contested decision in finding, in the context of the examination of the imputability to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the 2008 agreements that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] CCI, in its capacity as CCI-airport, not only was part of the public administration (recitals 210 and 297 of that decision) but constituted an undertaking to which [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid had been granted (recital 178 of that decision). The same entity could not be part of the public administration and an undertaking in receipt of aid at the same time, since the two characterisations are mutually exclusive. 129 The applicants add that, by failing to classify [OSCURATO:PERSONA] CCI either as an undertaking or another entity, the contested decision prevents the applicants from determining whether the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] based the criterion of imputation to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the 2008 agreements, which was applied in the case of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] CCI, on the indicators referred to in the judgment of 16 May 2002, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (C‑482/99, EU:C:2002:294), or on the mere fact that it belonged to the public administration. The contested decision is therefore vitiated by a flaw in the statement of reasons concerning the classification of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] CCI. 130 In that regard, it must be noted that, first, in the context of examining the aid measures granted to the operators of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] found that SMAC and CCI-airport had jointly carried out, for the period in question, the economic operation of that airport and that the financial support given to CCI-airport constituted [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 107(1) TFEU (recitals 18, 19, 21, 178, 182 and 211 to 275 of the contested decision). 131 It must be noted that, next, in the context of examination of the 2008 agreements, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relied on certain factors, such as the legal status of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] CCI, the nature of its activities and the intensity of the supervision provided by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in concluding that that entity, taken into consideration as CCI-airport, formed part of the public administration whose decisions were necessarily imputable to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 132 It must be held that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considered that, by its business activity within the framework of CCI-airport, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] CCI received [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid — the financial support in question in the present case — and was, moreover, an entity that formed part of the public administration and had agreed to grant aid to the applicants, in the present case the conclusion of the 2008 agreements by SMAC. 133 Nevertheless, since the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid in question is distinct and was moreover examined separately in the contested decision, it cannot be considered, as the applicants claim, that the classifications as a recipient of aid and as an entity forming part of the public administration are incompatible in the present case. A public entity can be the recipient of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid once the undertaking is active in the marketplace. However, nothing prevents a public body, which has been invested with general interest missions and, in that context, exercising an economic activity under the supervision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which forms part of the public administration, from also granting aid to undertakings, such as the applicants, by way of a separate measure (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 March 2011, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA]Anhalt v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑443/08 and T‑455/08, EU:T:2011:117, paragraphs 143 and 145). 134 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that nothing prevents the exercise of an economic activity from being integrated in public administration organisations (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 April 1991, Höfner and Elser , C‑41/90, EU:C:1991:161, paragraph 21). Similarly, the fact that an entity is engaged in economic and non-economic activities at the same time does not prevent it from being classified as an undertaking within the meaning of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid rules as regards the first activities (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 October 2002, Aéroports de Paris v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑82/01 P, EU:C:2002:617, paragraph 74). 135 In addition, the inclusion of an entity, such as the operator of an airport, in the public administration does not preclude that entity from being able to be a beneficiary of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid. It should be recalled that the existence or otherwise of legal personality distinct from that of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], conferred by national law on a body carrying out economic activities, does not prevent the existence of financial relations between the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and that body and, consequently, the possibility that that body will benefit from [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 107(1) TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 March 2011, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA]Anhalt v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑443/08 and T‑455/08, EU:T:2011:117, paragraphs 128 and 129 and the case-law cited). 136 It follows that, contrary to what the applicants claim, the contested decision is not vitiated by contradiction in so far as it classifies CCI-airport as a recipient of aid and as an entity forming part of the public administration at the same time. 137 The fourth complaint of the second plea in law must therefore be rejected. 138 In the light of the foregoing, the second plea in law must be rejected in its entirety. 3. The third plea in law, alleging incorrect application of the market economy operator test 139 By the third plea in law, the applicants claim that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] misapplied the market economy operator test and thereby infringed [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 107(1) TFEU. 140 The third plea in law is divided into two parts. In the first place, the applicants submit that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was wrong to refuse to carry out a comparative analysis, whereas the carrying out of such an analysis would have led it to conclude that there was no aid. According to the applicants, the contested decision is also vitiated by failure to state reasons on that point. In the second place, the applicants submit that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] made manifest errors of assessment in its analysis of incremental profitability and failed to give sufficient reasons for it. 141 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] disputes that line of argument. 142 Before examining the two parts of this plea, it should be borne in mind as a preliminary point that, according to the settled case-law of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid, as defined in the FEU Treaty, is a legal concept which must be interpreted on the basis of objective factors. For that reason, the EU Courts must in principle, having regard both to the specific features of the case before them and to the technical or complex nature of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] assessments, carry out a comprehensive review as to whether a measure falls within the scope of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 107(1) TFEU (see judgment of 30 November 2016, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Orange , C‑486/15 P, EU:C:2016:912, paragraph 87 and the case-law cited). 143 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has nevertheless held that judicial review was limited with regard to whether a measure came within the scope of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 107(1) TFEU, in a case where the appraisals by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] were technical or complex in nature (judgment of 30 November 2016, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Orange , C‑486/15 P, EU:C:2016:912, paragraph 88). 144 In that regard, where, in order to determine whether a measure comes within the scope of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 107(1) TFEU, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must apply the criterion of the prudent private investor in a market economy, as a rule, the application of that test requires the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to make a complex economic assessment (judgment of 30 November 2016, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Orange , C‑486/15 P, EU:C:2016:912, paragraph 89). 145 However, although the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must not substitute its own economic assessment for that of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], it is apparent from now well-settled case-law that not only must the EU judicature establish, among other things, whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also whether that evidence contains all the relevant information which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 November 2016, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Orange , C‑486/15 P, EU:C:2016:912, paragraph 91 and the case-law cited). (a) The first part, alleging errors of assessment and failure to state reasons concerning the decision to depart from the comparative analysis in the present case 146 The applicants argue that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] wrongly refused to have recourse to a comparative analysis and that, had it carried out such an analysis, it would have found an absence of aid, with regard to both the airport services agreement and the marketing services agreement. 147 In the contested decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] noted that point 53 of the 2014 Guidelines provided for two alternative methods of assessment for the purposes of applying the market economy operator test: –        the comparative analysis under which aid to an airline using an airport could, in principle, be excluded where the price charged for the airport services corresponded to the market price; –        the incremental profitability analysis under which such aid could be excluded if it could be demonstrated through an ex ante analysis that the airport/airline arrangement would lead to a positive incremental profit contribution for the airport (recital 339 of the contested decision). 148 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] also noted that, in the 2014 Guidelines, it expressed doubts that, at that time, an appropriate benchmark could be identified to establish a true market price for the services provided by airports. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had therefore considered an incremental profitability analysis to be the most relevant criterion for the assessment of arrangements concluded by airports with individual airlines (recital 340 of the contested decision). 149 In the contested decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] also relied essentially on the following considerations in order to reject the comparative analysis: –        the revenue and cost structure tended to differ significantly from airport to airport (recital 341 of the contested decision); –        the liberalisation of the air transport market complicated any purely comparative analysis; commercial arrangements between airports and airlines varied widely and it was therefore difficult to compare them based on a price per rotation or per passenger (recital 342 of the contested decision); –        the findings of a comparative analysis submitted by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] during the administrative procedure (‘the study of 25 June 2012’) cannot be accepted, because the method adopted was limited to the benefits and payments resulting from the airport services agreement without taking into account the marketing services agreement (recitals 343 and 344 of the contested decision); –        thus, the charges paid by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for airport services at other airports cannot serve as benchmark for the application of the market economy operator principle (recital 345 of the contested decision); –        the price actually paid by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for use of the airport services of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport was negative during the years 2008 and 2009 (recital 346 of the contested decision); –        the airports included in the sample of comparator airports contained in the study of 25 June 2012 were not sufficiently comparable (recitals 347 and 348 of the contested decision). 150 In those circumstances, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considered that, in the present context, taking into account all the information available to it, there were no grounds for departing from the approach recommended in the 2014 Guidelines, namely the incremental profitability analysis (recital 349 of the contested decision). 151 It is necessary to examine, in the light of the applicants’ complaints, whether the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was entitled, without making an error, to depart from the comparative analysis and whether it gave sufficient reasons in the contested decision in that regard. (1) The rejection of the comparative analysis as a method of application of the market economy operator test 152 The applicants argue that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed to have regard to the fact that the comparative analysis was the main method of assessment for the purposes of the application of the market economy operator test to determine whether the arrangement had conferred an advantage on the private party, since that method is indeed consistent with the principle of legal certainty. Relying on the judgment of 3 July 2003, Chronopost and Others v Ufex and Others (C‑83/01 P, C‑93/01 P and C‑94/01 P, EU:C:2003:388, paragraphs 38 and 39), they submit that, as a general EU law principle, it is only in cases where a comparative analysis, in particular a ‘private investor’ comparator, is not available that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may rely on an incremental profitability analysis, which is not the case for airport or marketing services. 153 In this regard, it is settled case-law that the conditions which a measure must meet in order to be treated as ‘aid’ for the purposes of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 107 TFEU are not met if the recipient undertaking could, in circumstances which correspond to normal market conditions, have obtained the same advantage as that which has been made available to it through [OSCURATO:PERSONA] resources (judgments of 5 June 2012, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v EDF , C‑124/10 P, EU:C:2012:318, paragraph 78, and of 24 January 2013, Frucona Košice v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑73/11 P, EU:C:2013:32, paragraph 70). That assessment is made, in principle, by the application of the market economy operator test (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 24 January 2013, Frucona Košice v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑73/11 P, EU:C:2013:32, paragraph 71). 154 In order to ascertain whether a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] measure constitutes aid, it is necessary to determine whether, in similar circumstances, a market economy operator of a size comparable to that of the bodies managing the public sector might have been prompted to conclude the agreements concerned (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 March 1990, Belgium v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑142/87, EU:C:1990:125, paragraph 29, and of 3 July 2014, Spain and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑319/12 and T‑321/12, not published, EU:T:2014:604, paragraphs 40 and 42). 155 However, determining whether a market economy operator would have made an arrangement such as that in question cannot necessarily imply for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] the obligation to use the comparative analysis. That method is merely one analytical tool amongst others to determine if the recipient undertaking has received an economic advantage which it would not have obtained under normal market conditions (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 6 March 2003, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA]Westfalen v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑228/99 and T‑233/99, EU:T:2003:57, paragraphs 250 and 254, and of 3 July 2014, Spain and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑319/12 and T‑321/12, not published, EU:T:2014:604, paragraphs 43 and 44). 156 The selection of the appropriate tool is a matter for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] within the framework of its obligation to conduct a complete analysis of all factors that are relevant to the transaction at issue and its context, including the situation of the recipient undertaking and of the relevant market, to determine whether the recipient undertaking has received an economic advantage which it would not have obtained under normal market conditions (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 March 2003, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA]Westfalen v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑228/99 and T‑233/99, EU:T:2003:57, paragraphs 251 and 258, and of 3 July 2014, Spain and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑319/12 and T‑321/12, not published, EU:T:2014:604, paragraph 45). 157 In the present case, without it being necessary to consider at this stage the merits of the grounds relied on by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in order to depart from the comparative analysis in the present case, it must be held that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] could therefore, without committing an error, examine, in recitals 339 to 349 of the contested decision, what was in the present case the most appropriate assessment method to choose for the purposes of the application of the market economy operator test. Thus, questioning whether it is currently possible to define an appropriate benchmark to establish a true market price for the airport services and taking into account considerations relating to the divergence of costs and revenues between airports, the low comparability of the transactions between airports and airlines, the existence of a negative price actually paid by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for the airport services in question and the inadequacy of the study of 25 June 2012, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] opted for the incremental profitability analysis method and departed from the comparative analysis. 158 That approach of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is not undermined by the case-law relied on by the applicants, namely the judgment of 3 July 2003, Chronopost and Others v Ufex and Others (C‑83/01 P, C‑93/01 P and C‑94/01 P, EU:C:2003:388, paragraphs 38 and 39), according to which, in the absence of any possibility of comparing the situation of a public undertaking with that of a private undertaking not operating in a reserved sector, normal market conditions, which are necessarily hypothetical, must be assessed by reference to the objective and verifiable elements which are available, such as the costs incurred by the public undertaking. That case-law must be read in the context of the circumstances of the case which gave rise to that judgment, namely the impossibility of applying a comparative analysis and therefore the lack of choice between such analysis and other methods. Consequently, in the abovementioned judgment, contrary to what the applicants essentially argue, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not rule on the existence of a hierarchy between the comparative analysis and other methods, but merely stated that it was not possible to have recourse to a comparative analysis in the present case. 159 It follows that the applicants’ argument concerning the existence of a general principle of EU law allegedly referred to in the judgment of 3 July 2003, Chronopost and Others v Ufex and Others (C‑83/01 P, C‑93/01 P and C‑94/01 P, EU:C:2003:388), which is said to establish a hierarchy between the comparative analysis and other methods, cannot succeed. 160 Similarly, the applicants cannot properly rely on the fact that the judgments of 6 March 2003, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA]Westfalen v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (T‑228/99 and T‑233/99, EU:T:2003:57), and of 3 July 2014, Spain and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (T‑319/12 and T‑321/12, not published, EU:T:2014:604), concerned the analytical tool of an average return in the sector, given that, in those judgments, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held that the use of an average return in the sector is only one analytical tool amongst others in the context of the application of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 107(2) TFEU. 161 Nor can the applicants properly rely on the case-law according to which the fact that the transaction at issue is reasonable for the public authority does not exempt the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] from ascertaining whether the measure in question conferred on the recipient undertaking an economic advantage which it would not have obtained under normal market conditions (judgment of 13 September 2010, Greece and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑415/05, T‑416/05 and T‑423/05, EU:T:2010:386, paragraph 213). The incremental profitability analysis aims precisely at establishing whether, by the conclusion of the agreement, the public authority acting as a market economy operator finding itself, to the extent possible, in the same situation conferred an economic advantage on the other party to the agreement which it could not have obtained under normal market conditions. 162 It follows that the applicants’ argument that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was required to carry out a comparative analysis in the case of marketing or airport services must be rejected. (2) The complaints concerning the grounds relied on in the contested decision to depart, in the present case, from the comparative analysis 163 The applicants dispute the specific reasons on which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relied in recitals 340 to 348 of the contested decision to depart, in the present case, from the comparative analysis as an assessment method for the purposes of applying the market economy operator test. 164 In particular, the applicants essentially put forward four complaints that the grounds in question contain errors of assessment and failures to state reasons. (i) The complaint, alleging that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in finding that diversity among airports justified its departure from the comparative analysis 165 The applicants maintain that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was wrong to find that the diversity among airports’ conditions invalidated the study of 25 June 2012. 166 In the first place, as regards the ground relating to the difference in the cost and revenue structure between airports (recital 341 of the contested decision), the applicants assert that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has not provided any data or examples to explain the degree and importance of those differences. It was for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to put forward arguments specific to the case in order to justify the rejection of the comparative analysis, which is the main method of assessment for the purposes of applying the private investor test. 167 In that regard, it is sufficient to note that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] found, in recital 341 of the contested decision, that the cost and revenue structure tends to differ significantly from airport to airport and, in support of that finding, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] listed a series of indicators of cost and revenue discrepancy. Furthermore, the applicants have not put forward any specific argument permitting the inference that the account of those indicators is vitiated by a manifest error of assessment. 168 In the second place, as for the ground relating to the low comparability of the transactions between airports and airlines (recital 342 of the contested decision), the applicants argue that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] incorrectly maintained that airport charges were generally not comparable between airports. 169 In this respect, it should be noted that the applicants make an incorrect reading of the contested decision when they claim that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considered that airport charges between airports were not comparable. In recital 342 of that decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] explained that, as shown in the present case, commercial relationships between airports and airlines were not based on a list of public prices for individual services, but varied widely and therefore it was difficult to compare them based on a price per rotation or per passenger. 170 Furthermore, the file shows that the 2008 agreements went well beyond a mere application of the general schedule of charges in force at [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport in terms of airport charges and included the conclusion of an airport services agreement and a marketing services agreement. 171 Moreover, so far as concerns the applicants’ argument that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] could not invoke the liberalisation of the air transport sector in Europe to justify its departure in the present case from the comparative analysis without providing evidence to substantiate it, it should be noted that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] alluded, in recital 342 of the contested decision, to the liberalisation to explain the heterogeneity of commercial practices among airports, which makes it more complicated to carry out a purely comparative analysis. Contrary to what the applicants claim, that decision does not accordingly aim to exclude the comparative analysis in determining whether a market economy operator would have made a specific arrangement in liberalised sectors, or in all sectors. 172 In the third place, as regards the applicants’ argument that the fact that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] departed, in the present case, from the comparative analysis in order to determine whether a market economy operator would have made a specific arrangement in the air transport sector in Europe is contrary to the approach previously taken by that institution in respect of other sectors, it must be noted that the concept of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid is a legal concept and must be interpreted solely on the basis of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 107(1) TFEU, and not on the basis of any previous administrative practice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], assuming that it is established (see, to that effect, judgments of 30 September 2003, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑57/00 P and C‑61/00 P, EU:C:2003:510, paragraphs 52 and 53, and of 3 July 2014, Spain and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑319/12 and T‑321/12, not published, EU:T:2014:604, paragraph 46). 173 Moreover, as regards the applicants’ argument that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is not ‘credible’ when it maintains that the comparative analysis ‘has no role to play’ in respect of airport services, even though it collected information relating to the comparison of airports during the administrative procedure following requests for information, it suffices to note that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considered, ultimately, that that information was irrelevant for the purposes of applying the market economy operator test. In addition, as it found in recital 348 of the contested decision, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed to establish that the comparator airports it proposed were sufficiently comparable to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport with regard to a certain number of parameters. 174 Accordingly, in view of all of the foregoing, it must be held that the complaint alleging that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was wrong to find that the diversity among airports justified its departure, in the present case, from the comparative analysis must be rejected. (ii) The complaint alleging that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was wrong to find that the comparative analysis should be based on a comparison of the 2008 agreements together with other similar transactions 175 At the outset, it must be noted that, in the contested decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] rejected the study of 25 June 2012 (recitals 343 to 348). 176 The study of 25 June 2012, first, identifies four comparator airports on the basis of a previously defined methodology. It then compares the charges paid by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport with the charges it pays to the comparator airports. Finally, the study concludes that the charges paid by that airline to that airport are substantially higher than those paid on average to those comparator airports, both on the basis of a price per rotation and on the basis of a price per passenger. According to that study, those results suggest that the charges paid by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport are consistent with those that it would have been offered in similar circumstances by a private market economy investor owning an airport. In addition, that study indicates that the analysis carried out does not take into account the marketing agreements, that is to say the marketing services agreement established between SMAC and AMS. 177 The applicants claim that the marketing services agreement concluded by SMAC and AMS should not be part of a joint comparison of the 2008 agreements with the charges of the comparator airports. 178 According to the applicants, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in rejecting, in recitals 344 and 345 of the contested decision, the conclusions drawn in study of 25 June 2012 on the ground that it merely concerns benefits and payments under the airport services agreement and disregards the payments to AMS under the marketing services agreement. They maintain that the price of the services provided in performance of that agreement reflects their value, as was shown by several economic studies which they produced during the administrative procedure. The airport services agreement and the marketing services agreement are two separate agreements each providing for adequate consideration in exchange for the services provided. The applicants submit that the fact that the 2008 agreements were signed at the same time by companies belonging to the same group do not suffice to justify the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] approach of treating payments under the marketing services agreement as a rebate on the airport charges provided for in the airport services agreement. Consequently, if it were necessary to analyse them together in a comparative analysis, the value of the marketing services, which is equal to the price to be paid under the marketing services agreement, should be added to that of the airport services, which cancels out the effect on the prices of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport compared to those of the comparator airports. 179 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, when the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] reviews whether a specific transaction contains [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid elements, it is required to take into account the context in which that transaction takes place (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 December 2011, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑244/08, not published, EU:T:2011:732, paragraph 57). The examination of a transaction outside its context could lead to purely formal results which do not correspond to economic reality (judgment of 8 January 2015, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑58/13, not published, EU:T:2015:1, paragraph 91). 180 When applying the private investor test, it is necessary to envisage the commercial transaction as a whole in order to determine whether the public entity has acted as a rational operator in a market economy. When assessing the measures at issue, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must examine all the relevant features of the measures and their context (judgment of 17 December 2008, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑196/04, EU:T:2008:585, paragraph 59; see also, to that effect, judgment of 6 March 2003, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA]Westfalen v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑228/99 and T‑233/99, EU:T:2003:57, paragraph 270). 181 In the present case, in the contested decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considered that it was necessary to carry out a joint analysis of the 2008 agreements, which constituted a single transaction, in order to determine whether they constituted [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid (recitals 304 to 313 of the contested decision). In reaching that conclusion, first, it stated that those agreements had been concluded on the same date and by the same parties, which constituted a single economic entity (recital 307 of the contested decision). Moreover, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] stated that the marketing services agreement was linked to [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s operation of air routes to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport (recital 308 of the contested decision). According to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the commercial relationship between SMAC and the applicants could be envisaged only in the unique context of [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s launch of the route linking [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport. In that regard, it referred to an audit carried out on behalf of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] local authorities and the statements of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] authorities declaring that those agreements constituted a coherent and comprehensive contractual arrangement that is indivisible. Moreover, it explained that the assessment of the inseparable link between the marketing services agreement and the route operated by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was reinforced by the provisions of that agreement, in which the clause relating to its object stipulated that it was based on [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s commitment to operate an air route between that airport and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) (recital 309 of the contested decision). In addition, it stated that the purpose of the marketing services agreement was to provide advertising space on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] website in order to promote [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) as a travel destination among visitors to that website and hence among the customers of the airline (recital 310 of the contested decision). It concluded that the costs associated with the agreement in question were, for SMAC, attributable to the opening of the route between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the benefits of that agreement could derive only from additional revenues linked to the passenger traffic on that route (recital 311 of the contested decision). Finally, it found that the agreement in question was inseparable from the airport services agreement and the air transport services that constitute its subject matter (recital 312 of the contested decision). It noted that the facts presented above showed that, in the absence of that route, and hence of the airport services agreement, the marketing services agreement would not have made sound economic sense for [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport and consequently would not have been concluded. It stated that at that time [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was the only large airline serving that airport and which could have increased traffic. According to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], if the airport wanted to promote traffic on other routes served by other competitor airlines, it is reasonable to assume that it would not have advertised on that website. 182 The applicants have failed to call that analysis into question. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not merely rely on the fact that the 2008 agreements had been signed on the same day by parties belonging to the same group of companies, but it considered those factors in relation to others such as the subject matter and terms and conditions of the marketing services agreement and the fact that it did not make sound economic sense for [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport to enter into that agreement without [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s providing a route. In that regard, it must be noted that the agreement in question expressly provided, however, that it was based on [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s commitment to operate a route between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 183 Moreover, the applicants have not adduced any evidence to invalidate the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] assessment that the marketing services agreement was inseparable from the airport services agreement and the air transport services covered by it. 184 It follows that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was entitled to consider without committing any error that it was necessary to analyse the 2008 agreements jointly, as a single transaction. 185 Consequently, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was entitled, without committing any error, to reject the findings of the study of 25 June 2012 as irrelevant and to rely on a joint analysis of the 2008 agreements (recital 344 of the contested decision). That study merely compared the airport charges imposed by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport with the airport charges imposed by certain airports in Europe selected for the purposes of comparison, whereas the correct application of the market economy operator test meant that, in the present case, those agreements had to be taken into account as a single transaction. 186 The applicants’ argument that the price paid under the marketing services agreement corresponded to the actual value of the services to be performed under that agreement must be rejected. That argument is based on the unsubstantiated assumption that the marketing services and airport services are distinct and independent (see paragraphs 179 to 184 above) and that, therefore, the price to be paid for marketing services cannot be considered to be a cost attributable to the opening of the route between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] that should be deducted from additional revenues, including airport charges, linked to the passenger traffic on that route. 187 It follows that the applicants’ claim that the price paid under the marketing services agreement corresponded to the actual value of the services to be performed under that agreement must be rejected. 188 Accordingly, the complaint alleging that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was wrong to find that the comparative analysis should be based on a comparison of the 2008 agreements viewed as a whole must be rejected. (iii) The complaint alleging that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] incorrectly considered that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] paid a negative price 189 The applicants claim that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in rejecting the study of 25 June 2012 on the ground that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had paid a ‘negative price’ in 2008 and 2009 for the use of the airport services of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport. The finding of a negative price is irrelevant with regard to the comparative analysis and at best has a role to play only in the context of the incremental profitability analysis. 190 In that regard, it is true that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] stated, in recital 346 of the contested decision, among the factors of its examination of the appropriateness of the comparative analysis, that the price actually paid by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for the use of those airport services had been negative in 2008 and 2009 and that the expected non-aeronautical revenues were not sufficient or likely to be developed during the term of the airport services agreement to the extent necessary to offset the negative price. 191 However, it should be noted that the comparative analysis is only one analytical tool amongst others for the purposes of applying the private investor test for the purpose of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 107(1) TFEU and that the use of the comparative analysis cannot relieve the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of its obligation to make a complete analysis of all factors that are relevant to the transaction at issue and its context. It was therefore entitled to take into account the fact that a negative return was foreseeable in a given transaction (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 July 2014, Spain and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑319/12 and T‑321/12, not published, EU:T:2014:604, paragraphs 44 and 45). 192 Therefore, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not err in referring to the negative price paid by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in its examination of the appropriateness of the study of 25 June 2012. 193 Accordingly, the complaint alleging that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] incorrectly considered that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] paid a negative price must be rejected. (iv) The complaint alleging that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in finding that the evidence provided by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed to demonstrate that the airports selected in the study of 25 June 2012 were sufficiently comparable to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport and a failure to state reasons in that regard 194 The applicants submit that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was wrong to find that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had failed to show that the four airports chosen in the study of 25 June 2012 were sufficiently comparable to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport. In that regard, first, they claim that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed to examine, let alone refute, the method used in that study to identify those selected airports. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed to establish that those airports did not constitute appropriate points of comparison. It wrongly criticised that study for the fact that one of the comparison criteria selected was based on belonging to the category of airports with a traffic volume of less than 1 000 000 passengers per year. In the reply, the applicants add that, in rejecting the study in question, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] incorrectly referred to the negative fee paid by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on account of the marketing fees paid by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport. Consequently, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed to give reasons and committed a manifest error of assessment. Second, the applicants argue that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not approach privately owned or privately operated airports in order to find out what prices they charged and therefore made no attempt to find comparison criteria. 195 In that regard, as regards the line of argument that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in considering that the evidence submitted by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not show that the airports selected in the study of 25 June 2012 were sufficiently comparable to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport, it should be noted that, as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] states, the fact that the marketing services agreement was not taken into account was sufficient to exclude the method used in that study (recital 344 of the contested decision). The application of the private investor test in the present case requires that the 2008 agreements, which constitute a single transaction, be analysed jointly (see paragraphs 179 to 184 above). Therefore, that argument must be rejected as ineffective. 196 In addition, it must be pointed out that the fact that the contested decision does not set out, for each of the airports selected in the study of 25 June 2012, the reasons why they could not be identified as comparators does not, by itself, allow the conclusion that there was a failure to provide a statement of reasons for the purpose of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 296 TFEU. 197 It should be borne in mind in this regard that, according to settled case-law, the statement of reasons required by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 296 TFEU must be appropriate to the act at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the court having jurisdiction to exercise its power of review. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of that provision must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment of 2 April 1998, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Sytraval and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑367/95 P, EU:C:1998:154, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited). 198 In the present case, in recital 340 of the contested decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] recalled its doubts, as expressed in point 59 of the 2014 Guidelines, that, at that time, an appropriate benchmark could be identified to establish a true market price for the services provided by airports. In addition, it found, in recital 347 of that decision, that the airports for which a negative price could be justified were few in number and did not feature in the sample of comparator airports contained in the study of 25 June 2012 and that the characteristics of the airports making up that sample were too disparate to provide a satisfactory basis for analysis. It stated that one of the comparators chosen was based on classification in the category of airports with a traffic volume of less than 1 000 000 passengers per year and that, since the charges applied by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport were compared to those applied by airports whose annual traffic was several hundred thousand passengers per year, the resulting comparative analysis was made on a basis that was not precise enough to be acceptable. Finally, with reference to the parameters set out in point 60 of those guidelines, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] found, in recital 348 of the contested decision, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had not shown how the airports it referred to were sufficiently comparable in terms of traffic volume, type of traffic, type and level of airport services, the presence of a large city in the vicinity of the airport, the number of inhabitants in the catchment area, prosperity in the surrounding area, and the existence of different geographical areas likely to attract passengers. 199 Admittedly, in the contested decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not specify in more detail the reasons why it did not accept the sample of airports chosen in the study of 25 June 2012 as a valid benchmark. 200 However, it cannot be disputed that the determination of comparator airports is based on complex technical assessments. Since the contested decision clearly disclosed the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] reasoning, enabling the substance of that decision to be challenged subsequently before the competent court, it would be excessive to require a specific statement of reasons for each of the technical choices or each of the figures on which that reasoning was based (see, to that effect, judgments of 1 July 2008, Chronopost and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v UFEX and Others , C‑341/06 P and C‑342/06 P, EU:C:2008:375, paragraph 108, and of 27 April 2017, Germanwings v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑375/15, not published, EU:T:2017:289, paragraph 45; see also, by analogy, judgment of 12 July 2005, Alliance for [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others , C‑154/04 and C‑155/04, EU:C:2005:449, paragraph 134). 201 Therefore, an explanation, for each of the airports selected in the study of 25 June 2012, of the reasons why they could not be accepted was not necessary in the contested decision for the applicants to understand the reasoning followed by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 202 Thus, the applicants were in a position effectively to challenge before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] rejection of the sample of airports selected in the study of 25 June 2012. 203 Therefore, the line of argument alleging failure to state reasons must be rejected. 204 In addition, the applicants fail to demonstrate that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] made a manifest error of assessment concerning the method of selecting the comparator airports. 205 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the applicants’ argument concerning classification in the category of airports with a traffic volume of less than 1 000 000 passengers per year cannot succeed. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] explains in recital 347 of the contested decision that the study of 25 June 2012 compares the airport charges applied by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport to those applied by airports whose annual traffic is several hundred thousand passengers per year, and concludes that the resulting analysis is made on a basis that is not precise enough to be acceptable. 206 In that regard, it must be held that, since, in recital 348 of the contested decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] also based its rejection of the study of 25 June 2012 on a number of other parameters, it has not been established that the finding relating to the parameter concerning the overall size of the airport was decisive in concluding that the comparator airports were not sufficiently comparable. 207 Second, the applicants do not call into question the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] finding, in recital 347 of the contested decision, that the airports for which a negative price could be justified were few in number and did not feature in the sample of comparator airports contained in the study of 25 June 2012. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] explained, without contradiction by the parties, that that study did not include airports for which a negative price would be justified. 208 Third, the applicants claim that they gave a very detailed explanation of the selection criteria used for the comparator airports, both generally and with specific reference to the airport. They refer inter alia to the study of 25 June 2012. 209 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submits that the study of 25 June 2012 had no value for the purpose of establishing the market price of the 2008 agreements. 210 In this respect, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] maintains that Bournemouth airport is owned by a [OSCURATO:PERSONA]-owned entity and that the study of 25 June 2012 does not claim that it is operated on a market economy basis, that Grenoble airport only operates in the winter ski season, that Maastricht airport had significant cargo operations, has received significant [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid since 2004 and was passed into public ownership in 2013, after it seemingly had to be rescued by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and that Knock airport, although privately owned, received considerable taxpayer support, namely grants of EUR 13 million between 1997 and 2012. 211 The applicants put forward a certain number of arguments, at the hearing, against that analysis carried out by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 212 As regards the applicants’ argument that Bournemouth airport was profitable during the 12 years preceding 2012, it must be pointed out that, while it is true that that is a relevant factor in considering the conduct of that airport as being the conduct of a market economy operator, the fact remains that that airport belongs to a public entity. 213 As regards the applicants’ argument that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] operated multiple summer routes to and from Grenoble airport between 2006 and 2009, it must be pointed out that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] stated both in those written submissions and at the hearing that that airport had a business model focusing on the winter season which distinguished it from [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport and, accordingly, was not an appropriate benchmark for the purpose of establishing a true market price for airport services (see recital 340 of the contested decision). 214 As regards the applicants’ argument that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] subsidies granted to Knock airport amounted only to 6% of the airport’s assets for the period in question, it must be noted that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was entitled to find, without committing any manifest error of assessment, that public funding of that magnitude was a relevant factor in its assessment of that airport’s appropriateness as a comparator. 215 As regards the applicants’ argument that Maastricht airport was privately owned during the period concerned, it must be noted that that does not call into question the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] finding, made on the basis of the study of 25 June 2012, that that airport had received subsidies of EUR 42.9 million since 2004. 216 In any event, it must be held that the applicants have not put forward any evidence, either in the application or in the reply, calling into question the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] finding that the airports selected in the study of 25 June 2012 were not sufficiently comparable in the light of the parameters set out in recital 348 of the contested decision. 217 Accordingly, despite the finding in paragraph 212 above, it must be held, in the light of all the evidence viewed as a whole, that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not commit a manifest error of assessment in rejecting the sample of comparator airports contained in the study of 25 June 2012. 218 As regards the applicants’ argument alleging the lack of effort on the part of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to make enquiries with privately owned or privately operated airports in order to find points of comparison, it must be noted that that complaint relates to the scope of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] investigation obligations when it is called upon to apply the market economy operator test to the 2008 agreements. 219 In accordance with the case-law, in the context of applying the private investor test, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must examine, when assessing a measure, all the relevant features of the measure and its context (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 December 2008, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑196/04, EU:T:2008:585, paragraph 59). 220 In that regard, all information liable to have a significant influence on the decision-making process of a normally prudent and diligent market economy operator, who is in a situation as close as possible to that of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concerned, must be regarded as being relevant (see, by analogy, judgment of 20 September 2017, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Frucona Košice , C‑300/16 P, EU:C:2017:706, paragraph 60). 221 It should also be borne in mind that the lawfulness of a decision concerning [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid falls to be assessed by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] judicature in the light of the information available to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] at the time when the decision was adopted (judgment of 20 September 2017, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Frucona Košice , C‑300/16 P, EU:C:2017:706, paragraph 70). 222 The information ‘available’ to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] includes that which seemed relevant to the assessment to be carried out in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 220 above and which could have been obtained, upon request by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], during the administrative procedure (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 September 2017, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Frucona Košice , C‑300/16 P, EU:C:2017:706, paragraph 71). 223 In the present case, in the first place, it must be noted that, in the contested decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] recalled its doubts, as expressed in the 2014 Guidelines, that it is currently possible to identify an appropriate benchmark for establishing a true market price for services provided by airports. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] refers in particular in points 56 to 58 of those guidelines to the fact that the vast majority of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airports benefit from public funding, that public airports’ charges tend not to be determined with regard to market considerations, but having regard to social or regional considerations, and that even the prices charged by private airports can be strongly influenced by the prices charged by the majority of publicly subsidised airports. Thus, even if it is conceivable that a sufficient number of suitable comparator airports can be found, as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] explained at the hearing, it found that, in accordance with point 61 of those guidelines, the incremental profitability analysis was the most relevant criterion for the assessment of the agreements concluded between airports and airlines. 224 In the second place, it must be recalled that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] referred, in the contested decision, to the difference in the cost and revenue structures between airports, the low comparability of transactions between airports and the existence of a negative price actually paid to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for use of its airport services as considerations which justify departure from the comparative analysis (recitals 341, 342 and 346 of the contested decision). 225 In the third place, it must be recalled that, in the opening decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] invited the interested parties to submit observations while further stating in the decision that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] authorities had not provided any basis for comparison which could be used to assess whether the price paid by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] corresponded to the normal market price. 226 Thus, during the administrative procedure, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submitted the study of 25 June 2012 in which a sample of comparator airports was presented. 227 In answer to a question from the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] at the hearing, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] explained that, even if the 2014 Guidelines foresaw the possibility of conducting a comparative analysis, the information in the file did not allow such an analysis to be carried out effectively in the present case. 228 In those circumstances, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was entitled, without committing any error, to choose, in the present case, to carry out the incremental profitability analysis rather than the comparative analysis, without having approached privately owned or privately operated airports with the aim of identifying possible airports which were sufficiently comparable to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport. 229 In the light of the foregoing, the applicants’ complaint alleging that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in finding that the evidence provided by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed to demonstrate that the airports selected in the study of 25 June 2012 were sufficiently comparable to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport and a failure to state reasons in that regard must accordingly be rejected. (3) The complaint alleging that the comparative analysis shows that no advantage was conferred through the 2008 agreements 230 The applicants claim, with reference to the economic reports and the other evidence on the case file, that the comparative analysis shows that the 2008 agreements conferred no economic advantage. It is apparent from several economic reports that the price stipulated in the marketing services agreement was in line with the market price received by AMS from private customers or the market price paid by private customers for comparable services supplied by other service providers. The study of 25 June 2012 shows that the airport charges paid by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport were compatible with the level of charges that would have been offered to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] by an airport-owning market economy operator in similar circumstances. 231 In that regard, it must be stressed that, as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] states, the applicants’ line of argument, which is based on the aforementioned economic reports and the study of 25 June 2012, is ineffective, since it starts from the incorrect premiss that the marketing services and the airport services are distinct and independent, whereas it was appropriate to analyse the 2008 agreements jointly in order to determine whether they constitute an advantage (see paragraphs 179 to 184 above). 232 So far as concerns the marketing services agreement, it must be borne in mind that the economic reports at issue do not take into account the fact that AMS’s marketing services were acquired by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport in order to promote the operation of the air route ensured by [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Thus, two economic reports compare the prices of advertising space and marketing on [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s website with the prices charged by the websites of other airlines or other travel websites for advertisements on the internet. Similarly, another economic report compares the prices set by AMS in its rate cards with rate card prices for advertising services on a wide selection of other [OSCURATO:PERSONA] travel websites. Those reports do not claim, in particular, that advertisers on other travel websites are comparable to airports which purchase marketing services linked to air transport services of an airline. 233 Moreover, the economic reports in question, which are based on the assumption of distinct and independent marketing services and airport services, make no attempt to call into question the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] analysis that the marketing services agreement is inseparable from the airport services agreement and the air transport services forming the subject matter thereof. The applicants cannot therefore rely on those economic reports in order to refute that analysis. 234 With regard to the examples of marketing services agreements by which certain private airports purchased AMS’s services, it is sufficient to state that the applicants have failed to show that the private airports were in a situation comparable to that of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport when they concluded the agreements. 235 So far as concerns the airport services agreement, the study of 25 June 2012 merely compares the airport charges imposed in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport with the airport charges imposed in the comparator airports without taking account of the marketing services agreement, although the two types of agreement must be regarded as constituting a single transaction. 236 Accordingly, the applicants’ complaint alleging that the comparative analysis shows that no advantage was conferred through the 2008 agreements must be rejected. 237 In the reply, the applicants contend that, in order to justify its departure from the comparative analysis, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] repeats, in the defence, its reservations about the unsubstantiated theory, expressed in the 2014 Guidelines, that even private airports cannot be used as valid comparators because their prices are ‘polluted’ by the prices charged by the majority of publicly subsidised airports against which they compete for agreements with airlines. According to the applicants, private airports are not prepared to enter into perpetually loss-making agreements in order to compete with subsidised public airports. Moreover, the airports experience only limited competitive tension with one another to secure a contract with [OSCURATO:PERSONA], given that there are a substantial number of airports that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not serve for operational reasons. 238 In this respect, it should be noted that, as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] rightly indicates, it did not state in the 2014 Guidelines that private airports were prepared to enter into perpetually loss-making agreements in order to compete with subsidised public airports. 239 Furthermore, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did indeed state in point 58 of the 2014 Guidelines that the prices charged by airports which are privately owned or managed by private companies could be strongly influenced by the prices charged by the majority of publicly subsidised airports, as the latter prices are taken into account by airlines during their negotiations with the privately owned or managed airports. It identified that risk, which the applicants mention by referring to ‘polluted prices’, as one of the reasons why it has serious doubts whether it is currently possible to identify an appropriate benchmark for establishing a true market price for services provided by airports. 240 The existence of limited competition between the airports to secure a contract with [OSCURATO:PERSONA], even if established, is insufficient to call into question the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] conclusions, in points 56 to 59 of the 2014 Guidelines, concerning the EU airport industry. 241 Moreover, at the hearing, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] also stated that it was open to a comparative analysis in so far as it is possible to find comparator airports. 242 In the present case, it is apparent from paragraphs 204 to 217 above that no valid sample of comparator airports was available on the date of the contested decision. 243 Therefore, it is necessary to reject the applicants’ line of argument, since, even if there is no risk of ‘polluted prices’, it is established that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was entitled to consider, without committing a manifest error of assessment, that a valid sample of comparator airports was not available. 244 Having regard to all of the foregoing, the first part of the present plea in law must be rejected. (b) The second part, alleging errors of assessment and insufficient reasoning as regards the incremental profitability analysis 245 The applicants argue that the incremental profitability analysis on which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relied in order to apply the market economy operator test and reach a finding of the existence of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid, within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 107(1) TFEU, is vitiated by manifest errors of assessment and a failure to state reasons. 246 In that regard, it is appropriate to observe, as a preliminary point, that, in the contested decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] underlined that, in order to apply the market economy operator test to the 2008 agreements, it had to analyse those agreements together and assess whether such an operator, motivated by the prospect of profits and operating [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport in place of CCI-airport and SMAC, would have entered into those agreements (recital 350 of the contested decision). In the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] view, to that end, it had to determine the incremental profitability of those agreements for their entire duration as it would have been assessed by a market economy operator at the time of their conclusion. 247 In the present case, it is not disputed that SMAC launched a forward study dated 14 June 2006. However, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considered in recital 356 of the contested decision that that study did not correspond to a relevant business plan for the purpose of analysing compliance with the market economy operator test. Furthermore, it found in recital 357 of that decision that it was clear from that study that SMAC could not have been unaware at that time that the opening of a route between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] operated by a low-cost airline would translate into significant operating losses and consequently high financing needs. It added in recital 358 of that decision that, despite that information, SMAC did not consider it necessary to commission a business plan or any other equivalent prior economic analysis of the agreements to be concluded by the applicants, in order to support, from an economic point of view, its decision to undertake those commitments. 248 In reply to a written question of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submitted a copy of the forward study of 14 June 2006. The applicants did not adduce, at the hearing, any evidence indicating that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had committed a manifest error of assessment in finding that that study, first, did not correspond to a business plan for the purpose of analysing compliance with the market economy operator test and, second, called into question the economic profitability of opening a route connecting [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 249 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] carried out the incremental profitability analysis on the basis of the incremental costs and revenues of the 2008 agreements, as a market economy operator would have calculated them at the time of their conclusion (recital 363 of the contested decision). 250 Thus, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] assessed, in the contested decision, the incremental profitability of the 2008 agreements for their entire duration, which was five years (2008 to 2012), taking into account the following: –        the future incremental traffic (number of additional passengers) expected from the implementation of those agreements, taking into account the possible positive effect of the marketing services on the load factors of the route between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA]; in that regard, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] made the assumption of a load factor of 85% per flight (recitals 369 to 372 of the contested decision); –        the future incremental revenues expected from the implementation of those agreements, including revenues from airport charges and ground-handling services, generated by that route, as well as non-aeronautical revenues from the additional traffic generated by the implementation of those agreements (recitals 373 to 380 of the contested decision); –        the future incremental costs expected from the implementation of those agreements, including the costs of marketing services and the incremental operating costs (staff costs and others) (recitals 381 to 386 of the contested decision). 251 In recitals 387 to 389 of the contested decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] presented the results of its assessment, displaying, for each year (from 2008 to 2012), the incremental traffic, the incremental revenues and the incremental costs associated with the 2008 agreements in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 12 of that decision. It found that all the anticipated annual incremental flows (revenues less costs) were negative. Therefore, it considered that those agreements conferred an economic advantage on the applicants. 252 In that regard, the applicants essentially put forward six complaints the validity of which is contested by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. (1) The complaint alleging reliance on insufficient, unverified, unclear and unreliable data 253 The applicants claim that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] incremental profitability analysis, the figures for which are set out in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 12 of the contested decision, is based on data that are manifestly insufficient, unverified and unreliable. 254 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the applicants maintain that it appears that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] used the forward study of 14 June 2006 commissioned by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport as its only source of data for the calculations in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 12 of the contested decision, in particular in so far as concerns incremental operating costs, even though it itself acknowledged that that study could not constitute a reliable business plan because its data were not precise enough and were unreliable and it referred to agreements that were not final. In their reply, the applicants add that the figures for non-aeronautical revenues and for incremental operating costs raise questions concerning the accuracy of the assessment of the quantum of aid to be recovered, inasmuch as that decision does not allow the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to make adjustments for the difference between the forecasts for those revenues and costs and the amounts actually paid (recital 415 of the contested decision). The applicants have finally produced a note prepared by their economic adviser which indicates that the amount of aid payable could be less than the amount estimated in the contested decision, because the actual costs are lower than the estimated costs. 255 In that regard, first, it must be held that it is by no means apparent from the contested decision that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relied solely on the forward study of 14 June 2006. It is apparent from recitals 355 to 363 of that decision that, in the absence of a business plan, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] carried out the incremental profitability analysis which relied on the information concerning the incremental operating costs provided by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] authorities and reproduced in recitals 88 and 89 of that decision. The applicants’ argument alleging that that study alone was used as a source of data for the calculations in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 12 of the contested decision must therefore be rejected. 256 Second, it must be pointed out that the applicants’ argument concerning the allegedly too narrow scope of the ex post adjustments that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may make in order to take into account actual payments once they have been recorded is irrelevant for the purposes of assessing the economic advantage gained by the 2008 agreements. According to settled case-law, for the purposes of applying the private investor test, the only relevant evidence is the information which was available, and the developments which were foreseeable, at the time when the decision to make the investment was taken. That is especially so where the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is examining whether there is [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid in relation to an investment which was not notified to it and which, at the time when the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] carries out its examination, has already been made by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 October 2015, Electrabel and Dunamenti Erőmű v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑357/14 P, EU:C:2015:642, paragraph 103). In order to assess the value of the economic advantage in the context of the incremental profitability analysis, it is therefore necessary to endorse the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] approach which consisted in taking into account expected revenues and costs at the time when [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport decided to enter into the 2008 agreements, and not the payments actually made subsequently. 257 Likewise, in so far as the note prepared by the applicants’ economic consultants makes calculations on the basis of traffic data and incremental operating costs established ex post in order to determine the amount of the aid, it is not relevant for the purpose of assessing the economic advantage gained by the 2008 agreements. 258 The applicants’ argument that the amount of aid payable could be less than the amount estimated in the contested decision, because the actual costs were lower than the estimated costs must therefore be rejected. 259 Second, the applicants call into question the reliability of the figures for incremental operating costs as forecast in the contested decision, which assumes, without any explanation, that those costs would increase from [ confidential ] in 2008 to [ confidential ] in each of the following years. The fact that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was an operational airline only a few months after the beginning of 2008 does not justify the lower figure for 2008, since the seasonal route was not supposed to start until the summer of each year. The applicants fear that incremental staff costs were imputed to them, for the period concerned, for the half of each year during which [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was not operating from the airport. Furthermore, since SMAC’s expansion plan included the operation of several regular routes, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]-specific operating costs were minimal, given that the incremental operating costs would have been the same if [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had not been operating from the airport. 260 In that regard, it must be pointed out that, first, in order to estimate the future incremental operating costs expected from the implementation of the 2008 agreements, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should have relied on the estimates made by CCI-airport and SMAC before those agreements were signed, since it was not able to estimate itself how a given agreement might affect the different cost items of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport (recitals 385 and 386 of the contested decision). 261 Those cost items of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport relating to [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s activity, which are contained in recitals 88, 89 and 387 of the contested decision, show a level of estimated incremental operating costs (handling and reception of passengers) in 2008 of EUR [ confidential ] to EUR [ confidential ] in each of the following years. Moreover, it is apparent from that decision that those overall incremental costs were divided into ‘staff costs’ and ‘other costs’. As regards staff costs, it was inter alia stated in recital 88 of the contested decision that the forecast additional staff numbers, needed for the handling and reception of passengers of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] flights amounted to 0.3 full-time equivalent in 2008 and 0.5 full-time equivalent in 2009 and 2010 and that the associated additional costs reached EUR 20 000 in 2008 and EUR 30 000 in 2009 and 2010. 262 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submitted that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was the only airline operating a regular route to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport and that no other agreement was planned at the time the 2008 agreements were signed, with the result that the incremental operating costs forecast by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] authorities were attributed to [OSCURATO:PERSONA], since those costs were specific to it. Moreover, it maintained that the incremental operating costs had been estimated by the manager of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport when those agreements were signed, that is to say when he had assumed that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] would conclude those agreements and ensure flights for five years. Finally, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submitted that, in 2007, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport accommodated only 2 362 passengers and no regular flights, whereas, in 2008, the number of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] passengers using the route between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was estimated at 29 946 passengers (recitals 16 and 387 of the contested decision), namely a figure 13 times higher than that previously recorded. 263 In those circumstances, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relied on objective evidence in order to accept that the predicted growth in the number of passengers in the period under consideration is accompanied by a significant increase in the estimated operating costs of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport for the handling and reception of additional [OSCURATO:PERSONA] passengers. Accordingly, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] made no manifest error of assessment in relying on the information concerning costs provided by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] authorities in order to carry out the incremental profitability analysis concerning the 2008 agreements. 264 In reply to a question of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] acknowledged that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] authorities did not explain directly, in their forecast why the expected additional handling costs for 2008 were lower than those for subsequent years. However, as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] correctly maintained, the figures concerning the incremental operating costs provided by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] authorities were based on estimates made by CCI-airport and SMAC before the signing of the 2008 agreements. It follows that they relied on objective evidence and not simply on unsubstantiated statements made by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] authorities. In those circumstances, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not err in relying on the figures concerning the incremental operating costs provided by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] authorities and did not have to ascertain the reasons why the expected additional handling costs for 2008 were lower than those of subsequent years. 265 Finally, as regards the applicants’ argument that the operational costs specific to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] were very low on account of SMAC’s expansion plan including the operation of several routes, it must be pointed out that that plan, referred to by the applicants, related to the call for tenders launched by SMAC, published on 9 March 2011, and cannot therefore, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 256 above, be taken into consideration to evaluate the economic rationality of the 2008 agreements from the perspective of a market economy operator. Moreover, the applicants do not call into question, by that argument, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] authorities’ estimate, as acknowledged by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], of the incremental operating costs for [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport on account of [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s launching the air route between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 266 Accordingly, the applicants’ argument calling in question the reliability of the figures for the estimated operating costs must be rejected. 267 Third, the applicants argue that there is nothing to suggest that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] verified whether the category of ‘other’ incremental costs for ground handling and reception included in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 12 of the contested decision includes activities falling within the scope of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] exercise of official powers, part of which at least appears to have been funded by SMAC. 268 In this regard, it should be noted, as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] states, that, in the system established by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] legislation in force, sovereign tasks are financed by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] through the airport tax levy (recitals 184 to 198 of the contested decision), so that the increase in air transport services at a given airport should not, logically, result in additional costs borne by the airport operator for performing these tasks. 269 Moreover, it follows from the contested decision that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] used, in its analysis, information concerning costs which excludes the implementing costs of sovereign tasks. Recitals 88 and 89 of that decision contain separate cost tables concerning safety and security and assistance and reception, whereas, in the incremental profitability analysis, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relied on the sole costs relating to assistance and reception (recital 387 of that decision). 270 Fourth, the applicants complain that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not verify whether part of the incremental costs used in the incremental profitability analysis in order to calculate any aid that they might have received did not mistakenly include an element of aid to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport that was approved as compatible with the internal market in accordance with the rules on service of general economic interest (‘SGEI’). There is nothing to indicate that the distinction between SGEI activities and non-SGEI activities was planned and taken into account in the allocation of the budget and the approval procedures followed by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport during the period in question (2007 to 2011). It is impossible to ascertain whether part of the incremental costs used by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the incremental profitability analysis was covered by the payments linked to SGEIs. 271 In that regard, it follows first from the contested decision that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considered that, during the period in question, the tasks of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport’s managers relating solely to keeping the airport operational and to infrastructure accessibility could be classified as an SGEI (recitals 225 and 231 to 233 of the contested decision) and that the public compensation for the performance of those tasks was compatible with the internal market in the light of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 106(2) TFEU, its communication of 11 January 2012 entitled ‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA] framework for [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid in the form of public service compensation’ (OJ 2012 C 8, p. 15) and its [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2005/842/EC of 28 November 2005 on the application of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [106(2) TFEU] to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest (OJ 2005 L 312, p. 67) (recital 291 of the contested decision). By contrast, it considered that, during that period, the development of commercial flights cannot meet the general interest criterion justifying the classification as an SGEI and that the compensation by SMAC of the additional costs incurred by the 2008 agreements should therefore be analysed as part of the assessment of any [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid elements contained in those agreements (recitals 225 and 234 of that decision). 272 Moreover, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] explained, in reply to a written question put by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], that, in its assessment of the compatibility with the internal market of the public compensation for the SGEI, it found, in recital 282 of the contested decision, that the procedure for adopting the budget allocated to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport guaranteed that the aid granted was limited to compensation for the deficit associated with the management of the airport, regarded as an SGEI. Furthermore, it referred to recital 283 of that decision, according to which the costs relating to the management activity of that airport had been kept separate from an accounting point of view and reviewed by the civil aviation authority. It added that the costs incurred by [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s activity were part of the commercial development of that airport and, accordingly, were not covered by the public compensation in respect of the SGEI. 273 Without there being any need to determine whether the mechanisms provided for in recitals 282 and 283 of the contested decision sufficed to ensure that the public compensation granted to the manager of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport did not cover the costs associated with the 2008 agreements, it must be held that, as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] correctly stated, the precise arrangements for the financing of those costs are irrelevant for the purpose of assessing whether those agreements constituted [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid. All that is relevant is whether a market economy operator in similar circumstances, motivated by the prospect of profits, would have entered into those agreements. Accordingly the applicants could have benefited from [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid even if part of that aid had been financed by public compensation received by that airport for performance of an SGEI . 274 Accordingly, the applicants’ argument that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not verify whether part of the incremental costs used in the profitability analysis in order to calculate any aid that they might have received did not mistakenly include an element of aid to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport that was approved as compatible with the internal market in accordance with the rules on SGEIs must be rejected. 275 Fifth, the applicants maintain that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not explain why the incremental operating costs contained in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 12 of the contested decision were exclusively linked to [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s activities, rather than being part, at least to some extent, of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport’s overhead costs. 276 In that regard, it must be recalled that it is apparent from recitals 88, 89, 385 and 387 of the contested decision that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] authorities provided the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] with information relating to the incremental operating costs. They indicated, inter alia, that the operator of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport had to incur staff costs and other additional costs on account of its commercial relationship with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (see tables in recitals 88 and 89 of that decision). 277 It must therefore be held that the contested decision is sufficiently reasoned as regards the imputability of the additional costs to the 2008 agreements. 278 Accordingly, it is necessary to reject the applicants’ argument that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed to explain why the incremental operating costs contained in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 12 of the contested decision were exclusively linked to [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s activities, rather than being part, at least to some extent, of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport’s overhead costs. 279 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], as regards the applicants’ argument that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] incorrectly added, in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 10 of the contested decision the airport charges paid by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to the payments made by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport to AMS for marketing services for the calculation of the net transfer, it must be held that the net figures contained in that table, which is reproduced in recital 40 of that decision, were not used to assess the existence or the amount of aid in that decision. Accordingly, that error, while regrettable, cannot affect the legality of the decision in question. 280 In the light of the foregoing, it is necessary to reject the applicants’ complaint that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] used insufficient, unverified, unclear and unreliable data in its incremental profitability analysis. (2) The complaint alleging that the information sent by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport was not verified and not compared with an average or well-run and efficient airport 281 The applicants argue that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not verify whether [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport’s projected non-aeronautical costs and revenues corresponded to those which an average airport, still less a well-run and efficient airport, might expect to incur. They claim that an airport that operates below an average level of efficiency does not act like a market economy operator. In the present case, the high incremental operating costs of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] assumed are significantly higher than those found in other cases and are not the market costs which an efficiently run airport would incur, cannot be taken into consideration in the context of applying the market economy operator test. 282 In that regard, it must be noted that, according to the case-law, it is for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to assess whether a rational market economy operator in a situation as close as possible to that of the public entity concerned would have been prompted to take the measure in question (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 June 2012, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v EDF , C‑124/10 P, EU:C:2012:318, paragraph 84). In that regard, it is necessary to take into account the structure of the actual costs and revenues of the public entity whose conduct is being compared to that of a market economy operator. 283 It follows that, contrary to what the applicants claim, it was not for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in the present case, to verify, in the context of applying the market economy operator test, whether the incremental operator costs and non-aeronautical revenues of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport corresponded to those which might have been expected of an average airport or a well-run and efficient airport. Accordingly, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was entitled, without committing any error, to apply the actual provisional costs and revenues of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport in order to assess whether the applicants had obtained an economic advantage. 284 For the same reasons, nor was the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] required to take into account the costs found in airports other than [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport or the comparative analysis of the incremental operating costs of certain airports, as submitted by the applicants. 285 Moreover, the downward revision of the actual figures of the costs and revenues of a public undertaking would be contrary to the rule in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 107(1) TFEU, which does not make a distinction on the basis the causes or aims of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] interventions but defines them in relation to their effects (judgment of 5 June 2012, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v EDF , C‑124/10 P, EU:C:2012:318, paragraph 77). 286 Consequently, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not err in failing to verify whether the actual expected costs and revenues of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport corresponded to those generally associated with a well-run or efficient airport. 287 That conclusion is not affected by the other arguments put forward by the applicants. 288 As regards the applicants’ argument that its litigious relationship with the manager of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport should have led the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to be particularly circumspect about information originating from that source, it must be held that that fact is not a relevant factor in establishing the existence of aid. Moreover, it must be noted that, in the light of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] duty to cooperate in good faith laid down in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 4(3) TFEU (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 June 2011, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] de Vizcaya and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑465/09 P to C‑470/09 P, not published, EU:C:2011:372, paragraph 152, and of 25 June 2015, SACE and Sace BT v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑305/13, EU:T:2015:435, paragraph 112), the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] could legitimately expect that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] authorities, including the manager of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport, would provide reliable information, while reserving the right to examine it diligently and impartially. 289 Likewise, the applicants have not demonstrated that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was not prudent when verifying the information provided by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] authorities in the light of the fact that SMAC kept [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport open all year round despite the seasonal operation of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] route. It follows inter alia from paragraphs 261 to 264 above that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relied on objective factors when verifying the information concerning costs produced by those authorities. (3) The complaint alleging that the scope of the analysis carried out for the purposes of applying the market economy operator test was too narrow 290 The applicants claim that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] limited its analysis in the context of applying the market economy operator test, first, by restricting itself to a five-year time horizon, that is to say the initial term of the 2008 agreements, next, by relying solely on the route between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and, finally, by failing to take into account wider benefits such as the network effects that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport could hope to benefit from as a result of its relationship with [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. (i) The time horizon 291 The applicants argue that, by restricting its analysis to the duration of the 2008 agreements, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] selected too short a time horizon in the context of applying the market economy operator test. 292 In that regard, in the first place, the applicants claim that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] approach in the contested decision to the effect that a market economy operator would have evaluated the incremental costs and revenues during the term of the 2008 agreements is contradicted by the commercial reality of large airports, which do not often receive any commitment from airlines and operate on the basis of general commercial terms and conditions which allow those airlines immediately to cease their services to the airport. The applicants submit that business plans of airports cover several decades and their revenue and cost projections are based on a reasonable analysis of the airport’s capacity, without any contractual commitment on the part of airlines. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] approach leads to the business plans of those airports having to cover only the calendar seasons determined by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (IATA) for which the airlines sell flights and the airports have certainty regarding traffic levels. 293 In the second place, the applicants argue that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was wrong to consider that a market economy operator would not have counted on the renewal of 2008 agreements or have been unaware that low-cost airlines like [OSCURATO:PERSONA] were known to be very dynamic in the way they conduct their business. Rationally managed airports aspire to enter into a long-term commercial relationship with airlines going well beyond the duration of the initial agreement. Market economy operators are willing to take risks and to conclude agreements that may be loss making for an initial period, in the expectation that the business will be successful and that the agreements will be renewed at the end of their term and the route will continue beyond that period. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the commitment to open a new route constitutes only a justified risk in the expectation of a future growth and a long-term commercial relationship, which is confirmed by the specific clauses in the airport services agreement. Moreover, most airports negotiating with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] expect their commercial relationship to extend beyond the duration of the initial agreement. Accordingly, on the whole, commercial relationships between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and airports develop over the long term and typically last longer than five years. 294 In the third place, the applicants claim that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] mistaken assumption as to the time horizon also led it to give contradictory reasons, since, in the contested decision, without providing any explanation, it applied the 85% load factor per flight for the duration of the airport services agreement, namely five years, whereas that load factor was ensured as a result of the marketing services agreement, which lasted for only three years. 295 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should reject the applicants’ line of argument. 296 It is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 154 above that it is necessary to examine whether the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was entitled to find, without erring, in the analysis of incremental profitability that a market economy operator acting in place of CCI-airport and SMAC would have assessed the value in entering into the 2008 agreements by choosing a time horizon of five years, in accordance with the duration of those agreements. 297 The conduct of a market economy operator is guided by prospects of profitability in the longer term (judgment of 21 March 1991, Italy v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑305/89, EU:C:1991:142, paragraph 20). Such an operator wishing to maximise profits is prepared to take calculated risks in determining the appropriate return to be expected for its investment. 298 In the present case, in the contested decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] found that, when assessing the value in entering into an airport services agreement or a marketing services agreement, a market economy operator would have chosen the term of the 2008 agreements as the time horizon for its assessment (recital 365 of the contested decision). It also considered that such an operator would not have counted on the renewal of those agreements, whether under the same terms or under different terms, particularly as a prudent manager could not have been unaware that low-cost airlines such as [OSCURATO:PERSONA] were known for being very responsive to market developments in their business dealings, both when starting up or shutting down air routes and when increasing or decreasing the number of flights (recital 366 of the contested decision). 299 Moreover, it is not disputed that the 2008 agreements were concluded for a period of five years with regard to the route between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 300 It is also common ground, as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] stated without being contradicted by the applicants, that, before the conclusion of the 2008 agreements, the managers of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport had not drawn up a business plan, which was at the very least robust, for the launch of the route between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 301 In that context, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was entitled to find, and did not err in so doing, that a market economy operator would have assessed the profitability of the 2008 agreements in the light of the expected costs and revenues for the planned period of their performance, that is to say for five years. 302 Likewise, it must be held that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was entitled to find, without committing a manifest error of assessment, that it was very difficult for an airport operator to assess the likelihood of an airline continuing to operate a route on the expiry of the term to which it had committed itself in the airport services agreement, in the knowledge that airlines, in particular low-fare ones, have proven to be very dynamic in terms of launching and withdrawing routes (recitals 335 and 365 of the contested decision). In those circumstances, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was entitled to find, without committing an error, that a normally prudent and diligent market economy operator, acting in place of the managers of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport, would not have counted on [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s willingness to extend the operation of the route in question on expiry of the 2008 agreements. 303 The fact that the airport services agreement considered the route between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to be the initial flight programme and provided, moreover, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should make an effort to [ confidential ], does not in itself permit the assumption that a market economy operator would have counted on the renewal of the 2008 agreements beyond the term planned at the time they were entered into. Moreover, it must be noted, as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] stated without being contradicted by the applicants, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] could have abandoned that route relatively easily even before the end of that agreement by paying a limited penalty (recitals 37 and 38 of the contested decision). 304 Indeed, a normally prudent and diligent market economy operator which operates an airport may be willing to take a commercial risk by concluding an agreement which is loss making throughout its planned duration, in the real expectation of renewing the agreement and continuing to operate the route and, thus, of making future profits to offset those losses. That behaviour seeking long-term profitability may correspond with economic rationality. However, it is clear from the foregoing that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was entitled to find, without making a manifest error of assessment, that such an operator would not, in the present case, have counted on renewal of the 2008 agreements on their expiry. In addition, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] found in recitals 314 to 338 of the contested decision that the same operator, acting in place of the manager of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport, would have considered that, except for the possible positive effect of the marketing services on the number of passengers using the air routes covered by those agreements for the operating period of the route between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the other benefits in the longer term were too uncertain to be taken into account in a quantifiable manner. The applicants have failed to demonstrate that that finding of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is vitiated by a manifest error of assessment (see paragraphs 327 to 332, 349 to 351 and 360 below). 305 Lastly, the evidence adduced by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to show that the average duration of the commercial links between it and the airports where it is active exceeds five years does not make it possible to establish the duration of the air routes from or to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport. Indeed, as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] rightly explains, the total duration of the commercial links between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and those airports does not guarantee the durability of other individual air routes. In addition, the conduct of a market economy operator must be assessed by placing it in a situation as close as possible to that of the manager of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport. As the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] rightly observes, the maintaining of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] operations at an airport depends on the specific situation of the airport in question and the specific conditions offered. 306 Similarly, the evidence produced by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concerning the average duration of its commercial relationships with the airports where it is present does not invalidate the finding made by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] that low-cost airlines are known to be very dynamic both in terms of launching and withdrawing air routes and in terms of increasing and reducing frequencies. That evidence makes it possible, at most, to establish the durability of certain individual air routes. 307 As regards the complaint alleging contradictory reasoning, it suffices to point out that, in the contested decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] applied an 85% load factor per flight for the duration of the airport services agreement. While acknowledging that the marketing services agreement has a shorter term than the airport services agreement, it correctly stated however that marketing services were likely to boost passenger traffic on the routes covered inter alia by the airport services agreement and that a market economy operator would have assessed the positive effect of marketing services on its revenues in the context of the airport services agreement (recitals 316 and 317 of the contested decision). In addition, it maintained that that load factor constituted a hypothesis which is favourable to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] but justified in order to reflect a possible beneficial effect of those services on the passenger traffic of air routes and in the absence of other elements quantifying the foreseeable impact of these services (recital 372 of the contested decision). 308 It follows that the contested decision contains no contradiction on that point. 309 In the light of the foregoing, it must be concluded that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not commit any manifest error of assessment or infringed its obligation to state reasons, for the purposes of the incremental profitability analysis, when it found that a market economy operator would not, when entering into the 2008 agreements, have chosen a time horizon exceeding the period of five years provided for in those agreements. (ii) The number of routes 310 The applicants claim, relying solely on the basis of the route connecting [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA], that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] incorrectly applied the market economy operator test. The applicants maintain that it is widely known that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] operates several routes in the vast majority of the airports it serves in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and that it seeks constantly to increase the number of routes beyond the air route initially launched. Such an operator would have assumed at the time of entering into the 2008 agreements that the route to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] consisting of three flights a week during the summer season would constitute the start of a relationship with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and would be followed by increased traffic or the opening of further lines if that route was successful. Such reasonable expectation of growth is reflected in the clauses of the airport services agreement, which show that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport’s intentions were not limited to a single route. 311 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that the applicants’ line of argument should be rejected. 312 It is apparent from the case-law (see paragraph 154 above) that it is necessary to examine whether the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was entitled to find, without erring, in the context of the incremental profitability analysis, that a market economy operator acting in place of the manager of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport would have assessed the value in entering into the 2008 agreements by merely taking into account the route between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 313 In the present case, it is common ground that, by the contested decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] based the incremental profitability analysis solely on the route between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA], thereby limiting the forecasts for aeronautical and non-aeronautical revenues (recitals 369, 370, 378, 380, 385 and 387). 314 In that regard, it must be noted that the conduct of a market economy operator must be assessed by placing it in a situation as close as possible to that of the manager of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport. 315 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submitted, without being contradicted by the applicants, that the 2008 agreements were concluded after publication of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] project call for tenders by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport and that no comparable agreement was entered into with another airline after the publication. In those circumstances, it is plausible that a normally prudent and diligent market economy operator would not base an assessment of the profitability of the agreements to be entered into with the applicants on the prospect of one or more additional routes. 316 Moreover, the fact that the airport services agreement referred to the initial flight programme and provided for [ confidential ] and a best endeavours clause does not suffice to undermine the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] assumption that a market economy operator, acting in place of the manager of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport, would not have counted on several routes before the expiry of the period provided for in the 2008 agreements. 317 In those circumstances, it must be held that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not commit a manifest error of assessment in assuming that, when assessing the value in concluding the 2008 agreements, a market economy operator would only have taken into account the route between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. (iii) The wider benefits 318 The applicants submit that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] wrongly failed to take account, in its incremental profitability analysis, of the positive network externalities that a market economy operator could expect from [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s operations and the longer-term effects achieved through AMS’s marketing services. According to the applicants, an increase in passenger numbers at [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport due to [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s presence improves the appeal of that airport and opens up possibilities of launching new routes and of other airlines and commercial outlets arriving. 319 In this respect, it should be noted that, as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] states, the concept of network externalities, as invoked by the applicants, is linked to the prospect of a greater number of passengers. 320 It follows from the foregoing (see paragraphs 312 to 317 above) that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was entitled, without committing any error, to consider that a market economy operator acting in place of the manager of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport would expect the commercial relationship with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to be limited to the operation of a single route during the summer season during the period provided for in the 2008 agreements. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that such an operator would not have made its calculations of the revenues and costs on the basis of a greater number of passengers arising from an increased frequency of existing air routes or the setting up of additional routes. Likewise, it is reasonable to assume that, in the absence of specific information, such an operator would not count on the arrival of other airlines or businesses in that airport. 321 As the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] maintains, without contradiction by the applicants, the 2008 agreements were the result of a single proposal by an airline, following publication of a call for [OSCURATO:PERSONA] projects seeking applications to relaunch air activities from [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport. Moreover, those agreements only concerned a single route on a seasonal basis and just three days a week. 322 The hypothesis that [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s presence as an ‘anchor airline at a small, underutilised, local airport’served to attract other airlines to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport as the applicants claim does not in itself imply that a normally prudent and diligent market economy operator, acting in place of the manager of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport, would, in the light of the particular circumstances of the airport, have counted on the arrival of other airlines. 323 In those circumstances, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not commit a manifest error of assessment by not taking into account network effects that were too uncertain. 324 In the light of all the foregoing, the applicants’ complaint concerning the overly narrow scope of the analysis carried out for the purposes of applying the market economy operator test must be rejected. (4) The complaint alleging that the assessment of the popularity and impact of [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s website was incorrect 325 The applicants claim that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in its assessment of the popularity and impact of [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s website when it rejected the grounds underlying the decision made by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport to enter into the marketing services agreement. 326 In particular, they maintain that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not examine the evidence which [OSCURATO:PERSONA] provided, which proved the enormous popularity of its website. It simply stated that that website was not as frequently visited as others and that television advertisements and posters would reach more consumers. Thus, relying on a flawed assessment of the allegedly modest popularity and effectiveness of [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s website, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] wrongly concluded that the site could only be useful for advertising [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s own routes and could only offer viable short-term marketing. Similarly, as a result, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] wrongly asserted that it was difficult to quantify with certainty the broader long-term benefits of AMS’s marketing. 327 In that regard, first, it must be pointed out that, by assessing the sustainability of the positive effects of the marketing services agreement which a market economy operator would have envisaged, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not call into question the popularity of [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s website, as is apparent from the evidence provided, in terms of the number of visits, direct or by search engine, but examined the impact of that website on the purchasing behaviour of the persons who had just visited it. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considered, in particular, that it was highly unlikely that the memory which persons visiting [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s website would retain of the advertising of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and its region as a travel destination would last or have an influence on their airline ticket purchases for more than a few weeks (recital 322 of the contested decision). 328 Consequently, the applicants’ argument that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] incorrectly assessed the popularity of [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s website must be rejected. 329 Moreover, in so far as concerns the impact of [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s website, it must be noted that, to assess the effects on consumer behaviour, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] found, in recital 322 of the contested decision, that an advertising campaign was likely to have a sustainable effect when the promotional activities involved one or more advertising media to which consumers were regularly exposed over a given period. By way of example, it referred to an advertising campaign on general television channels and radio stations, very popular websites or various billboards displayed outdoors or inside public places. Such a campaign could produce a long-term effect on consumers if they were passively and repeatedly exposed to those media. However, it considered that a promotional activity limited merely to [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s website was unlikely to have an effect lasting much past the end of the promotional campaign. According to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], it was highly unlikely that visitors to that website would have a recollection of the advertising of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and its region which was sustainable and capable of influencing their ticket purchases for more than a few weeks. In that regard, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considered, in recital 323 of the contested decision, that it was likely that consumers did not visit the website in question often enough to leave them with a lasting memory that that site offered a promotion on a certain destination. 330 It follows that, in order to assess the effects of the marketing services, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relied principally on the distinction between, first, the effects of campaigns to which consumers are frequently exposed, that is to say passively and repetitively, which are likely to have a long-lasting impact and, second, the effects of promotional activity limited solely to [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s website, which are accordingly devoid of long-lasting impact beyond the period of that promotion. 331 It must be found that the applicants have not adduced any evidence capable of calling into question that analysis. Although the passage from the economic report relied on by the applicants explains that the advertising on [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s website via AMS enables the airport to avoid incurring expenditure linked to traditional forms of marketing communication, it does not allow sufficient conclusions to be drawn concerning the long-term effects of AMS’s marketing services on the use of the route between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] covered by the airport services agreement. 332 Therefore, it follows that the applicants have failed to show that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] committed a manifest error of assessment in considering, in recital 324 of the contested decision, that, although the marketing services could have boosted passenger traffic on the routes covered by the marketing services agreement during the implementation period of those services, it is very likely that such an effect was zero or negligible after that period or on other routes. 333 For the same reasons, it is necessary to reject the applicants’ argument that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was wrong not to examine whether the advertising on [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s website had increased the general visibility of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport in relation to all potential [OSCURATO:PERSONA] passengers and companies specialising in airport retail. 334 In the light of the foregoing, the applicants’ complaint concerning the assessment of the popularity and impact of [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s website must be rejected. (5) The complaint alleging failure to allocate an appropriate value to AMS’s marketing services in the incremental profitability analysis 335 The applicants argue that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] allocated all of the costs of the marketing services agreement to the airport services agreement, while at the same time asserting that the only benefit that SMAC could expect from the former agreement was an increase in traffic on the route between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to an 85% load factor per flight for the duration of 2008 agreements, and that the other benefits were too uncertain to be taken into account and included in the analysis of the profitability of those agreements. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] thereby spread the entirety of the cost of the marketing services over the airport services agreement, without including any of the other benefits of the marketing services agreement. 336 In particular, in the first place, the applicants maintain that, in the absence of evidence of overpricing, the proper value of a service, including a marketing or advertising service, is its market price. Consequently, given that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had included the sums paid by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport to AMS on the costs side of the incremental profitability analysis, the value of the services provided by AMS, which correspond to their market price, should have been included on the benefits side, producing a net zero result. 337 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] made a manifest error of assessment and failed to state reasons by not attributing an appropriate value to AMS’s marketing services on the basis of the market price. 338 In the second place, in the context of their complaint alleging that the grounds underlying the decision taken by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport to enter into the marketing services agreement (see paragraph 371 below) were incorrectly rejected, the applicants put forward the argument, which must now be examined, that the marketing services agreement did not constitute a way for [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport to pay [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s marketing costs and to ensure high load factors on the route between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport secured the initial level of traffic that it wished to have by means of the airport services agreement, whereas the high load factors on [OSCURATO:PERSONA] routes are due almost exclusively to its own marketing, and not to any marketing efforts on the part of airports. 339 In the third place, the applicants maintain in the reply that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] wrongly refrained from including the benefits of marketing services in the incremental profitability analysis on the ground that, as referred to in recital 352 of the contested decision, a market economy operator would be unwilling to enter into the 2008 agreements if the incremental costs incurred under the transaction exceeded the incremental revenues in discounted value terms, even if the price payable for such services on the market was at or above the level of prices under the proposed transaction. 340 According to the applicants, ‘if private companies adhered to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] logic, some of the world’s most successful companies would not exist’. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], private companies often invest large sums in programmes for the development of their brand, while suffering incremental losses at first or in a start-up situation. The goal is not to achieve an immediate return on investment, but to achieve long-term benefits. Second, marginal losses are, according to the case-law, consistent with the market economy operator principle where there is no better alternative. A negative sale price may be consistent with the market economy operator principle unless other options such as bankruptcy are available and involve a lesser loss for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] that is the seller. However, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed to assess the losses that would have been caused by the closure of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport. 341 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] disputes the arguments put forward by the applicants. 342 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, by their arguments put forward in support of the present complaint, the applicants challenge the way in which the value of the marketing services was incorporated into the incremental profitability analysis concerning the 2008 agreements. 343 In that regard, it should be noted that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] analysed, in the contested decision, the benefits that a market economy operator acting in place of CCI-airport and SMAC could have expected from the marketing services agreement. In particular, it found that marketing services were capable of boosting passenger traffic on the routes covered by the 2008 agreements. It added that that effect benefited not only the airline, but also [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport, given that the increase in the number of passengers was capable of leading, for that airport operator, to an increase in airport and non-airport revenues. It concluded from this that, when assessing the value in entering into those agreements, a market economy operator would have taken that positive effect into account (recitals 314 to 318 of that decision). However, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] rejected as being too uncertain the full benefits of the marketing services agreement beyond the routes covered by those agreements and their duration (recitals 319 to 338 of that decision). Moreover, it incorporated, in the incremental profitability analysis, that potential positive effect in the load factor of the route linking [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] used for the implementation period of those agreements. On the other hand, it included the sums paid by SMAC to AMS for the purchase of marketing services among the incremental costs to be deducted from the incremental revenues linked to that airline (recitals 372 and 387 of the contested decision). 344 It must be held that the line of argument alleging insufficient reasoning of the contested decision must, in the light of the above, be rejected. The way in which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] took into account the value of marketing services provided by AMS in the incremental profitability analysis clearly follows from that decision. 345 Furthermore, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not commit a manifest error of assessment. 346 In the first place, it must be pointed out that the applicants’ argument that, since the value of the marketing services was equal to the market price, it offset the purchase price of those services as a cost in the incremental profitability analysis, is tantamount to considering that the marketing services and the airport services are distinct and independent and that the value of the marketing services must therefore be assessed independently of the operation by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the air routes covered by the airport services agreements which concern them. 347 The applicants do not validly refute the opposite approach, adopted in the contested decision, that the marketing services agreement and the airport services agreement are closely linked in that the marketing services are essentially intended to promote the air routes (see paragraphs 179 to 184 above and paragraphs 353 and 354 below). 348 Furthermore, nor do the applicants validly refute the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] analysis that a market economy operator would have considered any other benefit than that resulting from the positive effect on the passenger traffic on the air routes operated by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] as being too uncertain to be taken into account in a quantifiable manner (recitals 321 to 338 of the contested decision). By that approach, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was entitled, without erring, to consider the purchase price of the marketing services as an incremental cost to be deducted from the incremental revenues deriving from the route between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 349 On the one hand, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] found that, even though the marketing services might have boosted passenger traffic on the routes covered by the 2008 agreements during the term of those agreements, it was very likely that such an effect was zero or negligible after that period or on other routes (recitals 322 to 324 of the contested decision). The applicants have not succeeded in calling that finding into question (see paragraphs 327 to 332 above). 350 Moreover, the applicants have not provided any evidence to refute the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] analysis that the two methods proposed by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the studies of 17 and 31 January 2014 during the administrative procedure for assessing the benefits of the marketing services agreement going beyond the air routes in question and the term of operation of those routes gave very uncertain and unreliable results (recitals 325 to 337 of the contested decision). 351 In those circumstances, the applicants have not established that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] committed a manifest error of assessment in basing the incremental profitability analysis on the assumption that a market economy operator would take into account the marketing services agreement only for the positive effect on the number of passengers using the route provided by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and, therefore, on the additional incremental revenues linked to passenger traffic on that route, while considering the purchase price of the marketing services to be paid to AMS as an incremental cost for the airport to be deducted from the incremental revenues, and not as being offset by the value of the marketing services. 352 In the second place, the applicants’ argument to the effect that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] incorrectly considered that the marketing services agreement sought to ensure high load factors on the route between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must also be rejected. 353 In that regard, it must be held that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considered, in recitals 310 and 312 of the contested decision, that the purpose of the marketing services agreement was to provide advertising space on [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s website in order to promote [OSCURATO:PERSONA] as a travel destination to visitors to that website, and therefore to customers of that airline, and that the marketing services essentially sought to promote the route operated by [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 354 It is appropriate to uphold that analysis, which is based on the finding that the marketing services provided to the manager of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport were addressed to the potential [OSCURATO:PERSONA] passengers who would use the route operated by that airline towards or departing from that airport, even though those services promoted tourist attractions and businesses in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] region. Thus, those services proved to be closely linked to the operation of that route. 355 In addition, the promotion of [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s air transport services by means of the marketing services purchased from AMS did not prevent [OSCURATO:PERSONA] from itself ensuring high load factors through its own promotion. 356 In the third place, the applicants’ argument that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] incorrectly stated that a market economy operator would not have entered into the 2008 agreements because the incremental costs incurred exceeded the incremental revenues in discounted value terms must be rejected. 357 In the present case, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] found, in recital 352 of the contested decision, that a market economy operator motivated by the prospect of profits would not be prepared to purchase marketing services if it were predicted that, despite the positive effect of such services on passenger traffic on the air routes concerned, the incremental costs incurred by the agreements would exceed the incremental revenues in discounted value terms. 358 However, without it being necessary to rule on the question whether, in the light of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 107(1) TFEU, a market economy operator operating an airport would be likely to purchase marketing services while suffering an incremental loss in net present value, it must be held that, in any event, the applicants do not show that a market economy operator acting in place of the manager of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport would have been prepared, in the present case, to act in such a way. 359 In the present case, the applicants confine themselves in their arguments to stating generally that private companies often invest large sums in developing their brands while suffering initial incremental losses, without obtaining an immediate return on investment, in order, however, to achieve long-term benefits. They do not show that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] committed a manifest error in finding in recitals 325 to 337 of the contested decision that the benefits of the marketing services agreements going beyond the routes covered by the agreements and the term of operation of those routes were extremely uncertain and could not be quantified with a degree of reliability that would be considered sufficient by a market economy operator. 360 In particular, the applicants have not provided any evidence to refute the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] analysis that the two methods proposed by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the studies of 17 and 31 January 2014 during the administrative procedure for assessing the benefits of the marketing services agreements going beyond the air routes in question and the term of operation of those routes, that is to say the future revenues resulting in particular from the prominence and the strong brand image due to the marketing services, gave very uncertain and unreliable results (recitals 327 to 330 and 333 of the contested decision). 361 It follows that the applicants have not established that a market economy operator, acting in place of the manager of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport, would have taken the view that the marketing services purchased from AMS were an investment likely to generate profits in the longer term. 362 Finally, so far as concerns the applicants’ argument relating to the least onerous solution, it must be pointed out that, in the contested decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not err in stating that a market economy operator placed in the situation of manager of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport would have expected the 2008 agreements to be unprofitable. Therefore, as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] correctly states, it would have been a better alternative for such an operator not to sign those agreements, since they entailed negative incremental profitability and their conclusion would have accordingly led to deterioration of that airport’s financial situation. 363 Therefore, even assuming that the closure of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport led to a greater loss for its owner than the incremental loss expected from the implementation of the 2008 agreements, a market economy operator motivated by the prospect of profits, acting as the operator of that airport, would have rather preferred, in the present case, not to enter into those agreements. 364 In the light of all the foregoing, it must be concluded that, without committing a manifest error of assessment, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was entitled to take into account, in the incremental profitability analysis, only revenues generated by the route between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] during the planned duration of the 2008 agreements, even though it included the costs associated with the marketing services agreement, which were deemed to be generated in their entirety during that period. 365 It follows that all of the applicants’ arguments that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed to attribute an appropriate value to AMS’s marketing services must be rejected. 366 Finally, the applicants argue, in the reply, that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] assertion in the defence that a market economy operator would not be prepared to pay its customer for a period of up to three years, in the expectation that it would recover the money spent in future years, is unfounded. 367 In particular, the applicants submit, first, that airports are large, long-term infrastructure projects whose investment horizon substantially exceeds three years and, second, that, according to the economic and financial literature, the profitability of an investment should not necessarily be restricted to the expected net present value of future cash flows generated by that investment, but could also include the value of strategic options. A market economy operator could make a loss-making investment in the short term, even with a zero or negative net present value, if it had a strategic value and provided the undertaking with an option to undertake more profitable investments in the longer run, which would compensate for the initial losses. Thus, a loss-making advertising campaign could be a strategic investment in that it increases the value of the brand and so increases the company’s long-term profitability. 368 In that regard, first, it suffices to note that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not make a manifest error of assessment in considering that a market economy operator finding itself in the situation of the manager of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport would not have counted on a renewal of the 2008 agreements and would not have therefore agreed to incur losses during the planned duration of those agreements on the ground that it would obtain compensation for this by future benefits (see paragraph 304 above). 369 Second, it should be noted that, as stated by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the applicants have not demonstrated that the economic and financial literature which relates to the electricity sector and to capital investment projects would be relevant for assessing the conduct of the manager of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport when it launches a route. In any case, with regard to the development of the value of the brand by the establishment of a marketing programme, it is sufficient to refer to paragraphs 359 and 360 above. 370 Accordingly, it is necessary to reject that argument and the complaint as a whole. (6) The complaint concerning the grounds underlying the decision of the manager of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport to enter into the marketing services agreement 371 The applicants argue that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] wrongly disregarded the rationale behind the decision of the manager of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport to enter into the marketing services agreement. That manager thus took the rational business decision to make such a purchase on account of the numerous foreseeable benefits, which included enhancing the image of that airport and achieving several strategic goals, such as the diversification of airlines, increasing the airport’s market value and increasing the proportion of inbound passengers. The applicants refer several times in their line of argument to the earlier decision-making practice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relating to aid measures for airports. 372 In that regard, it must be stressed at the outset that, according to the case-law, the classification of a measure as [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid cannot depend on a subjective assessment by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and must be determined regardless of any previous administrative practice of that institution, assuming it to have been established (see judgment of 3 July 2014, Spain and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑319/12 and T‑321/12, not published, EU:T:2014:604, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited). 373 It follows that there is no need to examine whether the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] previous practice in taking decisions relied on by the applicants has been established. 374 In addition, it should be recalled that, in the context of applying the private investor test, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must examine, when assessing a measure, all the relevant features of the measure and its context (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 December 2008, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , T‑196/04, EU:T:2008:585, paragraph 59). 375 In the present case, it must be held, for the reasons referred to in paragraphs 376 to 389 below, that the applicants have failed to show that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] committed a manifest error of assessment in failing to take into account the advantages they invoked. (i) The need for regional airports to improve their image using marketing services 376 The applicants claim that, relying on an economic report of 10 April 2013, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should have concluded that the purchase of marketing services was justified, given that marketing was a necessary and legitimate tool for regional airports in order to improve their image and attract new customers and, in the particular case of SMAC, the aim of the marketing services agreement, in their own words, was to put [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport on the map for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] public. 377 In that regard, it should be noted that, in the contested decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not dispute the usefulness or the necessity for regional airports to develop a marketing strategy, or the value of the image of regional airports. Nor did it consider that SMAC’s purchasing of marketing services was unjustified. 378 On the other hand, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considered, in the contested decision, that AMS’s marketing services were not likely to enhance the brand image of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport in the long term. The applicants have not succeeded in demonstrating that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] analysis was vitiated by a manifest error of assessment in that respect (see paragraphs 327 to 332, 359 and 360 above). 379 It follows that the applicants’ argument that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] committed a manifest error of assessment as regards taking into account the enhancement of the image of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport thanks to the marketing services agreement must be rejected. (ii) The failure to take into account the strategic objectives of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport 380 Second, the applicants claim that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed to take account of the strategic benefits that, leaving aside any incremental profitability analysis, SMAC could expect from the marketing services agreement, which included the diversification of airlines, increasing [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport’s market value and increasing the proportion of inbound passengers. 381 In the first place, the applicants claim that, by means of the marketing services agreement, SMAC was pursuing the strategic objective of diversifying the airlines operating from [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport. Relying on an economic report, they explain that demonstrated success by an airport which has engaged in advertising to promote itself could encourage other airlines to include it on their schedules. For an airport, a demonstrated ability to enhance its image through advertising would incentivise airlines to begin serving it. According to the applicants, SMAC’s goal of attracting other airlines operating from [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport in addition to [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s summer seasonal route derives, first, from its initiatives, in 2007, second, from the promotion of its new image as an international airport to court other airlines, inter alia by participating in trade fairs, and, third, from the normal level of operation of that airport at that time in terms of staff and equipment outside the summer months, which reflected the desire to attract another airline to operate a winter route. 382 However, it must be held that those factors fail to establish that the marketing services provided by AMS would have allowed a market economy operator acting in place of the manager of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport to attract other airlines at [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport. It follows in particular from recitals 321 to 338 of the contested decision that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] found that the only certain and quantifiable benefit that a normally prudent and diligent market economy operator could expect from the marketing services agreement consisted in an increase in the number of passengers on the route between [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and that any benefit going beyond those routes was too uncertain to be taken into account in a quantifiable manner. The applicants have adduced no evidence to call into question that assessment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 383 Accordingly, the applicants’ complaint that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed to take into account the aim of diversification of airlines at [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport must be rejected. 384 In the second place, the applicants claim that the enhancement of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport’s image was such as to increase the market value and equity value of that airport. Airports are assets that are increasingly sold by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to private investors. 385 In that regard, it suffices to recall that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was entitled, without committing any error, to observe that the marketing services were not such as to reinforce the brand image of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport in the long term (see paragraphs 327 to 332 and 360 above). 386 Accordingly, the applicants’ complaint concerning failure to take into account the aim of increasing the value of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport must be rejected. 387 In the third place, the applicants claim that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed to take a position on the argument that advertising on [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s website would increase the proportion of inbound traffic from the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], even though increasing traffic was one of the main aims of the marketing services agreement. An increase in inbound traffic would be likely to generate higher non-aeronautical revenues than outbound traffic, and so the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] incremental profitability analysis probably underestimated the non-aeronautical revenues which [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport could reasonably expect from that agreement. 388 In that regard, it must be observed that, as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] stated, the contested decision implicitly included, by means of a load factor of 85% per flight, the effect of the marketing services agreement on the number of inbound passengers and the related non-aeronautical revenues. It is apparent from that decision that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] applied that load factor to the incremental overall traffic, including both outbound and inbound passengers, in order to then calculate the expected incremental non-aeronautical revenues resulting from the 2008 agreements. 389 In those circumstances, it must be held that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not commit a manifest error of assessment in taking into account the effect of the marketing services agreement on the number of inbound passengers and the related non-aeronautical revenues. 390 In view of the above, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must reject the applicants’ complaint regarding the grounds underlying the decision of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport to enter into the marketing services agreement. 391 The third plea in law must be rejected as unfounded. 392 The action must therefore be dismissed in its entirety and it is not necessary to rule on the applicants’ application for measures of organisation of procedure in so far as it concerns measures other than those already ordered. IV. Costs 393 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. As the applicants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to pay their own costs together with those of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in accordance with the form of order sought by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. On those grounds, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] DAC and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. [OSCURATO:PERSONA][OSCURATO:PERSONA] in open court in Luxembourg on 13 December 2018. E. Coulon G. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of contents I. Background to the dispute A. Measures at issue B. Administrative procedure C. Contested decision II. Procedure and forms of order sought III. Law 1. The first plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of good administration enshrined in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41 of the Charter and of the rights of the defence 2. The second plea in law, concerning the imputability of the measures in question to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (a) The first complaint, alleging failure to state reasons (b) The second complaint, alleging an error of assessment regarding the imputability to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the decision taken by SMAC to enter into the 2008 agreements (c) The third complaint, alleging an error of assessment concerning the nature of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] CCI (d) The fourth complaint, alleging contradictory reasoning 3. The third plea in law, alleging incorrect application of the market economy operator test (a) The first part, alleging errors of assessment and failure to state reasons concerning the decision to depart from the comparative analysis in the present case (1) The rejection of the comparative analysis as a method of application of the market economy operator test (2) The complaints concerning the grounds relied on in the contested decision to depart, in the present case, from the comparative analysis (i) The complaint, alleging that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in finding that diversity among airports justified its departure from the comparative analysis (ii) The complaint alleging that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was wrong to find that the comparative analysis should be based on a comparison of the 2008 agreements together with other similar transactions (iii) The complaint alleging that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] incorrectly considered that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] paid a negative price (iv) The complaint alleging that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in finding that the evidence provided by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed to demonstrate that the airports selected in the study of 25 June 2012 were sufficiently comparable to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport and a failure to state reasons in that regard (3) The complaint alleging that the comparative analysis shows that no advantage was conferred through the 2008 agreements (b) The second part, alleging errors of assessment and insufficient reasoning as regards the incremental profitability analysis (1) The complaint alleging reliance on insufficient, unverified, unclear and unreliable data (2) The complaint alleging that the information sent by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport was not verified and not compared with an average or well-run and efficient airport (3) The complaint alleging that the scope of the analysis carried out for the purposes of applying the market economy operator test was too narrow (i) The time horizon (ii) The number of routes (iii) The wider benefits (4) The complaint alleging that the assessment of the popularity and impact of [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s website was incorrect (5) The complaint alleging failure to allocate an appropriate value to AMS’s marketing services in the incremental profitability analysis (6) The complaint concerning the grounds underlying the decision of the manager of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport to enter into the marketing services agreement (i) The need for regional airports to improve their image using marketing services (ii) The failure to take into account the strategic objectives of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] airport IV. Costs * Language of the case: English. 1 Confidential data omitted.