Corte di giustizia UE n. 1/2013

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) 24 October 2013 ( * ) (Appeal – Competition – Agreements, decisions and concerted practices – Market for the installation and maintenance of elevators and escalators – Fines – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases – Effective judicial remedy) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑510/11 P, APPEAL under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 23 September 2011, [OSCURATO:PERSONA], established in Helsinki (Finland), [OSCURATO:PERSONA] GmbH, established in Hanover ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), [OSCURATO:PERSONA] BV, established in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (Netherlands), represented by T. Vinje, Solicitor, D. Paemen, avocat, and A. Tomtsis, dikigoros, appellants, the other party to the proceedings being: [OSCURATO:PERSONA], represented by E. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and R. Sauer, acting as Agents, with an address for service in [OSCURATO:PERSONA], defendant at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), composed of A. Rosas (Rapporteur), acting as President of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], D. Šváby and C. Vajda, Judges, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: J. Kokott, Registrar: L. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA], having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 14 March 2013, having decided, after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], to proceed to judgment without an Opinion, gives the following [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1 By their appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] GmbH and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] BV (together referred to as ‘the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group’ or ‘the appellants’) seek to have set aside the judgment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 13 July 2011 in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑151/07 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [2011] [OSCURATO:PERSONA]‑5313 (‘the judgment under appeal’), by which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed their action for annulment of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C(2007) 512 final of 21 February 2007 relating to a proceeding under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 81 [EC] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] COMP/E-1/38.823 − Elevators and Escalators) (‘the decision at issue’), a summary of which was published in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (OJ 2008 C 75, p. 19), or, in the alternative, for reduction of the fines imposed on them. Legal framework [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 1/2003 2 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 23(2)(a) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 [EC] and 82 [EC] (OJ 2003, L 1, p. 1), which replaced [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 15(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17 of 6 February 1962, first regulation implementing Articles [81 EC] and [82 EC] (OJ, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1959‑1962, p. 87), the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may by decision impose fines on undertakings and associations of undertakings where, either intentionally or negligently, they infringe [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 81 EC or [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 82 EC. 3 In accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 31 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1/2003, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice is to have unlimited jurisdiction to review decisions whereby the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has fixed a fine or periodic penalty payment. It may cancel, reduce or increase the fine or periodic penalty payment imposed. The 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 4 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (OJ 2002 C 45, p. 3) (‘the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’) sets out the conditions under which undertakings cooperating with the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] during an investigation it is carrying out into a cartel may be exempted from fines, or may be granted reductions in any fine which would otherwise have been imposed on them. 5 Points 8 to 12 of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which are in Section A thereof, headed ‘Immunity from Fines’, state: ‘8. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] will grant an undertaking immunity from any fine which would otherwise have been imposed if: (a)      the undertaking is the first to submit evidence which in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] view may enable it to adopt a decision to carry out an investigation in the sense of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 14(3) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17 … in connection with an alleged cartel affecting the Community; or (b)      the undertaking is the first to submit evidence which in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] view may enable it to find an infringement of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 81 EC … in connection with an alleged cartel affecting the Community. 9.      Immunity pursuant to point 8(a) will only be granted on the condition that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not have, at the time of the submission, sufficient evidence to adopt a decision to carry out an investigation in the sense of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 14(3) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17 in connection with the alleged cartel. 10.      Immunity pursuant to point 8(b) will only be granted on the cumulative conditions that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not have, at the time of the submission, sufficient evidence to find an infringement of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 81 EC in connection with the alleged cartel and that no undertaking had been granted conditional immunity from fines under point 8(a) in connection with the alleged cartel. 11.      In addition to the conditions set out in points 8(a) and 9 or in points 8(b) and 10, as appropriate, the following cumulative conditions must be met in any case to qualify for any immunity from a fine: (a)      the undertaking cooperates fully, on a continuous basis and expeditiously throughout the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] administrative procedure and provides the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] with all evidence that comes into its possession or is available to it relating to the suspected infringement. In particular, it remains at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] disposal to answer swiftly any request that may contribute to the establishment of the facts concerned; (b)      the undertaking ends its involvement in the suspected infringement no later than the time at which it submits evidence under points 8(a) or 8(b), as appropriate; (c)      the undertaking did not take steps to coerce other undertakings to participate in the infringement. … 12.      An undertaking wishing to apply for immunity from fines should contact the [OSCURATO:PERSONA][OSCURATO:PERSONA] for Competition. Should it become apparent that the requirements set out in points 8 to 10, as appropriate, are not met, the undertaking will immediately be informed that immunity from fines is not available for the suspected infringement. ... 15.      Once the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has received the evidence submitted by the undertaking under point 13(a) and has verified that it meets the conditions set out in points 8(a) or 8(b), as appropriate, it will grant the undertaking conditional immunity from fines in writing.’ 6 Points 20 to 23 of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which are in Section B thereof, headed ‘Reduction of a fine’, provide: ‘20.      Undertakings that do not meet the conditions under section A above may be eligible to benefit from a reduction of any fine that would otherwise have been imposed. 21.      In order to qualify, an undertaking must provide the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] with evidence of the suspected infringement which represents significant added value with respect to the evidence already in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] possession and must terminate its involvement in the suspected infringement no later than the time at which it submits the evidence. 22.      The concept of “added value” refers to the extent to which the evidence provided strengthens, by its very nature and/or its level of detail, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ability to prove the facts in question. In this assessment, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] will generally consider written evidence originating from the period of time to which the facts pertain to have a greater value than evidence subsequently established. Similarly, evidence directly relevant to the facts in question will generally be considered to have a greater value than that with only indirect relevance. 23.      [OSCURATO:PERSONA] will determine in any final decision adopted at the end of the administrative procedure: (a)      whether the evidence provided by an undertaking represented significant added value with respect to the evidence in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] possession at that same time; (b)      the level of reduction an undertaking will benefit from, relative to the fine which would otherwise have been imposed, as follows. For the: – first undertaking to meet point 21: a reduction of 30‑50%, – second undertaking to meet point 21: a reduction of 20‑30%, – subsequent undertakings that meet point 21: a reduction of up to 20%. In order to determine the level of reduction within each of these bands, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] will take into account the time at which the evidence fulfilling the condition in point 21 was submitted and the extent to which it represents added value. It may also take into account the extent and continuity of any cooperation provided by the undertaking following the date of its submission. In addition, if an undertaking provides evidence relating to facts previously unknown to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] which have a direct bearing on the gravity or duration of the suspected cartel, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] will not take these elements into account when setting any fine to be imposed on the undertaking which provided this evidence.’ 7 Point 29 of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] provides: ‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA] is aware that this notice will create legitimate expectations on which undertakings may rely when disclosing the existence of a cartel to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].’ Background to the dispute and the decision at issue 8 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is a global service and engineering undertaking, established in Finland, which sells, manufactures, installs, maintains and modernises elevators and escalators and services automatic building doors. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] operates through its national subsidiaries, such as [OSCURATO:PERSONA] GmbH in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] BV in the Netherlands. 9 In the summer of 2003, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] received information concerning the possible existence of a cartel among the principal [OSCURATO:PERSONA] manufacturers of elevators and escalators engaged in business activities in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], namely [OSCURATO:PERSONA] SA, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] GmbH, [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] BV [OSCURATO:PERSONA] en [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] SA, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] GmbH & Co. OHG, [OSCURATO:PERSONA][OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] BV, [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] SA, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] GmbH, [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] BV, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] as well as ThyssenKrupp [OSCURATO:PERSONA] NV, ThyssenKrupp Aufzüge GmbH, ThyssenKrupp Fahrtreppen GmbH, ThyssenKrupp [OSCURATO:PERSONA] AG, ThyssenKrupp AG, ThyssenKrupp [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and ThyssenKrupp [OSCURATO:PERSONA] BV (together referred to as ‘the ThyssenKrupp group’). Early in 2004, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] carried out inspections at the premises of those undertakings in [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the Netherlands. 10 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] applications were made by those undertakings. On 2 February 2004 the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group submitted such an application under point 8(b) of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which included information concerning [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and which it subsequently supplemented with, inter alia, information concerning [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (on 12 and 14 February 2004) and information concerning the Netherlands (on 19 July 2004). 11 In the decision at issue, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] found that the undertakings mentioned in paragraph 9 of the present judgment together with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] BV had participated in four single, complex and continuous infringements of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 81 EC in four [OSCURATO:PERSONA], sharing markets by agreeing or concerting to allocate tenders and contracts for the sale, installation, service and modernisation of elevators and escalators. 12 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group was granted immunity from fines in respect of the infringements in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. However, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(2) and (4) of the decision at issue, so far as the infringements in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the Netherlands were concerned, fines of EUR 62 370 000 and EUR 79 750 000 respectively were imposed jointly and severally on [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and its national subsidiaries. Proceedings before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the judgment under appeal 13 By application lodged at the Registry of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 8 May 2007, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group brought an action challenging (i) the legality of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(2) of the decision at issue, which imposed fines on the undertakings concerned for the infringements in [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and (ii) the legality of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(4) of that decision, which imposed fines on the undertakings concerned for the infringements in the Netherlands. 14 In support of the action, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group put forward three pleas in law. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] pleas alleged (i) infringement of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 15(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17 and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 65(5) [ECSC] (OJ 1998 C 9, p. 3) and breach of the principle of proportionality in the setting of the starting amounts of the fines, (ii) infringement of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the principles of the protection of legitimate expectations, equal treatment and the rights of the defence and (iii) infringement of the principles of the protection of legitimate expectations and equal treatment on the occasion of the calculation of the reduction of the fines granted for cooperation outside the framework of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 15 By the judgment under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed that action and ordered the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group to pay the costs. Forms of order sought 16 The appellants claim that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should: –        set aside the judgment under appeal; –        annul [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(2) of the decision at issue in so far as it imposes a fine on [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] GmbH, and impose either no fine or a fine at a lower amount than determined in that decision; –        annul [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(4) of the decision at issue in so far as it imposes a fine on [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] BV, and set the fine at a lower amount than determined in that decision; and –        order the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to pay the costs. 17 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice should: –        dismiss the appeal; and –        order the appellants to pay the costs. The appeal 18 The appellants raise six grounds of appeal in support of the form of order sought, which allege (i) misinterpretation of point 8(b) of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], (ii) misinterpretation of point 8(a) of that notice, (iii) infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, (iv) misinterpretation of points 21 to 23 of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], (v) infringement of the principle of equal treatment and (vi) infringement of the right to a fair trial, as guaranteed by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 47 of the Charter of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (‘the Charter’) and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 6 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on the Protection of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA], signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’). 19 The appellants maintain, in several of their grounds of appeal, that the review carried out by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the judgment under appeal was marginal and cannot be regarded as a ‘full review’. In order to address this criticism, which is made in relation to a number of the grounds of appeal, it is appropriate to recall, before going on to consider those grounds, the underlying principles of both the review of legality carried out by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] judicature and the unlimited jurisdiction which the latter is afforded in certain circumstances. Preliminary considerations 20 The principle of effective judicial protection is a general principle of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EU) law to which expression is now given by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 47 of the Charter and which corresponds, in EU law, to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 6(1) of the ECHR (see, inter alia, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑501/11 P [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited). 21 Whilst, as [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 6(3) TEU confirms, fundamental rights recognised by the ECHR constitute general principles of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] law and whilst [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 52(3) of the Charter requires rights contained in the Charter which correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR to be given the same meaning and scope as those laid down by the ECHR, the latter does not constitute, as long as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has not acceded to it, a legal instrument which has been formally incorporated into EU law (see [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑571/10 Kamberaj [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 62, and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑617/10 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 44). 22 As the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice has already observed in paragraph 35 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has held that, in administrative proceedings, the obligation to comply with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 6 of the ECHR does not preclude a ‘penalty’ from being imposed by an administrative authority in the first instance. According to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of [OSCURATO:PERSONA], compliance with that provision requires, however, that decisions taken by administrative authorities which do not themselves satisfy the requirements laid down in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 6(1) of the ECHR be subject to subsequent review by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction. The characteristics of such a body include, according to the same judgment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the power to quash in all respects, on questions of fact and law, the decision of the body below. The judicial body must in particular have jurisdiction to examine all questions of fact and law relevant to the dispute before it (judgment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in [OSCURATO:SOCIETA]. v. Italy , no. 43509/08, 27 September 2011, § 59). 23 Ruling on the principle of effective judicial protection, a general principle of EU law to which expression is now given by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 47 of the Charter, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice has held that, in addition to the review of legality provided for by the FEU Treaty, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] judicature has the unlimited jurisdiction which it is afforded by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 31 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1/2003, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 261 TFEU, and which empowers it to substitute its own appraisal for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and, consequently, to cancel, reduce or increase the fine or periodic penalty payment imposed ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑386/10 P Chalkor v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 63, and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , paragraph 36). 24 As regards the review of legality, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has pointed out that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] judicature must carry it out on the basis of the evidence adduced by the applicant in support of the pleas in law put forward and that it cannot use the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] margin of discretion – either as regards the choice of factors taken into account in the application of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] or as regards the assessment of those factors – as a basis for dispensing with the conduct of an in‑depth review of the law and of the facts (see, to that effect, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , paragraphs 37 and 155 and the case-law cited). 25 As the review provided for by the Treaties involves review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] judicature of both the law and the facts, and means that it has the power to assess the evidence, to annul the decision at issue and to alter the amount of a fine, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has concluded that the review of legality provided for under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 263 TFEU, supplemented by the unlimited jurisdiction in respect of the amount of the fine, provided for under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 31 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1/2003, is not contrary to the requirements of the principle of effective judicial protection which is currently set out in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 47 of the Charter ( [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , paragraph 38, and, to that effect, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑272/09 P KME [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 106; Chalkor v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , paragraph 67, and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑199/11 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 63). 26 It should also be recalled that the analysis by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] judicature of the pleas in law raised in an action for annulment has neither the object nor the effect of replacing a full investigation of the case in the context of an administrative procedure. As such a limitation of judicial review is, however, inherent in the notion of the review of legality, it cannot be understood as unduly limiting the review of legality which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] judicature is authorised to carry out (see, to that effect, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑399/08 P [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [2010] ECR I‑7831, paragraph 84 and the case-law cited). 27 Indeed, when it falls to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] judicature to review the legality of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] decisions imposing fines for infringements of the EU competition rules, it cannot encroach upon the discretion available to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the administrative proceedings by substituting its own assessment of complex economic circumstances for that of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], but, where relevant, must demonstrate that the way in which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] reached its conclusions was not justified in law (see, to that effect, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑441/07 P [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Alrosa [2010] ECR I‑5949, paragraph 67). 28 In that regard, whilst, in areas giving rise to complex economic assessments, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has a margin of discretion with regard to economic matters, that does not mean that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must refrain from reviewing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] interpretation of information of an economic nature. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must, among other things, not only establish whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also ascertain whether that evidence contains all the information which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it (see [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑12/03 P [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [2005] ECR I‑987, paragraph 39; [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑525/04 P Spain v Lenzing [2007] ECR I‑9947, paragraphs 56 and 57; Chalkor v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , paragraph 54, and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others , paragraph 59). 29 Moreover, although the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] sets out rules of practice from which the administration may not depart in an individual case without giving reasons compatible with the principle of equal treatment (see, by analogy, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , paragraph 67 and the case-law cited), the fact remains that that notice does not affect the intensity of the review which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must carry out in accordance with paragraph 28 of the present judgment. 30 It should, however, be borne in mind that proceedings before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] are inter partes . With the exception of grounds involving matters of public policy which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] are required to raise of their own motion, such as the failure to state reasons for a contested decision, it is for the applicant to raise pleas in law against that decision and to adduce evidence in support of those pleas (see, to that effect, KME [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , paragraph 104, and Chalkor v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , paragraph 64). 31 That requirement, which is procedural in nature, does not conflict with the rule that, in the case of infringements of the competition rules, it is for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to prove the infringements found by it and to adduce evidence capable of demonstrating to the requisite legal standard the existence of the circumstances constituting an infringement. What the applicant is required to do in the context of a legal challenge is to identify the impugned elements of the contested decision, to formulate grounds of challenge in that regard and to adduce evidence – direct or circumstantial – to demonstrate that its objections are well founded ( KME [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , paragraph 105, and Chalkor v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , paragraph 65). 32 Moreover, the failure to review the whole of the contested decision of the court’s own motion does not contravene the principle of effective judicial protection. Compliance with that principle does not require that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – which is indeed obliged to respond to the pleas in law raised and to carry out a review of both the law and the facts – should be obliged to undertake of its own motion a new and comprehensive investigation of the file ( KME [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , paragraph 106, and Chalkor v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , paragraph 66). 33 It is in the light of that review of the case-law that it is appropriate to analyse the grounds of appeal put forward by the appellants in the present proceedings and to consider, in relation to those grounds, the review carried out by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the judgment under appeal. Sixth ground of appeal: infringement of the right to a fair trial [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the parties 34 By their sixth ground of appeal, which it is appropriate to consider first, the appellants take issue with paragraphs 10 to 23, 29 to 37, 80, 82 to 85 and 95 of the judgment under appeal. They also refer, in the reply, to paragraphs 99 to 101, 104, 105, 114, 117 and 155 of that judgment. They complain that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed in its duty fully to review [OSCURATO:PERSONA] decisions – both in the standard of review that it applied, and in the way that standard was applied. In their submission, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] deferred completely to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] analysis and, so far as their cooperation was concerned, incorrectly took the view that complex factual and economic assessments were involved and that the review which it could carry out in that regard was therefore very limited. Furthermore, in the reply, while criticising the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for having infringed their right to a fair trial, the appellants complain that it rejected their plea alleging infringement of the rights of the defence without examining the documents to which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group had requested access. Thus, so the appellants argue, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed to respect their right to a fair trial, as guaranteed by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 47 of the Charter and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 6 of the ECHR. 35 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that the appellants do not indicate where precisely in the judgment under appeal the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] unduly deferred to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] discretion or failed to review the law and the facts. Since none of the paragraphs of that judgment to which the appellants refer constitutes a response to the pleas in law relied on or, a fortiori , the necessary basis for the operative part of that judgment, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submits that the sixth ground of appeal should be rejected. Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 36 As regards the argument which the appellants put forward in the reply, according to which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should have examined certain [OSCURATO:PERSONA] documents before reaching the conclusions contained in paragraphs 114, 117 and 155 of the judgment under appeal, it should be observed at the outset that, as is clear from Articles 42(2) and 118 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice in the version applicable on the date on which the present appeal was brought, no new plea in law may be introduced in the course of proceedings unless it is based on matters of law or of fact which come to light in the course of the procedure. 37 In order for such an argument to be admissible at the stage of the reply, the appellants should have established in what respect it was based on matters of fact which have come to light in the course of these proceedings (see, to that effect, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑219/95 P [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [1997] ECR I‑4411, paragraph 56). Since the appellants have adduced no evidence of this, the argument must be regarded as inadmissible. 38 As regards the other arguments raised in the sixth ground of appeal, the appellants assert, in essence, that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not exercise its unlimited jurisdiction when reviewing the legality of the decision at issue and that it thus infringed their right to a ‘fair trial’. 39 The sixth ground of appeal should be understood as being directed at, in the first place, the statements made by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concerning the scope of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] margin of assessment and, in the second place, the review in fact carried out by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] with regard to the decision at issue, having regard to its definition of that margin of assessment. 40 As regards the principles set out by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the judgment under appeal, concerning the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] margin of assessment, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] stated, in particular in paragraph 85 of that judgment, that ‘[i]n view of the margin of assessment available to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in evaluating the cooperation of an undertaking under the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], it is only where it manifestly goes beyond the bounds of that margin that it may be criticised by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’. Similarly, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] stated, in paragraph 95 of the judgment, that ‘[it] must consider, in the present case, whether the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] manifestly went beyond the bounds of [its] margin of assessment’. 41 In that regard, it should be noted that, by the sixth ground of appeal, the appellants merely criticise an abstract description of the applicable rules of law set out by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in paragraphs 85 and 95 of the judgment under appeal. 42 It is true that, as can be seen from the case-law of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice referred to in particular in paragraph 24 of the present judgment, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] cannot use the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] margin of discretion – either as regards the choice of factors taken into account in the application of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] or as regards the assessment of those factors – as a basis for dispensing with the conduct of an in-depth review of the law and of the facts. 43 However, for the purposes of determining whether the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed to comply with the requirements stemming from that line of case-law, account is not to be taken of the abstract and declaratory descriptions of judicial review in paragraphs 85 and 95 of the judgment under appeal, given that what matters is the criterion that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in fact applied in the specific examination of the added value represented by the cooperation of the undertakings in question with the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (see, to that effect, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , paragraph 156). 44 While it cannot be denied that that description of judicial review is not consonant with the case-law referred to inter alia in paragraph 24 of the present judgment, the fact remains that, by their sixth ground of appeal, the appellants in no way criticise the review which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in fact carried out in respect of the decision at issue. Therefore that line of criticism is not on its own a sufficient substantiation of the present ground of appeal, which is, consequently, ineffective. 45 However, in its consideration below of the other grounds of appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] will also examine, where appropriate, the question as to whether the review in fact carried out by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the judgment under appeal meets the requirements of a fair trial, in the light in particular of the case-law of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice set out in paragraphs 20 to 32 of the present judgment. First ground of appeal: misinterpretation of point 8(b) of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the parties 46 By their first ground of appeal, the appellants criticise paragraphs 88, 98 to 101 and 105 of the judgment under appeal. They complain that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] misinterpreted the wording of point 8(b) of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] when it held that, for a grant of immunity from fines under that provision, the evidence provided by undertakings must be incriminating and contemporaneous and in itself enable the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to find an infringement and must be such that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] can rely on it without reference to any other evidence in finding the infringement. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] allowed the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] an unduly broad margin of assessment in respect of the provision, in particular in relation to the words ‘in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] view’, in that it did not undertake even a limited review of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] evaluation of the evidence. 47 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that the appellants’ interpretation of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is incorrect and that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not make an error of law in the interpretation thereof. It submits that the first ground of appeal is inadmissible as to the remainder, given that it seeks to challenge the probative value of the evidence, although the appellants do not maintain that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] distorted the true sense of the evidence. Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 48 It should be noted, first, that the present ground of appeal is based on a misreading of the judgment under appeal in so far as the appellants maintain that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] found that the evidence provided must be such that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may rely on that evidence without reference to any other evidence in finding the infringement. 49 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] stated, in particular in paragraph 94 of the judgment under appeal, that ‘[a]lthough it is not necessary for the evidence provided to be sufficient to prove the infringement in its entirety or down to its every last detail, the evidence must none the less be sufficient in nature, precision and probative value to enable the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to find an infringement of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 81 EC’. Thus, the appellants’ argument must be rejected as unfounded. 50 Secondly, as regards the argument that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in law in stating that the evidence provided by undertakings must be incriminating and contemporaneous, it must be recalled that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held, in particular in paragraph 100 of the judgment under appeal, that the probative value of the evidence provided by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group was limited because either it had been drawn up by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group for the purposes of its application under the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and was not contemporaneous with the infringement or it was not, in itself, such as to enable the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to find an infringement. 51 In that regard, it is clear from point 8(b) of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] that, if it is to be granted immunity from fines under the notice, the undertaking concerned must submit to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] evidence which in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] view may enable it to find an infringement. 52 Whether evidence is such as to allow a finding of infringement entails an assessment of the value represented by the evidence concerned. When the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] assessed, in paragraph 100 of the judgment under appeal, the probative value of the evidence provided by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group and considered that value to be limited, it did not make an error of law in reaching that conclusion on the basis of the criterion that it adopted for the purposes of that appraisal. 53 Thirdly, as regards the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] margin of assessment under point 8(b) of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], it is necessary to refer to the observation made in paragraph 51 of the present judgment that, under that notice, it is for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to decide whether the evidence provided is such that it enables it to find the infringement. 54 Although, as the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] also states, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has a discretion for that purpose, it is the task of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] judicature, as has been recalled in paragraph 24 of the present judgment, to carry out its review of legality, without using the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] margin of discretion – either as regards the choice of factors taken into account in the application of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] or as regards the assessment of those factors – as a basis for dispensing with the conduct of an in-depth review of the law and of the facts. 55 However, it should be noted, in that regard, that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] carried out a detailed analysis, in paragraphs 96 to 101 of the judgment under appeal, of the value represented by the evidence provided by the appellants. 56 Even though the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] referred on a number of occasions, in particular in paragraphs 95 and 103 of the judgment under appeal, to whether the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had ‘manifestly’ gone beyond the bounds of its margin of assessment, such references did not prevent the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] from carrying out the full and unrestricted review, in law and in fact, required of it (see, to that effect, inter alia, Chalkor v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , paragraph 82). 57 It follows from all of the foregoing considerations that the first ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded. Second ground of appeal: misinterpretation of point 8(a) of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the parties 58 By their second ground of appeal, the appellants criticise paragraphs 111 to 117 of the judgment under appeal. They complain that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in the first place, erred in law in holding that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group could not, so far as the infringement in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was concerned, be granted immunity from fines under point 8(a) of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] because the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was already in possession of evidence enabling it to adopt a decision of the kind referred to in that provision, when that was not the case. In the second place, the appellants maintain that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in law in regarding as relevant the fact that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group had made its leniency application concerning the infringement in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] only on the basis of point 8(b) of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and not under point 8(a), since that application had been submitted as a supplement to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group’s application concerning the infringement in [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which had been made under point 8(b) of the notice. The appellants argue that, while it was the duty of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to qualify the evidence put forward and to interpret the notice in favour of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group in accordance with the principle of good administration, thus assessing its application under point 8(a) as well, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in law in failing to review the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] application of EU law and of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in this regard. 59 According to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the only question which arose for the purposes of determining whether the conditions for a grant of immunity under point 8(a) of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] were met in the present case was whether, at the time the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group made its leniency application, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had sufficient evidence to adopt a decision to carry out an inspection in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in connection with an alleged cartel affecting the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. In that regard, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not make an error in its interpretation of point 8(a) and submits that the fact that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] own independent interpretation coincides with that of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not make that interpretation wrong. At the hearing before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] stated, in response to a question put by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], that it is not obliged to consider on its own initiative whether the conditions for a grant of immunity under point 8(a) of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] are met when an application for immunity has been made only under point 8(b) of the notice. Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60 As regards proceedings before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] judicature, it should be recalled, as a preliminary point, that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has exclusive jurisdiction to find and assess the facts and, in principle, to examine the evidence which it accepts in support of those facts. Provided that the evidence has been properly obtained and the general principles of law and the rules of procedure in relation to the burden of proof and the taking of evidence have been observed, it is for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] alone to assess the value which should be attached to the evidence produced to it. Save where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted, that appraisal does not therefore constitute a point of law which is subject as such to review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice (see, inter alia, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑551/03 P [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [2006] ECR I‑3173, paragraph 52, and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑535/06 P [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [2009] ECR I‑7051, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited). 61 It is also important to point out that an appeal is inadmissible in so far as it simply repeats the pleas in law and arguments already put forward before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], including those based on facts expressly rejected by the latter, without even including an argument specifically identifying the error of law allegedly vitiating the judgment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Such an appeal amounts in reality to no more than a request for re‑examination of the application submitted to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice does not have jurisdiction to undertake on appeal ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑204/00 P, C‑205/00 P, C‑211/00 P, C‑213/00 P, C‑217/00 P and C‑219/00 P [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [2004] ECR I‑123, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited). 62 By contrast, provided that an appellant challenges the interpretation or application of EU law by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the points of law examined at first instance may be discussed again in the course of an appeal. Indeed, if an appellant could not thus base his appeal on pleas in law and arguments already relied on before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], an appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑229/05 P PKK and KNK v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [2007] ECR I‑439, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited, and judgment of 30 May 2013 in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑70/12 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , paragraph 27). 63 With regard, first, to the argument that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in law in holding that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group was not entitled to immunity from fines under point 8(a) of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] because the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was already in possession of evidence enabling it to adopt a decision of the kind referred to in that provision, it must be held that, although the appellants describe this argument as one relating to a point of law, it ultimately amounts to calling in question the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] assessment of the facts and evidence produced before it, as regards, in particular, the information which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had at the time the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group made its application for immunity from fines in respect of the infringement in [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 64 It should be noted that the appellants do not claim that the facts or the evidence was distorted. Rather, in contending that the information held by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was not sufficient, they merely maintain that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in law. 65 Such an assessment, based on facts, is not open to challenge in an appeal (see, inter alia, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑328/05 P SGL Carbon v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [2007] ECR I‑3921, paragraph 86). The appellants’ argument must therefore be rejected as inadmissible. 66 The appellants also maintain that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] made an error of law in accepting, inter alia in paragraph 113 of the judgment under appeal, that, solely because the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group had not enabled the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to ‘detect’ the infringement in [OSCURATO:PERSONA], it could not claim to be entitled to immunity from fines under point 8(a) of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA]; such an interpretation does not, in the appellants’ submission, accord with the notice. 67 In that regard, contrary to what is maintained by the appellants, point 8(a) of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], read in the light of point 6 thereof, lends itself to an interpretation whereby information enabling the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to detect a cartel has an intrinsic value. Moreover, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] made the statement in question only after finding, in paragraph 112 of the judgment under appeal, that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had already carried out inspections in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] at the time the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group submitted its application concerning [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Given that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has already made a finding of fact in that regard and that it is not for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice to review that finding in an appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] subsequent statement that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group had not enabled the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to detect the cartel in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is only the consequence following from its previous characterisation of the factual situation. This argument must therefore be rejected. 68 As regards, next, the argument that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in law in holding that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was entitled to reject the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group’s application under point 8(a) of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on the basis that the group had submitted an application for immunity only under point 8(b) of the notice, it is to be observed that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considered that contention, without approving it, in paragraph 114 of the judgment under appeal. However, it did so only for the sake of completeness, having already previously concluded, in particular in paragraph 113 of the judgment under appeal, that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group was not entitled to immunity from fines under point 8(a) of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], given that the information provided by it had not enabled the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to detect the cartel in [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 69 That is therefore an argument directed against a ground included in the judgment under appeal purely for the sake of completeness which cannot lead to the judgment being set aside and is thus ineffective (see, in particular, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C‑213/02 P [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [2005] ECR I‑5425, paragraph 148). 70 Finally, the appellants complain that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in law in failing to review the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] application of point 8 of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. They argue that in that application the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not adopt an interpretation in favour of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group as it should have done on the basis of the principle of good administration, as it results in particular from [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 41 of the Charter, and did not examine the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group’s application for immunity from fines, not only under point 8(b) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], but also under point 8(a) thereof. 71 However, it does not appear from the application which the appellants lodged before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] that they raised that argument before it. Nor does the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] refer to such an argument in the judgment under appeal. 72 In that regard, according to settled case-law, to allow a party to put forward for the first time before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice a plea and arguments which it did not raise before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] would be to authorise it to bring before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, whose jurisdiction in appeals is limited, a case of wider ambit than that which came before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. In an appeal, the jurisdiction of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice is thus confined to examining the assessment by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the pleas argued before it (see, to that effect, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , paragraph 165, and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑514/07 P, C‑528/07 P and C‑532/07 P Sweden and Others v API and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [2010] ECR I‑8533, paragraph 126). That argument must therefore be rejected as inadmissible. 73 Consequently, the second ground of appeal should be rejected as in part inadmissible and in part ineffective. Third ground of appeal: infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the parties 74 By their third ground of appeal, the appellants criticise paragraphs 129 to 131 of the judgment under appeal. They maintain that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in law in finding that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not breach their legitimate expectations by failing to inform them in a timely manner that immunity from fines was not available. Although the application for immunity was submitted to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 12 February 2004 and was supplemented on 18 February 2004, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] informed the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group of its refusal only on 29 June 2004, whilst, according to the appellants, it should, under the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], have done so immediately. 75 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that this ground of appeal is clearly unfounded, given that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group did not have any precise assurance from the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] so far as a grant of immunity from fines was concerned, and that, in any event, in this case the period of time that elapsed was not excessive. Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 76 According to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] settled case-law, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations is among the fundamental principles of EU law and any economic operator whom an institution has, by giving him precise insurances, caused to entertain justified expectations may rely on that principle (see, to that effect, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑369/09 P ISD Polska and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [2011] ECR I‑2011, paragraphs 122 and 123, and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑335/09 P Poland v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 180). 77 In that regard, it is appropriate to reiterate the observation made by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in paragraph 130 of the judgment under appeal that point 15 of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] explicitly states that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] will grant an undertaking conditional immunity from fines in writing. 78 Furthermore, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has already had occasion to explain that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] cannot, in the phase of the procedure prior to the adoption of the final decision, give any precise assurance as to any reduction of, or immunity from, fines (see, to that effect, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑511/06 P [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [2009] ECR I‑5843, paragraph 118). Thus, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was correct in concluding that the appellants could not entertain a legitimate expectation in that regard. 79 Consequently, the third ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded. Fourth ground of appeal: misinterpretation of points 21 to 23 of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the parties 80 By their fourth ground of appeal, the appellants criticise paragraphs 165, 168, 169, 171, 173, 176, 179 and 180 of the judgment under appeal. They complain that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in law in relying, in its assessment of the value of the information provided by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], entirely on the appellants’ characterisation of that information when it should have determined the value of that information not in the light of that characterisation but on the basis of the objective value of the information. In its assessment of the added value represented by that information, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should have appraised the value of the information by reference to the criteria set out in points 21 and 22 of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. The appellants submit that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] also erred in law in failing to recognise the distinction between, on the one hand, points 21 and 22 of the notice, which concern the actual entitlement to a reduction of the fine and, on the other, point 23 of the notice, which concerns the level of cooperation provided by the undertaking concerned. 81 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that the distinction drawn by the appellants between points 21 and 22 of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], on the one hand, and point 23 of the notice, on the other, is artificial. It submits that the fourth ground of appeal is clearly inadmissible inasmuch as the appellants are asking the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice to substitute its own assessment of the probative value of the evidence for that of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. In any event, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did look at the nature and level of detail of the alleged information provided by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] as part of its assessment of the probative value of the evidence. Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 82 As has been observed in paragraph 60 of the present judgment, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice does not have jurisdiction to establish the facts or, in principle, to examine the evidence which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] accepted in support of those facts. It is, however, for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice to ascertain whether the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in its assessment of the facts and evidence, made an error of law. 83 In that regard, it should first be observed that, although a contention such as that contained in the fourth ground of appeal – according to which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] misinterpreted the wording of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – may have an impact on the findings of fact made by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], it is, contrary to what is maintained by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], a point of law amenable, as such, to review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice (see, to that effect, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , paragraph 37). 84 Next, it should be recalled that, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 23(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1/2003, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has the power to impose fines on undertakings for infringements of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] competition rules. In the context of its general competition policy, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has adopted, among other measures, the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which sets out the conditions under which an undertaking may be granted – on account of its cooperation with the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – an exemption from fines or a reduction of the fines imposed, with a view to ensuring that such exemptions or reductions are granted in conditions of increased transparency and certainty. 85 In so far as the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] describes the criteria that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] requires to be taken into account in assessing an undertaking’s cooperation, the notice sets out rules of practice from which the administration may not depart in an individual case without giving reasons compatible with the principle of equal treatment (see, by analogy, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , paragraph 67 and the case-law cited). 86 It is apparent from points 20 to 22 of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in particular, that the undertakings at which those provisions are directed may be eligible to benefit from a reduction of any fine which would otherwise have been imposed when they provide the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] with evidence of the suspected infringement which represents significant added value with respect to the evidence already in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] possession, the concept of ‘added value’ referring in particular to ‘the extent to which the evidence provided strengthens, by its very nature and/or its level of detail, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]'s ability to prove the facts in question’. 87 The appellants’ argument that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relied solely on their characterisation of the information provided to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is based on a misreading of the judgment under appeal. 88 After first correctly outlining the notion of ‘added value’, as it follows from point 22 of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] went on, in paragraph 165 of the judgment under appeal, to consider the value of the evidence provided by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group from the point of view of its very nature and, in paragraph 166 et seq. of that judgment, its level of detail. In addition, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] noted, in paragraphs 165 and 168 of the judgment, in particular, that the information submitted by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group denied that the discussions between competitors had an anti-competitive purpose and, in paragraph 169 of the judgment, that the information had, therefore, tended to reduce the probative value of the evidence which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] already had. Finally, in paragraphs 171, 173 and 176 of the judgment under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] set out in detail the reasons why the information which the appellants had provided to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was not sufficiently detailed to be regarded as representing significant added value. 89 As regards the appellants’ argument that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in law in its interpretation of points 21 to 23 of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in failing to recognise the distinction between, on the one hand, points 21 and 22 of the notice, which concern the actual entitlement to a reduction of the fine, and, on the other, point 23 thereof, which relates to the level of cooperation provided by the undertaking concerned, the appellants’ reading of those points, which all form part of Section B of the notice, which is headed ‘Reduction of a fine’, is incorrect. 90 While point 21 of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] makes clear that, in order to qualify for reduction of the fine, undertakings must provide information which represents significant added value, point 22 explains, inter alia, the notion of added value. Point 23 of the notice states that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] will determine in its decisions, first, whether the information provided represents significant added value and, second, the level of reduction of the fine from which the undertaking concerned will benefit, that level being established according to the reduction bands specified in point 23; finally, point 23 sets out the criteria for determining that level of reduction within those bands. 91 In that regard, as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submits in the response, the criteria set out in point 23 of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for determining the level of reduction of the fine from which an undertaking may benefit are an aspect of the analysis of the notion of the significant added value which undertakings seeking to benefit from such a reduction must provide. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] therefore did not err in law when, in the judgment under appeal, it did not analyse the appellants’ cooperation in the way they describe in the fourth plea. 92 Finally, when the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] stated, in paragraph 179 of the judgment under appeal, that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ‘[had] not on any view manifestly [gone] beyond the bounds of its margin of assessment in concluding that that evidence did not represent significant added value within the meaning of point 21 of the 2002 [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’, it is to be observed that, whilst that finding is not consonant with the case-law referred to inter alia in paragraph 24 of the present judgment, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] made it only for the sake of completeness and consequently that finding cannot lead to the judgment under appeal being set aside. 93 In any event, even though the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] referred, in paragraph 179 of the judgment under appeal, to the question whether the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ‘manifestly’ went beyond the bounds of its margin of assessment, the reference to such a question did not prevent the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], as can be seen in particular from paragraph 88 of the present judgment, from carrying out the full and unrestricted review, in law and in fact, required of it (see, to that effect, inter alia, Chalkor v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , paragraph 82). 94 Consequently, the fourth ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded. Fifth ground of appeal: infringement of the principle of equal treatment [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the parties 95 By their fifth ground of appeal, the appellants criticise paragraphs 108 and 192 to 197 of the judgment under appeal. They complain that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] breached the principle of equal treatment in failing to conduct an assessment of the value added by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group’s leniency application concerning the infringement in the Netherlands as compared with the value added by the ThyssenKrupp group’s leniency application concerning the infringement in [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 96 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that this ground of appeal is clearly unfounded, given that information connected with separate infringements is not comparable and asserts that, in any event, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] conducted an analysis which showed that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group’s leniency submission concerning the infringement in the Netherlands did not represent significant added value. Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 97 The principle of equal treatment, as a general principle of EU law, requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way, unless such treatment is objectively justified (see, to that effect, inter alia, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑127/07 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Lorraine and Others [2008] ECR I‑9895, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited). 98 The appellants complain in essence that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not fulfil its obligation to exercise its power of review with regard to the added value represented by the information provided by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group in its leniency application. 99 In that regard, as has been observed in paragraphs 60 and 82 of the present judgment, save where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted, the appraisal of the facts does not constitute a point of law which is subject as such to review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice. 100 As regards the assessment, in law, carried out by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concerning the comparability of the value added by the information contained, on the one hand, in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group’s leniency application concerning the infringement in the Netherlands and, on the other, in that of the ThyssenKrupp group in relation to the infringement in [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] stated, in paragraph 196 of the judgment under appeal, that ‘the assessment of what constitutes significant added value by definition entails an analysis specific to the context of all the evidence available to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in connection with a particular infringement; accordingly, information connected with separate infringements, in this instance the infringements in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the Netherlands, is not comparable’. 101 Moreover, in paragraph 197 of the judgment under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] stated that, in any event, the situations of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] group and the ThyssenKrupp group were not comparable for reasons which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] explained in that paragraph and which concerned, in particular, the added value represented by the evidence provided in those two situations. 102 Thus, given that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had concluded that the situations in question were not comparable, it was fully entitled to find, in paragraph 197 of the judgment under appeal, that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had not breached the principle of equal treatment. 103 Accordingly, the fifth ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded. 104 Since the appellants’ grounds of appeal are in part inadmissible or ineffective and in part unfounded, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 105 In accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure, where the appeal is unfounded, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is to make a decision as to costs. 106 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, which applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has applied for costs to be awarded against the appellants and the latter have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to bear their own costs and, in addition, to pay those incurred by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby: 1. Dismisses the appeal; 2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] GmbH and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] BV to bear their own costs and, in addition, to pay the costs incurred by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. [Signatures] * Language of the case: [OSCURATO:PERSONA].