Corte di giustizia UE n. 1049/2019

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) 13 March 2019 ( * ) (Appeal — Access to documents — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 1049/2001 — Third indent of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 4(2) — [OSCURATO:PERSONA] presumption of confidentiality of documents relating to an investigation procedure in the field of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid — Scope) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑666/17 P, APPEAL under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 27 November 2017, AlzChem AG, established in Trostberg (Germany), represented by A. Borsos, avocat, and J.A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], abogado, appellant, the other party to the proceedings being: [OSCURATO:PERSONA], represented by L. Armati and A. Buchet, acting as Agents, defendant at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), composed of J.-C. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (Rapporteur), [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], C. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], L. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and M. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: G. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], having regard to the written procedure, having decided, after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], to proceed to judgment without an Opinion, gives the following [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1 By its appeal, AlzChem AG seeks to have set aside the judgment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 7 September 2017, AlzChem v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (T‑451/15, not published, ‘the judgment under appeal’, EU:T:2017:588), by which that court dismissed its action seeking annulment of the decision of 26 May 2015 in which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] refused to grant it access to documents relating to an investigation procedure in the field of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid (‘the decision at issue’). Legal context 2 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 15(3) TFEU confers on any citizen of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a [OSCURATO:PERSONA], a right of access to documents of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, subject to the principles and the conditions defined by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for reasons of public or private interest. 3 Recital 2 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EC) No 1049/2001 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43) states, inter alia, that ‘openness enables citizens to participate more closely in the decision-making process and guarantees that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is more effective and more accountable to the citizen in a democratic system’. 4 Recital 6 of that regulation states that ‘wider access should be granted to documents in cases where the institutions are acting in their legislative capacity’. 5 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 4(2) of that regulation provides as follows: ‘The institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would undermine the protection of: –        commercial interests of a natural or legal person, including intellectual property, –         court proceedings and legal advice, –        the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.’ 6 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 4(3) and (4) of that regulation provides: ‘3.      Access to a document, drawn up by an institution for internal use or received by an institution, which relates to a matter where the decision has not been taken by the institution, shall be refused if disclosure of the document would seriously undermine the institution’s decision-making process, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure. ... 4.      As regards third-party documents, the institution shall consult the third party with a view to assessing whether an exception in paragraph 1 or 2 is applicable, unless it is clear that the document shall or shall not be disclosed.’ 7 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1049/2001 provides as follows: ‘In the event of a total or partial refusal, the applicant may, within 15 working days of receiving the institution’s reply, make a confirmatory application asking the institution to reconsider its position.’ 8 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 10 of that regulation, entitled ‘Access following an application’ provides in paragraph 1 thereof that the applicant is to have access to documents ‘either by consulting them on the spot or by receiving a copy, including, where available, an electronic copy, according to the applicant’s preference’. Background to the dispute and the contested decision 9 The facts of the dispute may be summarised as follows. 10 By its Decision (EU) 2015/1826 of 15 October 2014 on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid SA.33797 — (2013/C) (ex 2013/NN) (ex 2011/CP) implemented by Slovakia for NCHZ (OJ 2015 L 269, p. 71), the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considered that that undertaking, which operates in the chemical sector, had received [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid that was unlawful and incompatible with the internal market, in the course of its bankruptcy proceedings. 11 AlzChem, a German company also active in the chemical sector, intervened as an interested party in the procedure that led to the adoption of that decision. 12 On 16 March 2015, AlzChem made an application to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for access to three documents from the administrative file relating to that procedure, namely the economic analysis of the administrator of NCHZ of 23 December 2010, a document of that undertaking entitled ‘NCHZ management presentation’ and the submissions made by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relating to the interpretation and application of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on bankruptcy (‘the documents at issue’). 13 On 27 March 2015, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] rejected that application on the ground that it was covered by the exceptions provided for in the third indent of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 4(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1049/2001 concerning protection of the institutions’ investigation activities and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 4(3) of that regulation concerning protection of the decision-making process of the institutions. 14 By letter of 16 April 2015, the appellant sent the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] a confirmatory application, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(2) of that regulation. 15 By the decision at issue, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] confirmed its refusal to grant that application and stated that its refusal was also based on the need to protect commercial information and sensitive data relating to NCHZ’s activities, by virtue of the first indent of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 4(2) of that regulation. The proceedings before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the judgment under appeal 16 By an appeal lodged on 5 August 2015, AlzChem claimed that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should annul the decision at issue. 17 By the judgment under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] rejected as unfounded the first of the three pleas in law raised by the appellant, alleging an error of law and a manifest error of assessment concerning the application of the general presumption of confidentiality of documents relating to an investigation procedure under the third indent of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 4(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1049/2001 (‘the general presumption of confidentiality’). 18 Given the rejection of the first plea in law in its entirety, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considered that it was not necessary to examine the second plea in law raised by AlzChem, which alleged an error of law and a manifest error of assessment relating to the application of the exception concerning the protection of commercial interests provided for in the first indent of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 4(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1049/2001. 19 Finally, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] also rejected as unfounded the third plea in law, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons for the refusal to grant access to documents in a non-confidential version or on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s premises. 20 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] therefore dismissed the action in its entirety and ordered AlzChem to pay the costs. Proceedings before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice and forms of order sought 21 By its appeal, AlzChem requests the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice to set aside the judgment under appeal and the decision at issue and to order the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to pay the costs. 22 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should dismiss the appeal and order AlzChem to pay the costs of the proceedings. The appeal The first ground of appeal, alleging an error of law and a manifest error of assessment relating to the application of the general presumption of confidentiality The error of law that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is alleged to have made in interpreting the general presumption of confidentiality – Arguments of the parties 23 AlzChem maintains, in the first place, that the general presumption of confidentiality of documents relating to a procedure for reviewing [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid cannot concern specifically identified documents. 24 The appellant submits that it is not sufficient for a document to be covered by an activity mentioned in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 4(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1049/2001 for the refusal to communicate it to be justified and that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is obliged to explain why that access could specifically and actually harm the interest protected. 25 In support of that argument, the appellant claims that it is only when the application for access concerns ‘categories’ or ‘sets’ of documents described ‘as a whole’, such as the case file, that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may rely on the general presumption of confidentiality, as is apparent from paragraph 4 of the judgment of 29 June 2010, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (C‑139/07 P, EU:C:2010:376) and paragraph 49 of the judgment of 14 November 2013, LPN and Finland v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (C‑514/11 P and C‑605/11 P, EU:C:2013:738). 26 The appellant maintains that the judgment of 14 July 2016, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (C‑271/15 P, not published, EU:C:2016:557), in which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice applied that presumption to specifically identified documents can only be a sui generis decision, if [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 42 of the Charter of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (‘the Charter’) is not to be infringed. In addition, it submits that a distinction should be made in accordance with the nature of the documents. 27 In the second place, AlzChem claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in law, in paragraph 58 of the judgment under appeal, in rejecting its argument concerning the ‘pre-existing’ nature of two of the three documents at issue, that is to say documents that were drawn up before the investigation was opened, not necessarily by the institution concerned or for the purposes of that investigation. AlzChem submits that its analysis is confirmed by the treatment afforded to the disclosure of such documents in other areas of EU law. It refers, inter alia, in that regard, to the Opinion of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in Pfleiderer (C‑360/09, EU:C:2010:782) concerning the leniency procedure. 28 In the third place, AlzChem alleges infringement of the principle that exceptions must be interpreted strictly, in the light of which [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 4(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1049/2001 must be interpreted. 29 In the fourth place, AlzChem maintains that the application of the general presumption of confidentiality on the sole ground that the documents at issue form part of the administrative file purely and simply prevents an applicant from rebutting that presumption. 30 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that that argument cannot succeed. – Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 31 In the first place, as regards the application of the general presumption of confidentiality when the request for access concerns documents which have been specifically identified and are few in number, it must be recalled that it follows from the case-law of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice that it is not only necessary to recognise the existence of a general presumption to the effect that the disclosure of the documents in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s administrative file in a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid review procedure in principle, undermines the protection of the purpose of an investigation, audit or inspection (judgment of 29 June 2010, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑139/07 P, EU:C:2010:376, paragraph 61), but also that that presumption applies irrespective of whether or not the application for access specifically identified the document or documents concerned (judgment of 14 July 2016, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑271/15 P, not published, EU:C:2016:557, paragraph 54). 32 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not therefore disregard the scope of the general presumption of confidentiality in finding, in paragraphs 25 and 26 of the judgment under appeal, that the mere fact that the documents at issue form part of the administrative file relating to a procedure for reviewing [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid was sufficient ground for the application of that presumption, even though those documents were specifically identified and few in number. 33 In the second place, as regards the appellant’s argument that ‘pre-existing’ documents are not covered by the general presumption of confidentiality, it must be noted that, first, it follows from the very nature of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid investigation that information about what may have taken place before the investigation was opened is collected, and that, secondly, it certainly does not follow from the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s case-law that such documents must be distinguished from the rest of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s administrative file. 34 Accordingly, the ‘pre-existing’ nature of certain of the documents applied for does not preclude them from being covered by the general presumption of confidentiality, because they form part of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s administrative file in an investigation procedure in the field of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid. 35 In the third place, while the appellant claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not comply with the principle that exceptions must be interpreted strictly in taking a broad view of the general presumption of confidentiality, it appears however that, far from infringing that principle, which, moreover it points out must be complied with in paragraph 81 of the judgment under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] correctly applied that presumption to the documents in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s administrative file. 36 In the fourth place, by claiming that it was impossible, in those circumstances, for it to adduce any evidence to the contrary, the appellant disputes, in essence, the fact that it must adduce evidence that the documents at issue are not covered by the general presumption of confidentiality. 37 However, as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] correctly recalled in paragraphs 31 and 83 of the judgment under appeal with reference to the case-law of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice in that regard, the general presumption of confidentiality certainly does not preclude the appellant’s right to show that one or more given documents, whose disclosure it has requested, are not covered by that presumption or that there is an overriding public interest in their disclosure by virtue of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 4(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1049/2001 (judgment of 29 June 2010, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑139/07 P, EU:C:2010:376, paragraph 62). 38 In paragraph 32 of the judgment under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] also stated correctly that the general presumption that the disclosure of documents in an administrative file would, as a general rule, undermine the protection of the purposes of investigations is not irrebuttable and does not rule out the possibility that some of the specific documents contained in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s file relating to a procedure for reviewing [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid may be disclosed (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 July 2016, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑271/15 P, not published, EU:C:2016:557, paragraph 42). 39 Finally, it must be noted that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice has previously held that the fact that it is difficult to adduce the evidence necessary to rebut a presumption does not in itself mean that that presumption is in fact irrebuttable (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 April 2014, Areva and Others v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑247/11 P and C‑253/11 P, EU:C:2014:257, paragraph 81). 40 All of the appellant’s arguments on those points must, therefore, be rejected. The error of law allegedly committed by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in finding that the general presumption of confidentiality could apply to documents relating to a closed investigation procedure – Arguments of the parties 41 AlzChem claims that, given the particular circumstances of the present case, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in law in accepting that the general presumption of confidentiality could apply when the investigation procedure had been closed on 15 October 2014. 42 It maintains that the documents at issue were not of very great relevance to that investigation procedure and adds that the refusal to grant access to those documents cannot validly be based on the fact that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] can alter its analysis at the end of the legal action against the decision adopted at the end of the procedure, because it could, at any time, re-examine certain decisions relating to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid. It also submits that the release of the documents at issue is not capable of adversely affecting the willingness of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to cooperate in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid investigations and that two of the documents at issue pre-dated the investigation. 43 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that that line of argument cannot succeed. – Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 44 AlzChem’s arguments merely constitute repetition of the arguments previously set out in its application before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], to which, moreover, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] responded in paragraphs 36 to 61 of the judgment under appeal, and seek, in reality, to obtain no more than re-examination of the same arguments, which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice does not have jurisdiction to undertake (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 October 2010, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑280/08 P, EU:C:2010:603, paragraph 24). 45 As regards the only new argument contained in paragraph 54 of the application, concerning the need to interpret the concept of ‘ongoing investigations’, it is not supported by any accompanying detail to enable the merits of that submission to be assessed. 46 The entirety of that line of argument can only therefore be rejected as inadmissible. The error of law that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is alleged to have committed in finding that the disclosure of the documents at issue was not justified by an overriding public interest in protecting the right to an effective remedy laid down in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 47 of the Charter and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 6 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for the Protection of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – Arguments of the parties 47 AlzChem maintains that even if the documents at issue are covered by the general presumption of confidentiality, the right to an effective judicial remedy, which supposes that third parties have full knowledge of all the relevant facts, must take precedence. 48 The appellant claims that it follows from the case-law of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice that if the judicial review is to be effective, the person concerned must be able to ascertain the reasons upon which the decision taken in relation to him is based, either by reading the decision itself or by requesting and obtaining notification of those reasons. It follows that the persons concerned must have full knowledge of the relevant facts underlying a decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in order to be capable of bringing a legal action against it. 49 The appellant submits that it required access to the documents at issue in order to ascertain whether the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s analysis was well founded and to exercise its right to an effective judicial remedy. 50 The appellant also claims that the existence of private interests cannot preclude recognition of the existence of a public interest and that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was therefore wrong to find, in paragraph 73 of the judgment under appeal, that its application for access to the documents at issue concerned a private interest. 51 The appellant maintains that, contrary to what the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held in paragraph 70 of the judgment under appeal, the fact that it was able to bring an action against Decision 2015/1826 of 15 October 2014, referred to in paragraph 10 of the present judgment, does not justify a finding that its right to an effective remedy was fully observed. 52 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that that line of argument should be rejected. – Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 53 AlzChem claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in law in finding that the disclosure of the documents at issue was not justified by an overriding public interest in protecting the right to an effective remedy laid down in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 47 of the Charter and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 6 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for the Protection of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA], signed in Rome on 4 November 1950. 54 However, after noting, rightly, in paragraphs 65 to 66 of the judgment under appeal, the need, for the institution concerned to weigh, on the one hand, the particular interest to be protected by non-disclosure of the document concerned against, on the other hand, inter alia, the public interest in the document being made accessible (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 November 2013, LPN and Finland v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑514/11 P and C‑605/11 P, EU:C:2013:738, paragraph 42), the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was also right to state, in paragraph 69 of the judgment under appeal, that if the judicial review is to be effective the person concerned must be able to ascertain the reasons upon which the decision taken in relation to him is based, so as to make it possible for him to defend his rights and to decide, with full knowledge of the relevant facts, whether there is any point in his applying to the court with jurisdiction (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 June 2013, ZZ , C‑300/11, EU:C:2013:363, paragraph 53). 55 As the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] maintained in its response, that obligation to state reasons must not be confused with the system of access to documents of the institutions. 56 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was therefore fully entitled to find, first, in paragraph 70 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellant had not been deprived of its right to an effective judicial remedy, since it had had access to Decision 2015/1826 of 15 October 2014, referred to in paragraph 10 of the present judgment and had been able to bring its action for annulment, and, secondly, in paragraph 73 of that judgment, in reliance on paragraph 146 of the judgment of 28 June 2012, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (C‑404/10 P, EU:C:2012:393), that the fact that the documents would have enabled the applicant to present more convincing arguments in its action for annulment does not constitute an overriding public interest in their disclosure, for the purposes of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 4(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1049/2001, but rather a ‘private’ interest not covered by that article — that case-law also being applicable to the field of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] aid (see, also, to that effect, judgment of 14 July 2016, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑271/15 P, not published, EU:C:2016:557, paragraphs 97 to 99). 57 Consequently, that part of the applicant’s line of argument must also be rejected. The infringement of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 15(3) TFEU and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 42 of the Charter – Arguments of the parties 58 AlzChem claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] interpreted and applied [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1049/2001 in breach of the fundamental right of access to documents, laid down in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 42 of the Charter and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 15(3) TFEU. 59 The appellant submits that it is apparent from recital 2 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1049/2001 that that regulation seeks to give the fullest possible effect to the right of public access to documents and maintains that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in law, in paragraph 80 of the judgment under appeal, in stating that the administrative activity of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not require such extensive access to documents as that required by the legislative activity of an institution. It claims that that finding, which follows from recital 6 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1049/2001, does not imply that it is necessary to confer ‘limited access’ with regard to documents relating to administrative procedures and adds that, contrary to what the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held in paragraph 88 of the judgment under appeal, the practices of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in relation to access to documents must be taken into account as a constitutional and administrative tradition common to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 60 It submits, in that regard, that the broad interpretation of the general presumption of confidentiality applied by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the judgment under appeal, strips [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 42 of the Charter and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1049/2001 of any substance. 61 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that this line of argument should be rejected. – Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 62 AlzChem claims that the application of the general presumption of confidentiality to the documents at issue is such as to infringe [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 42 of the Charter and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 15(3) TFEU. 63 However, in paragraph 77 of the judgment under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was right to find that if, by virtue of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 15(3) TFEU, read together with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 42 of the Charter, any citizen of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a [OSCURATO:PERSONA], is to have a right of access to the documents of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, it is subject to the principles and conditions to be defined in accordance with that provision. 64 It must also be noted that the second subparagraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 15(3) TFEU provides that ‘general principles and limits on grounds of public or private interest governing this right of access to documents shall be determined ... by means of regulations’ by the EU legislature. 65 Moreover, contrary to what the appellant appears to claim, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not consider, in paragraph 80 of the judgment under appeal, that it was necessary to confer ‘limited access’ with regard to documents linked to administrative procedures, but merely recalled that, as is apparent from the case-law of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, the administrative activity of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not require such extensive access to documents as that required by the legislative activity of an EU institution (see, inter alia, to that effect, judgments of 29 June 2010, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑139/07 P, EU:C:2010:376, paragraph 60, and of 27 February 2014, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v EnBW , C‑365/12 P, EU:C:2014:112, paragraph 91). 66 Finally, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was right to find, in paragraph 88 of the judgment under appeal, that the practices of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in relation to access to documents can have no influence on the interpretation of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1049/2001, which lays down a body of rules that is applicable exclusively to documents of the EU institutions and that is independent of comparable bodies of rules developed within those [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 67 It is therefore necessary to reject the entirety of that part of the appellant’s arguments and, accordingly, to reject that ground of appeal in its entirety. The second ground of appeal, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons for the refusal to grant access to the documents at issue in a non-confidential version or on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s premises Arguments of the parties 68 AlzChem claims, with particular reference to paragraphs 93 to 96 of the judgment under appeal, that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in law in confirming the legality of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s rejection of its application for access to a non-confidential version of the documents at issue, when the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not provide any specific justification in that regard. Nor did the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] give sufficient justification for its refusal to grant access to those documents on its own premises. 69 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considers that these arguments cannot succeed. Findings of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 70 It must be held that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was right to find, in paragraph 94 of the judgment under appeal, with reference to the case-law of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], that the documents covered by the general presumption of confidentiality do not fall within an obligation of disclosure, in full or in part, of their content (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 June 2012, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑404/10 P, EU:C:2012:393, paragraph 133, and of 14 July 2016, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑271/15 P, not published, EU:C:2016:557, paragraph 61). 71 In addition, as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submits, the possibility, provided for in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 10 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1049/2001, of consulting documents on the spot, relied on by the appellant in its appeal, cannot apply if they are covered by that presumption. 72 Thus, nor did the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] err in law in holding, in paragraphs 96 to 98 of the judgment under appeal, that the decision at issue contained sufficient reasons, since it justified the refusal to grant access to a non-confidential version of the documents at issue and the refusal to grant a request to consult those documents on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s premises, on the ground that they were covered by the general presumption of confidentiality. 73 It follows from the foregoing that the second ground of appeal must be rejected as inadmissible and, consequently, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 74 In accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], where the appeal is unfounded, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is to make a decision as to costs. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 138(1) of those rules, applicable to appeal proceedings by virtue of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 75 Since the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has applied for costs and AlzChem has been unsuccessful, the latter must be ordered to pay the costs. On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby: 1. Dismisses the appeal; 2. Orders AlzChem AG to pay the costs. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in open court in Luxembourg on 13 March 2019. A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] J.-C. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] * Language of the case: English.