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Corte di giustizia UEsentenza

Corte di giustizia UE n. 67/2016

ECLI:EU:C:2016:441
Testo integrale del provvedimento

Testo integrale del provvedimento

62016CO0043_EN

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] part

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑43/16 P,

APPEAL under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 21 January 2016, Copernicus-[OSCURATO:PERSONA], established in Borehamwood ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), represented by C. Röhl, Rechtsanwalt, applicant, the other parties to the proceedings being:

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO),

defendant at first instance, [OSCURATO:SOCIETA], established in Ardon (France), intervener at first instance,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]),

composed of D. Šváby, President of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], J. Malenovský and M. Vilaras (Rapporteur), [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: M. Bobek, Registrar: A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], having decided, after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], to give a decision by reasoned order, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], makes the following

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

1. By its appeal, Copernicus-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] asks the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to set aside the judgment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 25 June 2015 in Copernicus-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] v OHIM — [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) (T‑186/12, ‘the judgment under appeal’, EU:T:2015:436), by which that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed its action seeking the annulment of the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO) of 13 February 2012 ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] R 67/2011-4) concerning an application for registration of the word sign ‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA]’ as an EU trade mark.

On the appeal

2. Pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of its Rules of Procedure, where the appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], decide by reasoned order to dismiss that appeal or cross-appeal in whole or in part.

3. On 22 April 2016, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] took the following position: ‘1 In my view, the present appeal should be rejected as manifestly inadmissible because Copernicus-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] (the appellant) failed to bring it within the prescribed time limit. 2 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] gave its judgment in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑186/12, Copernicus-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] v OHIM on 25 June 2015.

The judgment was notified to the appellant on 26 June 2015.

Upon notification, the appellant had 2 months and 10 days within which to lodge an appeal at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56, Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 51, Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice: “Rules of Procedure”). 3 The appellant filed an application for legal aid with the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice on 3 September 2015.

That application had the effect of suspending the time limit within which the appellant had to lodge its appeal until the date of service of the order making a decision on that application ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] 186, Rules of Procedure). 4 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice granted the appellant’s application for legal aid with an order made on 10 November 2015.

That order was served on the appellant on 11 November 2015. 5 The appellant eventually lodged its appeal on 21 January 2016.

It follows from the text of the Rules of Procedure that an application for legal aid merely suspends the time limit for lodging an appeal ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] 186, Rules of Procedure; see a contrario the rule in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 55(7), Rules of Procedure).

Therefore the time limit for bringing an appeal before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice does not start to run anew from the date of service of the order making a decision on the application for legal aid.

The service of that order simply resumes the course of the initial time limit which, in this case, started to run upon the appellant’s notification of the judgment under appeal (see also by analogy the interpretation by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of similar provisions in its Rules of Procedure (order of 6 September 2010 in Kerelov v Commission , T‑60/08 P, EU:T:2010:350, paragraph 18). 6 It follows that upon service of the order making a decision on the application for legal aid on 11 November 2015, the appellant had two days left within which it had to lodge its appeal.

As the appellant brought its appeal on 21 January 2016, it was clearly brought too late. 7 The appeal must therefore be rejected as manifestly inadmissible.’

4. On the same grounds as those adopted by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the appeal must be dismissed. Costs

5. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 137 of the Rules of Procedure, applicable to the procedure on appeal pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) of those rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings.

Since the present order was adopted before the appeal was served on the respondent and therefore before the latter could have incurred costs, the appellant must be ordered to bear its own costs. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] part On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby orders:

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. Copernicus-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] shall bear its own costs.

Anonimizzato ex art. 52 D.Lgs. 196/2003
62016CO0043_EN [OSCURATO:PERSONA] part [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑43/16 P, APPEAL under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 21 January 2016, Copernicus-[OSCURATO:PERSONA], established in Borehamwood ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), represented by C. Röhl, Rechtsanwalt, applicant, the other parties to the proceedings being: [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO), defendant at first instance, [OSCURATO:SOCIETA], established in Ardon (France), intervener at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), composed of D. Šváby, President of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], J. Malenovský and M. Vilaras (Rapporteur), [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]: M. Bobek, Registrar: A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], having decided, after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], to give a decision by reasoned order, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], makes the following [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1. By its appeal, Copernicus-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] asks the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to set aside the judgment of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 25 June 2015 in Copernicus-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] v OHIM — [OSCURATO:SOCIETA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) (T‑186/12, ‘the judgment under appeal’, EU:T:2015:436), by which that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] dismissed its action seeking the annulment of the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO) of 13 February 2012 ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] R 67/2011-4) concerning an application for registration of the word sign ‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA]’ as an EU trade mark. On the appeal 2. Pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 181 of its Rules of Procedure, where the appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], decide by reasoned order to dismiss that appeal or cross-appeal in whole or in part. 3. On 22 April 2016, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] took the following position: ‘1 In my view, the present appeal should be rejected as manifestly inadmissible because Copernicus-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] (the appellant) failed to bring it within the prescribed time limit. 2 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] gave its judgment in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑186/12, Copernicus-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] v OHIM on 25 June 2015. The judgment was notified to the appellant on 26 June 2015. Upon notification, the appellant had 2 months and 10 days within which to lodge an appeal at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56, Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 51, Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice: “Rules of Procedure”). 3 The appellant filed an application for legal aid with the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice on 3 September 2015. That application had the effect of suspending the time limit within which the appellant had to lodge its appeal until the date of service of the order making a decision on that application ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] 186, Rules of Procedure). 4 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice granted the appellant’s application for legal aid with an order made on 10 November 2015. That order was served on the appellant on 11 November 2015. 5 The appellant eventually lodged its appeal on 21 January 2016. It follows from the text of the Rules of Procedure that an application for legal aid merely suspends the time limit for lodging an appeal ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] 186, Rules of Procedure; see a contrario the rule in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 55(7), Rules of Procedure). Therefore the time limit for bringing an appeal before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice does not start to run anew from the date of service of the order making a decision on the application for legal aid. The service of that order simply resumes the course of the initial time limit which, in this case, started to run upon the appellant’s notification of the judgment under appeal (see also by analogy the interpretation by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of similar provisions in its Rules of Procedure (order of 6 September 2010 in Kerelov v Commission , T‑60/08 P, EU:T:2010:350, paragraph 18). 6 It follows that upon service of the order making a decision on the application for legal aid on 11 November 2015, the appellant had two days left within which it had to lodge its appeal. As the appellant brought its appeal on 21 January 2016, it was clearly brought too late. 7 The appeal must therefore be rejected as manifestly inadmissible.’ 4. On the same grounds as those adopted by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the appeal must be dismissed. Costs 5. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 137 of the Rules of Procedure, applicable to the procedure on appeal pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) of those rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings. Since the present order was adopted before the appeal was served on the respondent and therefore before the latter could have incurred costs, the appellant must be ordered to bear its own costs. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] part On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) hereby orders: 1. The appeal is dismissed. 2. Copernicus-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] shall bear its own costs.