Corte di giustizia UEsentenza
Corte di giustizia UE n. 2018/2025
ECLI:EU:C:2025:233
Testo integrale del provvedimento
Anonimizzato ex art. 52 D.Lgs. 196/2003
Provisional text
[OSCURATO:PERSONA]
delivered on 3 April 2025 (
1
)
Case C
‑
92/23
[OSCURATO:PERSONA]
v
[OSCURATO:PERSONA]
( Failure to fulfil obligations – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] communications – Radioelectric spectrum – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2002/20/EC, 2002/21/EC, 2002/77/EC and (EU) 2018/1972 – Individual rights of use – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] legislation and administrative decisions depriving a commercial radio station of the possibility of broadcasting media services on a radio frequency – Principles of proportionality, transparency, non-discrimination and good administration – Charter of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 11(2) – Freedom and pluralism of the media )
I.
Introduction
1.
By its action for failure to fulfil obligations, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] asks the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice to declare that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has failed to fulfil its obligations under a number of provisions of EU law relating to the regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (‘the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications’), the principles of proportionality, non-discrimination, sincere cooperation and good administration, and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 11 of the Charter of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (‘the Charter’).
2.
In essence, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that the Médiatanács ([OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]), in application of the national legislation on the media and in breach of the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications, prevented the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] radio station ‘Klubrádio’ from providing media services using radio frequencies, by refusing to renew its right to provide those services, by excluding it from the tendering procedure for the award of that right and by prohibiting it from providing those services on a temporary basis, which, ultimately, undermined the freedom and pluralism of the media in [OSCURATO:PERSONA].
3.
The present cases raises, as a preliminary issue, the question of the applicability of EU law in a situation in which the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications (
2
) and the national legislation on the media (
3
) overlap and, more particularly, the question of the extent to which administrative decisions adopted by the national authority responsible for the media – concerning, mainly, authorisation of the activity of broadcasting and indirectly the right to use a radio frequency – are subject to the EU rules on the allocation of radio frequencies. As to the substance, this case relates essentially to the application of the principles of proportionality and non-discrimination in the context of the allocation and renewal of the right to use radio frequencies.
II.
Legal framework
A.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] law
1.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA]
4.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] 5 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], entitled ‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA] of use for radio frequencies and numbers’, states, in paragraphs 2 and 3:
‘2. Where it is necessary to grant individual rights of use for radio frequencies and numbers, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] shall grant such rights, upon request, to any undertaking for the provision of networks or services under the general authorisation referred to in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 3, subject to the provisions of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 6, 7 and 11(1)(c) of this [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and any other rules ensuring the efficient use of those resources in accordance with [the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]].
Without prejudice to specific criteria and procedures adopted by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to grant rights of use of radio frequencies to providers of radio or television broadcast content services with a view to pursuing general interest objectives in conformity with Community law, the rights of use for radio frequencies and numbers shall be granted through open, objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate procedures, and, in the case of radio frequencies, in accordance with the provisions of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 9 of [the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]]. An exception to the requirement of open procedures may apply in cases where the granting of individual rights of use of radio frequencies to the providers of radio or television broadcast content services is necessary to achieve a general interest objective as defined by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in conformity with Community law.
…
3. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on the granting of rights of use shall be taken, communicated and made public as soon as possible after receipt of the complete application by the national regulatory authority, … within six weeks in the case of radio frequencies that have been allocated to be used by electronic communications services within the national frequency plan. …’
5.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], entitled ‘Procedure for limiting the number of rights of use to be granted for radio frequencies’, provides, in paragraphs 3 and 4:
‘3. Where the granting of rights of use for radio frequencies needs to be limited, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] shall grant such rights on the basis of selection criteria which must be objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate. Any such selection criteria must give due weight to the achievement of the objectives of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8 of [the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]] and of the requirements of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 9 of that [OSCURATO:PERSONA].
4. Where competitive or comparative selection procedures are to be used, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may extend the maximum period of six weeks referred to in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 5(3) for as long as necessary to ensure that such procedures are fair, reasonable, open and transparent to all interested parties, but by no longer than eight months.
…’
6.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] 10 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], entitled ‘Compliance with the conditions of the general authorisation or of rights of use and with specific obligations’, provides, in paragraph 3:
‘3. The relevant authority shall have the power to require the cessation of the breach referred to in paragraph 2 either immediately or within a reasonable time limit and shall take appropriate and proportionate measures aimed at ensuring compliance.
…’
2.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA]
7.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], entitled ‘Definitions’, states the following:
‘For the purposes of this [OSCURATO:PERSONA]:
…
(c) “electronic communications service” means a service normally provided for remuneration which consists wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on electronic communications networks, including telecommunications services and transmission services in networks used for broadcasting, but exclude services providing, or exercising editorial control over, content transmitted using electronic communications networks and services; it does not include information society services, as defined in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1 of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 98/34/EC, [(
4
)] which do not consist wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on electronic communications networks;
…’
8.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], entitled ‘Policy objectives and regulatory principles’, is worded as follows:
‘1. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] shall ensure that in carrying out the regulatory tasks specified in this [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the national regulatory authorities take all reasonable measures which are aimed at achieving the objectives set out in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4. Such measures shall be proportionate to those objectives.
…
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] regulatory authorities may contribute within their competencies to ensuring the implementation of policies aimed at the promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity, as well as media pluralism.
2. The national regulatory authorities shall promote competition in the provision of electronic communications networks, electronic communications services and associated facilities and services by inter alia:
(a) ensuring that users, including disabled users, elderly users, and users with special social needs derive maximum benefit in terms of choice, price, and quality;
(b) ensuring that there is no distortion or restriction of competition in the electronic communications sector, including the transmission of content;
…
(d) encouraging efficient use and ensuring the effective management of radio frequencies and numbering resources.
…
5. The national regulatory authorities shall, in pursuit of the policy objectives referred to in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, apply objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate regulatory principles by, inter alia:
(a) promoting regulatory predictability by ensuring a consistent regulatory approach over appropriate review periods;
(b) ensuring that, in similar circumstances, there is no discrimination in the treatment of undertakings providing electronic communications networks and services;
(c) safeguarding competition to the benefit of consumers and promoting, where appropriate, infrastructure-based competition;
…’
9.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] 9 of that directive, entitled ‘Management of radio frequencies for electronic communications services’, is drafted as follows, in paragraph 1:
‘Taking due account of the fact that radio frequencies are a public good that has an important social, cultural and economic value, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] shall ensure the effective management of radio frequencies for electronic communication services in their territory in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8 and 8a. They shall ensure that spectrum allocation used for electronic communications services and issuing general authorisations or individual rights of use of such radio frequencies by competent national authorities are based on objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria.
…’
3.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA]
10.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] 4 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], entitled ‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA] of use of frequencies’, states:
‘Without prejudice to specific criteria and procedures adopted by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to grant rights of use of radio frequencies to providers of radio or television broadcast content services with a view to pursuing general interest objectives in conformity with Community law:
…
2. The assignment of radio frequencies for electronic communication services shall be based on objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria.’
B.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] law
11.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] 22(8) of the Law on the media, in the version applicable to the facts of the present case, provides:
‘Providers of media services shall be required to provide to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] each month data allowing compliance with broadcasting quotas to be monitored. …’ (
5
)
12.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] 48 of that law provides, in paragraphs 5 and 7:
‘5. The right to provide analogue linear media services using limited resources belonging to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] shall be valid for a maximum of 10 years as regards broadcasting …; upon expiry, it may be renewed once without a call for tenders, at the initiative of the provider of media services, for a maximum period of seven years, it being understood that contracts for the provision of audiovisual media services shall expire on the date prescribed in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 38(1) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] LXXIV of 2007 on the rules on broadcasting and the transition to digital broadcasting …. The initiative seeking a renewal shall be notified to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 14 months before the date of expiry. In the event of non-compliance with that time limit, no renewal shall be allowed. In the context of the exercise of property rights on behalf of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] shall inform the media services provider that the right in question will be renewed, or that it will not be renewed, not sooner than six months and not later than four months before the expiry of the rights. The media services provider cannot demand that the right to provide media services be renewed, and the initiative seeking such renewal shall entail no obligation for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to conclude a contract.
…
7. The right cannot be renewed:
(a) if, by final decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the media services provider has been held guilty of repeated or serious breaches of the contract or the provisions of the Law on the freedom of the press or the present Law, or
(b) if, at the time of the submission or the examination of the initiative, the media services provider is burdened by an overdue amount in respect of the levy relating to media services.
…’
13.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] 55(1) of the Law on the media states:
‘In order to participate in the tendering procedure, any undertaking:
…
(c) which during the five years preceding publication of the call for tenders has not been the subject of
(ca) any final administrative decision establishing a serious infringement resulting in non-compliance with the administrative contract, or
(cb) any cancellation of its administrative contract by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA],
…’
14.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] 65 of that law provides, in paragraphs 1 and 11:
‘1. Upon application, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may, having regard to considerations relating to the media market and to media policy, conclude a temporary administrative contract of a maximum duration of 180 days in order to develop a possibility of providing media services:
…
(c) for which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] demonstrates that it is possible to provide the media services without causing interference to others and without infringing international standards.
…
11. If the right to provide linear radio media services expires after having already been renewed once by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and if the tendering procedure relating to the possibility to provide media services has already been launched, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may, possibly even on several occasions, conclude with the media services provider that previously held that right, and at the request of that provider, a temporary administrative contract for a maximum period of 60 days. On the basis of the present paragraph, a temporary administrative contract may be concluded only until the closure of the tendering procedure or, if the order terminating the tendering procedure has been the subject of an administrative appeal, until the matter has been definitively settled. The temporary administrative contract shall come to an end on the date on which the administrative contract with the applicant selected is concluded.’
15.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] 187(5) of that law provides:
‘For the purposes of paragraphs 1 to 4, an infringement shall be considered to be repeated where the offender repeats, within a period of 365 days, the same unlawful conduct – relating to the same legal basis, the same legal provision and the same area – as that established by definitive administrative decision, with the exception of minor infringements’. (
6
)
III.
The background to the dispute and the pre-litigation procedure
16.
Klubrádió is a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] commercial radio station, which, beginning in 1999, broadcast its programmes (
7
) on the 95.3 MHz analogue frequency in the broadcasting area of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]). Following numerous administrative and judicial vicissitudes, (
8
) the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Klubrádió, on 13 February 2014, terminated the broadcasting contract between them for the 95.3 MHz frequency and concluded a new contract for the use of the 92.9 MHz frequency in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] broadcasting area (‘the frequency at issue’) for the period from 14 February 2014 to 14 February 2021, renewable for a period of five years (‘the contract for the use of the frequency at issue’). (
9
)
17.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] 830/2020 of 8 September 2020 (‘the refusal decision’), (
10
) the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] refused to renew that contract (
11
) on the ground that, during the period between 26 September 2016 and 31 May 2017, Klubrádió had failed on a number of occasions to comply with the obligation to provide monthly information on broadcasting quotas laid down in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 22(8) of the Law on the media (‘the obligation to communicate data relating to broadcasting quotas’). (
12
)
18.
On 4 November 2020, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] published a new call for tenders for the provision of media services on the frequency at issue (‘the call for tenders at issue’), in response to which Klubrádió and two other media services providers submitted applications, which were all considered to be invalid for procedural reasons. According to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 180/2021 of 10 March 2021 (‘the invalidity decision’ (
13
)), Klubrádió’s application was declared invalid on three grounds: first of all, the presence, in the programming schedule, of a programme recapitulating another broadcast described in that schedule, which was not mentioned in the bid; next, a discrepancy of five minutes in the indication of the duration of one programme, as indicated in two different points of the form attached to the call for tenders; and, last, the existence of negative equity in Klubrádió’s accounts during the five years preceding the filing of its application.
19.
On 30 March 2021, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concluded temporary administrative contracts with one of the media services providers which had participated in the unsuccessful call for tenders, for the operation of the frequency in question for the period between 3 May and 29 October 2021.
20.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA], taking the view that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] authorities’ conduct and the relevant national legal framework constituted a breach of [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s obligations under a number of provisions of the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 11 of the Charter, initiated infringement proceedings against [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and, unconvinced by the arguments put forward – at each stage of the infringement proceedings – by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], (
14
) brought the present action for failure to fulfil obligations.
IV.
The procedure before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the forms of order sought
21.
By application of 17 February 2023, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], supported by the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should:
– declare that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has failed to fulfil its obligations under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8 and 9 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 5, 7 and 10 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 4(2) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the general principles of proportionality, non-discrimination and good administration, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 11 of the Charter and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 45 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (‘the EECC’), (
15
) owing to:
– the adoption, by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], of the refusal decision and the adoption, by the national legislature, of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 48(7) of the Law on the media, and the fact that Klubrádió was thus prevented from pursuing its activity in the radio broadcasting services sector;
– the failure to adopt, within the six-week period, a decision on the application for a renewal of the right to use the frequency previously used by Klubrádió and the failure to organise a procedure for the purpose of allocating that frequency within a period that would have permitted a decision to be adopted before the expiry of Klubrádió’s right of use;
– the fact that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in the call for tenders and in the invalidity decision, imposed disproportionate conditions on the allocation of the rights to use the frequency in question, failed to determine in advance the conditions for the grant of those rights and failed to exercise any discretion in assessing the seriousness and relevance of errors in the applications submitted that could entail the disqualification of applicants, and disregarded how minor infringements by Klubrádió were;
– the adoption of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 65(11) of the Law on the media;
– order [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to pay the costs.
22.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should:
– dismiss the action as inadmissible or, in any event, as unfounded;
– order the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to pay the costs.
V.
Analysis
23.
The complaints raised by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relate, first, to the incompatibility with the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications of the refusal decision and the underlying national legislation; second, to the incompatibility of the invalidity decision (together with the refusal decision, ‘the decisions at issue’) with that regulatory framework; third, to the incompatibility with that regulatory framework of the national legislation relating to the conclusion of a temporary contract for the use of radio frequencies; and, fourth, to the infringement of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 11 of the Charter.
24.
Before I analyse those complaints, it is appropriate, as a preliminary step, to address the arguments raised by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concerning, first, the inapplicability of the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications (and, consequently, of the Charter) to legislation and to decisions relating to media services and, second, the inadmissibility of the action for failure to fulfil obligations in so far as it relates to individual decisions of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].
A.
The applicability of EU law
1.
The applicability of the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications
25.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications does not apply to the decisions and the call for tenders at issue (‘the measures at issue’), which relate to the provision of radio media and not to the right of use of the radio frequencies. The allocation of radio frequencies in connection with the right to provide media services is indeed governed by the rules on electronic communications, however the right to provide media services, conversely, is governed solely by the Law on the media. (
16
) Furthermore, in accordance with the second subparagraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 5(2) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], authorisation procedures relating to the regulation of the media constitute an exception to the application of that regulatory framework. In addition, as EU law is not applicable, the Charter is therefore not applicable either.
26.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] maintains that that regulatory framework is applicable since the purpose of the measures at issue is to determine not only the provision of media services but also the use of radio frequencies, in so far as the right to provide media services includes the right to use radio frequencies.
27.
In that regard, it is appropriate, first of all, to clarify the scope of the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications, in order, next, to examine the scope of the measures at issue and, last, to draw the conclusions from that analysis as regards the application of that regulatory framework to those measures.
28.
First of all, as far as is relevant in the context of the present dispute, I recall that the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications defines the detailed and harmonised rules relating to the grant of rights of use of radio frequencies and establishes, essentially, that those rights must be granted through open, objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate procedures, without prejudice to specific criteria and procedures adopted by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to grant rights of use of radio frequencies to providers of radio or television broadcast content services with a view to pursuing general interest objectives in conformity with EU law. (
17
) In addition, that regulatory framework draws a distinction between, on the one hand, the rules relating to services that involve the transmission of signals over electronic communications networks and, on the other, those relating to services providing, or exercising editorial control over, content transmitted using electronic communications services. (
18
)
29.
Next, I note that the decisions at issue relate to procedures concerning the use of the frequency at issue and are based on national legislation (in this instance, the Law on the media) which concerns, inter alia, the provision of radio content through radio frequencies.
30.
In that regard, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] emphasises the distinction between, on the one hand, the right to provide media services, which forms the subject matter of the measures at issue, adopted by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and, on the other, the right to use the radio frequencies, which forms the subject matter of a separate administrative procedure and a separate decision, which fall within the powers of the NMHH.
31.
It seems to me that the measures at issue do not relate exclusively to the rules on the provision of media services but, in accordance with the Law on the media, (
19
) also affect the grant of the rights of use of the radio spectrum. (
20
) In other words, it is those measures that implement the provisions of the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications referred to in point 28 of this [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. (
21
)
32.
Last, having regard to all of the foregoing, I consider that the EU regulatory framework on electronic communications is applicable to the measures at issue.
33.
While it is true that, as observed in point 28 of this [OSCURATO:PERSONA], that regulatory framework makes a clear distinction between ‘electronic communications services’ and ‘services consisting in providing content’ (media services), I consider that that framework is nonetheless applicable to measures, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, whereby the national authority responsible for media services, in this instance the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], takes account of criteria linked with the provision of those services, in this instance of criteria relating to programme content, when granting the right to provide media services, in so far as that right includes the right of use of a radio frequency. (
22
) In addition, that regulatory framework is also applicable to all procedures whereby the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] grant rights of use of radio frequencies, (
23
) independently of the fact that the users are themselves media services providers or providers of electronic communications services who broadcast content produced by third parties (
24
) and without distinguishing the nature of the conditions imposed. (
25
) If that were not so, it would be possible for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to circumvent the rules of that regulatory framework relating to the grant of radio frequencies and, therefore, to undermine the effectiveness of those rules. (
26
)
34.
It is also appropriate, in that regard, to reject the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] argument that the measures at issue are covered by the exception provided for in the second sentence of the second subparagraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 5(2) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. As was specified in the legislative procedure relating to the adoption of that directive, that provision merely specifies that, when radio frequencies are granted to radio or television content providers, the general interest objectives recognised by EU law may prevail over the need to apply open, non-discriminatory and transparent procedures. (
27
) However, nothing to that effect seems to emerge from the file before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. (
28
)
35.
In conclusion, I consider that the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications is applicable in the present case. It also follows that, since EU law is applicable, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 11 of the Charter is also applicable, pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 51(1) thereof.
2.
The applicability
ratione temporis
of the EECC
36.
Among the provisions of EU law that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is alleged to have infringed, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submits that while the refusal decision (adopted on 8 September 2020) and the call for tenders (published on 4 November 2020) are subject to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the invalidity decision (adopted on 10 March 2021), conversely, is subject to the EECC, which repealed and replaced those two directives with effect from 20 December 2020. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] disputes the applicability of the EECC to the invalidity decision, on the ground that the call for tenders that initiated the procedure leading to that decision was published before the EECC entered into force and that, accordingly, the entire procedure, including the invalidity decision, is governed by the rules in force at the time when the procedure was initiated.
37.
I support the interpretation suggested by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which, moreover, was not challenged by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in its reply, while emphasising that the obligations imposed by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 45(1) of the EECC, infringement of which is alleged by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], are equivalent to those required by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 9(1) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], as those two provisions lay down, inter alia, an obligation for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to ensure that radio spectrum allocation used for electronic communications services is based on transparent and proportionate criteria. (
29
)
38.
It follows, in my view, that the EECC is of no relevance in the context of the assessment of the present action for failure to fulfil obligations.
B.
The admissibility of the action for failure to fulfil obligations
39.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] submits that the action for failure to fulfil obligations is inadmissible on the ground that it is aimed at two individual administrative decisions, which, moreover, were confirmed by judicial decisions which have acquired the force of
res judicata
, and not at an administrative practice. (
30
) By contrast, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] asserts that, according to settled case-law of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], it may initiate infringement proceedings not only in relation to an administrative practice but also in individual cases of incorrect application of EU law.
40.
In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s case-law, the procedure provided for in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 258 TFEU is based on the objective finding that a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has failed to fulfil its obligations under the FEU Treaty or an act of secondary law and, in the context of such proceedings, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] enjoys a discretion as to whether or not to commence such proceedings, which is not for review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. (
31
) It also follows from that case-law that an action against a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for failure to fulfil its obligations is objective in nature and, consequently, where a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] fails to fulfil its obligations under EU law, the infringement exists regardless of the frequency or the scale of the circumstances complained of. (
32
) Furthermore, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has made clear that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may ask it to find that, in not having achieved, in a specific case, the result intended by a directive, a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has failed to fulfil its obligations. (
33
)
41.
Therefore, even if the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s practice in relation to actions for failure to fulfil obligations generally concerns situations in which decisions have a sufficiently broad scope, there is nothing to preclude individual decisions, for which all remedies in national law have been exhausted, from being the subject matter of an action by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for failure to fulfil obligations, as [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 258 and 259 TFEU do not limit the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s review solely to general provisions adopted by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. (
34
)
C.
The first complaint, concerning the refusal decision
42.
By its first complaint, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] puts forward four arguments relating to the incompatibility of the refusal decision and, as a subsidiary matter, of the Law on the media with the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications. Those arguments relate to, first, the proportionality of the refusal decision; second the proportionality of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 48(7) of the Law on the media (the first and second arguments being relied on in the alternative); third, the discriminatory nature of the refusal decision; and, fourth, the excessive duration of the administrative procedure.
1.
The proporti
onality of the refusal decision
43.
By its first argument, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that, by the refusal decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] infringed the relevant provisions of the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications – and, more particularly, the principle of proportionality (
35
) – on the ground that the refusal decision is based solely on the fact that, in 2017, Klubrádió had twice failed to comply with its obligation to communicate monthly data concerning broadcasting quotas, infringements which, however, had not been classified by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] as constituting serious infringements. (
36
) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] refers, in that regard, to the principle of the proportionality of penalties, which requires that account be taken, in particular, of the nature and the gravity of the infringement. (
37
) It also emphasises that the right of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to determine the conditions of the renewal of the right to provide media services does not allow them to avoid the obligations arising under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the principle of proportionality. (
38
)
44.
According to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the principles on which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relies are irrelevant, since the refusal to renew an authorisation to provide media services is not a ‘penalty’. (
39
) In the present case, the right to provide media services, which is not an individual right, was not withdrawn from Klubrádió but ceased naturally upon expiry of the relevant period, and therefore on account of its legal nature. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] are therefore entitled to determine the conditions governing the renewal of the right to provide media services. (
40
)
45.
In that regard, it is appropriate to examine at the outset whether the principle of proportionality applies in the context of the present case and, if so, to determine whether that principle has been breached.
46.
As regards, in the first place, the application of the principle of proportionality, it should be observed that, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 9(1) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the second subparagraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 5(2) and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(3) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 4(2) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the rights to use radio frequencies must be assigned on the basis of objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria; the latter condition means that those criteria are to be appropriate for achieving their objective and do not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective. According to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s case-law, those criteria must be respected, not only at the time of the initial assignment of the radio frequencies, but also with every subsequent assignment or renewal, or conversion of the radio frequencies as part of the digital transfer. (
41
)
47.
Therefore, independently of the classification of the refusal to renew the radio frequencies as a ‘penalty’, which, moreover, is not envisaged by either of the parties to the proceedings, (
42
) it seems clear that that renewal must be granted on the basis of objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria, those principles being applicable also to the refusal of a renewal.
48.
It is admittedly true, as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims, that the use of the radio frequencies ceased in the present case not because of an act of the competent authorities or, a fortiori, as the consequence of a penalty, but that it ceased purely because of the expiry of the right to use the radio frequencies, the time limit of which is laid down in the contract for the use of the frequency at issue. It is also true that the possibility of providing media services, which permits the use of radio frequencies, does not appear to be an individual right or a property right. It is therefore possible, presumably, that no renewal is provided for by the national legislation on expiry of the right to use radio frequencies or that that legislation, as from a certain point in time, provides for different rules or conditions.
49.
In the present case, however, it is the national legislation that, subject to compliance with certain conditions, provides for such a renewal. Accordingly, in so far as that renewal is provided for, the conditions of that renewal must respect the principles established by the relevant provisions of the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications, (
43
) including the principle of proportionality, on which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relies in the present case.
50.
As the principle of proportionality is applicable, it falls to be determined, in the second place, whether that principle was breached.
51.
In that regard, I recall that the ground that led to the renewal of the contract for the use of the frequency at issue being excluded was the breach of the condition referred to in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 48(7)(a) of the Law on the media, which required that there had been no serious or repeated infringements of the Law on the freedom of the press, the Law on the media or the conditions set out in that contract. (
44
) I also note that, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 187(5) of the Law on the media, minor infringements are excluded from the concept of ‘repeated infringement’.
52.
While the prohibition on the renewal of a contract for the use of a radio frequency following repeated infringements, as laid down in the Law on the media, is not on its own capable of constituting a breach of the principles referred to in point 46 of this [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the application by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of that prohibition following infringements relating to the obligation to communicate data relating to broadcasting quotas raises some doubts. While that obligation is important for the purposes of ascertaining respect for the conditions for the grant of broadcasting rights, the breach of that obligation, in the circumstances of the present case, does not appear to be so serious as to lead to the prohibition in question. As the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submits, the infringement was limited to the breach of the obligation to communicate data, with which Klubrádió had complied during the procedure, without any breach of the obligation relating to the broadcasting data being established on the basis of those data. (
45
)
53.
In conclusion, I am of the view that, by the refusal decision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] breached the principle of proportionality.
2.
The proportionality of
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] 48
(7)
of
the Law on the media
54.
By its second argument, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] maintains that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 48(7) of the Law on the media infringes
per se
the relevant provisions of the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications, (
46
) in so far as it excludes, automatically and in all cases, the right to a renewal of the right to use radio frequencies on the ground that the media services provider was late on more than one occasion in meeting its obligation to provide information relating to compliance with broadcasting quotas, (
47
) and leaves the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] no discretion in assessing proportionality when it adopts decisions (such as the renewal of the right to use radio frequencies) under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7 and 10 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], thereby depriving it of the possibility of assessing the negligible nature of the infringement and the proportionality of the legal consequences of that infringement. (
48
)
55.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] emphasises that the national legislation defines the circumstances in which the renewal of the right to use radio frequencies is precluded, relying on objective rules which preclude any discretion in their implementation and which prevent such renewal only in the case of the most serious infringements (the gravity of the infringement being assessed in the context of the penalty procedure and not subsequently, at the stage of the renewal procedure) or repeated infringements (which do not include minor infringements), taking the principle of proportionality into account. (
49
)
56.
I would observe, as a preliminary point, that the provisions on which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relies require that the rights to use radio frequencies are allocated on the basis of objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria. (
50
)
57.
In this instance, as provided for in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 48(7)(a) of the Law on the media, the right to provide media services cannot be renewed if, by final decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the media service provider has been held responsible, in particular, for serious or repeated infringements of that law, without taking account of – in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 187(5) of that law – minor infringements in the context of the assessment of the repeated nature of the infringements.
58.
In that regard, it cannot in my view be concluded that, as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] maintains, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 48(7) of that law precludes, automatically and in all cases, the renewal of the right to use radio frequencies, on the ground that media services provider was on more than one occasion late in meeting its obligation to communicate data relating to broadcasting quotas. The application of that provision in conjunction with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 187(5) of the Law on the media allows the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to assess an application to renew the right to provide media services in the light of the infringements committed by the applicant, by requiring the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], when it assesses the repeated nature of those infringements, not to take account of minor infringements. (
51
)
59.
Accordingly, the Law on the media lays down objective conditions for exclusion from the renewal of the right to provide media services, while leaving it to the competent national authority to assess the minor nature of an infringement when examining the repeated nature of the infringements committed. (
52
)
60.
In those circumstances, I do not think that, merely by prohibiting renewal following repeated infringements, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 48(7) of the Law on the media fails to meet the conditions laid down in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 9 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 5, 7 and 10 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 4 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. I therefore propose that the second argument put forward by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] be rejected.
3.
The discriminatory
nature of the refusal decision
61.
By its third argument, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] maintains that the automatic nature of the refusal to grant a renewal provided for in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 48(7) of the Law on the media also constitutes a breach of the principle of equal treatment, which can indeed lead to the same legal consequence for infringements of very different magnitude, as is demonstrated by the fact that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not renew Klubrádió’s right to provide media services when it did so for other radio stations, namely [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and KARCAG, in spite of the serious and repeated infringements of the Law on the media committed by them.
62.
In that respect, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that no repeated infringement was committed either in the case of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (
53
) or in those mentioned by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], as the procedures in those cases were based on different facts and took place in a legal context distinct from that applicable to Klubrádió. (
54
)
63.
As a preliminary point, I recall that it follows from settled case-law of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relating to the burden of proof in proceedings for failure to fulfil obligations under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 258 TFEU that it is for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to prove the alleged failure. It is the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] that must provide the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] with the evidence necessary for the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to determine whether there has indeed been a failure to fulfil obligations, and in doing so it may not rely on any presumption. (
55
) It must therefore be determined whether the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in the light of the information communicated by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the course of the procedure, discharged the burden of proof imposed on it.
64.
In that regard, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relies on the data contained in a table, produced by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] during the pre-litigation procedure and annexed to the application, concerning the grounds of the refusal decisions issued by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], from which it is apparent that, except in Klubrádió’s case, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has never refused to renew a right to provide media services on the sole ground that the provider had not met its obligation to communicate data relating to broadcast quotas. (
56
) Furthermore, since that table does not contain information on decisions to renew the right to provide media services, it cannot be precluded that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has in the past renewed that right in cases where providers had committed infringements comparable to, or even more serious than, those committed by Klubrádió. (
57
)
65.
Independently of any breach by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of its obligation of sincere cooperation, which ultimately was not relied on by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], (
58
) it does not seem to me that the evidence adduced by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is sufficient to substantiate the existence of discrimination on the part of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] authorities vis-à-vis Klubrádió. (
59
) Accordingly, I propose that the third argument raised by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should be rejected.
4.
The timely a
doption of the refusal decision
66.
By its fourth argument, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that the refusal decision was adopted at the close of a procedure lasting 10 months, whereas [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 5(3) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] prescribes a period of 6 months for decisions granting rights of use of radio frequencies and the grant of the right to provide media services is an integral part of the procedure for the award of radio frequencies.
67.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] retorts that the procedure for the renewal of authorisations provided for in the Law on the media is not the procedure for the granting of rights of use for radio frequencies referred to in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 5(3) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and that neither the national legislation transposing that directive nor any other provision of EU law sets a time limit for the renewal of the right to provide media services.
68.
In my view, that argument is strictly linked to the question of the application of the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications to the refusal decision. In so far as that decision, although it is based on the national legislation relating to the right to provide media services, is also considered to affect the right to use radio frequencies for providers of radio content, it seems reasonable to me to conclude that those decisions must respect the criteria and principles laid down by that regulatory framework, including the provisions relating to time limits for the adoption of decisions. Furthermore, as stated in point 31 of this [OSCURATO:PERSONA], it is the measures at issue that govern the allocation of limited resources such as the radio spectrum, in accordance with the relevant provisions of that regulatory framework.
69.
Since the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] adopted the refusal decision in a period that exceeded the time limit laid down in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 5(3) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], it must therefore be concluded that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] infringed that provision.
D.
The second complaint, concerning the invalidity decision
70.
By its second complaint, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that, at the close of the call for tenders at issue, Klubrádió’s application was rejected as invalid for substantive reasons, on the basis of three grounds (two relating to errors in Klubrádió’s programming schedule and the final one to the existence of negative equity in its accounts) based on disproportionate criteria, which were not determined in advance and which left no discretion to the competent national authority. It also takes issue with the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] authorities on account of the excessive duration of the procedure.
1.
The grounds of
invalidity
relating to the programming schedule
71.
The first two grounds of invalidity relate to two irregularities in Klubrádió’s weekly programming schedules: first, it did not complete the form for the programme, broadcast at weekends, ‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ismétlés’, consisting of a selection of extracts from the programme ‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA]’ broadcast during the week; and, second, it included in that schedule a programme entitled ‘Kovátsműhely’ lasting 45 minutes, although the form relating to that programme indicated a duration of 50 minutes.
72.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] maintains that such irregularities were mere administrative errors, which could easily be corrected in accordance with the Law on the media, whereas, according to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], although that law distinguishes between procedural defects that render the bid invalid and other defects that do not have that consequence, the failings referred to above could not be corrected, since they would have entailed a substantial amendment of Klubrádió’s bid and therefore a breach of the principle of equality of arms with the other applicants. (
60
)
73.
In that regard, it is common ground between the parties that Klubrádió’s bid was vitiated by such inaccuracies in the programming schedule. However, it also seems clear to me that those inaccuracies are so insignificant that it seems disproportionate to make them a ground for declaring the bid invalid. As the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] asserts, it does not follow clearly from the call for tenders that a programme such as ‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA] ismétlés’, which consisted exclusively of extracts from another broadcast, constituted a separate broadcast requiring an individual description. (
61
) Furthermore, it seems clear that a difference of five minutes between two indications of the length of the programme ‘Kovátsműhely’ in Klubrádio’s bid could only be a clerical error that could not genuinely affect the substance of that bid.
74.
The inaccuracies referred to therefore do not appear to affect the substance of the bid and do indeed seem to lend themselves to correction following a request for clarification from the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]; that circumstance could not genuinely affect the principle of equality of arms with the other applicants.
2.
The ground of
invalidity
relating to
equity
75.
The third ground of invalidity relates to Klubrádió’s negative equity during the years preceding the filing of its application, which, according to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], meant that its business plan was inappropriate.
76.
In that regard, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that that conclusion was based not on a breach of the conditions relating to financial viability set out in the call for tenders, which were met by Klubrádió, (
62
) but on the ground that the bid was inappropriate for achieving the objective of contributing to the creation of a stable broadcasting market. (
63
) Furthermore, independently of the fact that the deterioration of Klubrádió’s financial situation was attributable to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failure to conclude any administrative contracts with it, which was unlawful and had formed the subject matter of an action for damages, it is apparent from Klubrádió’s annual accounts for 2020 and 2021 (and the corresponding waivers of debt by its principal creditor) that Klubrádió’s economic situation had improved. In addition, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not accept that Klubrádió might be able to cover its operating costs with the help of sponsorship, as it had done in the past, which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] regards as a legitimate and increasingly common means of financing the media. (
64
)
77.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] emphasises that Klubrádió’s turnover had been falling for several years before the call for tenders and that, at the time when the bid was assessed, it did not even satisfy the basic conditions of lawful operation, in accordance with the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Nor were the waivers of debt to which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] refers sufficient, since they were conditional, and the annual accounts for 2020 again reported negative equity (the 2021 accounts, on the other hand, were not relevant, as they postdated the assessment of the bid).
78.
As a preliminary point, it is important, in my view, to emphasise that the third ground of invalidity is based not on a breach of the conditions relating to the financial viability of applicants responding to the call for tenders, referred to in point 1.8.2 of that call for tenders, but rather on the breach of the conditions laid down in point 1.11.9.2(c) of the call for tenders, (
65
) which states that an application is to be invalid on substantive grounds if, because it is unfounded, the bid is ‘inappropriate for achieving the objectives’ defined by the Law on the media or in the call for tenders. The objective in question was the objective, specified in point 1.2 of the call for tenders, of ‘contributing to the creation of a broadcasting market the functioning of which is stable and predictable’.
79.
In that regard, in the first place, I consider that although the state of own funds constitutes a factor which, by definition, is mainly linked with the financial viability of the applicant undertaking, it was not among the criteria of financial viability referred to in the call for tenders and was not disputed by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the context of the examination of those criteria. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], it was mentioned in a completely different context, that is to say, in connection with the objective of creating a stable and predictable broadcasting market. For that reason, I consider that the use of that criterion in the context referred to above was not foreseeable, which may constitute a breach of the obligation of transparency, as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] maintains.
80.
In the second place, it is also debatable in my view that the existence of Klubrádió’s negative own funds, which, it seems to me, had thus far not been considered problematic, and which is not capable of affecting its financial viability, might nonetheless undermine the creation or the functioning of the broadcasting market as a whole.
81.
In the third place, I do not think that it is reasonable to preclude any relevance, in the assessment of Klubrádió’s bid, of the use of sponsors or external participants, which, as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] observes, is a common method of financing the media.
82.
Accordingly, I consider that the existence of negative own funds in Klubrádió’s accounts is not a factor which, in the circumstances of the present case, ought to have led to its bid being rejected.
3.
The timely a
doption of the
invalidity
decision
83.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that, having regard to the delay in the adoption of the refusal decision (which forms the subject matter of the fourth argument in the first complaint in the action), the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not allow sufficient time to close the call for tenders before the date of the expiry of the contract for the use of the frequency at issue and had only two months to evaluate the bids and to conclude a new administrative contract, which leads to an infringement of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(2)(d) and (4)(e) and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 9(1) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and of the principle of good administration.
84.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] asserts that the period of six weeks relating to the procedure for the allocation of the radio frequencies did not apply to the tendering procedure and, in any event, was respected in the present case, in so far as [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(4) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] allows that period to be extended to eight months where competitive procedures, such as the call for tenders in the present case, are used. (
66
)
85.
In that regard, in view of the possibility, provided for in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(4) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], of extending the period referred to in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 5(3) of that directive, it seems to me that the complaint in question is not sufficiently precise, (
67
) since the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has provided no concrete factor on which it might be concluded that the period within which the tendering procedure took place did not allow Klubrádió to submit an appropriate bid or the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to evaluate the bids in an appropriate manner.
86.
I therefore consider that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has not discharged the burden of proof placed on it, in accordance with the case-law of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] set out in point 63 of this [OSCURATO:PERSONA].
87.
In conclusion, I propose that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s second complaint should be upheld, in so far as the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that, in rejecting Klubrádió’s application at the close of the call for tenders as invalid on a substantive ground, on the basis of disproportionate criteria, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] infringed [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 5(2) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].
E.
The third complaint, concerning the refusal to conclude a temporary administrative contract
88.
By its third complaint, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] maintains that the Law on the media gives rise to unequal treatment, in that, on the one hand, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 65(11), it does not permit
a temporary administrative contract for the provision of media services to be concluded
where there have been minor and repeated infringements of its provisions, but, on the other hand, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 55(1)(c), it authorises
a frequency to be allocated by a call for tenders
without consideration of infringements of its provisions, thus treating two comparable situations unequally. (
68
)
89.
In the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submission, the conditions relating to the temporary right to provide media services cannot be compared with those imposed on applicants in a call for tenders (
69
) and, in any event, the conditions governing the conclusion of that temporary administrative contract are not stricter than those linked with participation in a new call for tenders, since minor but repeated infringements also preclude the renewal of the right to provide media services.
90.
By way of preliminary point, I recall that, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 65(11) of the Law on the media, on expiry of the right to provide radio media services and during the tendering procedure for the grant of that right, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] may grant a right to provide media services on a temporary basis, by means of a temporary administrative contract, (
70
) if the right to provide radio media services has already been renewed once,
provided that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has not established a serious or repeated infringement by the media services provider
. On the other hand, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 55(1)(c) of that law does not lay down such conditions for the allocation of the right to provide those services in the context of a call for tenders.
91.
The complaint in question is based on the premiss that the grant of a right to provide media services on a temporary basis is comparable to the grant of those services by means of a new call for tenders and that, consequently, the imposition of more rigorous conditions for the grant of such a right on a temporary basis constitutes a breach of the principle of equal treatment.
92.
To my mind that premiss is incorrect. Although the two situations referred to (namely the temporary contract and the award of a contract in a call for tenders) have common features, in particular the possibility of continuing to provide media services, those situations are distinguished by important characteristics.
93.
First, the conclusion of a temporary contract constitutes a provisional situation justified by practical reasons, namely the requirement to ensure an uninterrupted use of the radio frequencies. That transitional and emergency situation may, in my view, justify the imposition of particularly strict conditions. Where it is not possible to initiate a thorough evaluation of the situation of the undertaking in question, such as that carried out in the call for tenders, it is not unreasonable to require that the undertaking’s conduct has not been vitiated by any substantial irregularity. (
71
)
94.
On the other hand, the award of a contract in a call for tenders requires a thorough analysis of the situation of the tendering undertaking on the basis of numerous criteria relating, inter alia, to its competence, its financial viability, etc. That circumstance, to my mind, justifies the imposition of different criteria from those applied in the context of the conclusion of a temporary contract. In the course of a call for tenders, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is able to assess in greater detail tenderers’ circumstances and to appraise whether, and to what extent, any infringements committed in the past may prevent those tenderers from participating in any meaningful sense in the call for tenders.
95.
In any event, I consider that, in view of the significant differences between those two situations, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] retain a significant discretion as regards the conditions to be imposed in that respect.
96.
I therefore propose that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s third complaint should be rejected.
F.
The fourth complaint, concerning the infringement of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 11 of the Charter
97.
By its fourth complaint, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] maintains that the measures and legislation at issue prevented Klubrádió from broadcasting its programmes on a radio frequency, which constitutes the most serious breach of the freedom of the media and may be placed on the same footing as the termination of the activities of a medium by the national authorities. (
72
) Although freedom of expression and the freedom of the media are not absolute rights, (
73
) the limitations to those rights in the present case are not necessary for the objectives pursued (
74
) and, moreover, those limitations are not proportionate, as the objectives referred to above could be attained by less intrusive means, such as requests for information and the possible revocation of the decision to grant spectrum in the event that the undertaking were to be liquidated or wound up.
98.
In the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submission, the present case relates solely to a question of the regulation of the media, which has not been harmonised under EU law and, consequently, is not subject to the provisions of the Charter, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 51(1) thereof. In addition, the mere fact that an operator is not granted the right to make its media services available on a particular broadcasting platform does not necessarily mean that there is a breach of freedom of expression.
99.
It must be remembered that, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 11(2) of the Charter, the freedom and pluralism of the media must be respected. It follows from the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s settled case-law that that provision constitutes one of the essential foundations of a pluralist, democratic society and is one of the values on which, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2 TEU, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is founded, and that, in such a context, interferences with the rights and freedoms guaranteed by that provision must therefore be limited to what is strictly necessary. (
75
)
100.
In so far as it is established, in the preceding points of this [OSCURATO:PERSONA], that the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications is applicable and that some of the complaints raised by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] are well founded, it is appropriate to assess whether and to what extent the infringements established undermine the freedom and pluralism of the media in [OSCURATO:PERSONA], taking into account the fact that the conduct complained of by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] affects the rights of a very specific undertaking.
101.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA], which bears the burden of proof in accordance with the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s case-law cited in point 63 of this [OSCURATO:PERSONA], seems to rely on the fact that Klubrádió is an independent radio station which is critical of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. However, the action is not based on a specific analysis of the relationship between Klubrádió’s activity and the more general situation of the media in [OSCURATO:PERSONA], since the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] merely refers to the existence of an environment that is particularly hostile to the pluralism of the media in that [OSCURATO:PERSONA], owing to the considerable interference of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the field of the media, as has been recognised on many occasions within the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. (
76
)
102.
In that regard, it is true that the legislation on the media in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – and, in particular, the Law on the media – has been the subject of much criticism in recent years, notably by a number of international institutions and organisations, in view of the limitations placed on the freedom and pluralism of the media. In addition, and in all likelihood, in a situation in which the freedom and pluralism of the media are tested, the exclusion of a media services provider which provides detailed coverage of politics in a country and is particularly critical of the political power is likely to affect that situation even more.
103.
However, while the examination of the measures at issue can clearly not disregard the conditions and the particular context in which they were adopted (
77
) and while, consequently, it cannot be precluded that those measures did in fact affect the freedom and pluralism of the media, it seems to me that, in the circumstances of the present case, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has not adduced proof of the existence of such an effect and has therefore not discharged its burden of proof. Apart from a general description of the situation of the media market in [OSCURATO:PERSONA], it has adduced no evidence showing the consequence of the measures at issue on that situation. (
78
)
104.
That being so, if the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should nonetheless find that the infringements established have the effect of limiting the freedom and pluralism of the media in [OSCURATO:PERSONA], it must be determined whether, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 52 of the Charter, that limitation is consistent with the principle of proportionality, namely whether it is necessary to meet the objectives of general interest pursued and does not go beyond what is necessary for the pursuit of those objectives.
105.
In that regard, while the objectives pursued by the national legislation, namely that of strengthening the national and cultural identity and that of ensuring competition on the media market and freedom of expression, constitute, in principle, objectives of general interest recognised by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], I doubt that the limitations imposed by the decisions at issue are necessary and proportionate in that regard. The failures alleged against Klubrádió in the present case, which prevented it from pursuing its activity, constitute either minor infringements or inaccuracies of a procedural nature, (
79
) or situations which, as such, should not render it impossible for that radio station to pursue the activity of broadcasting. (
80
)
VI.
Costs
106.
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since I propose that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should essentially uphold the form of order sought by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and since the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has applied for costs to be borne by [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should be ordered to pay the costs.
VII.
Conclusion
107.
In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should:
– declare that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has failed to fulfil its obligations under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8(1) and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 9(1) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2002/21/EC of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), as amended by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2009/140/EC of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 25 November 2009, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 5(2) and (3) and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(3) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2002/20/EC of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), as amended by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2009/140, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 4(2) of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2002/77/EC of 16 September 2002 on competition in the markets for electronic communications networks and services ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) and the principle of proportionality, owing to the adoption by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], vis-à-vis Klubrádió, of refusal decision No 830/2020 of 8 September 2020 and invalidity decision No 180/2021 of 10 March 2021 and to the failure to adopt, within the six-week time limit laid down in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 5(3) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], a decision on Klubrádió’s request to renew the contract on the use of the 92.9 MHz frequency in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] broadcasting area;
– dismiss the action for the remainder;
– order [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to pay the costs.
1
Original language: French.
2
That regulatory framework consists, in particular, of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2002/21/EC of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) (OJ 2002 L 108, p. 33), as amended by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2009/140/EC of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 25 November 2009 amending [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (OJ 2009 L 337, p. 37) (‘the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’); of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2002/20/EC of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]) (OJ 2002 L 108, p. 21), as amended by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2009/140 (‘the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’); and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2002/77/EC of 16 September 2002 on competition in the markets for electronic communications networks and services (OJ 2002 L 249, p. 21) (‘the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’).
3
A médiaszolgáltatásokról és a tömegkommunikációról szóló 2010. évi CLXXXV. Törvény ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] CLXXXV of 2010 on media services and mass communication methods; ‘the Law on the media’),
[OSCURATO:PERSONA]
2010. évi 202. száma.
4
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations (OJ 1998 L 204, p. 37), as amended by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2009/140.
5
It should be noted that that provision was subsequently amended as follows: ‘It shall be the responsibility of linear media service providers, each month and by no later than the last day of the month following the month in question, and at the latest on 31 January of the year following the reference year, to provide the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] with data allowing compliance with the broadcasting quotas to be monitored. …’
6
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] 354/2017 and No 1224/2017 were adopted, that provision was laid down in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 187(4) of the Law on the media.
7
It broadcast, essentially, programmes dealing with public life in [OSCURATO:PERSONA], not musical broadcasts like most commercial radio stations.
8
In 2010, since the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] és [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] radio and television committee, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]; ‘the ORTT’) had not yet launched the call for tenders for use of the radio frequency which it operated, Klubrádió submitted an application to use the radio frequency at issue, but secured the conclusion of that contract only by initiating judicial proceedings (the ORTT had selected Klubrádió at the time of the call for tenders but had not signed the broadcasting contract). Subsequently, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which in the meantime had succeeded the ORTT as media regulator, launched a call for tenders for the 95.3 MHz frequency and, on 13 March 2013, awarded the contract to Klubrádió, again following judicial proceedings (the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had initially selected a candidate other than Klubrádió, then, after that decision had been declared invalid, had declared that call for tenders unsuccessful, as all the applications were invalid for procedural reasons) and concluded a broadcasting contract with that radio station with effect from 3 May 2013 (before that date, Klubrádió was able to broadcast its programmes for a certain time on the radio frequency in question, on the basis of temporary 60-day licences).
9
The present case arises from the refusal to extend that contract and the exclusion of Klubrádió from the new call for tenders launched following that refusal. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], as reported by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the facts described up till then, which took place during the period between 2010 and 2014, gave rise to an action for damages brought by Klubrádió against the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in the context of which it was recognised, first, that Klubrádió had sustained material loss as a result of having to pay fees to use the 95.3 MHz frequency, when the use of the radio frequency at issue ought to have been free, and, second, that it had sustained non-material loss because the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had caused damage to its reputation by statements made in the media by its representatives.
10
That decision was contested by Klubrádió and confirmed by the judgment of the Fővárosi Törvényszék ([OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]) of 9 February 2021, upheld on appeal by judgment of the Kúria ([OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]) of 17 June 2021. By judgment of 8 February 2022, the Alkotmánybíróság ([OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]) also dismissed a plea of unconstitutionality raised by Klubrádió in that regard.
11
The application for an extension had been submitted by Klubrádió on 8 November 2019, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 48(5) of the Law on the media.
12
Those infringements had been established by two decisions adopted in 2017 (namely, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 354/2017 and No 1224/2017), which were not contested by Klubrádió, whereby the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], while taking account of the fact that Klubrádió had complied with the requirement to submit data relating to broadcasting quotas before those decisions were adopted, imposed on it two fines amounting to 30 000 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] forint (HUF) (approximately EUR 75) and HUF 36 000 (approximately EUR 90), respectively. According to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the infringement had been committed twice within 365 days, and therefore constituted a ‘repeated infringement’ within the meaning of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 187(5) of the Law on the media and, in application of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 48(7) of that law, Klubrádió’s right to provide media services could not be renewed.
13
An appeal against that decision was dismissed on 6 May 2021 by judgment of the Fővárosi Törvényszék ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]), upheld on appeal on 28 September 2021 by judgment of the Kúria ([OSCURATO:PERSONA]).
14
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] sent the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] a letter of formal notice on 9 June 2021 and a reasoned opinion on 21 December 2021, to which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] replied by letters of 9 August 2021 and 2 February 2022, respectively.
15
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EU) 2018/1972 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 11 December 2018 establishing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (OJ 2018 L 321, p. 36).
16
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] to provide media services falls within the powers of the media regulation authority, namely the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], while authorisation to use radio frequencies falls within the powers of the authority for the regulation of electronic communications, namely the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]- és [OSCURATO:PERSONA] ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA]; ‘the NMHH’). The applicant selected at the close of a call for tenders for the provision of media services will admittedly be entitled to submit an application for the grant of a radio licence; nonetheless that licence would not be issued automatically but would be subject to technical conditions.
17
See the second subparagraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 5(2) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. See also [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 9(1) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(3) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 4(2) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], which also provide that the grant of rights of use of radio frequencies is to be made on the basis of objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria.
18
See, in particular, recital 5 and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 2(c) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Thus, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has held that that regulatory framework makes a clear distinction between the production of content, which involves editorial responsibility, and the transmission of content, which does not entail any editorial responsibility, content and transmission being covered by different measures which pursue their own specific objectives (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 September 2020,
Vivendi
, C‑719/18, EU:C:2020:627, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited).
19
More particularly, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 48 of the Law on the media governs the award of media services ‘using the limited resources owned by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’, by means of an administrative contract awarded in the context of a call for tenders administered by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] within the meaning of paragraph 1 of that provision, which may be extended without a call for tenders in accordance with paragraphs 5 and 7 of that provision.
20
In that context, the decision of the NMHH relating to the grant of the broadcasting licence to which [OSCURATO:PERSONA] refers is confined to the award of the radio licence, after verification of the relevant technical conditions.
21
Contrary to the position maintained by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the regulatory framework is applicable not because the provision of media content (which forms the subject matter of the measures at issue) assumes the transmission of signals, but rather because the measures at issue are the only national measures whereby the spectrum is allocated, in accordance with the provisions referred to in point 28 of this [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Furthermore, in the judgment of 31 January 2008,
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7
(C‑380/05, EU:C:2008:59, paragraphs 85 and 86), the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] held that, in the area of television broadcasting, freedom to provide services, as enshrined in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 49 EC [now [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 56 TFEU] and implemented in this area by the EU framework for electronic communications, requires not only the grant of broadcasting authorisations, but also the grant of broadcasting radio frequencies and that an operator cannot exercise effectively the rights which it derives from EU law concerning access to the television broadcasting market without broadcasting radio frequencies.
22
Furthermore, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has stated that, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1(3) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] remain competent to regulate the media ‘having due regard for EU law’ (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 September 2020,
Vivendi
, C‑719/18, EU:C:2020:627, paragraph 47).
23
It must be borne in mind that, in addition to being limited resources, radio frequencies are a public good that has an important social, cultural and economic value (see, in particular, to that effect, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 9(1) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]). It would be inconsistent to apply the relevant provisions of the EU regulatory framework on electronic communications only when they relate exclusively or mainly to those resources.
24
In that regard, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has stated that the EU regulatory framework on electronic communications is applicable to providers of electronic communication services that are at the same time providers of media services (see judgments of 31 January 2008,
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7
, C‑380/05, EU:C:2008:59, and of 26 July 2017,
Persidera
, C‑112/16, EU:C:2017:597).
25
For example, conditions linked with programming and therefore with programme content.
26
Furthermore, according to the settled case-law of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the margin of discretion conferred on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the application of a directive must not be used by them in a manner which would undermine the effectiveness or the objective of that directive or which would infringe the principle of proportionality (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 September 2024,
Sagrario
, C‑63/23, EU:C:2024:739, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
27
See, to that effect, Communication from the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] pursuant to the second subparagraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 251(2) EC concerning the common position of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on the adoption of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (SEC/2001/1411 final – COD 2000/0188).
28
The same consideration must apply with regard to the argument based on the ‘exception’ referred to in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1(3) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], according to which, in essence, the provisions of the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications are without prejudice to measures taken at national level to pursue general interest objectives, in particular relating to content regulation and audiovisual policy. As may be seen from the Report of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 7 February 2001 on the Proposal for a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (COM(2000) 393 – C5-0428/2000 – 2000/0184(COD)), which introduced that provision, that provision ‘underlines the separation between audiovisual content and transmission infrastructure’. That said, the fact remains that, as is apparent from the considerations developed in points 28 to 33 of this [OSCURATO:PERSONA], that regulatory framework remains applicable to all procedures by means of which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] grant rights to use radio frequencies.
29
The answer to that question therefore has no practical impact on the merits of the third complaint, a fortiori because the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in its submissions, relies on [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 45 of the EECC in conjunction with the provisions of the EU regulatory framework on electronic communications (however, that provision is relied on in the context of the third complaint, which in any event I propose should be rejected).
30
That argument is relevant only with regard to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s complaints in relation to the measures at issue and not to those concerning the Law on the media.
31
See judgment of 6 October 2020,
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (Higher education)
(C‑66/18, EU:C:2020:792, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).
32
See judgment of 28 January 2020,
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Italy ([OSCURATO:PERSONA] combating late payment)
(C‑122/18, EU:C:2020:41, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).
33
See, in particular, judgment of 14 April 2005,
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Spain
(C‑157/03, EU:C:2005:225, paragraphs 42 to 46 and the case-law cited), and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of [OSCURATO:PERSONA]Hackl in
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Germany
(C‑441/02, EU:C:2005:337, points 59 to 63 and the case-law cited). Only when an administrative practice is the subject matter of an action for failure to fulfil obligations is it required, according to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s case-law, that it must be, to some degree, of a consistent and general nature (see judgment of 17 December 2020,
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (Reception for applicants for international protection)
, C‑808/18, EU:C:2020:1029, paragraph 111 and the case-law cited). See also, in the literature, Lenaerts, K., Gutman, K. and Nowak, J.T.,
EU [OSCURATO:PERSONA]
, [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA], 2023, p. 180.
34
Admittedly, with regard, in particular, to a complaint concerning the implementation of a national provision, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has held that proof of a [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failure to fulfil its obligations requires production of evidence different from that usually taken into account in an action for failure to fulfil obligations concerning solely the terms of a national provision, and that in those circumstances the failure to fulfil obligations can be established only by means of sufficiently documented and detailed proof of the alleged practice of the national administration and/or courts, for which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] concerned is answerable (see judgment of 17 December 2020,
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] v [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (Reception for applicants for international protection)
, C‑808/18, EU:C:2020:1029, paragraph 113 and the case-law cited). That principle was established with respect to a ‘practice’, but it is even more relevant with regard, as in the present case, to individual decisions.
35
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] relies in that regard on [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 9(1) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the second subparagraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 5(2) and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 7(3) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 4 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].
36
According to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 48(7) of the Law on the media, the right to use radio frequencies cannot be extended if, inter alia, the media services provider has been found to repeatedly breach the contract or infringe the provisions of that law.
37
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] submits, first of all, that the principle of proportionality is binding on the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] not only in the case of penalties but also in the case of measures that restrict the freedoms guaranteed by EU law (see judgment of 31 May 2018,
Zheng
, C‑190/17, EU:C:2018:357, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited); next, that in the present case, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 48(7) of the Law on the media, the refusal to extend the right to provide media services was actually based on infringements committed in the past; and, last, that the penalty provided for in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 10(5) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the refusal to grant an extension are comparable in terms of their legal consequences.
38
Furthermore, in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s contention, the fact that Klubrádió is able to broadcast its programme on the internet is not sufficient to make up for the loss of the radio frequencies.
39
Furthermore, according to that [OSCURATO:PERSONA], an extension procedure does not become a penalty procedure merely because, among the situations in which an renewal is precluded, the law provides for the situation in which a serious or repeated infringement has been committed previously by the media services provider.
40
Furthermore, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] contends that Klubrádió has not sustained any harm linked to the non-extension of its right to provide media services – as the consequences of that non-extension were foreseeable on the basis of the infringements committed and the expiry of the contract for the use of the radio frequency at issue – and was still able to provide its services via other transmission systems, including the internet. In addition, the argument alleging breach of the principles of proportionality and non-discrimination was not raised in the application.
41
See, to that effect, judgment of 26 July 2017,
Persidera
(C‑112/16, EU:C:2017:597, paragraphs 39 and 40 and the case-law cited).
42
Although in its application the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] refers on numerous occasions to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s case-law on penalties, it does not seem to intend to treat the present case as comparable to a penalty but, rather, to consider that the principles identified in that case-law are also applicable to the present case, since the refusal to extend the right to provide media services is comparable to a penalty (in this instance, the termination of that right) in terms of their legal consequences.
43
See point 46 of this [OSCURATO:PERSONA].
44
In the present case, Klubrádió was held liable for repeated breaches of the obligation to communicate data relating to broadcasting quotas imposed by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 22(8) of that law.
45
In addition, the fines imposed on Klubrádió were quite small, which might also amount to evidence in support of the limited importance of the infringements found. It is therefore apparent that, in assessing the existence of repeated infringements attributed to Klubrádió, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not take account of the insignificant nature of those infringements.
46
More particularly, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 9 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 5, 7 and 10 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 4 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the principle of proportionality.
47
Such an infringement is not a serious and flagrant case that would justify the refusal to renew.
48
That argument is put forward as an alternative to the first one. Either the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] misused its discretion and failed to respect the principle of proportionality (first argument), or the Law on the media does not allow it any discretion and therefore constitutes in itself a breach of the principle of proportionality (second argument).
49
Furthermore, in those circumstances, the extension of Klubrádió’s right to provide media services would have entailed discrimination vis-à-vis its competitors.
50
I refer, more precisely, to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 9 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 5 and 7 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 4 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 10 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relates only to penalties imposed by the competent national authority.
51
However, in so far as the wording of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 187(5) of the Law on the media seems to be clear in that respect, where it provides that an infringement is to be regarded as repeated where the offender repeats, within a period of 365 days, the same unlawful conduct as that established by a definitive administrative decision, ‘with the exception of minor infringements’, I have difficulty in understanding the position maintained by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] at the hearing, namely that it follows from that provision that, if minor offences are repeated, the sum of the minor infringements must be treated as a serious infringement, a position which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], moreover, disputes.
52
It is apparent from the case file and, more particularly, from the discussion at the hearing, that the Law on the media does not lay down precise criteria for the assessment of the minimal nature of an infringement, which is therefore in all likelihood entrusted to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in the context of the assessment of an application to extend the right to provide media services.
53
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] is stated to have infringed not a provision of the Law on the media, but a provision of the Law on the freedom of the press, which, at the time when the decision was adopted, did not yet constitute a ground for non-extension.
54
In the cases of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and KARCAG, in particular, the same radio frequencies were operated by different providers.
55
See, in particular, judgment of 29 July 2024,
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Portugal ([OSCURATO:PERSONA])
(C‑768/22, EU:C:2024:643, paragraph 79 and the case-law cited). Admittedly, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in its written observations, claimed that there had been a lack of cooperation on the part of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] authorities, which might constitute a breach of the obligation imposed on [OSCURATO:PERSONA] by the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 4(3) TEU. However, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not develop that potential complaint further, nor is it included in the form of order sought in the application.
56
It is apparent from that table that most of the refusal decisions established the existence of an infringement linked with the classification of programmes in the appropriate age category or with a departure from the programming schedule agreed in the contract, which, in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s view, constitutes a more serious infringement than failure to comply with the obligation to communicate data relating to broadcasting quotas of which Klubrádió is accused.
57
That might be the case of [OSCURATO:PERSONA], in respect of which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] requested [OSCURATO:PERSONA], during the pre-litigation procedure, to provide it with detailed information in that regard, a request which remained unanswered.
58
See footnote 54 to this [OSCURATO:PERSONA].
59
It seems to me, moreover, that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s complaint is lacking in precision, in so far as, when examining that complaint, that institution states that
the automatic nature of the refusal to grant a renewal provided for in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 48(7) of the Law on the media
infringes EU law, whereas, in the form of order which it seeks, it states that
the refusal to extend the right to provide media services
in Klubrádió’s case (taken in conjunction with the extension of the rights of the other providers) is contrary to the principle of non-discrimination.
60
The rectification of the length of a programme would have entailed a modification of the commitments and the essential declarations set out in the bid (in particular the duration and the length of the programme), thus running counter to the principle of fair competition.
61
This broadcast had been considered by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to be a new broadcast since it was not covered by the definition of a ‘rebroadcast’. According to the definitions in the call for tenders, a ‘broadcast’ consists of a series of sounds, animated images with or without sound or fixed images forming an autonomous unit, whatever its length, of a programming schedule or offer prepared by a media service provider, while a ‘rebroadcast’ is the rebroadcasting, without the need for any other technical intervention, of recorded audio material that has previously been broadcast in a programme.
62
Point 1.8.2 of the call for tenders, relating to the financial viability of applicants, imposed, inter alia, a number of conditions regarding the absence of outstanding debts (in respect of customs, social security, taxation, to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]), certain obligations concerning overdue payment, insolvency proceedings, liquidation or relating to the dissolution of the company.
63
In accordance with Point 1.11.9.2(c) of the call for tenders, the application was declared invalid if, because it was not well founded, the tender was inappropriate for achieving the objectives defined in the Law on the media or in the call for tenders. Among those objectives, point 1.2 of the call for tenders laid down the objective of contributing to the creation of a broadcasting market the functioning of which is stable and predictable.
64
Furthermore, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] awarded a contract, in the context of a different call for tenders, to an applicant which had in the past operated with negative equity, which the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] denies.
65
See footnotes 61 and 62 to this [OSCURATO:PERSONA].
66
To my mind the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is relying on a misinterpretation of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s complaint, which it interprets as alleging that the six-week period set out in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 5(3) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was exceeded.
67
In the form of order which it seeks, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] requests a declaration that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has failed to fulfil its obligations under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 8 and 9 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 5(3) of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the principle of good administration, ‘by failing to carry out a procedure for granting rights of use of the frequency previously used by Klubrádió within a period which would have allowed Klubrádió to obtain the decision before the expiry of its right of use’.
68
In the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s contention, the grant of a temporary right of use would have been consistent with the obligation to ensure the effective management of radio spectrum laid down in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 45(1) of the EECC, with the requirement to ensure predictability and consistency of the extension and amendment of rights of use for radio spectrum laid down in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 45(2)(c) of the EECC, and also with the requirement to guarantee regulatory certainty, consistency and predictability laid down in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 45(2)(g) of the EECC.
69
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] also observes that Klubrádió did not request temporary authorisation. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] states, however, that – independently of the fact that Klubrádió was aware that it did not meet those conditions – it takes issue with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on the ground that the Law on the media, and not just the decision relating to Klubrádió, is not compatible in that respect.
70
That temporary right, with a maximum duration of 60 days, comes to an end, in any event, on the date on which the administrative contract is concluded with the applicant selected following the call for tenders.
71
I start from the premiss, as confirmed by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in its written observations, that the assessment of the conditions of a renewal is subject to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 187(5) of the Law on the media, which provides that minor infringements are not to be taken into account in determining the existence of repeated infringements.
72
The possibility for Klubrádió to broadcast its programmes on the internet is not, in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s contention, an alternative equivalent to broadcasting on radio frequencies within the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] media market.
73
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] 52(1) of the Charter, limitations on those rights must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms and, subject to the principle of proportionality, may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.
74
According to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], as regards the refusal decision, the objective of preserving the national and cultural identity through the use of broadcasting quotas was not undermined by the infringement alleged against Klubrádió, which concerned not failure to respect the broadcasting quotas, but merely infringement of the obligation to communicate data relating to the broadcasting quotas; as regards the invalidity decision, the objective of ensuring fair competition was not undermined by procedural defects of minor significance and the objective of guaranteeing a stable presence on the media market was not undermined by the existence of negative equity in Klubrádió’s accounts, as its financial viability could be guaranteed by other modes of financing.
75
See judgment of 4 October 2024,
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] de Fútbol
(C‑633/22, EU:C:2024:843, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited). Furthermore, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 52(3) of the Charter, the rights contained in the Charter have the same meaning and scope as the corresponding rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and [OSCURATO:PERSONA], signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’), without preventing EU law from providing more extensive protection. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] interpreting [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 11 of the Charter, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must therefore take account of the corresponding rights guaranteed by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 10 ECHR, as interpreted by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of [OSCURATO:PERSONA], as a minimum threshold of protection. In that regard, it follows from the settled case-law of that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] that exceptions to the freedom of expression are to be construed strictly and that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 10(2) ECHR leaves little scope for restrictions on freedom of expression in the fields of political speech and matters of public interest (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2024,
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] de Fútbol
, C‑633/22, EU:C:2024:843, paragraphs 51 to 53 and the case-law cited).
76
[OSCURATO:PERSONA], supported by the interveners, refers, in particular, to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 2011 on [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s media legislation; to the publication entitled ‘The independence of media regulatory authorities in [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’ of 2019 of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]; to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’s 2021 Rule of law report ; to the ‘Memorandum on freedom of expression and media freedom in [OSCURATO:PERSONA]’ of 2021 by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] for [OSCURATO:PERSONA]; to the 2022 Report of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and of expression; to the ‘[OSCURATO:PERSONA]’ of 2023 of the Centre for [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and Freedom; and also to the reports of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Those publications refer, in particular, to the lack of plurality in the composition of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], whose decisions are taken, in essence, by the majority party of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].
77
See in particular, to that effect, judgment of 5 June 2023,
[OSCURATO:PERSONA] v Poland (Independence and private life of judges)
(C‑204/21, EU:C:2023:442, paragraph 139).
78
I refer, in particular, to any factual or statistical data showing the importance of Klubrádió, which, moreover, is a radio station broadcasting in a single (albeit important) area, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] area, in the panorama of the media in [OSCURATO:PERSONA], taking into account all the radio stations or media in that country.
79
In this instance, I refer, first, to the breach of the obligation to communicate monthly data relating to broadcasting quotas, which was the subject matter of the refusal decision, and, second, to the lack of precision concerning the programming schedule, which was the subject matter of the invalidity decision.
80
I refer, in that regard, to the existence of negative equity in Klubrádió’s accounts, which was the subject matter of the invalidity decision, which, as stated in point 81 of this [OSCURATO:PERSONA], could readily be offset by crowdfunding.