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Corte di giustizia UEsentenza

Corte di giustizia UE/2022

ECLI:EU:C:2022:399
Testo integrale del provvedimento

Testo integrale del provvedimento

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]-[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

17 May 2022 ( * ) (Appeal – Intervention – EU trade mark – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] proceedings – Other party to the proceedings before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO) granted leave to participate in the proceedings in the case before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – Time limits – Point from which time starts to run – Unforeseeable circumstances – Rejection)

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑103/22 P(I),

APPEAL under the second paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 57 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 6 February 2022,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA].,

established in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (China), represented by J.‑B. Devaureix, abogado, appellant, the other parties to the proceedings being:

[OSCURATO:PERSONA],

established in Blanquefort (France), represented by T. de Haan, avocat, applicant at first instance,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO),

represented by V. Ruzek, acting as Agent, defendant at first instance,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]-[OSCURATO:PERSONA],

after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], M. Szpunar, makes the following

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

1 By its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. seeks to have set aside the order of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 10 January 2022,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

v EUIPO – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (Representation of Chinese characters) (T‑323/21, not published, EU:T:2022:7; ‘the order under appeal’), by which the latter decided that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was not entitled to participate, as an intervener, in the proceedings in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑323/21.

Background to the dispute 2 The background to the dispute is set out in paragraphs 1 to 5 of the order under appeal and may, for the purposes of the present proceedings, be summarised as follows. 3 On 8 January 2009, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] obtained from the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO) registration of an EU figurative mark. 4 On 29 May 2018, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] filed an application for revocation of that mark.

After the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of EUIPO rejected that application, on 3 April 2020, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of EUIPO, on 22 March 2021, upheld an appeal brought by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and revoked that mark.

The procedure before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the order under appeal 5 By application lodged at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 8 June 2021, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] brought an action for annulment of the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of EUIPO. 6 In accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 178(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the application was served on [OSCURATO:PERSONA] by letter from the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 28 June 2021. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] acknowledged receipt of that letter on 12 July 2021. 7 On 23 September 2021, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] lodged a response at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 8 By a measure of organisation of procedure of 27 October 2021, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] requested [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to submit its observations on the reasons for the late submission of its response. 9 By the order under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] decided that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was not entitled to participate, as intervener, in the proceedings in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑323/21. 10 First, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] examined, in paragraph 26 of the order under appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] argument that its response should be regarded, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], as having been lodged within the prescribed time limit. 11 In that regard, it considered, in paragraph 23 of that order, that it followed from [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 179 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], read in conjunction with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60 of those rules, that the parties to the proceedings before EUIPO other than the applicant were required to submit their responses within a time limit of 2 months and 10 days from the service of the application. 12 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] added, in paragraphs 24 and 25 of that order, that, since [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had acknowledged receipt of the application on 12 July 2021, it had, pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(b) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], until 22 September 2021 to submit its response. 13 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] deduced from this, in paragraph 26 of that order, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had lodged its response outside the prescribed time limit. 14 Secondly, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] rejected [OSCURATO:PERSONA] argument that the late submission of its response was due to unforeseeable circumstances. 15 In that regard, after recalling the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice’s case-law on the concepts of unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure and excusable error, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] noted, in paragraph 31 of the order under appeal, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relied on human error in the internal handling of the letter by its services and, in paragraph 32 of that order, that a party could not rely on the inadequate functioning of its internal organisation or on a failure to apply its internal instructions to support its claim that the error which it or its employees committed was excusable, or the existence of unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure .

Forms of order sought by the parties 16 By its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should: – set aside the order under appeal; and – grant it leave to intervene in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑323/21. 17 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and EUIPO contend that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should: – dismiss the appeal; and – order [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to pay the costs of the appeal proceedings.

The appeal 18 In support of its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] raises two ground of appeals in law relating, first, to the application of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(a) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and, secondly, to the application of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 45 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

The first ground of appeal Arguments 19 By its first ground of appeal, first, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submits that it never claimed that the expiry of the time limit to present its response fell on a public holiday or a Sunday and that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] thus erred in its interpretation of that party’s arguments. 20 Secondly, the order under appeal is vitiated by a failure to state reasons in that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not explain in any way how the final limb of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(a) of its Rules of Procedure should be interpreted. 21 Thirdly, it follows from that provision that the day of service of the application cannot be included in the calculation of the period of 2 months and 10 days laid down in the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

Accordingly, the last relevant day for submitting a response in the present case was 23 September 2021. 22 Any other solution is tantamount to repealing [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(a) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA].

Furthermore, the proposed interpretation of that provision is compatible with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(b) of those Rules of Procedure in that that provision should be applied only to determine whether the day of expiry of the two-month period from the service of the application is a public holiday or a Sunday. 23 That interpretation is, moreover, consistent with the common rules in force in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], as shown by the procedural rules applicable in Spain. 24 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and EUIPO contend that the first ground of appeal should be rejected.

Assessment 25 In the first place, it cannot be held that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] distorted the observations submitted by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] by stating, in paragraph 25 of the order under appeal, that 22 September 2021 was neither a Saturday, Sunday, nor a public holiday. 26 It does not appear from paragraph 25 of the order under appeal that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considered that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had argued that that date was a Saturday, Sunday or public holiday, since the finding made in that regard was merely intended to show that the time limit for [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to submit its response had in fact expired on that date. 27 In the second place, it must be pointed out, first, that, in the context of the appeal, the purpose of review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice is, inter alia, to consider whether the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] addressed, to the requisite legal standard, all the arguments raised by the appellant and, secondly, that the ground of appeal alleging that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed to respond to arguments relied on at first instance amounts, essentially, to pleading a breach of the obligation to state reasons which derives from [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 36 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], applicable to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] by virtue of the first paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 53 of that statute, and from [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 117 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (see, to that effect, order of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 20 July 2018, Müller and Others v Parliament , C‑187/18 P(I), not published, EU:C:2018:580, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited). 28 That obligation to state reasons does not require the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to provide an account which follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments put forward by the parties to the case and the reasoning may therefore be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to know why the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has not upheld their arguments and provides the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review (see, to that effect, order of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 20 July 2018, Müller and Others v Parliament , C‑187/18 P(I), not published, EU:C:2018:580, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited). 29 In the present case, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not explicitly state in the order under appeal how [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(a) of its Rules of Procedure should be interpreted. 30 However, first, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] set out, in paragraphs 19 to 23 of that order, the rules which it considered relevant for calculating the period within which parties to the proceedings before EUIPO other than the applicant were required to lodge their response.

Secondly, in paragraphs 24 to 26 of that order, it referred to the reasons why the application of those rules led to the finding that the period for [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to submit its response had expired on 22 September 2021. 31 It thus appears that the reasoning in paragraphs 19 to 26 of the order under appeal is sufficient to enable [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to understand why the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considered that its response had not been lodged within the period laid down for that purpose and to enable the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice to exercise its power of review in that regard. 32 Accordingly, the complaint alleging a failure to state reasons in paragraphs 19 to 26 must be dismissed as unfounded. 33 In the third place, as regards the argument that the reasoning followed by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is contrary to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(a) of its Rules of Procedure, it should be noted that that provision provides that, where a time limit expressed in days, weeks, months or years is to be calculated from the moment at which an event occurs or an action takes place, the day during which that event occurs or that action takes place is not to be counted as falling within the time limit in question. 34 It follows that it is true that the day on which the application was served was not counted as part of the period within which [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was required to submit its response. 35 However, contrary to what [OSCURATO:PERSONA] maintains, the application of that rule implies that, when the time limit for appeal is expressed in calendar months, that period expires at the end of the day which, in the month indicated by the time limit, bears the same number as the day from which time was set running (see, by analogy, judgment of 15 January 1987, Misset v Council , 152/85, EU:C:1987:10, paragraph 8), as is provided explicitly, moreover, in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(b) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 36 It must therefore be held that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(a) and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(b) of those Rules of Procedure set out, in a consistent manner, the rules defining, respectively, the date on which a procedural time limit starts to run and the date on which such a time limit ends (see, to that effect, order of 11 June 2020,

GMPO

v Commission , C‑575/19 P, not published, EU:C:2020:448, paragraph 30). 37 Moreover, the interpretation of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relied on by [OSCURATO:PERSONA], according to which the rule in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(b) of those Rules of Procedure should be applied only to determine whether the day on which the two-month period for service of the application expired is a public holiday or a Sunday, finds no support in the wording of that provision, which refers generally to the day on which the procedural time limit ‘ends’. 38 Furthermore, the fact that a different rule for calculating procedural time limits is applied in Spain or in other [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not warrant a departure from the rule arising from the clear wording of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1) of those Rules of Procedure, which makes no reference to national legal systems (see, to that effect, order of 9 September 2010,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

v OHIM and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑290/10 P, not published, EU:C:2010:511, paragraph 15 and the case-law cited). 39 In those circumstances, it cannot be held that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in law in holding, in paragraphs 24 and 25 of the order under appeal, that the interpretation of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(a) of its Rules of Procedure relied on by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had to be dismissed and that the time limit for it to submit its response had expired on 22 September 2021, that is to say, on expiry of a single period of 10 days commencing after the day which, in the last month in which the time limit was calculated, bore the same number as the day on which the application was served. 40 Consequently, the first ground of appeal must be dismissed as unfounded.

The second ground of appeal Arguments 41 By its second ground of appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] argues that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not explain why a one-off error that occurred within an organisation which had proved itself to be efficient to date cannot be considered unforeseeable circumstances. 42 Furthermore, the circumstances relied on by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] are unusual and unforeseeable, as this is the first time that the letter reception system in question did not work properly.

Those circumstances could not have been avoided, since they were not foreseeable.

The appellant has shown due diligence, in that it strictly observed the time limit of 2 months and 10 days from the date of the stamp placed by its services. 43 In those circumstances, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should take into consideration that the lodging of the response did not prejudice any of the other parties to the proceedings. 44 Furthermore, if the appeal is dismissed, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is deprived of its right to be heard and its right to effective judicial protection. 45 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and EUIPO contend that the second ground of appeal should be rejected.

Assessment 46 With regard, in the first place, to the complaint that inadequate reasons were given for the part of the order under appeal dismissing [OSCURATO:PERSONA] argument concerning the existence of unforeseeable circumstances, it should be pointed out that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] recalled, in paragraphs 28 to 30 of the order under appeal, the conditions under which the prejudice of a right in consequence of the expiry of a procedural time limit may be dismissed due to the existence of unforeseeable circumstances, force majeure , or an excusable error.

Furthermore, in paragraph 32 of that order, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] noted that a party could not rely for that purpose either on the inadequate functioning of its internal organisation or on a failure to apply its internal instructions. 47 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] found, in paragraph 31 of that order, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relied on human error in the internal processing of its mail, it deduced, in paragraph 33 of that order, from the principles recalled in paragraph 46 above, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had not established the existence of unforeseeable circumstances or of force majeure . 48 In the light of those factors, it appears that the reasoning in paragraphs 19 to 26 of the order under appeal is sufficient to enable [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to understand why the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considered that it had not established the existence of unforeseeable circumstances and to enable the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice to exercise its power of review in that regard. 49 Consequently, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraphs 27 and 28 above, the complaint that inadequate reasons were given for the part of the order under appeal dismissing [OSCURATO:PERSONA] argument concerning the existence of unforeseeable circumstances must be dismissed. 50 As regards, in the second place, the error of law allegedly committed by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in ruling out the existence of unforeseeable circumstances, it should be recalled, first of all, that, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 45 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], no right is to be prejudiced in consequence of the expiry of a time limit if the party concerned proves the existence of unforeseeable circumstances or of force majeure . 51 As the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] emphasised, in essence, in paragraph 29 of the order under appeal, according to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice’s settled case-law, the concept of force majeure or unforeseeable circumstances, which corresponds to exceptional circumstances, contains both an objective element relating to abnormal circumstances extraneous to the person concerned, and a subjective element involving the obligation of that person concerned to guard against the consequences of the abnormal event by taking appropriate steps without making unreasonable sacrifices (order of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 20 July 2018, Müller and Others v Parliament , C‑187/18 P(I), not published, EU:C:2018:580, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited). 52 Therefore, errors committed by an applicant’s employees or by service providers used by the applicant in the conduct of its business cannot, in so far as they do not constitute circumstances unconnected with the applicant, be relied on to demonstrate the existence of unforeseeable circumstances or of force majeure (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 December 1994, Bayer v Commission , C‑195/91 P, EU:C:1994:412, paragraph 33, and of 22 September 2011, Bell & Ross v

OHIM

, C‑426/10 P, EU:C:2011:612, paragraph 50). 53 Therefore, even supposing that the human error relied on by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was indeed unforeseeable and that it had exercised due care, those factors cannot be regarded as establishing that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in law in holding, in paragraph 32 of the order under appeal, that a party may not rely either on the inadequate functioning of its internal organisation or on a failure to apply its internal instructions in support of the existence of unforeseeable circumstances or of force majeure . 54 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] argument that it could be granted a derogation from the time limit for the submission of the response on the ground that that derogation would not prejudice the other parties must be rejected, since the strict application of the procedural rules is not intended solely to protect the procedural rights of the parties but, more broadly, to meet the requirement of legal certainty and the need to avoid discrimination or arbitrary treatment in the administration of justice (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 April 2013, Gbagbo and Others v Council , C‑478/11 P to C‑482/11 P, EU:C:2013:258, paragraph 71). 55 Finally, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] cannot be validly criticised for disregarding [OSCURATO:PERSONA] right to be heard and its right to effective judicial protection by excluding the existence of unforeseeable circumstances or of force majeure . 56 It is settled case-law of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] that the right to be heard and the right to effective judicial protection are in no way undermined by the strict application of EU rules concerning procedural time limits (see, to that effect, order of 2 October 2014,

[OSCURATO:PERSONA]

v EEA S, C‑501/13 P, not published, EU:C:2014:2259, paragraph 39, and judgment of 19 June 2019, RF v Commission , C‑660/17 P, EU:C:2019:509, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited). 57 In the light of those factors, the second ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded and, consequently, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety.

Costs 58 In accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, where the appeal is unfounded, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is to make a decision as to costs. 59 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, which applies to the appeal procedure by virtue of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 60 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and EUIPO have applied for costs against [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the latter has been unsuccessful, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and EUIPO.

On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] hereby orders:

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO).

Luxembourg, 17 May 2022.

A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA]

L. [OSCURATO:PERSONA]

* Language of the case: English.

Anonimizzato ex art. 52 D.Lgs. 196/2003
[OSCURATO:PERSONA]-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] 17 May 2022 ( * ) (Appeal – Intervention – EU trade mark – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] proceedings – Other party to the proceedings before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO) granted leave to participate in the proceedings in the case before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] – Time limits – Point from which time starts to run – Unforeseeable circumstances – Rejection) [OSCURATO:PERSONA] C‑103/22 P(I), APPEAL under the second paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 57 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], brought on 6 February 2022, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]., established in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (China), represented by J.‑B. Devaureix, abogado, appellant, the other parties to the proceedings being: [OSCURATO:PERSONA], established in Blanquefort (France), represented by T. de Haan, avocat, applicant at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO), represented by V. Ruzek, acting as Agent, defendant at first instance, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]-[OSCURATO:PERSONA], after hearing the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], M. Szpunar, makes the following [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 1 By its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. seeks to have set aside the order of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 10 January 2022, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v EUIPO – [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (Representation of Chinese characters) (T‑323/21, not published, EU:T:2022:7; ‘the order under appeal’), by which the latter decided that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was not entitled to participate, as an intervener, in the proceedings in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑323/21. Background to the dispute 2 The background to the dispute is set out in paragraphs 1 to 5 of the order under appeal and may, for the purposes of the present proceedings, be summarised as follows. 3 On 8 January 2009, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] obtained from the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO) registration of an EU figurative mark. 4 On 29 May 2018, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] filed an application for revocation of that mark. After the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of EUIPO rejected that application, on 3 April 2020, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of EUIPO, on 22 March 2021, upheld an appeal brought by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and revoked that mark. The procedure before the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the order under appeal 5 By application lodged at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] on 8 June 2021, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] brought an action for annulment of the decision of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Appeal of EUIPO. 6 In accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 178(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], the application was served on [OSCURATO:PERSONA] by letter from the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 28 June 2021. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] acknowledged receipt of that letter on 12 July 2021. 7 On 23 September 2021, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] lodged a response at the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 8 By a measure of organisation of procedure of 27 October 2021, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] requested [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to submit its observations on the reasons for the late submission of its response. 9 By the order under appeal, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] decided that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was not entitled to participate, as intervener, in the proceedings in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑323/21. 10 First, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] examined, in paragraph 26 of the order under appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] argument that its response should be regarded, in accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], as having been lodged within the prescribed time limit. 11 In that regard, it considered, in paragraph 23 of that order, that it followed from [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 179 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], read in conjunction with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 60 of those rules, that the parties to the proceedings before EUIPO other than the applicant were required to submit their responses within a time limit of 2 months and 10 days from the service of the application. 12 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] added, in paragraphs 24 and 25 of that order, that, since [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had acknowledged receipt of the application on 12 July 2021, it had, pursuant to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(b) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], until 22 September 2021 to submit its response. 13 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] deduced from this, in paragraph 26 of that order, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had lodged its response outside the prescribed time limit. 14 Secondly, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] rejected [OSCURATO:PERSONA] argument that the late submission of its response was due to unforeseeable circumstances. 15 In that regard, after recalling the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice’s case-law on the concepts of unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure and excusable error, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] noted, in paragraph 31 of the order under appeal, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relied on human error in the internal handling of the letter by its services and, in paragraph 32 of that order, that a party could not rely on the inadequate functioning of its internal organisation or on a failure to apply its internal instructions to support its claim that the error which it or its employees committed was excusable, or the existence of unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure . Forms of order sought by the parties 16 By its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] claims that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should: –        set aside the order under appeal; and –        grant it leave to intervene in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] T‑323/21. 17 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and EUIPO contend that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should: –        dismiss the appeal; and –        order [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to pay the costs of the appeal proceedings. The appeal 18 In support of its appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] raises two ground of appeals in law relating, first, to the application of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(a) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and, secondly, to the application of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 45 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. The first ground of appeal Arguments 19 By its first ground of appeal, first, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] submits that it never claimed that the expiry of the time limit to present its response fell on a public holiday or a Sunday and that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] thus erred in its interpretation of that party’s arguments. 20 Secondly, the order under appeal is vitiated by a failure to state reasons in that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not explain in any way how the final limb of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(a) of its Rules of Procedure should be interpreted. 21 Thirdly, it follows from that provision that the day of service of the application cannot be included in the calculation of the period of 2 months and 10 days laid down in the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Accordingly, the last relevant day for submitting a response in the present case was 23 September 2021. 22 Any other solution is tantamount to repealing [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(a) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. Furthermore, the proposed interpretation of that provision is compatible with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(b) of those Rules of Procedure in that that provision should be applied only to determine whether the day of expiry of the two-month period from the service of the application is a public holiday or a Sunday. 23 That interpretation is, moreover, consistent with the common rules in force in the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], as shown by the procedural rules applicable in Spain. 24 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and EUIPO contend that the first ground of appeal should be rejected. Assessment 25 In the first place, it cannot be held that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] distorted the observations submitted by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] by stating, in paragraph 25 of the order under appeal, that 22 September 2021 was neither a Saturday, Sunday, nor a public holiday. 26 It does not appear from paragraph 25 of the order under appeal that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considered that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had argued that that date was a Saturday, Sunday or public holiday, since the finding made in that regard was merely intended to show that the time limit for [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to submit its response had in fact expired on that date. 27 In the second place, it must be pointed out, first, that, in the context of the appeal, the purpose of review by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice is, inter alia, to consider whether the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] addressed, to the requisite legal standard, all the arguments raised by the appellant and, secondly, that the ground of appeal alleging that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] failed to respond to arguments relied on at first instance amounts, essentially, to pleading a breach of the obligation to state reasons which derives from [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 36 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], applicable to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] by virtue of the first paragraph of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 53 of that statute, and from [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 117 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (see, to that effect, order of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 20 July 2018, Müller and Others v Parliament , C‑187/18 P(I), not published, EU:C:2018:580, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited). 28 That obligation to state reasons does not require the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to provide an account which follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments put forward by the parties to the case and the reasoning may therefore be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to know why the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] has not upheld their arguments and provides the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review (see, to that effect, order of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 20 July 2018, Müller and Others v Parliament , C‑187/18 P(I), not published, EU:C:2018:580, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited). 29 In the present case, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] did not explicitly state in the order under appeal how [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(a) of its Rules of Procedure should be interpreted. 30 However, first, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] set out, in paragraphs 19 to 23 of that order, the rules which it considered relevant for calculating the period within which parties to the proceedings before EUIPO other than the applicant were required to lodge their response. Secondly, in paragraphs 24 to 26 of that order, it referred to the reasons why the application of those rules led to the finding that the period for [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to submit its response had expired on 22 September 2021. 31 It thus appears that the reasoning in paragraphs 19 to 26 of the order under appeal is sufficient to enable [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to understand why the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considered that its response had not been lodged within the period laid down for that purpose and to enable the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice to exercise its power of review in that regard. 32 Accordingly, the complaint alleging a failure to state reasons in paragraphs 19 to 26 must be dismissed as unfounded. 33 In the third place, as regards the argument that the reasoning followed by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is contrary to [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(a) of its Rules of Procedure, it should be noted that that provision provides that, where a time limit expressed in days, weeks, months or years is to be calculated from the moment at which an event occurs or an action takes place, the day during which that event occurs or that action takes place is not to be counted as falling within the time limit in question. 34 It follows that it is true that the day on which the application was served was not counted as part of the period within which [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was required to submit its response. 35 However, contrary to what [OSCURATO:PERSONA] maintains, the application of that rule implies that, when the time limit for appeal is expressed in calendar months, that period expires at the end of the day which, in the month indicated by the time limit, bears the same number as the day from which time was set running (see, by analogy, judgment of 15 January 1987, Misset v Council , 152/85, EU:C:1987:10, paragraph 8), as is provided explicitly, moreover, in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(b) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. 36 It must therefore be held that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(a) and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(b) of those Rules of Procedure set out, in a consistent manner, the rules defining, respectively, the date on which a procedural time limit starts to run and the date on which such a time limit ends (see, to that effect, order of 11 June 2020, GMPO v Commission , C‑575/19 P, not published, EU:C:2020:448, paragraph 30). 37 Moreover, the interpretation of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58 of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relied on by [OSCURATO:PERSONA], according to which the rule in [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(b) of those Rules of Procedure should be applied only to determine whether the day on which the two-month period for service of the application expired is a public holiday or a Sunday, finds no support in the wording of that provision, which refers generally to the day on which the procedural time limit ‘ends’. 38 Furthermore, the fact that a different rule for calculating procedural time limits is applied in Spain or in other [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not warrant a departure from the rule arising from the clear wording of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1) of those Rules of Procedure, which makes no reference to national legal systems (see, to that effect, order of 9 September 2010, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v OHIM and [OSCURATO:PERSONA] , C‑290/10 P, not published, EU:C:2010:511, paragraph 15 and the case-law cited). 39 In those circumstances, it cannot be held that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in law in holding, in paragraphs 24 and 25 of the order under appeal, that the interpretation of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 58(1)(a) of its Rules of Procedure relied on by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had to be dismissed and that the time limit for it to submit its response had expired on 22 September 2021, that is to say, on expiry of a single period of 10 days commencing after the day which, in the last month in which the time limit was calculated, bore the same number as the day on which the application was served. 40 Consequently, the first ground of appeal must be dismissed as unfounded. The second ground of appeal Arguments 41 By its second ground of appeal, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] argues that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] does not explain why a one-off error that occurred within an organisation which had proved itself to be efficient to date cannot be considered unforeseeable circumstances. 42 Furthermore, the circumstances relied on by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] are unusual and unforeseeable, as this is the first time that the letter reception system in question did not work properly. Those circumstances could not have been avoided, since they were not foreseeable. The appellant has shown due diligence, in that it strictly observed the time limit of 2 months and 10 days from the date of the stamp placed by its services. 43 In those circumstances, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] should take into consideration that the lodging of the response did not prejudice any of the other parties to the proceedings. 44 Furthermore, if the appeal is dismissed, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is deprived of its right to be heard and its right to effective judicial protection. 45 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and EUIPO contend that the second ground of appeal should be rejected. Assessment 46 With regard, in the first place, to the complaint that inadequate reasons were given for the part of the order under appeal dismissing [OSCURATO:PERSONA] argument concerning the existence of unforeseeable circumstances, it should be pointed out that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] recalled, in paragraphs 28 to 30 of the order under appeal, the conditions under which the prejudice of a right in consequence of the expiry of a procedural time limit may be dismissed due to the existence of unforeseeable circumstances, force majeure , or an excusable error. Furthermore, in paragraph 32 of that order, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] noted that a party could not rely for that purpose either on the inadequate functioning of its internal organisation or on a failure to apply its internal instructions. 47 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] found, in paragraph 31 of that order, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] relied on human error in the internal processing of its mail, it deduced, in paragraph 33 of that order, from the principles recalled in paragraph 46 above, that [OSCURATO:PERSONA] had not established the existence of unforeseeable circumstances or of force majeure . 48 In the light of those factors, it appears that the reasoning in paragraphs 19 to 26 of the order under appeal is sufficient to enable [OSCURATO:PERSONA] to understand why the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] considered that it had not established the existence of unforeseeable circumstances and to enable the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice to exercise its power of review in that regard. 49 Consequently, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraphs 27 and 28 above, the complaint that inadequate reasons were given for the part of the order under appeal dismissing [OSCURATO:PERSONA] argument concerning the existence of unforeseeable circumstances must be dismissed. 50 As regards, in the second place, the error of law allegedly committed by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] in ruling out the existence of unforeseeable circumstances, it should be recalled, first of all, that, under [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 45 of the Statute of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA], no right is to be prejudiced in consequence of the expiry of a time limit if the party concerned proves the existence of unforeseeable circumstances or of force majeure . 51 As the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] emphasised, in essence, in paragraph 29 of the order under appeal, according to the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice’s settled case-law, the concept of force majeure or unforeseeable circumstances, which corresponds to exceptional circumstances, contains both an objective element relating to abnormal circumstances extraneous to the person concerned, and a subjective element involving the obligation of that person concerned to guard against the consequences of the abnormal event by taking appropriate steps without making unreasonable sacrifices (order of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of 20 July 2018, Müller and Others v Parliament , C‑187/18 P(I), not published, EU:C:2018:580, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited). 52 Therefore, errors committed by an applicant’s employees or by service providers used by the applicant in the conduct of its business cannot, in so far as they do not constitute circumstances unconnected with the applicant, be relied on to demonstrate the existence of unforeseeable circumstances or of force majeure (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 December 1994, Bayer v Commission , C‑195/91 P, EU:C:1994:412, paragraph 33, and of 22 September 2011, Bell & Ross v OHIM , C‑426/10 P, EU:C:2011:612, paragraph 50). 53 Therefore, even supposing that the human error relied on by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] was indeed unforeseeable and that it had exercised due care, those factors cannot be regarded as establishing that the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] erred in law in holding, in paragraph 32 of the order under appeal, that a party may not rely either on the inadequate functioning of its internal organisation or on a failure to apply its internal instructions in support of the existence of unforeseeable circumstances or of force majeure . 54 [OSCURATO:PERSONA], [OSCURATO:PERSONA] argument that it could be granted a derogation from the time limit for the submission of the response on the ground that that derogation would not prejudice the other parties must be rejected, since the strict application of the procedural rules is not intended solely to protect the procedural rights of the parties but, more broadly, to meet the requirement of legal certainty and the need to avoid discrimination or arbitrary treatment in the administration of justice (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 April 2013, Gbagbo and Others v Council , C‑478/11 P to C‑482/11 P, EU:C:2013:258, paragraph 71). 55 Finally, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] cannot be validly criticised for disregarding [OSCURATO:PERSONA] right to be heard and its right to effective judicial protection by excluding the existence of unforeseeable circumstances or of force majeure . 56 It is settled case-law of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] that the right to be heard and the right to effective judicial protection are in no way undermined by the strict application of EU rules concerning procedural time limits (see, to that effect, order of 2 October 2014, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] v EEA S, C‑501/13 P, not published, EU:C:2014:2259, paragraph 39, and judgment of 19 June 2019, RF v Commission , C‑660/17 P, EU:C:2019:509, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited). 57 In the light of those factors, the second ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded and, consequently, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 58 In accordance with [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] of Justice, where the appeal is unfounded, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] is to make a decision as to costs. 59 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, which applies to the appeal procedure by virtue of [OSCURATO:PERSONA] 184(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 60 [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and EUIPO have applied for costs against [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and the latter has been unsuccessful, [OSCURATO:PERSONA] must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and EUIPO. On those grounds, the [OSCURATO:PERSONA]-[OSCURATO:PERSONA] of the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] hereby orders: 1. The appeal is dismissed. 2. [OSCURATO:PERSONA]. shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by [OSCURATO:PERSONA] and by the [OSCURATO:PERSONA] (EUIPO). Luxembourg, 17 May 2022. A. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] L. [OSCURATO:PERSONA] * Language of the case: English.
Sentenza Corte di giustizia UE/2022 — Fons Iuris — Fons Iuris